Can the U.S. Still Lead a Coalition?

Sherzimah Akbar and Eman Tariq

The 2026 war with Iran has exposed a widening gap between American military power and its ability to rally allies and partners behind it. Washington still possesses overwhelming military capabilities. After September 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, and European states joined the subsequent international campaign in Afghanistan. However, the 2003 Iraq War did not automatically produce European political support. The difference in the support provided is reflective of one thing: while military superiority gives Washington the ability to act, hegemonic leadership requires securing cooperation from other states. The 2026 war further confirms that military superiority does not guarantee allies’ participation or a durable political settlement.

September 11: When Allies Followed Washington

September 11 showed how quickly American military power engendered allied action. On September 12, NATO Allies invoked Article 5, treating the attack on the United States as an attack on the Alliance. The attack was understood as a common security challenge, allowing Washington to mobilize the Alliance’s institutions and secure substantial European participation. Even then, the Alliance’s machinery was used selectively, and NATO assumed formal command of ISAF only in August 2003.

Iraq: When the Coalition Fractured

Iraq was different. The United States and Britain led the invasion, while several European states joined the coalition in different capacities. NATO itself records that it had no role in the decision to launch the invasion. NATO’s own record attributes its absence to divided opinion among members. Allies’ participation had become conditional rather than automatic.

The war against Iran reveals a different form of the same problem: the Allies can remain aligned with Washington while drawing their own limits on participation. The U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28 forced European governments to balance strategic alignment with Washington and the risks of joining the war. European governments remained concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic-missile capabilities, and regional activities, but these concerns did not translate into uniform support for the military campaign.

Britain first declined a U.S. request to use British bases and then, on March 1, authorized their use for what the government described as collective self-defense. France questioned the legality of military action. Germany was more supportive of the U.S. and Israel’s objectives but still emphasized restraint. Spain refused the use of Spanish bases for U.S. operations against Iran. President Trump threatened to cut off trade with Spain, yet the refusal stood. By contrast, Portugal allowed the use of its Lajes base in the Azores. Europe neither rejected the United States nor collectively joined its war. Instead, governments responded according to their own national interests, legal assessments, and security priorities.

London supported the defense of regional partners and freedom of navigation while repeatedly calling for de-escalation and negotiations. Britain and France moved toward an independent, defensive multinational mission to protect commercial shipping and support mine clearance in the Strait of Hormuz. They describe this assistance as strictly defensive and separate from the wider military campaign. Support for protecting shipping, according to these countries, is not akin to that for the offensive campaign.

The European Union also levied sanctions and pressure against Iran while maintaining that diplomacy was necessary to achieve a durable settlement.

Europe’s cautious approach is also an attempt to safeguard material interests. The confrontation affected European economic security because the Strait of Hormuz is a major route for global energy supplies. The European Commission estimated that a prolonged disruption to energy markets could push inflation to 3.5 percent in 2027. In that scenario, EU growth in 2027 would fall to 0.7 percent, against 1.4 percent in the baseline. Supporting Washington could help contain threats Europe already regarded as serious, but prolonged conflict also imposed economic and security costs on Europe itself.

The pattern is not confined to Europe. New Delhi shares Washington’s concern over regional instability while making its own calculations about access, energy security, and military exposure. In March, New Delhi secured the passage of two Indian-flagged LPG carriers through talks with Tehran. India was not among the states that declared political support for the UK-French Hormuz mission. Its exposure helps explain the caution: the Strait normally carries around 46-50 percent of India’s crude imports and about 90 percent of its LPG imports. India’s attempt to exercise autonomy bought access but not insulation. As Harsh V. Pant argues, maritime capability alone cannot resolve India’s energy vulnerability.

None of this means that American power has disappeared. The United States remains the conflict’s most capable military actor. The problem is that military power does not automatically result in Allies’ participation. European states have not abandoned cooperation with Washington. At the same time, they have advocated negotiations, questioned aspects of military action, and avoided treating participation in U.S. operations as an automatic consequence of Alliance membership. Here Allies’ hesitation reflects judgements about this war, not a rejection of the Alliance.

All in all, the ongoing war has shown that Washington has to distinguish between allies that support its objectives and allies that are willing to fight alongside it. The lesson is not that the U.S. has moved from dominance to decline. If anything, it is that dominance alone cannot guarantee active Allies’ participation. Washington can still fight without a European coalition, but establishing and sustaining a durable political order requires cooperation that military superiority alone cannot command.

Sherzimah Akbar is a strategic and security researcher currently serving as Research Coordinator & Content Manager at the South Asia Times. Her research interests include Indian defense and military modernization, maritime strategy, South Asian security, India–Pakistan relations, and the Indo-Pacific.

Eman Tariq is a graduate in International Relations from International Islamic University, Islamabad. Her research interests include Afghanistan, terrorism, international security, the foreign policy of major powers, and Middle East-related studies.