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
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# PAKISTAN & TURKEY BROTHERS IN ARMS



Rupert Stone

both, the military has exerted a dominant influence and staged multiple coups (four apiece). Both have become increasingly religious, despite the secular inclinations of their respective founding fathers. Both have been nominal US allies for decades, while often maintaining strained relations with the 'West'. Indeed, Turkey and Pakistan have had to confront serious refugee and terrorist problems relating to their involvement in US-backed campaigns in Syria and Afghanistan respectively.

Their partnership with the US goes back to the Cold War when they both became part of the "Northern Tier" against Soviet expansion. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, while Pakistan started receiving US military aid in 1954. But their relations with Washington soured in the 1960s. Turkey was reprimanded by the US for its role in Cyprus, and Pakistan faced an American arms embargo during the 1965 war with India. Turkey, in response, gravitated towards the USSR, while Pakistan received help from China. They also grew closer to one another, forming the Regional Cooperation for Development (with Iran) in 1964.

standing with Pakistan against all odds & proving that we are one. We are proud to have a brother like you." The Turkish ambassador in Pakistan replied, "Most welcome".

This episode encapsulates the warmth of the bond between Turkey and Pakistan. Their relationship has strengthened in recent years, especially in the security sphere. But the two countries share deep historical and religious ties. Turkic Muslim dynasties, such as the Mughals, ruled north India for centuries. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, admired Turkey's first president, Mustafa Kemal, who, like Jinnah, was a secularist and nation-builder. There are roads named after Kemal in Islamabad and Karachi, while in Turkey's capital Ankara, one of the largest streets is Cinnah Caddesi (Jinnah Avenue).

Moreover, there are striking parallels in the countries' postwar political trajectories. In

Relations with Washington picked up again in the 1980s when both sided with America against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After 9/11, cooperation on Afghanistan continued, with both Turkey and Pakistan supporting the US-led invasion of the country. In the last decade,

**“ Turkey and Pakistan have had to confront serious refugee and terrorist problems relating to their involvement in US-backed campaigns in Syria and Afghanistan respectively ”**

**W**hen Pakistan was placed on a terrorist financing "grey list" by the Financial Action Task Force in February, Turkey was the only country to oppose the move. Both Saudi Arabia and China – strong Pakistani allies – eventually supported the US-led effort to have Islamabad grey-listed. Acknowledging Ankara's loyalty, Pakistan's then interior minister, Ahsan Iqbal, tweeted, "Thank you Turkey for

**“ Turkey has also tried to soothe tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, convening regular trilateral summits in Ankara to address issues such as refugees and the border dispute ”**

Turkey has also tried to soothe tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, convening regular trilateral summits in Ankara to address issues such as refugees and the border dispute. The 2000s also saw increasing defence ties between Turkey and Pakistan, with new training initiatives and a High Level Cooperation Council set up in 2009.

Turkey's pious Muslim leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, clearly likes Pakistan. He has visited the country often and addressed its parliament three times, more than any other leader. He has strongly supported Pakistan against India in the Kashmir dispute (just as Pakistan backed Turkey over Cyprus) and opposed New Delhi's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. There is affection, too, on the Pakistani side: General Musharraf (who grew up in Turkey and speaks fluent Turkish) was known to respect Mustafa Kemal; former prime minister Nawaz Sharif reportedly admired Erdogan for reining in the Turkish military.

The Turkey-Pakistan relationship is now entering a new phase, catalysed, once again, by tensions with the US. Turkey is furious with Washington for backing the Syrian Kurds, which are affiliated with Kurdish militants in its own territory. The US is concerned about Turkey's rapprochement with Russia, and also by its detention of American

citizens suspected of subversive activities. Relations have nosedived under Trump, as the US imposed sanctions on Ankara for detaining an American pastor, and then slapped tariffs on Turkish exports, exacerbating the country's currency crisis.

Pakistan supported Turkey in its recent standoff with Washington. And well it might, as its own ties with the US have deteriorated. In 2011, a series of crises derailed the bilateral relationship. US aid has steadily declined so far this decade, culminating in Trump's suspension of all security assistance this year. To compensate, Pakistan has strengthened its alliance with China, which has now become Pakistan's main arms supplier, while forging an unlikely partnership with former Cold War adversary, Russia. Less widely reported, Islamabad has rapidly boosted its security relationship with Turkey.

Under Erdogan, Turkey has been pushing to produce its own military equipment and achieve "defence autarky" rather than rely on imports from the US and Europe, which have repeatedly blocked arms supplies (the US Congress is currently impeding the delivery of F-35 aircraft, for example). The Turkish government intends to achieve full self-sufficiency in the defence sphere by 2023. And, as the Turkish security sector has expanded, so, too, have its exports. According to a 2018 report by SIPRI, Turkish arms exports from 2013-2017 grew by a whopping 145% from the 2008-2012 period.

One of the markets where Turkish companies have been particularly active is Pakistan. In 2015, Turkey agreed to provide thirty four fighter aircrafts. The following year, a deal was concluded to upgrade Pakistan's F-16 jets. Then, in 2018, came the largest ever defence contract between the two countries, with the sale of thirty ATAK helicopters. There have also been naval contracts: in 2016 a Turkish firm won a contract to upgrade three Pakistani attack submarines and, in 2018, Pakistan inked a deal for four corvettes. Moreover, April 2018 saw the first ever bilateral naval exercise between the two countries.

Turkey has now surpassed the US to become Pakistan's second biggest arms supplier, after China. And their relationship will likely get stronger, still, as both countries drift further away from the US and closer to Moscow. Turkey has confirmed it is purchasing the S-400 missile defence system from Russia, while Pakistan has just launched a new military training program with its old foe. Furthermore, Turkey and Pakistan see eye-to-eye on the need for a diplomatic settlement in Afghanistan. Turkey has agreed to allow a Taliban office in Ankara, and could use its leverage with the Afghan Uzbeks and Turkmen to facilitate peace talks.

But all is not rosy. The Turkish defence industry still relies on US-made components and may suffer if tensions with Trump escalate. Furthermore, economic ties between Ankara and

**“ Turkey has now surpassed the US to become Pakistan's second biggest arms supplier, after China ”**

Islamabad are weak. Trade is very low, hampered partly by Turkish tariffs imposed on Pakistani goods in 2011. Those tariffs caused Pakistan's exports to drop precipitously by 2017. Eager to rectify this situation, Pakistan has been trying to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with Ankara. But progress has been slow, and talks collapsed earlier this year, with Islamabad threatening action at the World Trade Organization.

As long as these roadblocks remain, Turkey will never be as close to Pakistan as China or Saudi Arabia, which both have strong economic relations with Islamabad.

---

*Rupert Stone is an independent journalist based in Germany*



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
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# PAKISTAN POST 9/11



# SEVENTEEN YEARS OF WAR, DEATH & HATE



**Rabia Akhtar**

‘Move away, get away from here. Hurry. Clear the area. There is a bomb here.’ A guy wearing a bomb suit shouts as he makes his way to a location in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. People are curious. They still linger. A bag has been found on the scene. It has a bomb.

Boom goes the sound. This is the opening scene of a documentary titled *Armed With Faith*. Before watching this documentary couple of months ago, I did not know that in KP there was a bomb disposal unit (BDU) comprised of 34 men. This documentary was my first introduction to this small group of men who voluntarily have chosen to become part of a bomb disposal squad in an area which is ridden with IEDs and landmines so that they could save lives. To most of us living elsewhere in Pakistan, we are numb. To majority of us, these men

are invisible. It is as if they do not exist. They dispose off bombs. They disarm landmines. They lose their limbs and in some cases their lives in the process. Their love for Pakistan is beyond any measure. They do not fear the enemy. These men are armed with faith.

But who is the enemy? Why is the enemy killing innocent Pakistanis? Why is the enemy planting IEDs and landmines in Pakistan? The questions are difficult and perhaps endless. But answers are not so hard. 9/11 was a watershed event in history,

a dastardly act taking lives of thousands of American people. It not only changed how America looked at the world – it changed how the world looked at America as well. It brought war to our neighborhood. It brought war to Pakistan. One could argue that even if Pakistan had decided against joining the U.S. led war on terrorism in 2001, war would still have found its way to Pakistan given the geography and curse of the Durand line that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the Al-Qaeda/Taliban militants were being bombed out of their caves in Afghanistan then the only exit to them was into Pakistan’s tribal areas in the north-west and from there




Source: Asad Farooq




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
**Pakistan: Minimum civilians killed in CIA drone strikes, 2004 to present**



**Pakistan: Minimum people killed in CIA drone strikes, 2004 to present**



**Pakistan: CIA drone strikes by President**



into KP merging with the predominately pashtoon population where everyone looked the same.

The first recorded CIA drone strike inside Pakistan took place on June 17, 2004. The target was Nek Mohammad, a local Taliban commander. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, total

CIA drone strikes that took place during the Bush years from 2004 to early 2009 were 51. Total reported killed were 410-595. Civilians reported killed were 167-332. Children reported killed were 102-129. Total reported injured were 175-277.

Consider this: If you were born in 2001, you are 17 now. If you were born in 2004,

you are 14. Out of the total reported killed in these years, it is likely that some were your family members, cousins, brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers or uncles. You being 17 or 14, don't know much about life yet but you do know of 'America' and its 'evil ways'. You perhaps still cannot find America on the map but that is not your problem. You know what a drone



reported injured were 262-397. In Obama years from 2009 to early 2017, in a total of 2089 CIA drone strikes, minimum of 373 people had lost their lives. In 16 CIA drone strikes in the first year of Trump's presidency, minimum of 6 people have reportedly lost their lives. These are not just numbers. These are people. Some evil but majority collateral.

The cycle starts again. You are born in 2018 and by the time you are 14 or 17, it is likely that you would have lost one or more of your family members in drone attacks inside Pakistan's north-western region. The war is far from over. This is one unfortunate reality in Pakistan.

Anayat ullah 'Tiger' Khan, BDU officer in Dera Ismail Khan, tries to disarm a landmine. It detonates. He has lost his hand and his leg. Why in your right mind do you even do this dangerous job? He is often asked. 'Tiger is my call sign. Whenever I get a call, I pounce on it like a Tiger pounces on its prey. This is my job. I have to do my job for the future of humanity,' says Anayat ullah from his hospital bed. Tiger and his team has lost many friends and team members in the process of disposing off IEDs and disarming landmines. They have collected body parts in plastic bags of their fellow Pakistanis, families and friends and buried them. Yet, they are not deterred. 'I do think about death. But if I die while disposing off an IED, only one person will die. I will save lives of at least 30-40 people in the process,' says Abdul Rahim, another

BDU officer. These men in the BDU in KP are resilient. Each one of them is a soldier. Their faith is unshakable. Their love for Pakistan is boundless. This is yet another side of Pakistan for it contains within it multiple realities.

How many Americans even know the price Pakistan has paid and continues to pay to still stand with the U.S.? How many American teenagers, 14 or 17 respectively know what has the U.S. war on terrorism wrought in other countries around the world since 9/11? A generation of Pakistani teenagers, 14 and 17 respectively know exactly what the U.S. has taken away from them. Families of 75,000 plus Pakistanis who have lost their lives in terrorist attacks since 9/11 know exactly how this global war on terrorism changed their lives. Hate has won. It continues to win.

Tiger spreads his prayer mat for the evening prayer by the side of the lake, takes off his prosthetic leg and prays for Pakistan and the humanity at large. There is another day to be lived. Another life to be saved.

---

*Dr. Rabia Akhtar is Editor, Pakistan Politico. The documentary Armed With Faith is directed by Asad Faruqi and Geeta Gandbhir. The quotes used in this article have been translated from Urdu to English from the screenplay by the author. For more information about the movie visit [www.amredwithfaithfilm.com](http://www.amredwithfaithfilm.com)*

is and that is all that matters. You hate Pakistan Army and Pakistan for allowing the Americans to use Pakistan's airspace for drone warfare. Your only source of information is a cleric who would want you to wage jihad against Pakistan, its army, its civilians and the Americans to not only avenge the death of your family members but also to guarantee your place in heaven. You are fighting the infidels and that is a high.

Now step back. You are not alone. There are thousands like you who have grown up hating America and Pakistan, brainwashed into fulfilling this one mission of total annihilation of self (through suicide bombing) and others in the process. In 2009 alone, total CIA drone strikes inside Pakistan were 52. Total reported killed were 465-744. Civilians killed were 100-210. Children killed were 36-39. Total



# THE MILITANT LANDSCAPE, TACTICS & PAKISTAN'S WAR ON TERROR



**Amira Jadoon**

Pakistan may have joined the U.S. war on terror under pressure, but today it is imperative that the country takes complete ownership of its fight against domestic terrorism. The nature and magnitude of Pakistan's internal security challenges have transformed since 9/11, and the undeniable existence of terrorist organizations in the country directly threatens stability and human security within Pakistan as well as in the broader region. A discussion on some of the emerging threats in Pakistan through the lens of terrorist organizations' tendency to innovate and adapt to ensure survival, especially when under attack by the state and/or in competition with rival groups is thus warranted.

Regardless of their origins, over time militant organizations on Pakistani soil have developed deeply vested interests to prevail, and their evolution is rooted in local dynamics. As the Pakistani state ramps up its efforts to undermine specific organizations, these groups are likely to turn to innovative ways to survive. In this light, deeper cooperation between targeted groups, and the mobilization of female

operatives are two potential pathways through which groups may sustain their violent campaign in an increasingly difficult operating environment.

## **TERRORIST INNOVATION**

Similar to how business organizations innovate to survive competitive markets, militant groups innovate on a tactical, strategic or organizational level to outbid rivals and target the state. Terrorist innovations range from the adoption of new technologies, focusing on new targets

**“ Deeper cooperation between targeted groups, and the mobilization of female operatives are two potential pathways through which groups may sustain their violent campaign in an increasingly difficult operating environment ”**

or adopting new organizational designs. Successful terrorist innovations generally incorporate an element of surprise and result in higher lethality. The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and the 2014 Peshawar School massacre are spectacular examples of terrorist innovation that involved elements of surprise and exploited victims' lack of preparedness. While several armed non-state actors in Pakistan fall outside the state's radar, groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been subjected to a series of military operations by the Pakistani Army as well as U.S. drone strikes. Many of these groups are plagued with internal divisions, and frequently clash with other groups. While these factors contribute to the deterioration of targeted groups, they also provide them with the impetus to devise new ways to sustain their lethality and prolong their survival.

## **OPERATING AS A NETWORK**

One of the ways that terrorist actors can innovate is by redesigning the way their organization operates. Cooperation amongst terrorist organizations, and/or the enlistment of independent terrorist

entrepreneurs can shift the usual modus operandi of groups and serve multiple objectives. Cooperation can increase organizations' longevity and lethality by pooling resources, sharing explicit and tacit knowledge and increasing recruitment. Alliances between groups are usually feasible when they share a common ideology and/or a common enemy. One of the gravest threats facing Pakistan today is the enormous potential for groups to cooperate in a saturated militant landscape. This threat has been exacerbated by the arrival of the Islamic State in the region, which calls for the establishment of a transnational *ummah*, espouses a sectarian ideology, and expresses hostility towards the Pakistani State. The Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) brand thus provides a central anti-state organizing principle around which a multitude of groups can coalesce. As such, a cornerstone of ISK or Daesh's strategy in Pakistan is to form alliances with groups, without necessarily seeking a formal bay'a, on the basis of a common enemy and/

or ideology. While several opportunistic groups pledged formal allegiance to ISK, its informal links with potent groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) are likely to be the most consequential.

Most of these relationships have a pragmatic basis and yield mutual benefits. LeI is known to have a hold

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**“ One of the gravest threats facing Pakistan today is the enormous potential for groups to cooperate in a saturated militant landscape ”**

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over a smuggling network, which allows linkages between ISK bases in Nangarhar, Afghanistan and the Orakzai agency in Pakistan. Despite having never publically pledged allegiance to ISK, LeI's cooperation facilitates cross-border activity for both groups. Similarly, while LeJ and JuA have not pledged formal allegiance to ISK, there is evidence of operational cooperation between the groups. In 2014, the Baluchistan government reported to the federal government its suspicions of links between LeJ and ISK. In 2016, an LeJ spokesman openly admitted that LeJ and the Islamic State had collaborated to conduct a brutal attack in Quetta in October 2016 which killed 60 individuals at a police academy. JuA expressed support for the Islamic State indirectly in 2014, and also reunited with other TTP factions in 2015 to target the Pakistani state. While the precise nature of these relationships still remains blurry, links between domestic groups and ISK imply knowledge, resource and expertise sharing which can contribute to



**“ For Pakistan, identifying the most consequential partnerships is essential to not only disassemble the ISK brand but also to constrain any deadly developments in the behavior of domestic groups ”**

the proliferation of new tactics and targets, and the killing capacity of each group. As reflected in the GTD data and my own research, in 2015, LeJ killed at least 4 times as many civilians as it did in 2014; and in 2016, it escalated its targeting of security and military personnel. In each of the years 2016 and 2017, JuA's attacks resulted in more than 270 deaths, compared to less than a 100 deaths in each of the years 2014 and 2015. The benefits seem to flow both ways; ISK-linked attacks in Pakistan have progressively claimed higher civilian deaths since 2014 and the group continues to grow as a threat.

Understanding how terrorist networks form, operate, and sustain themselves is a challenging task, and adequately weakening them even more so. For Pakistan, identifying the most consequential partnerships is essential to not only disassemble the ISK brand but also to constrain any deadly developments in the behavior of domestic groups. Thwarting the establishment of an enduring lethal network between the most potent groups in Pakistan is critical in the country's fight against terrorism.

**DEPLOYMENT OF FEMALE OPERATIVES**

While female participation in terrorist and insurgent activity is prevalent in both support and combat roles, the employment of female operatives by militant groups in Pakistan would constitute a relatively new

development. But such a development is not unconceivable, given the evolution in women's jihad in conservative Islamic societies, which is indicative of a shift in women's roles from passive facilitators to active operatives. The operational imperatives of violent organizations often compel them to be innovative by using female members. Recruitment of women

can yield specific tactical and strategic advantages for organizations, which are advantageous for their long-term survival and short-term effectiveness. Because women are not traditionally associated with violence or terrorism, female combatants can evade security measures and reach a wider number of targets. The surprise component of deploying female



operatives and generating substantial publicity is particularly useful for terrorist organizations, and has resulted in an upsurge in female suicide bombers in both secular and religious terror networks.

Recent examples indicate that South Asia, and more specifically Pakistan, may not be immune to such a trend. In January 2015,

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was reported to have formed Shaheen Women's wing, a force of 500 female suicide bombers. Similar changes have been observed in Bangladesh, where the first Islamic State linked female suicide bomber emerged in December 2016, followed by a series of arrests of female militants in 2017.

While the operative realm of terrorism is still largely a male dominated phenomenon in Pakistan, optimal supply and demand conditions in the militant market may create a real space for higher levels of women involvement. Many Pakistani Islamist groups have long made concerted efforts to recruit women in some capacity, and are generally able to



Source: AFP

## “ Female combatants in Pakistan have existed in low numbers in the past, the past may not be the best predictor of the future in this case ”

draw women's support through dedicated women's outreach wings. The Lashkar-e-Taiba is a prominent example of a group that has made efforts to win and publicize the support of the mothers of militants to facilitate recruitment and strengthen support for its mission. But there are early signs that terrorist groups in Pakistan are becoming more willing to engage women in active jihadist endeavors, and women may be willing to participate. The turn by the TTP to assume a more gender-inclusive jihad is indicative of this trend. The TTP released an English-language magazine *Sunnat-e-Khauila* in August 2017 making a direct appeal to educated Pakistani women to move beyond passive roles (propagandists, recruiters, fundraisers, and logistical facilitators) toward more active roles. While this notable shift in TTP's approach runs parallel to the IS ideological shift toward female participation in battlefield combat, it is likely driven by TTP's own dwindling capacity and competition with ISK. As targeted militant groups in Pakistan (such as the TTP and LeJ) face an increasingly hostile environment, and the arrival of transnational brands tightens the competition for recruits in general, groups may feel compelled to become more proactive in attracting female recruits – which remains a relatively untapped market. In addition, the expanding network and influence of ISK within South and South East Asia may contribute to normalizing the practice of using more female recruits. For example, the Islamic State became more tolerant of female participation in violent jihad as it moved

to a defensive position, and used female suicide bombers in efforts to hold Mosul.

Parallel to organizations' willingness to employ female combatants, there are signs of women's increased willingness to participate. A recent report highlighted that more women may have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, serving in various capacities than previously thought. This may also mean that the number of women returning or transferring to other theaters of jihad, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, may have been underestimated. In December 2015, Pakistani authorities discovered the Islamic State linked Bushra Cheema who had reportedly relocated herself and 20 others to participate in jihad in Syria. Several other examples suggest that this was not an isolated event. An Islamic state linked female operative Naureen Leghari was captured in a counterterrorism raid, in an apparent attempt to target a church during Easter, and in the same year,

## “ The security architecture of Pakistan must look inwards to keep pace with rapid developments in its internal security challenges in order to tackle militant groups effectively ”

Karachi police detained several women involved in female recruitment for ISIS. In 2018, police learned about a female suicide bomber who had returned to Afghanistan after a failed mission to target the Bethel memorial church in Quetta. Prior to these incidents, both the TTP and LeJ have deployed female suicide bombers in Bajaur and in Quetta respectively. Although female combatants in Pakistan have existed in low numbers in the past, the past may not be the best predictor of

the future in this case. There is a need for the state to avoid complacency about the potential threat of female recruitment by being attentive to current dynamics, which may trigger a change. On one hand, a challenging operating environment may pressure militant groups to devise creative ways to fight back. On the other hand, potential female recruits that constitute a significant proportion of Pakistan's sizeable young population are now more accessible via social media and online platforms than ever before.

### LOOKING FORWARD


In the realm of terrorism, violent organizations' practice of forming intricate networks or recruiting female operatives is not new. Even within Pakistan, these trends have characterized the militant landscape to some degree. Yet, the reorganization of lethal groups in Pakistan to operate as an extensive network, with links to a deeply sectarian and anti-state transnational brand may bring forth a new set of targets, tactics and strategies. Increased willingness to incorporate female operatives adds an additional layer of complexity. The security architecture of Pakistan must look inwards to keep pace with rapid developments in its internal security challenges in order to tackle militant groups effectively. Striving to stay two steps ahead of potential terrorist innovations is essential for the state to protect its civilian populations and prevent spiraling instability at home.

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*The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government.*

# THE RUSSIAN FOOTPRINT IN AFGHANISTAN



**Ishaq Ahmed**

Russian engagement and involvement in Afghanistan is not a new development. Previously from regime influence to invasion and currently pursuing its regional security

objectives, the Russians have always been deeply involved in Afghan affairs. Their engagement with the Taliban, against whom they have supported the NATO and the US during Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and even other Afghan groups prior to 2001, however, is new and different in its kind.

Soviet influence in Afghanistan achieved quantum growth during King Zahir

Shah's regime. The rationality of the Cold War support continued to sustain and improve Moscow-Kabul relations during the regime of Sardar Daud, the Afghan president from 1973-78. The Soviets had the closest relations in the era of the Marxist regime from 1978-92, when they invaded Afghanistan.

Russians, after unprecedented exit even backed some Islamist factions against

Taliban whom they had fought during their quest for total control, yet they maintained and have now revived contacts with the Taliban. It may be noted that for quite some time the Russians remained busy putting their own house in order, therefore were not apparently much concerned. But it was not long before they were attracted towards development in Afghanistan, especially due to the emergence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and the threat of Islamist's spillover towards mainland Russia.

Afghanistan seems to be on low priority and less important to the U.S policy makers. This was probably one of the reasons for a shift in Russia's thinking and policy. Having observed that Washington has revisited its engagement, Moscow got an opportune moment to get involved which it did through the Moscow

**“ The Russians believe that despite the uncertainty within the warring factions, the Afghan Taliban do not have transnational aspirations ”**

peace initiative. However, Russia, being Afghanistan's neighbor, has the additional benefits and also fears Islamists' support to the insurgency in Russia. Recently, reports emerged that Moscow has enhanced its relations with the Taliban. Although keeping in view the regional and strategic interests, the Russian contacts with the Taliban must not be taken as unrealistic.

Russian interest in controlling the spillover towards Central Asia and mainland Russia is the prime cause for enhancing the engagement and exerting its influence. For this sole reason, over the past few years, Russia's relationship with the Taliban has become a need and reality. Though the

relationship is essentially and apparently a diplomatic one, yet some intelligence engagement and financial support must also be taking place to counter Daesh's influence, activities and expansion and more predominantly steps towards peace efforts.

The players in the ongoing 'great game' must take into account Taliban's need to be distinguished from Al-Qaeda and Daesh. The Russians believe that despite the uncertainty within the warring factions, the Afghan Taliban do not have transnational aspirations.

One might ask, why is Russia engaging in the peace process when all efforts initiated by the US and others have not yielded positive results? Even though the Russians do not have cherished memories of Afghanistan yet they are unlikely to be under any misconception about Afghanistan. The Russians are well aware of the fact that it is difficult to appease Afghans. However, the Russians cannot and must not ignore that Afghanistan will not come under Russian influence for obvious reasons.

Afghanistan is no longer considered an opportunity by Moscow; rather it has become a source of concern due to Islamic extremism and its spillover towards Central Asia alongside US/NATO security and intelligence presence. The drug trafficking has grown widely in Afghanistan, especially in recent times and is having a destructive impact on the Russian society and economy. As Afghanistan continues to stay in a state of instability, Russia is evaluating and delicately proceeding with stabilized support and engagement.

The immediate past has witnessed some critical observations about Russian engagements with the Taliban and many have raised eyebrows after the Moscow peace initiative, especially the US.

One must ask what is forcing Moscow to engage with the Taliban and what are the Russian stakes in Afghan peace? Also, how well can the Russians play their cards to become relevant and refresh its long-

lost influence?

Today, the problem for Russia is how Moscow can attempt to raise Afghanistan from a liability to an interest. While Russia was a marginal player in Afghanistan at the end of the 20th century, the post-2001 Afghanistan has dragged Russia to rethink its role as a major contributor towards peace and development.

Russia's relationship with Afghanistan has gained importance in recent times, with regard to fears of militancy spillover from the South, US, and NATO presence and their sinister designs against Russia and security of the Southern borders. At the same time, Russia would safeguard Afghanistan from being used against Russian interests in the heart of Asia, and to limit Afghan drug flow into mainland Russia.

China's connectivity visualization for the Euro-Asian continent, the CPEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative has serious threats from an unstable Afghanistan, therefore China besides other motives is endeavoring to play a predominant and constructive role in Afghan's peace initiatives.

Though Moscow has enhanced its role in Afghanistan since last many years, especially after 2010, yet it remains cautious due to the historic bitter experience and probably lack of clarity of objectives in the presence of the Americans. Russian concerns about Islamic militancy, keeping

**“ China's connectivity visualization for the Euro-Asian continent, the CPEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative has serious threats from an unstable Afghanistan ”**

Southern borders safe and US presence in close proximity are forcing or dragging the Russian decision makers to expand and exert broadly in Afghanistan.

Russia also seems cautious while getting too involved in the 'quagmire', however, it has started actively supporting the peace process with the Taliban and the US - China - Pakistan - Afghanistan Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). For the past few years, in the wake of the Islamic State's (ISIS) presence in Afghanistan and its extraordinary activities, Russia has become proactive in directly engaging with the Taliban.

In December 2015, Russian officials stated that they are engaged in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the threatening presence of Daesh in Afghanistan. Subsequently, in April 2017, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, accused Russia of providing weapons to the Taliban fighters. This was the first time a senior US commander made such an allegation. The Russians responded blatantly and termed the allegations 'unprofessional and groundless' and stated that it is an attempt to 'put the blame for failures in Afghanistan on Russia besides Pakistan. Russia also counter blamed the US for supporting Daesh in Afghanistan.

While the blame game reflects Cold War rhetoric, it is important to understand why Russia has engaged with the Taliban in the first instance and what its aims at in the foreseeable future.

Many in Russia contest the US presence in its neighborhood whether as a dormant or apparent threat. The view has been that the US invasion of Afghanistan was a ploy to gain a military foothold in the region and to keep a check on Russia, Pakistan, China, and Iran, besides other political and financial objectives. It is widely stated and believed that the US is intentionally working towards prolonged conflict in Afghanistan for its own strategic interests and gains. Some even state that the US is using the ISIS/ ISIL as a proxy to counter China and Russia while making Pakistan the next target.

## “ The US withdrawal would pave the way for a resurgent Moscow to increase its influence beyond Central Asia in Afghanistan and Pakistan ”

The Russians, therefore, might be assisting the Taliban in order to counter US intentions and make US bleed at an unbearable level and thus forcing it to exit. The US withdrawal would pave the way for a resurgent Moscow to increase its influence beyond Central Asia in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Another reason for the Russian involvement with the Taliban could be to wrestle the growing threat of the ISIS and Islamists in Afghanistan. Moscow is very concerned on account of growing or existing Islamic extremism in mainland Russia, therefore making all-out struggles to control and keep the Southern borderland clear and safe alongside inland territories. Russia is therefore concerned over the outgrowth of IS' influence in Afghanistan, and over the possibility of radicalization expanding towards Central Asian states. The threat would make Russia seriously vulnerable. Another major worry for Moscow is that many ex-Taliban fighters and commanders have switched to Daesh, which is also recruiting Central Asians and the Russians. Having said that, the Taliban have emerged as an ally for Russia. One more reason of Russia's closeness with the Taliban is to control the drugs outflow. Opium is widely consumed in Russia and transported throughout the country for the market in Europe. It may be noted that earnings from the drug trade are believed to be a source of funding for the Taliban.

Finally, the most significant purpose of Russia's engagement with the Taliban could be to influence and transform the political landscape in Afghanistan after the US departure. Moscow may possibly

be also working towards making Taliban a reckonable political entity, which is seen as a nationalist movement in contrast to the radical character of Daesh or ISIS.

According to Shah Nawaz Tanai, ex-communist Afghan Army Chief *"Soviets have always strived towards friendly [relations] and influenced Afghanistan and at times [have] exerted [their will]"*. The Soviet invasion of 1979 was a step in the same direction and fear of loss contributed towards military intervention. By mid-50s, the US had started investing in various sectors in Afghanistan and their influence had become a source of concern for the Soviets.

Even now, Moscow would like to have and is striving towards friendly and pro-Moscow government in Kabul. Therefore, engagement with the Taliban is to make peace possible through negotiations. The peace that shall have good place and space for the Taliban in the power corridors of Afghan society.

With the changing global environments of multi-polarity, the Russians have to regain the lost place and space and Afghanistan is a test case for them. The peace efforts through the Moscow initiative is a right step towards stability in the neighborhood and the region. Besides peace in Afghanistan, the Russians must also curtail US' influence and presence which has become a threat of a serious nature.

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# 9/11 & THE NEW WORLD ORDER



**Mujahid Kamran**

It was on September 11, 2001, that the event known as 9/11 took place. On this date, three buildings, WTC1, WTC 2 and WTC 7, located in the Manhattan District of NY city, collapsed, as if in a free fall. Two of these were apparently hit by what were said to be hijacked aircraft and the third building was said to have collapsed as a result of fires that began when burning material from WTC 1 and 2 fell on WTC7. The

aircrafts were said to have been hijacked by collaborators of Osama Bin Laden. On this pretext the US launched an attack on Afghanistan, and has, since, waged endless wars in the world destroying Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and so on. These are energy-resource rich Muslim countries, while Afghanistan has rare minerals and is located strategically on the route of oil and gas transportation out of the Central Asian states.

But is the dominant narrative on 9/11 correct? Does it merit closer scrutiny? This question needs to be answered logically and comprehensively because it has been made the basis of unending US militarism post-9/11.

It was on June 5, 2006, that an investigative journalist enquired from Rex Tomb, the Chief of Investigative Publicity for FBI, as to why was the name of Osama bin Laden



was absent from the Most Wanted FBI List of 9/11 perpetrators. Rex Tomb replied:

***“The reason why 9/11 is not mentioned on Osama Bin Laden’s Most Wanted page is because FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11... He has not been formally indicted and charged in connection with 9/11 because the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11.”***

So did the US invade Afghanistan without any evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11? It seems so. Interestingly, this explosive statement was completely blacked out by the mainstream media (MSM).

It is well known that fires cannot melt or soften steel which has a melting point of 1538°C. The highest temperature known to have been generated by fires is 340°C. Fires, before or after 9/11, have left steel structures intact in every case, even though everything else in the buildings was gutted. How did fire bring down these three buildings still remains an unanswered question. Richard Gage, founder of Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth, makes this case:

***“The official FEMA and NIST reports provide insufficient, contradictory, and fraudulent accounts of the circumstances of the tower’s destruction... We are therefore calling for a grand jury investigation of NIST officials...”***

In his book, *9/11 The Simple Facts: Why the Official Story Can’t Possibly Be True*, author Arthur Naiman quotes NY Fire Department firefighter Joe Cassiligi who wondered:

***“You have two 110-storey buildings. You don’t find a desk. You don’t find a chair. You don’t find a telephone, a computer... The building collapsed to dust.”***

Naiman further stressed that “90,000 tons of concrete” and the entire “office furniture, fixtures and equipment” weighing

thousands of tons “are missing from the debris pile.” NY Governor George Pataki also stated: “The concrete was pulverized... All of lower Manhattan, not just this site, from river to river, there was dust, powder...” What technology could have converted concrete and metallic fixtures and equipment to fine powder enough that “a four-inch layer of dust covered Lower Manhattan.” It is hard to wrap one’s head around this one since fire just cannot turn concrete and metal into fine powder. Dr. Judy Wood has coined the term “Dustification” for such anomalous 9/11 effects to contextualize the phenomenon.

In an op-ed titled “Stonewalled by the C.I.A.,” that appeared in the New York Times on January 2, 2008, Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Chair and Vice Chair respectively of the 9/11 Commission stated:

***“What we do know is that government officials decided not to inform a lawfully constituted body, created by the Congress and the president, to investigate one of the greatest tragedies to confront this country. We call this obstruction.”***

Why did the CIA obstruct? What was being hidden from the 9/11 Commission? No one knows for sure. However, John Farmer, senior counsel to the official 9/11 Commission writes in his 2010 book *The Ground Truth*:

***“In the course of our investigation into the national response to the attacks, the 9/11 Commission staff discovered that the official version of what had occurred [the morning of September 11, 2001] – that is what the government and military officials had told the Congress, the Commission, the media and the public about who knew what when – was almost entirely and inexplicably untrue.”***

Why did the US government and the military lie and continue to lie about 9/11? Millions of Americans still believe that their government concealed information from them about 9/11 attacks. Many have speculated the reasons for official

information on 9/11 still missing. The predominant counter-narrative to the mainstream narrative on 9/11 is that the Bush administration lied because the war of aggression against Afghanistan had already been planned as part of a long range agenda of global domination that could not have been revealed to the US public. Afghanistan was to enable the US to gain a military foothold in Central Asia so that it could exploit the energy and mineral resources of the region for US corporations. In addition, it was to help acquire military bases in the region in order to threaten China and Russia in accordance with the Neo-con Project of New American Century (PNAC).

For those who follow the US foreign policy closely, it is not a hidden fact that the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) predominately dictates US foreign policy. However, it is less well known that CFR is a front for Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and that both the CFR and RIIA were set up by the Rothschilds after WWI. Together these think tanks act like an invisible government, make policies and publish their ideas in mainstream journals, the likes of *Foreign Affairs* for example. Articles are expanded into book form and are given raving reviews to popularize it by the MSM, considered to be a propaganda arm of the US corporate Elite. For instance, CFR member Samuel P. Huntington first published an article with the title ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in a 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. His book with the similar title ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’ was published in 1996 which brought global fame to the author due to the fantastical hypothesis it carried. The thesis of the *Clash of Civilizations* conjured the divide between the West and the rest – mainly the Islamic civilization as the one working against the West – something that Huntington predicted needed to be controlled. In the post-Cold War world, without communism, Huntington provided the roadmap to get hold of the energy resources of the Muslim world as means of exerting control over them. This thinking was further propagated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was the co-founder of

the global elite Trilateral Commission in 1973, in his 1997 book titled *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Imperatives*. Like Huntington, an article on this theme was published by Brzezinski in *Foreign Affairs* prior to expanding it in book form. Brzezinski wrote:

“[I]t is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges capable of dominating Eurasia and thus challenging America.” Moreover (p 31):

*“A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent. About 75 percent of the world’s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for 60 percent of world’s GDP and about three fourths of the world’s known energy resources.”*

It is the wealth and energy resources of Eurasia that are the targets of the limitless greed of the global financial Elite that also owns the four largest oil companies of the world. Brzezinski further writes (pp.35-36, emphasis added):

*“It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad. This limits the use of America’s power, especially its power for military intimidation. Never before has a populist democracy attained global supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in case of a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is defense spending) and human sacrifices (casualties among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to the cause of imperial mobilization.”*

This means that in order to build a global empire – a one world slave state governed by the financial Elite – the US constitution must be undermined so that US no longer remains a democracy. Simultaneously, “a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s sense of domestic well-being” be created, to bring the US public on board to fighting wars. Thus the Elite agenda, designed and published by CFR and elsewhere, by Brzezinski et al was: dictatorship at home and war abroad. This is precisely the course things have taken after 9/11.

A constitutional lawyer, John Whitehead proclaims:

*“What we have is Government of Wolves. More than that we are now being ruled by a government of scoundrels, spies, thugs, thieves, gangsters, ruffians, rapists, extortionists, bounty hunters, battle ready warriors and cold-blooded killers who communicate using a language of force and oppression.”*

The FBI and other civilian law enforcement agencies have been ‘militarized’ precisely to oppress the people of America if they oppose wars abroad and want to have their constitutional liberties back. These civilian law enforcement agencies have been provided with armoured vehicles and military gear. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has purchased 2.2 billion rounds of hollow point bullets which as some have speculated is enough for a 30 year civil war (during the Iraq war only 70 million rounds were used when the war was at its height).

The US invasion of Afghanistan was pre-planned. Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary and Pakistan’s representative at a four-day meeting in Berlin in July 2001 was told by ‘senior US officials’ in July 2001 that war would be imposed on Afghanistan by October 2001 if the Taliban did not share power with US friendly factions. Naik stated this in a BBC interview and has never been contradicted. Naik’s statement is also quoted by David Ray Griffin in his book titled *The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions*. Michael Craig

Ruppert, American writer and author of *The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil* who was hated by the CIA and died in 2014 in an apparent ‘suicide’ wrote in an article on the timeline surrounding Sept 11<sup>th</sup>:

*“Sept. 1-10 – In an exercise called Operation ‘Swift Sword’ and planned for four years, 23000 British troops are streaming towards Oman. Although the 9-11 attacks cause a hiccup in the deployment, the massive operation was implemented as planned. At the same time two US carrier battle groups arrive in Gulf of Arabia, just off the Pakistani coast. Also at the same time, some 17000 US troops join more than 23000 NATO troops in Egypt for ‘Operation Bright Star’. All these forces are in place before the first plane hits the WTC.”*

There are some inconvenient truths about what actually happened on 9/11. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 9/11 were carried out to implement the strategy spelled out by Brzezinski on behalf of, not just the CFR, but his real pay masters, the Rothschilds and Rockefellers, etc. who constitute the inner core of the global financial Elite. The Elite treats the entire globe as a real estate and wants to own it all. It wants to enslave all mankind, but by significantly and violently reducing the global population. They own the governments of the US, UK and Israel. Europe of course, has the status of a vassal as far as the US is concerned. The New World Order means a global slave state run by the Elite and its subservient collaborators. It is in their interest that the engineered reality about 9/11 is mainstreamed and the counter-narratives and truth missions be dubbed as conspiracy theories.

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# OF MILITARISM, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND LIMITED SUCCESSSES

## U.S. FOREIGN POLICY POST-9/11



Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

“Diplomacy: the art of restraining power.”  
*Henry Kissinger*

The dastardly attacks on the Twin Towers on 11th September, 2001 were colossal and impactful. The aftershocks of the 9/11 carnage jostled countries in South Asia and the Middle East. The magnitude of the event was such that it had an indelible impact on US’ foreign policy, and given that the US was the mightiest power in a unipolar world order, it became a watershed. US’ foreign policy gambits always pandered to *raison d’etat* and resorted to means of containing its foes. Setbacks like the Vietnam War were mixed with successes in the Afghan war in 1979 against the former USSR. However, post 9/11, the US’ proclivity towards interventionism, use of force and muscular diplomacy has been dealt with severe blows while ceding more space to its adversaries.

In less than a month after 9/11, the United States started its air campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom were the obliteration of terrorists’ havens and the war-waging capabilities of the Taliban forces. The aerial

campaign from land-based B1, B2 and B52 bombers certainly have telling impact in conventional wars but are ineffective against insurgents since they elicit strength from changing locations and tactics. With their leadership well intact, the Taliban regrouped and emerged as a stronger force. The ill-thought out application of military power precludes the possibility of achieving success through the employment of a military-heavy policy in Afghanistan. The troop-surge in 2010 and the New South Asia Policy announced in 2017 have clearly amplified the fact that an increase in firepower was an anathema to peace in Afghanistan.

Not only are the Taliban stronger than they were since 2001, Washington’s threats have also alienated its ally, Pakistan. Today, Islamabad is not only resisting US’ pressure but is also fairly wedded with China and fast-developing ties with Russia. Here it is important to assert that Moscow and Beijing are surely increasing their footprints in Afghanistan. Both of these strategic challengers to the US are consistently pushing for a political

“ The Taliban neither had the will nor the capacity to radiate their influence beyond the borders of Afghanistan, let alone the US. Hence, Washington’s inability to discern between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was a mistake ”



solution to the Afghan quagmire. It is US’ persistence with its military-heavy policy that has allowed its nemeses to ingress in Afghanistan.

The Iraq War in 2003 and its aftermath exemplify how the supersession of diplomacy and a penchant to apply military force resulted in trouble for the US. The credibility of the US and its intelligence community was called into question after it was found that there were no Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs) in Iraq when the US attacked it under the aegis of UNSC 1441. After overthrowing Saddam Hussein, the US failed to chalk out a stable political order. Sectarian violence and the advent of the Islamic State (IS) not only compounded challenges for the US but also helped give Iran a greater clout in Baghdad.

Similarly, US' continued military presence in Syria even after the defeat of the ISIS has again put doubts on Washington's ability to appreciate ground realities. The Assad regime, however repressive, does not pose any threats outside Syria. That said, the massive intervention on part of the US has not invoked Iranian meddling but also increased Assad's reliance on US' rivals.

Iran's policies in Syria, Iraq or Lebanon for that matter. Washington's unilateral withdrawal just added one more point of friction to the many outstanding disputes between the two arch-rivals. The US' strategic practitioners have continually advocated punitive measures against Iran without understanding as to how the Islamic Republic conducts its foreign relations based on its national interests.

The situation in the Korean Peninsula is all but disconcerting. The Trump administration's 'Fire and Fury' approach to handling Kim Jong Un's nuclear weapons made Pyongyang fully utilize the value of the ultimate weapon. By threatening Guam and Continental US, the Kim regime deterred a US' counterforce strike.

US before 9/11, it has now become a cornerstone. However, if one were to look at the Taliban or the Kim regime, it becomes abundantly clear that the security threat has been inflated in each case. The Taliban neither had the will nor the capacity to radiate their influence beyond the borders of Afghanistan, let alone the US. Hence, Washington's inability to discern between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was a mistake. Pyongyang's nuclearization has now turned into a security challenge and perhaps will continue to remain so unless the US resorts to constructive dialogue.

As Gen. George S. Patton famously said "if everybody is thinking alike, then somebody is not thinking." The US, by and large, has thought in the same way



The Washington-Tehran rivalry since the Iranian Revolution defies Lord Palmerston's quote on inter-state relations who sagely stated that 'there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.' Today, both countries are embroiled in threatening each other. The US' withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal has compelled scholars to analyze possible war scenarios. The deal was a landmark agreement meant to stem Iran's nuclear program; it was not meant to check

The saber-rattling ultimately resulted in direct talks between President Trump and Kim. While Kim's pariah status was done away with, Trump left Singapore without any assurance of 'Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization.' Here, the US has been unable to weave a link between insecurity and nuclearization.

One common theme that permeates in all these and other US foreign policy engagements is national security. While security was an important goal for the

when it comes to dealing with foreign policy challenges. Coercive diplomacy and militarism have only given more space to current and potential enemies of the US. A muscular approach may also go on to swell the ranks of the challengers.

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*Word from the Author:*

# SHAKING HANDS WITH CLENCHED FISTS

## THE GRAND TRUNK ROAD TO CBMS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA




**Asma Shakir Khawaja**

Whenever any region is decolonized, nations are reborn thereby learning to forget their past and try to buy their already sold integrity and freedom that had been raided by the imperial towers so far. Subcontinent, decolonized since August 1947, had become a land of opportunity for division & variety of hates on socially confined grounds. Pakistan and India have been greeting each other with a blame game, bullet exchange, water politics, economic manipulations, rigorous visa responses, sponsored extremism and several other overwhelming gestures for about 70 years. Now, as a result, most of the efforts for peaceful conflict resolution to ensure coexistence fell prey to their notion of hostility, mistrust and domestic politics.

The book, *Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists*, is a factual and academic account of Pakistan's side of the story regarding Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India. Theoretically and academically, my work deliberates on Pakistan's intentions and policies to forge peace with India at different junctures of history. Furthermore, it highlights the incompatibilities between leadership, phases, issues, self-interests and national interests which costed sustainable peace in South Asia. It has also paid special attention to the issue of spoilers and identified the actors who derailed various phases of peace process throughout history. This book attempts at analyzing different discourses of Indo-Pak CBMs since 1947 reflecting on the leadership vision during those specific eras. The onus of creating peace in South Asia lies with its two key players – Pakistan and India. It is therefore essential that they defeat their trust deficit through focused attempts of cooperation and organize a conducive

environment for the region's transition from hostility to mutually beneficial alliances. Strong, well-planned, and pragmatic bilateral confidence building measures are need of the day to make the dream of peace come true.

Disparate interests and trust deficit have been a constant companion in way of conflict resolution in South Asia. Pakistan seeks disputes resolution as a pre-condition to normalization of relations with India, whereas India appears inclined to crisis management and shallow measures dragging its feet towards peaceful coexistence. There is a proclivity to remain embroiled in disputes rather than looking for conducive ways for rapprochement. Foreign policies of the two states take this color too. The officially declared policy, nevertheless, remains the pursuit of peace, comprising several efforts to resolve disputes and seek a permanent solution to conflicts, but regrettably, preceded by incompatible postures.



For the first time, through an academic and scholarly account in this book, the issue of political capital and its relevance with success of CBMs in the region has been discussed. It attempts to answer the most relevant questions about the successes and failure of a sustained peace process between India and Pakistan generally

**“ This book seeks to take stock of the past Pak-India bilateral relations with a vision of chalking out a new future of their involvement for a sustained regional harmony and collective development ”**

raised by academia and international media. Students of History, Politics, Security Studies, International Relations and South Asian Studies will immensely benefit from this in-depth research study.

This book is an endeavor to examine practiced and discarded CBMs between Pakistan and India in the socio-political context. It offers pros and cons of CBMs in order to build a constructive future for one-fifth of humanity that lives in abysmal conditions in the subcontinent.

Divided in ten (10) chapters, from theory to practice, this well-researched book covers all aspects of CBMs between India and Pakistan. The first Chapter begins by discussing *the theoretical aspects of the CBM process* between Pakistan and India. The second chapter provides a *historical review of CBM efforts* between the two countries. In the third chapter, this research focuses on the central position and salience of the *Kashmir conflict* in

forging confidence in the region. The fourth chapter discusses *Water Diplomacy*, and analyzes how politicization of water distribution and use is hampering the CBMs. The fifth chapter analyzes *the relevance of Military and Nuclear CBMs* and focuses on creating trust between the armed forces of the two hostile neighbors, while arguing that such trust between the two forces would have trickle down effect in socio-political-economic spheres. The sixth chapter is on *bilateral economic interdependency* and analyses the *Economic Peace Dividends* with special focus on irritants in this regard. The seventh chapter emphasizes the pertinent *role of civil society* and highlights the steps taken by them to ensure peace between the two countries.

This research also highlights the role of media as an agenda setter in the given scenario. In the eighth chapter it analyzes *media's influence on perception building* and its potential for creating an appetite for peace on both sides of the border. It is hard to deny the fact that Pakistan-India CBM initiatives have been hostage to peace spoilers at both sides of the border. The ninth chapter aims at identifying various *spoilers in CBM initiatives*. The identification of spoilers will pave the way for their containment and realization of peace and stability. The tenth chapter concludes the debate by emphasizing *the strategic and political eminence of CBMs* in the case of Pakistan-India relations.

Dr. Mahbub ul Haq once aptly stated that Pakistan and India needed to bury deep the bitter legacy of the past and cultivate a new harvest of hope to ensure regional peace, economic sustainability and higher human development index for the sake of their own people. This book seeks to take stock of the past Pak-India bilateral relations with a vision of chalking out a new future of their involvement for a sustained regional harmony and collective development.

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# A TALE OF TWO PEACE PROCESSES:

# KOREA AND CYPRUS



Colin Irwin



Seongwon Yoon

## TWO FROZEN CONFLICTS

All peace processes are different, different peoples, histories, places, time lines and how they got in the mess they are in and how to get out of it. This is true of Cyprus and Korea but there are also some similarities and if we focus on those there may be some peace-making lessons each side can learn from the other. Both Korea and Cyprus are 'frozen conflicts', Korea since the Armistice in 1953 and Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in 1974. Although not all conservatives are intransigent, in general, the conservative politicians in both

Cyprus and Korea have made the process of peace negotiations far more difficult.

Both Cyprus and Korea are separated North and South by the Green Line in Cyprus and Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea. The South in both Cyprus and Korea is economically well developed while the North is less so and this results in the Southern populations in both Cyprus and Korea being very sceptical about the prospects of reunification as that process may create as many problems as it solves. Also, neither country can make peace all by themselves. Cyprus requires

the agreement of their Guarantor States, the UK, Greece and Turkey while China and the US participated in the Armistice agreement for Korea and they, in turn, will have to play a crucial role in ending the Korean War. Finally, in this context, security is the most critical issue for both Cypriots and Koreans, both North and South, and this issue must be resolved to every parties' satisfaction as part of a peace agreement and new political arrangements going forward.

A liberal Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades, who had supported the



failed 2004 UN Annan Plan was elected in the South of Cyprus in 2013. In 2014, a UN Joint Declaration for renewed peace negotiations was signed and a liberal Turkish Cypriot, Akinci, was elected President in the North in 2015. Similarly, liberal or progressive leaders took office in both Koreas: President Moon Jae-in in the South; and in the North, the Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un looks to be heading in quite a different direction to his father, Kim Jong-il, resulting in the signing of the Panmunjom Declaration on the 27th of April this year. But the agreement signed in Cyprus in 2013 has not resulted in a settlement of the Cyprus Problem. The conflict there remains frozen. However, Korea's future prospects for peace took another step forward with the joint signing of an agreement at the US-Trump/NK-Kim summit on the 12th of June in Singapore. Hopefully that process will be more successful than the failed UN, Cyprus, UK, Greece and Turkey summit at Crans-Montana in Switzerland last year.

#### **CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES**

Significantly, on this critical point of success and failure there are some very substantial differences between the two summits and the preparations made to help achieve a positive outcome. In Cyprus the leaders shunned a programme of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) while the Koreans have given their Cypriot counterparts a 'Master Class' in CBM, public diplomacy and personal statesmanship that have shifted South Korean public opinion in ways that Greek Cypriots can only dream of. Critically Clause 7 of the UN Joint Declaration signed by the Cypriots in 2014 only requires that: *'The sides will seek to create*

*a positive atmosphere to ensure the talks succeed. They commit to avoiding blame games or other negative public comments on the negotiations. They also commit to efforts to implement confidence building measures that will provide a dynamic impetus to the prospect for a united Cyprus.'* No CBMs are specified here and no penalties for non-compliance included. It was only an aspiration of negotiation not a condition.

However, the Panmunjom Declaration signed by the Koreans listed a number of specific CBMs and publicly, at the signing, more CBMs were announced and have been, or are in the process of being implemented. Notably, Pyongyang's participation in the 2018 Winter Olympics under a unified flag and promised to shut down its nuclear test site and to suspend nuclear/missile tests before the summit. Seoul removed propaganda loudspeakers across the DMZ right after the summit. Then, Pyongyang shifted its clocks to align with the time in the South and dismantled its nuclear test site on May 24th as agreed. Following the 12 June Singapore summit the scheduled CBMs included: establishing a liaison office at the border town of Kaesong, military talks, talks between sports officials, Red cross talks regarding the separated families, and recovering the remains of US war dead.

Most importantly, and it was this that so dramatically shifted South Korean public

**“ Security for Greek and Turkish Cypriots is the most important issue for the two communities going forward. Similarly, security for all Koreans on the Korean peninsula is the most important issue for them ”**

opinion, the day of pageantry, symbolism and expressions of public friendship and good will between the two leaders resulted in a shift of 50 per cent, from 14.7 before their first summit to 64.7 after the summit, believing denuclearization and peace was possible. Significantly, this positive attitude remained firm at 66.5 per cent the day after President Trump temporarily cancelled his summit on May 24 and possibly rose further following Kim and Moon's impromptu second summit on May 26 to get the US-NK June 12 summit back on track.

The Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades may not be able to get quite such a dramatic result in the South of Cyprus, but less than half the Korean shift in public opinion is all he needs to get a peace 'package' through a referendum. Both he and Akinci were given an opportunity to do this at the opening of the Greek Church, in the Turkish Cypriot occupied ancient city of Famagusta, on the Easter leading up to the failed summit in Crans-Montana. Again, this year the same opportunity was there but the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders did not take it to demonstrate that peace on their island was possible and their future would be better for it.

Peace processes are generally best known for the agreements, declarations and treaties signed and made. But this tale of two peace processes underlines the importance of CBMs both symbolic and substantial. With this point in mind, given the Cyprus experience, the authors developed a peace poll to test Korean CBMs in Korea in the hope that some of them would be put into practice. Happily, events overtook these efforts with the Koreans implementing CBMs at a pace and with great effect that was not anticipated. The questionnaire was written to complement a similar programme of work undertaken in Cyprus. Regrettably those suggestions remain undone and the Cyprus peace process remains frozen. The Greek Turkish Forum has recommended the Cypriots implement these CBMs but they are painfully slow to do so and would do well to look to the Koreans for inspiration.

## “ ‘Unilateral disarmament’ be it nuclear or conventional is not going to lead to security, peace and the economic benefits that flow from security and peace ”

With all these points in mind perhaps the time has come for the UN Security Council and Guarantor States to require the Cypriots to implement a significant programme of CBMs before they sponsor another round of negotiations and summit. As for Korea, they should keep doing what they are doing so well. Implementation of the agreement made in Singapore on the 12th June will not be easy and CBMs will continue to have an important role to play in their peace process for months and years to come. Significantly at the June 12 summit, President Trump also undertook to suspend South Korea/US ‘war games’ but only in so far as North Korea negotiates in good faith. This should be regarded as a substantial CBM as North Korea has always considered these joint military exercises as rehearsals for invasion. However, the military exercises can be reinstated at any time while the measure of removing sanctions imposed by America and its allies would require international coordination and cooperation to get them re-established.

### SECURITY NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ AND GREEN LINE

But what about those negotiations at the US-North Korea summit that must resolve outstanding security issues and the failed Cyprus negotiations and summit, are there also some lessons to be learnt there? Security for Greek and Turkish Cypriots is the most important issue for the two communities going forward. Similarly, security for all Koreans on the Korean peninsula is the most important issue for them. Neither Cypriots or Koreans want a return to the conflicts that divided their

communities and in this context Koreans and Cypriots, both North and South, all want arrangements to be put in place that ensure their security the day an agreement is signed and for years and generations thereafter.

Two distinctly different proposals were suggested for doing this on the Korean peninsula. One was the ‘Libya model’ that requires North Korea to denuclearise completely before peace is made, and only then can they enjoy all the benefits promised by America with the lifting of sanctions that allow North Korea to develop economically with China and South Korea. The other is the ‘Progressive model’, which allows for complete denuclearisation by North Korea in return for security guarantees over a period of time. Inevitably ‘the devil is in the detail’ with such a model in terms of verification and how North Korea’s security can be assured. Those details have to be worked out and might include a formal end to the Korean War and establishment of a credible East Asian security regime.

Similarly, there are two distinct models for peace and security on Cyprus. At the Crans-Montana summit Anastasiades for the Greek Cypriot community wanted “zero [Turkish] troops and zero [Turkish] guarantees” from day one of any new agreement that would establish a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal state as part of the European Union. However, Akinci for the Turkish Cypriot community advocated a phased reduction in the drawdown of Turkish forces from the island in tandem with new arrangements with regional partners, a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ had been proposed in addition to the security benefits that would come with EU and NATO membership.

The ‘Libya model’ advocated by National Security Advisor, John Bolton, was rejected by North Korea as ‘unilateral denuclearization’ that, in their view, would threaten their security. By the same token, Akinci could not accept Anastasiades proposals for “zero [Turkish] troops and zero [Turkish] guarantees” from day one of any new agreement and the Crans-Montana summit failed. If there

is a lesson to be learnt here in this ‘tale of two peace processes’ then it is surely this: ‘unilateral disarmament’ be it nuclear or conventional is not going to lead to security, peace and the economic benefits that flow from security and peace. The US Administration saw the error of its ways and adopted a variant of the ‘Progressive model’ at the June 12 summit and hopefully too, the Cypriots will learn from that success and agree on a ‘Progressive model’ that works for them.

### LESSONS LEARNT

Perhaps there are also lessons in this ‘tale of two peace processes’ for other frozen conflicts. Firstly, the successful Northern Ireland peace process was supported by an extensive programme of peace polling and public diplomacy. Korea appears to be doing the same but as a does not have to test its agreements at a referendum their programme of CBMs and public diplomacy is there as much for the international audience as it is for their domestic constituencies. If the two Koreas can be seen to be making peace then the international community should do everything they can to support them and they appear to be doing so.

Israel and Palestine also regularly test a potential peace agreement against public opinion to demonstrate what ‘package’ and ‘incentives’ will win a referendum. But like Cyprus they do not have in place a comprehensive programme of CBMs. On the contrary the movement of the US Embassy to Jerusalem has been characterised as a ‘Confidence Diminishing Mechanism’ (CDM) with an accompanying loss of public support for US led negotiations in the Arab World. The lines that separate symbolic CBMs from substantial CBMs, and substantial CBMs from substantial agreements and actions are a little arbitrary. Suffice it to say that CDMs should be avoided and all CBMs should be welcomed, even the small ones that the Northern Ireland politician David Ervine famously characterised as ‘Baby steps’, because those baby steps led to an end of war and the Belfast Agreement.

Secondly, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was negotiated and

**“ There are no guarantees for success but generals making war and politicians making peace must be opportunistic and be willing to risk their reputations for the prize of success ”**

implemented over time in Northern Ireland because the Irish Republican Army viewed unilateral decommissioning, before the Belfast Agreement, as an act of ‘surrender’, and that was unacceptable to them. So out of sight of any cameras their weapons were placed ‘beyond use’ under the watchful eye of international monitors.

Security issues must be addressed with cold precision but so too must the sensitivities and respect of the parties involved in Northern Ireland, North Korea, Northern Cyprus and Palestine. Arguably such respect for the ‘other’ is the most important CBM of them all and in this regard the Americans appear to have given the North Koreans as much ‘space’ as they can to manage denuclearisation with their domestic audience. For the Americans ‘Complete Denuclearisation’ means ‘Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearisation’ and possibly the North Koreans accept this interpretation privately but, for now, the Americans appear to have accepted a significant degree of ‘constructive ambiguity’ on this point to give the North Koreans an opportunity to do what is expected of them.

The ‘Progressive model’ may or may not work but it has been given every chance of success by establishing good will through public diplomacy and CBMs at the highest

levels. At the June 12 summit the North Korean flag and Stars and Stripes, in equal size and measure provided a backdrop to the words of praise and expressions of gratitude shared by Kim and Trump. There are no guarantees for success but generals making war and politicians making peace must be opportunistic and be willing to risk their reputations for the prize of success. Following the Turkish Presidential elections in 2018, Anastasiades and Akinci have one more chance to make peace this year. Will they embrace it and take it?

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
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# AF-PAK COOPERATION & THE RISE OF IS IN KHORASAN



**Hamzah Rifaat Hussain**

It was election year in Pakistan and the Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf has formed the government in the center. The change of guard notwithstanding, the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad and the situation in Afghanistan continues to be in the doldrums. This relationship will always be a mooted point for respective administrations on either side of the border regardless of which party comes into power. The blatant reality is that administrations, governments or transitions between civil and military rule in Pakistan have not rectified the state of the bilateral relationship which is characterized by several flashpoints that remain unresolved. It is high time that both countries with their respective policy makers and external stakeholders need to be at the forefront of resolving this quagmire. It is hoped that the positive optics from the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan reciprocated by the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani translates into something substantive. Rhetoric and pleasantries are good. Action and implementation would prove to be even better.

Attacks in Kabul and areas in close vicinity to the city have skyrocketed in 2018 and the Mastung massacre prior to the general elections in Pakistan underlines the pressing realities that both countries need to deal with. These developments

**“ Beijing continues to be wary and irked by the presence of Islamic militancy which is in close geographical proximity to the Xinjiang region of the country ”**

highlight the urgency with which both countries need to address their differences for collective peace in the region given that history is replete with barbs being traded which dates back to differences over the Durand Line. Pressing issues which continue to haunt both countries require a bilateral or an *'Afghan led'* solution with the onus on both leaderships to form joint commissions to address the issue of terrorism and confront the security dilemma which revolves around the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban and more pressingly, the Islamic State in the Khorasan province.

Sadly, on the subject of terrorism, Kabul has continued to echo the mantra from Washington D.C. that Pakistan needs to *'do more'* to eradicate extremist elements on its soil which pose a direct threat to the promotion of democratic stability and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Islamabad on the other hand, contends that terrorist groups operating from its soil have been

eliminated and the onus is on Afghanistan to eradicate elements such as the Afghan Taliban and off late, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province in order for peace to materialize. The interesting aspect about these narratives is the fact that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are familiar with the modus operandi of the Taliban with the former achieving great successes against the TTP and the latter grappling with the group on its soil. There are thus, opportunities for collaboration based on the common Taliban element on both sides of the border which needs to be given precedence as compared to trading barbs which has been a characteristic off late. Other regional powers may not have the indigenous understanding that both countries would have in terms of understanding home grown threats with the exception of IS which is a recent phenomenon and alarms all major capitals across the world, let alone Kabul and Islamabad.

China's concerns can be taken as a prime example. Beijing continues to be wary and irked by the presence of Islamic militancy which is in close geographical proximity to the Xinjiang region of the country given the region's history of discontent over what is viewed as the center's discriminatory policies against the Uighur population. The Islamic state is viewed as a threat that is bound to create more unease given the group's belief in a global caliphate which represents 'Pan Islamic' interests that challenge the writ of any state, including China. Similarly,



Washington D.C. which continues to have a fractious relationship with Pakistan over issues such as the Haqqani network as well as jihadist groups which allegedly target India, may consider shunning away differences with its non- NATO ally given the collective threat which IS poses to all states regardless of political leanings or disputes with one another. New Delhi has always been seen as an ally in Kabul. India has supported the Northern Alliance since 1996 and is also bound to have similar concerns. There are opportunities at both the regional and bilateral fronts.

With opportunities present, the onus is thus on policy makers and leaderships which must go beyond 'Strategic Depth', coercive diplomacy and isolationist rhetoric. The establishment in Pakistan has favored the role of acting as a broker for


talks between the Afghan administration and the Taliban but witnessed such efforts being hijacked with developments such as the sudden disclosure of Mullah Omer being deceased which hijacked the Murree peace process in 2015. A fresh start however, is needed and without political ownership of the crisis, elements such as the IS will continue to gain momentum. As of today, over 50% of Afghanistan's territory is beyond the writ of the central government in Kabul and the brutality of IS's tactics is bound to exploit this vacuum even further. The IS will continue to feel emboldened after the fall of Mosul in Iraq where its presence on Afghan soil will be a matter of survival for the group. The suspicion from Kabul has been that elements within the Pakistani agencies are playing a dual game where negotiations are coupled with carrying out cross border attacks on Afghan soil. This skepticism will only allow the IS to gain momentum

as history is replete with examples of attacks taking place when negotiations are in process. The Islamic State is not only a security threat but also an irritant and a spoiler. This fixation with blaming Pakistan for a threat which emanates from Afghan soil from Kabul needs to be supplanted with political will and the desire to see Pakistan as a stakeholder instead of an irritant.

Whether or not both capitals can shun away their differences and promote constructive dialogue for peace on both sides of the border remains to be seen. The optics are positive but both Pakistan and Afghanistan must act swiftly under a bilateral or regional framework in order for challenging threats to be addressed. There are no two ways about it.

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**“ This fixation with blaming Pakistan for a threat which emanates from Afghan soil from Kabul needs to be supplanted with political will and the desire to see Pakistan as a stakeholder instead of an irritant ”**





# TRUMP'S SPACE FORCE AND THE FATE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY



**Waqas Iqbal**

**T**he United States of America has always introduced novel initiatives like nuclear weapons, NATO, Missile Defense Shield, quarantine etc., in world politics which, in turn have spawned competition and conflict. Although sometimes it has promoted cooperation as well but such instances are too few to be common placed. Whatever the initiative might be, US national interest has always been the main driver. Such relentless pursuit of national interest especially by superpowers like the US or

Russia has historically had the potential to weaken international law. U.S. withdrawal under President George W. Bush, from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in June 2002 is one such case in point.

The latest expression of U.S.' pursuit of its strategic goals is President Donald Trump's recent announcement of establishing a 'Space Force' as the sixth branch of U.S. military as 'separate but equal' to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) which oversees U.S. military space operations. He referred to space as 'A War Fighting Domain' where the U.S. needs dominance instead of presence only. U.S. Vice President, Mike Pence, on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2018 in a speech at

the Pentagon in Washington DC echoed Trump's words by stating that, "the previous administrations all but neglected the growing security threats emerging in space...our adversaries have transformed space into a war-fighting domain already, and the United States will not shrink from this challenge."

This strategic initiative of Trump administration is a direct outcome of activities by China and Russia in outer space. However, its contours are yet unclear as to what would be the shape of U.S. Space Force. It also needs Congressional approval but one thing is obvious that it will initiate the

weaponization of space which until this day has been prevented by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) which was signed in 1967. It is high time that the OST is reviewed to address new challenges emerging in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As it stands, the Treaty bars state parties to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space. The OST is silent over deployment of conventional weaponry in space which gives a license to spacefaring states to use outer space for military purposes. Still, it is important to understand the subtle difference between militarization and weaponization of space. In comparison to the latter, the former is a passive concept which merely entails having a military presence in space. Militaries all over the world use satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning and navigation with the global positioning system.



### According to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty:

- (i) States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
- (ii) The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

It is also important to note that currently the outer space is under dual use i.e.

military and civilian since it is inseparable for all intent and purposes. Both civil and military space missions share launching pads, vehicles, platforms satellites etc. Just like in the case of war, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is generally blurred in violation of the International Humanitarian Law – the promised use for ‘peaceful purposes’ of outer space is impossible. Therefore, there is a need for urgent revision and updation of the fifty one-year old OST.

Currently there are no weapons deployed in space but both the U.S. and China tested their anti-satellite capabilities in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The U.S. has also developed the Missile Defense Shield to protect its mainland and allies’ territories against limited missile attacks. These acts of states parties to the treaty somehow were inconsistent with Article IV (ii) since it can also trigger space-based arms race which will become the biggest nightmare of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Therefore, a new international legal framework is required to deal with this probable threat to world peace. This urgency is acknowledged by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 69/32:

The international community recognizes that present legal regime itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in space. Russia and China already submitted a joint draft treaty i.e. Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) but US called it fundamentally flawed so negotiations could not begin yet.

The idea of Space Force and the U.S. desire to dominate space is not that new a phenomenon. In fact, it is an outcome of

constant research and strategic planning for years. Donald Rumsfeld, the then Secretary of Defense recommended in January 2001 that, “the US Government should rigorously pursue the capabilities called for the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attack on US interests.” Later in 2006, the Bush administration’s overtly aggressive space policy based on unilateral approach stated that the U.S. will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit U.S. access to and use of space. It is hard to imagine a ‘force’ without weapons. Republicans have always aggressively pursued U.S. national interest. Even in the case of North Korea, key policy decisions taken by President Trump is a demonstration of hard power and unilateralism.

The establishment of U.S. ‘Space Force’ as the sixth branch of U.S. military by 2020 may afford another term of presidency to President Trump but it will also trigger weaponization of space. That consequently, has the potential to destroy strategic balance and stability around the world while undermining the Outer Space Treaty. Given its track record, it is not unlikely that in coming years the US may withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty as it did from other multilateral arrangements knitted by the international law whenever it suited its convenience.

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# THE QUANTUM RACE: QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY



Ji Yeon-Jung

Global powers are now shifting their attention to acquire strategic technology for future warfare. The quantum technologies that are critical to securing strategic dominance are opening a new era of the arms race. In particular, experiments in the field of quantum entanglement, which were esoteric to theoretical physicists in the past, have increasingly, opened new possibilities for gaining an edge in military power and intelligence gathering. These developments are drawing serious attention from policy-makers, who bet on issues of life and death to achieve military predominance. Other technologies, such as quantum tunneling and quantum superposition, are also being applied in high-stakes competitions to create new types of computation, sensing and cryptography for military applications. The mastery of these technologies is likely to tip the scales of ongoing day-to-day cyberwarfare as well as state-on-state combat in the future. As the first movers take advantage in a giant industry for decades to come, global powers are throwing their hat into the ring for quantum supremacy.

## Technological Leap Forward

In 2016, China's world-first quantum satellite, Micius, made a breakthrough in the field of ultra-long-distance quantum

communication. The prospect of hack-proof quantum teleportation based on quantum entanglement is a groundbreaking competitor among traditional encryption methods, such as the use of fiber-optics communication. The fiber optic communications and wireless airwaves that are commonly used to pass digital information with encryption have made revolutionary strides in the transmission of massive amounts of data. However, these modes are still vulnerable to attempts by eavesdroppers to decrypt the traffic. In theory and practice, the systems require the maintenance of a high level of mathematical complexity to prevent unauthorized access to decrypt the content. The traditional communication methods enabled the construction of a global network system, yet failed to provide reliable methods for detecting eavesdroppers.

The quantum technologies, however, have two advantages that traditional communication channeling lacks. First, quantum communication is safe, as any interference is detectable. This form of communication works on the basis of quantum entanglement, where pairs of particles, such as pairs of photons, work like quantum twins that share their quantum properties, such as spin, position, and momentum, in a particular way. If one of the measured halves of a pair goes up, the other one goes down—that is, each photon of a pair works according to the principle of opposites. Until quite recently, however, the distance and the


magnitude to maintain entanglement between two particles remained one of the major obstacles to commercialize from the theory.

China's experimental satellite, Micius, proved that entangled photon pairs can be securely sent and received over the long distance between the satellite and ground observatories. The satellite, which orbits at nearly 8km/sec, cruising between 500 to 2,000 kilometers above the earth, succeeded in beaming entangled pairs of photons to two ground stations, Delingha in Qinghai and Gaomeigu Observatory in Lijiang, which are about 1,200 kilometers apart. These telescopes are emplaced on high mountains to reduce the atmospheric disturbance that photons need to traverse. This quantum experiment became a major milestone of intercontinental quantum communication between the satellite and the ground observatories to demonstrate that pairs of photons are not fragile. In theory, this enables perfect security in communications, since by observing the photons, any changes made by an intruder or manipulator will be detectable.

Second, this satellite-to-ground quantum communication enhances the quantum cryptography with quantum computers. In the past, the loss of photons delivered by optical fibers was high due to the light absorption, with the result that, generally, photons cannot be delivered over distances greater than 200 kilometers. With Micius, quantum cryptography proved that the loss of photons is far less,

## Quantum leaps

China's Micius satellite, launched in August 2016, has now validated across a record 1200 kilometers the "spooky action" that Albert Einstein abhorred (1). The team is planning other quantum tricks (2-4).



going beyond the border between the two parties sharing the key to encode and decode the message. The video conference between the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing and the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna validated the quantum privacy guaranteed with a one-time pad. The possibility for global-scale communication opens the promise of a future global quantum network both for commercial and military purposes that attracts many to consider making the heavy investment necessary for quantum research.

In addition to communication, quantum metrology technology appears to establish advanced radar technology for military purposes. This technique enables the immediate changes of a targeted object at the atomic scale. For instance, the effect of gravity on subatomic particles and other key changes in other characteristics of the object is immediately noticeable. It opens the possibility of improved radar capability against electromagnetic stealth techniques, in which the U.S. has invested nearly 1 trillion USD. If the new form of quantum radar incorporates the quantum mechanics, it is nearly impossible to evade detection. The development of quantum metrology can further enhance the key application of autonomous vehicles or submarines freed from the GPS system or other external navigation settings that are vulnerable to jamming and detection.

### Active Investments

The scope of quantum technologies for both commercial and military applications appears to be almost limitless, stimulating a race among nations to achieve quantum supremacy. Currently, two giants are leading the trend. Last year, China, which established itself as the first mover to launch a quantum satellite, announced the plan to invest 10 billion USD in building a new quantum research center in Hefei by 2020. China set two principal goals for this national laboratory: developing quantum metrology and developing a quantum computer as part of the national defense plan. With quantum metrology research, China appears to intend to pioneer various military platforms for vehicles to improve communication systems to be

un-hackable as well as jam-proof. In the field of quantum computing, China was a latecomer, however, Beijing is making a proactive investment to get ahead of its competitors. The prototype of quantum computing is known 100 million times faster than the current computers using microwaves and quantum particles.

China's move has alarmed many in Washington to step up in the race. As part of maintaining U.S. military supremacy, the U.S. government re-prioritized the strategic planning with

on average since the mid-2000s. In 2016, the Obama administration set up an inter-agency working group for quantum research, while many still believe that it is not enough to compete with China for capturing quantum supremacy. The recent National Quantum Initiative Act passed by Congress incorporates a ten-year development program through inter-agency coordination on quantum research to spur a competitive edge. A quantum industry coalition, including Intel, Google, Lockheed Martin, OxBranch, and so on has been initiated to mobilize



innovative technologies, reinforcing the joint cooperation among academia, national laboratories and the private sector into a national security innovation base. Quantum computing and its linkage with artificial intelligence appear to be the priority as part of the catching-up strategy. The U.S. appears to have spent 200 million dollars on quantum research

the quantum science research across the government.

Some discussions are also ongoing about China's quantum radar and imaging development plans that aim at reducing the U.S. advantage in stealth technology. The F-35 stealth fighter, a single-engine, multirole stealth combat aircraft, is one

of the main weapon systems of the U.S. air force. In 2016, China already had developed a single-photon quantum radar that effectively works up to one hundred kilometers distance from its targets.

In Europe, the European Commission (EC) is the leading agency to invest in quantum research and has announced the creation of a 1.1 billion U.S. dollar initiative as the institution's quantum technology flagship. However, the industrial partners seem to be less enthusiastic for such an EC-led coordination, which has induced many

Quantum Technologies Program, the political hurdles have slowed the joint research apart from the initial ambitious agenda.

India also is joining the race. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and Raman Research Institute launched joint quantum technology research to secure satellite communications. In 2017, the Space Applications Center under ISRO funded the Quantum Information and Computing laboratory at Raman Research Institute, which took the first step toward

### More to go

The door has just been opened to visualize quantum physics. However, a number of issues remain to be solved before technological obstacles can be overcome. At present, the quantum satellite needs to fly directly over the receiver. To improve the tracking accuracy, the receiver needs to be placed high on a mountain to receive the data. The limitation on the bandwidth determines the effective coverage of the satellite communications. Also, the cost and size of the device matters. In coming years, perhaps a decade or so, the



Source: Shutterstock

countries, including Germany, Austria and Hungary, to launch independent quantum technology programs. Furthermore, in the wake of Brexit, the possibility of including Britain in such projects has become politically complex. As Britain was one of the few countries promoting an inter-agency research program, worth some 450 million USD under the National

quantum communications. Japan and Singapore also conduct quantum-communication experiments through micro and nanosatellites, respectively. However, both countries' experiments have yet to involve quantum entanglement, or quantum teleportation.

quantum technologies will improve by leaps and bounds, which is sure to truly open a new type of arms race among the global powers.

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*Ji Yeon-jung is a Lecturer at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul.*



Sahar Khan

Afghanistan's peace process is experiencing some hiccups. After two successful joint conferences between Afghanistan and regional players in Kabul in February and then Tashkent in March, it seems to have slowed down considerably. Why? And can Pakistan, under the leadership of Imran Khan, and with a foreign policy guided by seasoned

more time to prepare. Initially, the Afghan government had decided not to attend the talks in Moscow, arguing that all direct talks with the Taliban should be held in Afghanistan. The United States also refused to attend the talks as a show of solidarity with the Afghan government. If the Moscow talks take place, it will be the first time an Afghan government would meet with Taliban officials under a multilateral setting. While the Tashkent conference and subsequent declaration was hailed as a huge success by all stakeholders, the Taliban did not attend the conference.

for the first time Ghani made a three-day ceasefire offer to the Taliban on Eid ul Fitr, the festival following the holy month of Ramadan. In an unprecedented move, the Taliban accepted the offer. Though violence resumed immediately after the ceasefire was over, the fact that it even occurred is an important development for two reasons. First, the Taliban have enough control over its insurgent units to stop attacks (albeit for a very short duration). Second, and more significantly, their willingness to halt attacks for three days at a time when they control the most territory they have ever controlled in

# THE STALEMATE IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN'S STALLED PEACE PROCESS ON U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

politician and new foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, have a positive impact on Afghanistan's peace process?

## Afghanistan's Ongoing Peace Process

Moscow was due to hold the next round of peace talks on September 4, which was to consist of 12 countries, including China, Iran, and Pakistan and the Taliban. But the talks have been postponed after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani requested

President Ghani has made several attempts to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. In February of this year, Ghani offered to hold direct talks with the Taliban that would be "without preconditions" and would involve considering the Taliban as a legitimate political party, providing an office for them in Kabul, issuing them Afghan passports, helping with resettlement of their families, and assisting with taking the names of top commanders off international terrorist lists. In June,

Afghanistan indicates that they eventually want peace despite what critics say.

The violence following the June ceasefire, however, also indicated the decreasing capacity of the Afghan security forces and fragility of the current government, which has been a problem over the last several years. In an April 2018 report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General of Afghanistan, Afghan police and military forces have decreased by 11 percent



Source: AFP

over the past year. The decrease is partly due to deflections and partly due to the reluctance of Afghans joining the security forces for fear of being targeted by the Taliban and the Islamic State, which is also operating in Afghanistan, contributing to the increasing violence and instability in the country.

Ghani, therefore, made another ceasefire offer to the Taliban, to begin on Eid ul Adha, the festival following the Hajj, which was on August 21. While the Taliban have yet to officially respond to the ceasefire, Taliban-led violence continued in Kunduz, where three passenger buses with almost 200 passengers were attacked, and several taken hostage. While Afghan security forces were able to free about 150 passengers, 21 remained captured. The Taliban issued a statement saying that passengers that belonged to Afghan security forces were targeted, while all other civilians, including women and children were released.

### **Pakistan's Role in the Afghan Peace Process**

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan has remained a contentious issue for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States alike. Recently the United States asked Pakistan to facilitate Afghan-Taliban peace talks, which may seem like a promising development – even an olive branch of sorts when considering the hardline approach the Trump administration has taken with Pakistan, such as suspending security and military aid, sanctioning seven Pakistani firms, and discontinuing the U.S. International Military and Education (IMET) program.

Yet, Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan has not always supported an Afghan government that is in the interest of the Afghan people. Pakistan's military has long-adopted policy toward Afghanistan that involves installing and maintaining a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. Called “strategic depth,” the Pakistani policy is based on the assumption that a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul will ensure that dispute over the Durand Line, the contested border between the two countries, would not become more

contentious. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's support of the Taliban in the 1990s was partly based on the idea that the Taliban would be more supportive of Islamabad than a Northern Alliance-led government. Even after the U.S.-led Global War on Terror started, and Pakistan agreed to partner with the United States, it continued its support of the Taliban (now well-documented in Steve Coll's book, *Directorate S*), much to the United States' annoyance.

In other words, most of the current tension within the U.S.-Pakistan relationship stems from Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, and how it diverges from U.S. policy. However, it is essential to note that U.S. policy in Afghanistan has never been clear and has often been executed poorly and with very little vision. There is now a collection of literature from analysts, scholars, journalists, servicemen, and politicians who fundamentally agree on one thing: the U.S. war in Afghanistan is not going well.

However, despite American criticism and efforts to isolate Pakistan, the Trump administration needs Pakistan if it hopes – and wants – to broker a deal with the Taliban. And it seems like the United States is moving toward wanting a political settlement. For example, Alice Wells met with Taliban officials in Doha in July with the support of the Afghan government. Wells also expressed her agreement with Imran Khan's comments regarding working toward achieving peace in Afghanistan in his victory speech. The United States has also been supportive of the Afghanistan–Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity, a bilateral agreement made in April 2018 and designed to decrease terrorism in Afghanistan and facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process.

The important question, therefore, is: can the Khan administration serve as a facilitator between the Afghan government, the Trump administration, and the Taliban? Historically, Khan has been critical of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, calling it out for being one-sided. For example, in his victory speech, he said,

“the U.S. thinks it gives us aid to fight their war.” Instead, he called for a “balanced relationship.” He has also vehemently opposed U.S. drone strikes in the tribal areas. Yet, the United States should not dismiss him due to his criticisms or lack of foreign policy experience. The United States and Pakistan have always had a complicated relationship, and Afghanistan has always played a central role in bilateral U.S.-Pakistan relations. Khan's desire to improve relations with Afghanistan should be seen as an advantageous opening that could potentially pave the way for developing trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and even Pakistan and the United States.

### **Afghanistan's Unpredictable Future**

Unfortunately, Afghanistan's future is unpredictable. But the ongoing peace process is a positive development not only for Afghanistan but also for the whole region. While Afghanistan's peace process should be led by Afghan leaders, any attempts at peace will fail without regional and international support.

Ultimately it is in both the United States' and Pakistan's interest to cooperate on Afghanistan and work together to bring the Afghan government and Taliban together to the negotiating table. Whether or not Khan can facilitate such negotiations will largely depend on what happens in the next few months as he and his foreign policy team meet with world leaders and begin implementing a foreign policy. But if Khan is unable to convince the Taliban to meet with the Afghan government, it will most likely create more tensions between the U.S. and Pakistan.

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# THE MILITARIZ OF OUTER SPACE

"The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind!"

Outer Space Treaty, 1967

Source: OST Futurism



**Tughral Yamin**

As a young boy, in the days of black and white TV, I would wait for each new episode of the sci-fi serial Star Trek. Each journey of the Star Ship Enterprise into uncharted territory where no man had ever gone before would fire my imagination. Each journey was a

fascinating account of Captain Kirk on the ship's deck and his crew of first officer Mr. Spock of mixed human-vulcan heritage and Dr. Nimoy overcoming challenges in outer space. This included aliens, other life forms, hurtling meteoroids, hostile spaceships and malfunctions in the ships

# ATION

operations. It seems that science is now about to imitate art. Donald Trump has spoken of reviving the manned space program and creating a space force. In a recent statement his Vice President, Mike Pence has said that time for such a force has come. The US Space Force is planned to come into being in 2020. What does this portend for the human race? Is the space about to be militarized?

For a very long time now the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has gathered dust in the Conference of Disarmament (CD) – the UN disarmament negotiating forum – in Geneva. PAROS is a UN Resolution that basically reaffirms the fundamental principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and advocates a ban on the weaponization of space. The PAROS resolution acknowledges the limitations of existing laws related to outer space and recognizes that the Outer Space Treaty does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution calls for further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space by, among other things, urging all state parties, particularly those with space capabilities, to adhere to the objectives of PAROS. In addition, it calls on CD to establish an ad hoc committee regarding PAROS resolution issues.

In 1981, the CD initiated talks on PAROS treaty and in 1985 an ad hoc committee was established to work out the contours of the Treaty. There was a lot of opposition, from the US on the treaty negotiations and the committee was dissolved in 1994. The committee has yet to reconvene despite an annual, near-unanimous vote by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the CD approving the PAROS resolution. The US is the only country to vote against the resolution, with Israel abstaining. The US has been arguing that PAROS is unnecessary because there are no weapons – and thus no arms race – in outer space at this time. It appears this is about to change.

Since 2005, the UNGA has adopted further measures to ensure the prevention of arms race in outer space, approving an annual resolution on “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.” China and Russia have produced several working papers on PAROS, which offer suggestions for different confidence building measures (CBMs) together with suggested verification measures. Some of these suggestions include: exchanges of information, demonstrations, notifications, consultations, and thematic workshops. In 2008, China and Russia submitted a draft treaty to the CD

entitled “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT). The PPWT reiterates the importance of a weapon-free outer space, defines relevant terms such as “weapons in outer space,” and proposes the creation of an additional protocol to establish “measures of verification of compliance with the Treaty.”

In January 2007, China caused ripples when it tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. A Chinese weather satellite in polar orbit was killed by a kinetic vehicle. The test was claimed to be successful. China claimed it had informed the US, Japan and other countries in advance. This advance notification did not prevent a visible uproar against the testing by the US. Although the Chinese said that they would not be conducting any further tests, there have been reports of use of the same system for missile interception in January 2010 and January 2013.

The potential US space force has been criticized for being a wasteful and extremely expensive exercise. Many are reminded of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) popularly known as Star Wars system of space based weapons announced by Ronald Reagan in 1983. The program was shelved among other reasons because of the end of the Cold War. Now that Trump wants a space force, there is likely to be competition from the Chinese and Russian side. The Indians are also pursuing an active space program. Can they or the Israelis be left far behind? Is the world about to experience an arms race in space? Seriously it is time for the non-space going nations to actively support the renewal of talks on PAROS and a sincere effort to keep space only open for scientific exploration. Humanity must be saved from a militarized outer space.

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# RESPONSIBILITY AND DETERRENCE IN SOUTH ASIA




**Salma Shaheen**

**T**he notion of responsibility is the new black in the emerging nuclear world order that predominantly aims at reducing nuclear arsenal and minimizing their salience

in security policies leading to nuclear disarmament. These aims tend to present the idea of responsibility as abstract and distinct from the realities of prevailing security environment in South Asia

# SIA



whose management rests upon nuclear deterrence – a duo of threat of use of force and state of mutual vulnerability. Therefore, there is a need to appraise responsibility in line with nuclear

deterrence where the aim should be to manage mutual vulnerabilities effectively enough to minimize the probability of deterrence failure. In so doing, the nuclear planners tend to aim at establishing and maintaining the conditions (in terms of doctrine and capability) necessary for deterrence to prevent war.

Nuclear deterrence involves threat of nuclear attack to persuade an adversary from taking a certain course of action. In so doing, the nuclear force needs to be capable and credible enough to threaten use of force to inflict desired unacceptable damage in a timely manner. Credibility of this tragic necessity of use of nuclear force is enhanced when unitary and rational nuclear adversaries are in a state of mutual vulnerability. Mutual vulnerability induces fear of retaliation, hence convinces rational leaders to avoid risk-taking. The nuclear adversaries are dependent because being vulnerable is in the interest of both. On the other hand, responsibility, by definition, refers to a state of having a duty to deal with a situation or have a control over something for which one can be held accountable. In nuclear deterrence parlance, it is the responsibility of rational nuclear planners in nuclear weapon states to maintain a credible and effective nuclear posture that sustains the state of mutual vulnerability and related dependency so that deterrence should not be undermined.

Considering the intensity of hostilities between India and Pakistan and competitive arms build-up, it is understood that nuclear weapons continue to exist in South Asia for any foreseeable future. Hence, there lies considerable responsibility on nuclear planners in both countries to not only preserve deterrence but also minimize the probability of its failure through consistently seeking strengthening of mutual vulnerabilities. Hence the relationship between responsibility and deterrence goes like: *the more the responsible conduct of deterrence (strengthening mutual vulnerabilities) the higher the probability of its (deterrence) success.* Arguably, the prevailing doctrinal ideas and the developing sophistication in nuclear forces on both sides (India and

**“ It is imperative for both India and Pakistan to rationalize their doctrines and refrain from ideas (that are also translated into capability) that either drive nuclear planners to carry out disproportionate nuclear first strike in haste, or, advertently or inadvertently, lower the nuclear threshold ”**

Pakistan) tend to destabilize the mutual vulnerability reflecting irresponsible conduct of nuclear deterrence in the region.

As per the requirements of deterrence, India and Pakistan have developed nuclear forces, however, the conditions pertaining to their deterrent postures are not overwhelmingly strengthening mutual vulnerability in the region. For instance, India maintains a *credible minimum deterrent with a No First Use (NFU)* posture that ensures massive retaliatory nuclear strike to ‘inflict unacceptable damage’ in case of any WMD (including biological and chemical weapons) attack on Indian territory and/or Indian forces anywhere. This NFU posture is inherently destabilizing, as it is likely to drive India irrationally to initiate a massive nuclear first strike during a (non-nuclear) military crisis in the region. On the other hand, Pakistan maintains Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) within the bounds of *credible minimum deterrence* to prevent war. The FSD is based upon a comprehensive targeting strategy encompassing battlefield, counter-force and counter-value targets at three levels

of strategic, operational and tactical with appropriate weapon yield. This posture is endorsed by Pakistan's National Command Authority as a response to Indian ideas of limited conventional fighting (Indian Cold Start and Pro-Active Operations) that are aimed to address the space within military spectrum left to sub-conventional/low-intensity war. The implied proportionality and flexibility within the FSD have lowered the nuclear threshold in the region. This is risky for the success of deterrence in the absence of escalation control mechanism that could effectively restrain sub-conventional/low intensity conflict within the required bounds.

The nuclear use, in addition, to inflicting unacceptable damage at any level in South Asia would be unacceptable for both India and Pakistan. The harm would be counted at three levels: first is related to the actual damage to human and material resource either in case of an attack or retaliation; second is related to the harm a nuclear attack will inflict on defender's (nuclear armed defender) ego, along with resource damage, propelling retaliation; and third is associated with the burden both countries will have to bear as a result of breaking the non-use taboo. Therefore to initiate and retaliate with infliction of unacceptable damage – nuclear use, the causal responsibility (a subset of responsibility – who causes it) will be with the first-user. This attribution of responsibility to first-user is problematic: India's massive nuclear first use against chemical and biological attack cannot be justified as it would undoubtedly invite a 'severe' response from Pakistan involving counter-value, counter-force and battlefield nuclear targeting. It is important to note here that deterrence binds a rational actor to hold back its nuclear use until the adversary takes an unwanted action, however, by no means, it allows a rational actor to arbitrarily prefer risking the destruction of the whole region, as rightly stated by David Hume, "to the scratching of [its] finger". That is why it is imperative for both India and Pakistan to rationalize their doctrines and refrain from ideas (that are also translated into capability) that either drive nuclear planners to carry

out disproportionate nuclear first strike in haste, or, advertently or inadvertently, lower the nuclear threshold.

With regards to capability, both India and Pakistan are developing robust and survivable nuclear forces capable of inflicting unacceptable harm on each other. This reflects that both sides are in control of keeping themselves vulnerable to each other. This vulnerability is important as it induces fear that tends to positively affect both India and Pakistan to steer away from danger. However, certain technological developments could gravitate region towards instability.

Comparatively, India is seemingly more vulnerable to Chinese nuclear force modernization than to Pakistan's so New Delhi feels more responsible to maintain its vulnerability against Beijing, which in turn makes Islamabad more vulnerable. In such a scenario, the causal responsibility lies with China to correct this equation whereas China is vulnerable to American nuclear posture and modernization. Simultaneously, Pakistan assumes task responsibility (it is your job to get it correct – another subset of responsibility) to manage its vulnerability. Therefore, in order to meet their deterrent needs, both India and Pakistan are developing sophisticated and credible nuclear forces in response to their evolving strategic environments. It is worth mentioning here that: 1) deterrence does not strictly imply developing a nuclear force capable of threatening and inflicting harm proportionate to adversary's attack, and 2) deterrence is susceptible to technological breakthroughs especially when they amplify attack(s) with numbers and sophistication. The second point is particularly relevant to the new technologies introduced in the region such as missile defence shield and MIRV technology. Given the relativity in both states' vulnerabilities, Indian development of ballistic defence capability to secure itself and Pakistan's reciprocal development of MIRV technology to penetrate Indian defenses can be argued as plausible options to secure themselves against an attack and/or retaliation, yet these technologies undermine rival's confidence in its ability

**“ The premise of nuclear deterrence is the normative non-use of nuclear weapons therefore it is the responsibility of both India and Pakistan to continue to uphold this norm ”**

to destroy/retaliate. Both technologies are inherently destabilizing for deterrence stability therefore both states need to address this factor so that a stable state of mutual vulnerability is restored with a nuclear force that could promise mutual destruction.

The premise of nuclear deterrence is the normative non-use of nuclear weapons therefore it is the responsibility of both India and Pakistan to continue to uphold this norm. To ensure the non-use of their nuclear arsenals, deterrence between India and Pakistan relies upon maintaining: 1) mutual vulnerability and dependency among them with looming fears and risks that in turn compel both states to take responsibility of their situation and make efforts to strengthen it; and 2) the tragic necessity of threat of nuclear use whose credibility depends on a nuclear posture that is compatible to state of mutual vulnerability and guarantees mutual destruction. In addition, a responsible conduct of nuclear deterrence holds critical significance to the stability between India and Pakistan allowing more space for conflict resolution.

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# “WE LOVE DEATH

# AS YOU LOVE LIFE”

BRITAIN'S  
SUBURBAN  
TERRORISTS



UK: HURST AND COMPANY LIMITED PUBLISHERS 2015



Amna Ejaz Rafi

## **W**e Love Death As You Love Life: Britain's Suburban Terrorists is written by Raffaello Pantucci.

Raffaello is Director, International Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and his expertise are studies related to terrorism and radicalization.

The book is an insight into the lives of British Muslims whose parents migrated to Britain in search of better living. Immigrant parents provided their children with good schooling and the kids had the opportunity to acquaint with the British way of life. However, there are three factors that explain the rise of Britain's suburban terrorists. First is the issue of identity. Pantucci writes that the British Muslims born and brought up in the UK have the same accent as their British fellows and a university degree and all they want is acceptance from the British society. They have identity issues given that they are discriminated against due to their dark coloured skin which somehow makes them less British for some. The author quotes Anjum Choudary, leader of Al-Muhajiroun in the UK who believes that, *"the overt racism of the earlier generations might have died down, despite the fact that you have just as many qualifications as the next man and have gone to the same universities, [but] there is still a feeling that you are disadvantaged or people are still discriminating against you."*

A child from Muslim parents, living in the UK, attends British school, also goes to the mosque and interacts with his relatives back home. These various platforms are opportunities to learn, however, the contrast in school and mosque, the difference in home and society and one's own experiences triggers conflictual thoughts. The young British Muslims find it hard to strike a balance between their parental values and societal norms, between their mosque and the school. On

the other hand, British Muslims, who adapted to the British way of life may at times also feel ill-placed and face racial discrimination. Pantucci writes that *"you find someone called Muhammad, who grew up in the Western society, he changes his name to Mike, he has a girlfriend, he drinks alcohol, he dances, ... after everything he gave up to be accepted, they tell him he is a bloody Arab, or a Paki."* British Muslims (unlike their parents) want to be a part of the society but the racial sentiment prevalent in the society makes them marginalized. It leads to social isolation which in turn provokes reactionary tendencies in young Muslim Brits who are facing identity issues. Young British Muslims in search of new identity try to build a connection with their parental lineage and become assertive by openly saying, "I'm a Paki"; "I think of myself as a British Asian Muslim"; "I'm a Muslim, I believe in Islam"; or "I think of myself as a British Asian." Perhaps this is what gives them the sense of identity otherwise lost.

The Second thread that this book explores is the issue of *grievance*. The book draws attention to the narrative of 'global Muslim identity' and the magnetic pull it carries. Pantucci argues well that the religious education which a British Muslim receives from his parents aims at making him a conservative and may not necessarily be supportive of the global Muslim identity. However, the inclination towards the phenomenon of Muslim Ummah does exist. Muslims suffering around the world, in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, carry political dimensions and have greatly impacted the Muslims who live in Western countries. British Muslims have expressed their opposition to Britain's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan war theatres even though their sentiments differed with respect to their ties to the suppressed communities. For example, British Pakistanis strongly resonated with their ethnic brethren in Afghanistan while for Iraq, the sentiment primarily revolved around suffering of the broader 'global Ummah' which is often seen through the Arab world

prism. This sense of grievance which is generated through West's involvement in the Muslim world through acts of war and suppression pushes young British Muslims to express solidarity with their Ummah unfortunately through extremist ways. How instrumental have these wars been in prompting radical leanings? The book explores this question in depth. Munir Farooqi, 40, resident of Manchester left for jihad in Afghanistan, was captured in Mazar-e-Sharif and was later freed. After his return to the UK, he *"established a pipeline in Manchester sending young men to fight alongside the Taliban."*

The third inter-linked thread explored by Pantucci is the issue of recruitment of these young Muslim men and women by terrorists which thrives on both their sense of lost identity and grievance. In this regard, Pantucci discusses the role of 'radical preachers' in provoking anti-Western sentiments. Regular speeches by terrorists that get prospective recruits hooked rely on hate sentiments provoking the sense of dignity and connectivity with the oppressed Ummah. For example, Pantucci refers to a 2010 speech which called upon the Muslims to boycott elections, by saying that *"voting is Kufr and Haram – voting would mean supporting a system which had allowed the invasion of Iraq."* The book talks about British Muslims who have travelled to Kashmir, Afghanistan and Lebanon in quest of peace and pursuance of jihad after being recruited by terrorists.

But despite all the pessimism that surrounds the reality of Britain's suburban terrorists, Pantucci highlights that the British society is still rife with positives which still holds attraction for outsiders including Muslims. For instance, the justice system and the rule of law in the country is same for all. Medical and health benefits that the British society offers to immigrants from a developing country are worth appreciating.

Racism, however, is one real issue with which the society is struggling. It alone has created a real divide between the British and other immigrant communities (in particular Muslims) in Britain responsible

for provocative behaviours that it invites. Extremist outfits exploit this polarization and have given a political dimension to this racial divide. There is no denying the fact that there is a level of White supremacy that does exist but justifying radical behaviour on the premise of discrimination is not a solution. To control this growing divide, parents alongside religious scholars need to play their due role. Pantucci identifies religious concerns of the immigrants and highlights that Muslim communities have brought religious clerics from their ancestral homes to impart religious education to their children at home. These clerics (Mullahs) are neither fluent in English nor are they well-versed with the British society. When questioned about belief, the rigid response snubs the “*spirit of inquisitiveness that is fostered in the British education system.*” Dilwar Hussain, head of the Policy Research Centre at the Islamic Foundation, and a second

generation Bangladeshi, told Pantucci that “*asking questions in the mosque ... seemed only to inflame the tempers of the impatient, doctrinally rigid imams.*”

The tendency for young British Muslims to join the ranks of extremist organizations could be a reflection of a politico-religious mindset. But the puzzle remains: how come a fraction of British Muslims are at odds with their values and are inclined towards violence? Pantucci asks whether it is the enthusiasm and ‘familial passion’ that motivates a youngster or social isolation? The likes of Mohammad Shakil, Mohammad Siddique Khan, Zeeshan Siddiqui and Omar Khyam were all British citizens brought up in a liberal society yet still joined extremist organizations. Pantucci advises Muslim parents bringing up their kids in the West to be extra vigilant, become involved and be aware of their children’s activities. On

the religious front, they should not rely only on religious clerics to impart religious education but rather should take personal interest in shaping their children’s beliefs and value systems.

Pantucci brilliantly weaves these three threads of identity, grievance and recruitment of lone-wolves (by foreign extremists) who do not identify with the true spirit of Islam, are facing rejection of some form from the society in which they were born, finally finding refuge in bonding with the Ummah at some higher level driven by anger at the West’s treatment of their fellow Muslims around the world.

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*Amna Ejaz Rafi is Assistant Research Officer at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)*

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
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