Source: MoneyControl
Shaza Arif
The recent attack in Pahalgam, Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K), claiming 26 lives, has triggered a predictable but worrisome sequence of events: a blame game directed towards Pakistan, followed by serious diplomatic actions. This is consistent with the practice of igniting cross-border tensions ahead of important events with a view to extracting political mileage.
Immediately after the attack, the Indian media and policymakers were quick to blame Pakistan and create war hysteria, a reflexive response without substantive investigation. In the aftermath of the attack, both social and electronic media were flooded with anti-Pakistan content. The same sentiment came from high offices shortly afterward. This was followed by India unilaterally suspending the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), expelling diplomats, and ordering Pakistani visa holders to leave the country within 48 hours, among other drastic measures.
Historically, India has displayed a consistent pattern of attributing militant activities to Pakistan. Notable examples include the Chittisinghpura massacre (2000), the attack on the Indian Parliament (2001–2002), the Samjhauta Express bombing (2007), the Mumbai attacks (2008), the Pathankot and Uri attacks (2016), the Pulwama bombing (2019), and the 2023 incidents in Poonch and Rajouri. In each case, accusations against Pakistan emerged swiftly despite the absence of verified evidence or conclusive findings.
Pakistan is fairly accustomed to such behavior, which tends to become pronounced before critical junctures such as Indian general or state elections, important visits of foreign high-level officials, or efforts to fulfill vested BJP interests. Much like the Chittisinghpura massacre, which occurred during U.S. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000, the recent Pahalgam attack coincided with the visit of U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance. The timing is unlikely to be mere coincidence. Within hours of the incident, India announced the suspension of the IWT, a move it had already signaled in September 2024, suggesting a premeditated policy shift under the cover of crisis.
Such an Indian policy helps achieve several objectives. First, it serves as a diversionary tactic, deflecting public attention from pressing domestic challenges such as economic and governance issues, and deepening internal fault lines. Second, it provides a convenient pretext for projecting national security concerns on the international stage, thereby rationalizing expanded defense acquisitions. Finally, it creates justification for the deployment of additional troops and military assets in IIOJ&K, aimed at suppressing Kashmiri dissent and dismantling local resistance movements under the guise of counterterrorism. In this context, just a few days ago, it was reported that the CoBRA Battalion would be deployed for counterterrorist operations under the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in IIOJ&K. Such diversionary tactics also shift attention away from Indian state-sponsored assassinations, most notably in Canada and the United States.
The Pahalgam incident appears to follow the same old script of the past. The tactics are not new; they represent a continuation of longstanding policies, repackaged to fit contemporary contexts. These episodes, resulting from calculated neglect, have increased, particularly under the Narendra Modi-led government. Earlier, leaked WhatsApp conversations revealed that the Pulwama attack was premeditated and state-managed.
The tragic attack in Pahalgam may enable expanded military action by India. Pulwama did not yield the results that India had hoped for. Therefore, it is possible that New Delhi may execute another military misadventure, bringing the region to the brink of a major war. However, it is pertinent to mention that such a misadventure will not break the existing pattern. If anything, the cycle is likely to continue in one form or another in the future, just as it did in the past. These trends enable the reinforcement of specific national narratives to augment Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) political foothold. Such incidents also reflect the unprofessionalism and operational deficiencies of the Indian Armed Forces. Furthermore, they undermine the image of a global power that India has sought to project on the world stage. Likewise, they demonstrate the lack of strategic nous within the BJP government, which has effectively held the Indian media hostage to its agenda.
While Pakistan has previously demonstrated a willingness to engage constructively with India, it now needs to adopt a firmer position in light of the increasingly aggressive Indian posturing. The government ought to pursue a more proactive and strategic approach to safeguarding its national interests by highlighting India’s subversive activities, such as global assassination attempts and operations within Pakistan. Important examples include the Kulbhushan Jadhav episode and India’s involvement in Balochistan. Furthermore, in light of the suspension of the IWT, Pakistan should call upon the World Bank to address India’s unilateral actions. The Foreign Office should also actively engage with states that hold influence or maintain healthy relations with both India and Pakistan. Those include the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as well as key European powers such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Equally important is the role of Middle Eastern countries like Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, whose diplomatic influence in the region can be instrumental. Lastly, Pakistan should leverage its current position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to amplify its diplomatic outreach and strengthen its case.
The Pahalgam incident has reignited Indo-Pak tensions, appearing less an isolated event and more a calculated manoeuvre,one which Pakistan must counter with strategic resolve and well-conceived diplomacy to prevent any future Indian misadventures.
Shaza Arif is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s, and they do not necessarily represent those of Pakistan Politico.
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