Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
Just days ahead of another round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States, Israel launched strikes targeting Iran’s military and scientific leadership ,as well as key nuclear facilities. While it is too early to ascertain the impact of these strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, Israel’s excessive use of force will have deleterious ramifications for peace, stability, and, above all, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT)— a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At a time when both the regime and the nuclear order appear to be disintegrating, such brazen attacks will deal a severe blow to the NPT. There are two reasons why this is the case.
First, the mere fact that Israel— a non-NPT nuclear-armed state, is incessantly attacking nuclear facilities of an NPT non-nuclear -weapon State (NNWS), Iran, erodes the credibility of the Treaty. It essentially signals something very disturbing to the Iranians: Your NPT membership cannot protect your nuclear installations from the nefarious activities of non-NPT malign actors. Iran could rightly refer to the Preamble of the Treaty, which underscores the need for easing tensions and improving international security. It could also remind the world that Israel’s military actions against its nuclear sites are repugnant to the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences (RevCons). According to the Final Document agreed to at the 2010 RevCon, “attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
Also, Iran and other groups of States Parties will certainly be more vociferous in calling out Tel Aviv’s nuclear weapons program and Washington’s espousal to it. Moreover, Israel’s unremitting use of violence on both nuclear and non-nuclear targets will further attenuate the prospect of the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMD-FZ) in the Middle East. The creation of a WMD-FZ in the Middle East has been a major plank of the Treaty since its indefinite extension in 1995. Nonetheless, it has remained one of the most contentious issues within the NPT Review Process, leading to a stalemate in the 2015 RevCon. The U.S.—a State Party that has not only shielded Israel’s non-NPT status but also significantly contributed to instability in the Middle East— will come under immense pressure in fora, including the 2026 RevCon.
Second, the targeted nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow are all under the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both the Agency and its Safeguards lie at the heart of the NPT. It is through IAEA Safeguards that the Agency verifies States Parties’ compliance with the NPT. Therefore, military strikes on such facilities will severely deride the importance of IAEA Safeguards.
Iran, it must be noted, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. From 2003 until 2006, it implemented the Additional Protocol voluntarily. After signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, Iran provisionally applied it until 2021. Its refusal to continue adhering to the Additional Protocol was a belated response to Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA— an agreement Iran was compliant with.
Iran’s retaliatory steps, including an increase in the level of uranium enrichment and a consistent refusal to cooperate with the IAEA, are concerning to say the least. Coupled with a failure to satisfy the Agency about operations in three undeclared locations, these developments do not inspire confidence in Iran’s commitment to nonproliferation. That being said, none of these justifies attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities. In fact, Israel’s ongoing efforts to completely obliterate key Iranian nuclear establishments are as expansive and dangerous than Russia’s asaault on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, especially because Tel Aviv is not a party to the NPT. While Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA’s Director General, has expressed concerns over the strikes and cited IAEA’s resolutions against such actions, he has not condemned Israel. As the adjudicator of States Parties’ NPT compliance, the IAEA must put more pressure on Israel. By urging both sides to show restraint, the Agency has wrongly equated the victim and the aggressor while also trivializing the impact Israeli use of force will have on IAEA Safeguards. If attacks on safeguarded units by non-NPT states are not properly condemned and penalized, the NPT would be severely undermined. Iran has already called out the Agency for its silence over Israeli aggression, announcing that it will limit cooperation with it. This will raise many a question about the effectiveness of Safeguards—something that will weaken the NPT.
Already beset by a number of challenges emanating from geopolitical competitions and the evisceration of arms control, the NPT will lose its credibility if Israel is not scrutinized and held accountable by the IAEA and the nuclear haves, not least the U.S, respectively. However, Washington’s continued support for Tel Aviv, coupled with the Agency’s reluctance to call the country out, militates against any such step. All of this will not only reduce confidence in the Treaty but also widen the schism between Nuclear-Weapon States and NNWS. As a result, an increasingly dissatisfied and wronged Iran will be incentivized to withdraw from the Treaty— an eventuality that might create a domino effect.
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is Associate Editor, Pakistan Politico.
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