
Source: Foreign Policy/ Getty Images
Muhammad Shareh Qazi and Palwasha Khan
Modern warfare is precision warfare done smartly, an act that combines flexibility of operations with deadly accuracy. From the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia to the Russia-Ukraine War, this stratagem has made its way to South Asia. Both states recently underwent a similar experience, one that had all the potential to escalate to unimaginable proportions—until it did not. A significant use of cruise missiles, artillery, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare was witnessed. Adequate instances of a possible escalation were evident, and both claimed victory after an internationally negotiated ceasefire. There may be several points to ponder, and perhaps a new set of precautions should definitely be considered in order to avert future misadventures.
The experiences on both sides of the border are significant and their impact monumental, especially when it comes to revisiting military preparedness. Although this may not be the last confrontation both states had, it surely would have a long-lasting impact on their operational capabilities. Integrated defense strategies and precision strikes are two of the most substantial facets of the Pakistan-India confrontation. Beyond escalation control and crisis termination, finding a new normal is easier said than done when prestige, situational awareness, escalation control, and crisis communication are simultaneously at play. Where interoperability and synergy should have been the Clausewitzian center of gravity, both states took lessons from attrition warfare currently at play in Ukraine— a paradigm shift visible in almost every confrontation around the world. To better understand how it panned out between Pakistan and India, a critical evaluation of their stratagem is required to better chalk out their means and ends.
Pulwama, Pahalgam, and Operation Sindoor: A Gambit Gone Wrong?
The Pulwama-Balakot fiasco taught India that it may be better to avoid breaching Pakistan’s airspace, no matter what military hardware it has in the inventory. Losing an aircraft and having it paraded in a museum are psychologically devastating and counterintuitive, especially when cruise missiles can be more effective. A new lesson, employed in Operation Sindoor, was utilizing a mass of loitering munitions, breaching multiple points to create a shock effect. For India, such a strategy has two benefits: first, it creates a situation where Pakistan breaks its offensive-defense due to overwhelming interceptions; and second, it allows for locating breaches and caveats in its defenses. Therefore, learning from Operation Swift Retort, Indian aircraft remained cautiously engaged while loitering munitions compensated for the offensive. On an operational level, it creates an image that India has been able to target almost every vital location along its border with Pakistan, seemingly achieving the required results. This seems a sound strategy until it encounters two challenges. First, loitering munitions work best on maneuverable forces as stationary targets have formidable defenses. Second, drone swarming is better than independent targeting as it increases the probability of success. This Indian strategy of sending a barrage of drones in loose formations shows it has the pieces but lacks the chessboard.
Transitioning from Area Defense to Point Defense: Is Pakistan’s Air Defense Evolving?
The success of striking aircraft is nothing new for Pakistan as it already has a budding scorecard from 2019’s Operation Swift Retort. Concerns emanate from a BrahMos landing in Mian Channu in 2022 and Indian loitering munitions as well as missiles making their way across a large number of psychologically and strategically critical locations. Where area defense strategies were more than able to allow Pakistani air defense to minimize significant breaches and irreplaceable loss, a caveat in its air defense perhaps is an inadequate point defense. For Pakistan, Operation Sindoor identifies four aspects to consider: first, loitering munitions require engagement zone to accommodate very short-range air defense (VSHORAD); second, C-RAM and C-UAV would require point defense to accommodate more kinetic options than its air defense currently offers; third, it should consider expanding the Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns (SPAAGs) capable of fielding Advanced Hit Efficiency and Destruction (AHEAD) Ammunition, and fourth, modular targeting and interception systems for base protection. Pakistan can even field integrated sensor and effector networks to its Electronic and Disruption Warfare capabilities to add an extra layer to its air defense. Integrating modular and mobile tactical jamming and disruption vehicles can also be a convenient way of providing support where needed. For Pakistan, C-RAM, C-UAV, VSHORAD, SHORAD, and Ground-based Close-in Weapons Support (CIWS) systems would provide an effective insulation from loitering munitions, a challenge it has dealt with for the first but probably not the last time.
Setting New thresholds for Conventional Warfighting
The paradigm shift experienced in modern-day wars has made its way to South Asia. However, it did not quite achieve the desired impact. India celebrates targeting major city centers and locations with an uncoordinated loitering munitions tactic and a barrage of precision munitions lacking accuracy. Pakistan applauds yet another psychological upgrade to its scorecard while contemplating the means to insulate its major cities along the Indian border, an aspect it knows India will surely remember. Conventional weapons developments and acquisitions, taking stock of the lessons learned, will likely center on niche technologies as a means to avoid brinkmanship for the sake of quick victories and psychological advantage.
Both states are likely to go for partnerships aimed at accelerating their acquisition of advanced electronic and disruption warfare technologies, increasing the stockpiling of loitering munitions, and perfecting drone swarm strategies. Pakistan’s partnerships with Türkiye and China may provide it with a quick advantage compared to India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan (Self-reliant India), owing to how it gets the best of both worlds. Where Türkiye’s military-industrial complex is rapidly gaining traction with regard to emerging technologies, Chinese military systems are also worth taking note of. India’s strategy of ‘going big’ has it bogged down in terms of generating an effective revolution in military affairs, as it is spending less on technologies that have given it an edge in the current conflict. Warfighting dynamics in this confrontation point to the success of precision targeting in a coordinated framework versus a highly maneuverable set of layers in point defense, base defense, and area defense for effective resistance, a playbook that necessitates devastating attrition if inadequately executed. South Asia’s conventional warfighting may yet find its evolution in weapon systems that offer more than just prestige—weapons that offer quick victories without trespassing into the volatile domain of deterrence failure.
Dr. Muhammad Shareh Qazi is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab.
Palwasha Khan is a PhD Scholar at Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab.
The views expressed in the article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of Pakistan Politico.