Source: Tehran Times
Sameer Ali Khan
A zero-enrichment deal with Iran may appear pragmatic after the 12-day war, but it risks institutionalizing double standards within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal that had considerably hampered Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, was derailed because its opponents demanded restrictions on Iran’s missile program. Therefore, diplomacy was undermined, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the 12-day war. In the prelude to Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Washington’s zero-enrichment demand became a contentious issue.
While there is increasing skepticism over the effectiveness of U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, longer-term solutions to the Iranian nuclear conundrum are being debated. Recently, nonproliferation experts, Siegfried S. Hecker and Abbas Milani, recommended a no-enrichment deal. The deal would mean that Iran forfeit its right to enrich uranium domestically. They argue that the Israeli and U.S. bombings of Iranian enrichment facilities have removed a key barrier—the enrichment capability Iran has been adamant about retaining. Hecker and Milani believe that Iranian enrichment had no civilian rationale to begin with, notwithstanding its right to enrich as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Foreign Dependence in Civilian Nuclear Operations
While they rightly argue that enrichment services are widely available under Safeguards, they do not address how such services have historically been denied even for safeguarded operations. Pakistan’s experience with fuel supply interruptions for its KANUPP-1 reactor illustrates how political considerations can override such arrangements. The experts dismiss Iranian concerns about energy independence, scientific prestige, and distrust of international suppliers. However, these are legitimate concerns, particularly given Iran’s complex strategic environment. Even if enrichment is unnecessary for power production today, Iran’s military-strategic calculations—including about submarine propulsion—complicate the picture.
Thus, the demands for zero-enrichment essentially mean stripping Iran of its sovereign right to master the nuclear fuel cycle. This is especially problematic given the extreme politicization of civil nuclear cooperation.
Enrichment—The Only Proliferation Concern?
The argument that uranium enrichment is necessary “only if the country wants to hedge its bets to make an ostensibly peaceful program a springboard to nuclear bomb fuel” equally applies to nuclear reprocessing. But like enrichment, we know that large-scale nuclear reprocessing facilities are supported in states despite nonproliferation concerns and a lack of commercial viability.
However, these are irrelevant at the moment because Iran does not have a significant number of nuclear power plants. The few it has are fueled by foreign suppliers who manage spent fuel. Still, Iran had given up its right to reprocessing in the JCPOA. But the agreement is no longer in place. Therefore, at the moment, Iran has no obligations not to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.
It is a given that Iran already forfeited its right to reprocessing once, and the renegotiated deal will likely build on that to include enrichment—closing both routes to creating fuel (fissile material) for a nuclear bomb. However, there are instances where states have been treated with exceptionalism. Within the NPT framework, Japan stands out as a key example. The proponents of no-enrichment find Iran’s comparison of uranium enrichment with oil to be incredible. Yet uncertainty surrounding oil supplies during the 1973 energy crisis was a major factor in Japan’s decision to heavily invest in nuclear reprocessing. Nevertheless, Japan’s well-deserved “broader conclusions” about its peaceful nuclear intentions have eased the political pressure on it, allowing it to pursue sensitive technologies without undergoing the same level of scrutiny.
While Japan is deserving of the “broader conclusions,” not every state merits such entitlement regarding its intent. Outside the NPT, reprocessing programs were at the forefront of Indian nuclearization. The U.S., with no different “broader conclusion” about peaceful intent, was behind the Indian nuclear tests of 1974. Indian claims of peaceful uses of nuclear reprocessing were as grand as Iran’s about enrichment—yet demonstrably implausible. But exceptions were made. As a result, India today sits atop the largest stocks of weapon-usable nuclear materials outside International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards.
Nonproliferation in the Absence of Security
It would be unfair to consider Japan’s exemplary nonproliferation credentials while overlooking the environment in which the country operates. It enjoys Washington’s nuclear umbrella, backed up by the ground presence of U.S. forces and all the associated military might. Since security assurances are well-placed alongside nonproliferation commitments, there is a sense of satisfaction in the functioning of the system. But Iran does not enjoy Japan’s privileges. It faces a conventionally superior non-NPT nuclear weapon state (Israel) without powerful allies to provide security guarantees. More importantly, its international obligations have failed to deliver on their promises of security.
Toward Equitable Solutions
Acknowledging these realities, however, does not mean accepting Iranian nuclear weapons development. The emphasis on Iranian rights under the NPT is not intended to discount its obligations under the regime. Rather, it suggests that durable solutions must address the underlying security and political dynamics that drive proliferation. Several approaches merit consideration. Most importantly, meaningful discussions on a Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone are long overdue. The regional aspirations for a free zone have been expressed in the NPT review process but face Israeli and U.S. opposition. The process could benefit from nuclear transparency from Israel to begin with.
Moreover, some credible guarantees covering nuclear fuel supply, non-interference in Iran’s domestic affairs, and recognition of its legitimate security concerns may prove useful. Rather than complete prohibition, Iran might accept enrichment limitations and ratify the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. This should be accompanied by economic benefits, including sanctions relief and technology transfer, to provide alternative sources of prestige and sovereignty protection.
The Iranian nuclear issue cannot be resolved through technical fixes alone. No-enrichment deals that apply different standards to different states based on geopolitical preferences rather than legal obligations will likely prove as unsustainable as previous agreements. A durable solution must acknowledge the deeply political nature of nuclear proliferation, address legitimate security concerns, and create equitable frameworks that respect sovereignty while managing genuine proliferation risks.
The current milieu, created by military strikes on Iranian facilities, may bring tactical opportunities for negotiations. However, lasting success will require moving beyond the technical paradigm toward comprehensive political solutions that address the security dilemmas and double standards that have long plagued nonproliferation efforts. Only by acknowledging these deeper realities can the international community hope to achieve sustainable progress on one of the most challenging nonproliferation cases of our time.
Sameer Ali Khan is an independent policy analyst based in Rawalpindi. He runs an online platform, Noobs’ Nuclear.
The views expressed in the article are the author’s own, and they do not necessarily reflect those of Pakistan Politico.
About The Author
