Source: PBS
Mubashar Rizvi
On May 6, 2025, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, unleashing missile strikes against targets in Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. This episode marked the most forceful cross-border action between the nuclear-armed neighbours since 1971 and raises fundamental questions about international legal frameworks and regional stability. While New Delhi described the strikes as a measured blow against “terrorist infrastructure,” Islamabad labelled them as an unprovoked act of war that killed civilians, violating its sovereignty and international law. Analysis of publicly available information indicates that India crossed an international border with force, had no Security Council mandate, and was not responding to a qualifying armed attack. The UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force therefore remains operative, and the burden shifts to India to demonstrate a lawful exception, an argument it has yet to substantiate.
Analysis of India’s Potential Legal Justifications
Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes self-defense when an armed attack occurs. In this regard, India cites the April 22 Pahalgam massacre that killed twenty-six people and blames Pakistan-based militants. Even if, for argument’s sake, New Delhi could prove that link, it must still show that the threat was so imminent and overwhelming that no reasonable alternative existed. General intelligence about possible future plots does not clear that threshold.
Moreover, India’s official statement refers only to credible intelligence and the need to “deter and pre-empt” future attacks, terminology that would be characterized as reprisal rather than self-defense. International courts have repeatedly held that reprisals are unlawful; missiles launched deep inside another state appear to exceed what the Charter views as necessary and proportionate. India’s limited disclosure also weakens the evidentiary basis because self-defense claims traditionally rely on verifiable facts shared with the international community. Above all, however, the fact that India’s National Investigation Agency issued a public call for photographs and video of the Pahalgam bombing only after the missile strikes, suggests that New Delhi was still assembling the evidentiary chain needed to link the attack to Pakistan.
Evaluating the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine
In this context, with the self-defense rationale in doubt, India appears to lean on the “unwilling or unable” theory: if Pakistan will not neutralize militants, India may lawfully act within Pakistani territory. Analysis of this doctrine, however, shows that state practice shows no settled rule granting that permission, and UN organs have never endorsed it. Accepting such a principle could allow states to create de facto exceptions to the Charter, potentially weakening the collective security framework on which all members rely. Smaller states view the doctrine as a license for unilateral coercion, and its wider acceptance could normalize cross-border raids in other volatile theatres, from the Sahel to the Caucasus. This framework therefore presents significant systemic risks to the principle of sovereign integrity.
Response Options and the Role of International Legal Mechanisms
Islamabad responded first with diplomacy while signaling its capacity to use force. A formal démarche to India’s Chargé D’affaires cited the Charter violation, and the National Security Committee authorized the armed forces to respond “at a time and place of its (sic) choosing.” To date, Pakistan has confined its actions to repelling Indian aircraft that crossed the Line of Control and has not launched offensive strikes of its own. However, an assessment of the effectiveness of international legal avenues in halting immediate state action suggests limitations. Past practice suggests that UN debates, advisory opinions, or even a judgment at The Hague seldom halt a determined actor in real time. Because India does not accept compulsory jurisdiction at the International Court of Justice on security matters, a rapid ruling is improbable. Legal pressure therefore must be paired with credible military and diplomatic signaling. Legal pressure therefore must be evaluated as a component of a broader strategy, paired with credible military and diplomatic signaling.
An example for Pakistan is its own mixed approach of limited military riposte with broad diplomatic outreach during the 2019 Balakot incident. During that crisis, Islamabad invited foreign diplomats to inspect the site and declassified radar footage of the air engagement that followed. A similar transparency effort now, such as hosting UN observers to verify strike locations and interview witnesses, could undercut Indian assertions while helping keep escalation pressures manageable. Such measures function to shape the international narrative and build legitimacy through verifiable facts.
Operation Sindoor in Context: A Pattern of Divergence from Established Norms
Viewed historically, Operation Sindoor did not occur in isolation. Only weeks earlier, India suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty on terrorism grounds, a unilateral step deemed illegal by international law experts. Similarly, in 2019, New Delhi altered Jammu & Kashmir’s constitutional status despite UN resolutions treating the territory as disputed. Commentators inside India argue that such moves involve limited domestic consultation and may concentrate authority in the executive branch. Analysts therefore discern a broader pattern: bypass legal frameworks whenever they appear to constrain policy objectives. The latest strike fits that trajectory by substituting an unratified doctrine for the Charter’s clear text.
At the domestic level, politics reinforces the trend. With Bihar’s pivotal assembly election due in October-November 2025, Indian premier Narendra Modi will be looking to use a forceful response to stir nationalist sentiment and increase his voter base. Pakistan, meanwhile, is navigating IMF-driven reforms that constrain fiscal room for defence modernization, raising concern that Indian planners may be testing Islamabad’s tolerance while the latter focuses on economic stabilization. These political and economic factors represent significant contextual elements influencing state behavior and strategic calculations in the region.
Escalation Dynamics and Strategic Stability in South Asia
Beyond legal considerations, the incident carries significant strategic risks and requires an assessment of the current security dilemma. Operationally, the strike compounds an already volatile military balance. Within hours, twenty-seven Pakistani fighters interacted with seventy Indian aircraft in what analysts describe as the largest air-to-air engagement between nuclear-armed states. Crisis management channels remain dormant, miscalculation risks are high, and several observers note that Washington’s mediating role has diminished. New Delhi has offered no public evidence connecting Islamabad to Pahalgam, reinforcing a perception that the strikes serve political optics more than security imperatives.
Furthermore, escalation dangers intensify because both militaries employ rapid-response concepts: India’s “Cold Start” and Pakistan’s Quid Pro Quo Plus. Compressed timelines leave minimal room for clarification. Past mishaps, such as the 2022 BrahMos missile that veered into Pakistan and the 1999 Kargil conflict under a nuclear shadow, demonstrate how technical or political errors can ignite a wider conflict. Cyber operations and space-based intelligence assets further complicate the decision-making environment, making the risk of cascading escalation structural rather than incidental.
Policy Responses: Integrating Legal Advocacy, Diplomacy, and Credible Signaling
Given this complex environment, a multi-faceted response is required. Legal advocacy remains essential for Islamabad. Introducing a Security Council resolution, even if vetoed, obliges states to record positions and shapes global expectations. Pakistan could also request a Human Rights Council investigation of civilian harm and seek a fact-finding panel on the Pahalgam attack, the inquiry New Delhi avoided before launching missiles. A comprehensive disclosure of munition fragments, blast data, and casualty figures would highlight proportionality questions and press India to share its intelligence.
Accordingly, diplomacy will succeed only if paired with a calibrated use of force. Pakistan can strengthen air defences, signal readiness to intercept intrusions, and publicize adherence to humanitarian targeting rules, limiting India’s flexibility to conduct similar strikes. Credible restraint, including proportional responses, avoidance of civilian sites, and continued communication, enhances Islamabad’s moral and legal standing and reassures Beijing and Washington, both of which have strategic stakes in regional stability.
Finally, major powers have a significant role. The United States supplies advanced arms to India, while China is Pakistan’s principal defense partner. Coordinated engagement encouraging restraint would demonstrate that escalation threatens strategic investments on both sides. A revitalised Quadrilateral mechanism or an expanded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dialogue could promote risk-reduction measures such as missile-test notifications, air-marshal hotlines, and Track II talks among former officials. External backing for crisis-management protocols provides political cover for regional leaders to temper hard-line postures. These external interventions represent critical elements in managing escalation risk in a nuclearized environment.
Upholding the Charter in a Volatile Region
In sum, India’s 6 May strike appears inconsistent with the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. Its self-defense claim does not satisfy established legal criteria, and the “unwilling or unable” concept lacks recognized legal foundation. While international law can appear fragile when confronted by realpolitik, sustained legal pressure can delegitimize shortcuts. Pakistan should continue to expose that illegality while maintaining a credible deterrent so future Indian governments reconsider testing the Charter’s limits. Combining legal action with strategic restraint offers the best chance to move South Asia away from the crisis and to demonstrate that even nuclear rivals remain accountable to the rules they accepted when they joined the United Nations. The incident underscores the persistent challenge of maintaining strategic stability in a nuclearized region while simultaneously upholding the foundational principles of the international legal order.
Mubashar Rizvi is an independent researcher specializing in International Relations and Security Studies.
The views in the article are the author’s own, and they do not necessarily those of Pakistan Politico.
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