


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THREE ROUTES TO PAKISTAN'S CONTAINMENT BY INDIA AND THE US

THE US-INDIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AIMS TO "CONTAIN" PAKISTAN IN THREE WAYS THAT GO BEYOND THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF FOMENTING INSTABILITY WITHIN ITS BORDERS.



Andrew Korybko

One of the centerpieces of 21st century geopolitics in the New Cold War has been the US-Indian Strategic Partnership that has been incipiently developing over the past two decades but really took off over the past couple of years. Disagreements undoubtedly remain between these two Great Powers concerning India's import of Russian weaponry and its economic relations with Iran, but these are nevertheless expected to be dealt with

in the coming future as both parties iron out their differences in reaching a deal for expanding their cooperation even further. In light of this, the most responsible thing that Pakistani decision makers can do is to begin countenancing the consequences that the US-Indian Strategic Partnership will have on their country and its long-term policy planning in the emerging multipolar world order, with this being the first step in crafting the necessary responses for thwarting these future threats.

Much has already been written about how the US and India are cooperating with one another in fomenting ethno-regional identity conflicts (hybrid wars) within Pakistan's borders, partially assisted as these many scenarios are by Afghan-based terrorists, but comparatively less has been said about the other forms of "containment" that are being advanced by these two allies against their mutual adversary. The three means which have hitherto evaded much scrutiny are in the realms of air & missile defense, naval affairs, and perception management (media), with each of them being touched upon in the course of this analysis.

AIR & MISSILE DEFENSE

Pakistan's nuclear deterrence capabilities have been a godsend for its national security, thus far serving to stave off any irresponsible large-scale conventional Indian aggression and therefore retaining a somewhat stable state of affairs in South Asia. This framework is threatened, however, by the US' air & missile defense cooperation with India in seeking to undermine the existing balance of power decisively to New Delhi's advantage. At first glance, one would be forgiven for thinking that Russia's planned S-400 deal with India seems to lead to no different of an outcome, though it is here where the crucial differentiating factor between the US and Russia's "military diplomacies" needs to be described.

Russia's arms exports are intended to retain the balance of power between competing rivals so that neither side feels confident enough to start a war against the other, and it is for this reason that Russia

has already delivered S-400s to Pakistan's Chinese ally. The US, meanwhile, takes the opposite approach and deliberately tries to break the regional balance in order to give its ally an aggressive edge, which is why it is reportedly considering challenging Russia's planned S-400 deal with India by offering up its own Patriot air & missile defense system on competitive terms. No other country in the region has this technology, and while its effectiveness supposedly pales in comparison to the S-400's, there is really no way of knowing until both are used in similar combat conditions.

The US is clearly signaling to Pakistan that it has an interest in contributing to India's air & missile defense capabilities so as to give New Delhi the advantage in offsetting Islamabad's nuclear deterrence and therefore destabilizing South Asia.

NAVAL AFFAIRS

The next component of the US-Indian anti-Pakistani "containment" strategy deals with naval affairs, which form the bulk of military-to-military interactions between Washington and New Delhi. The grand vision at play is for the US to turn India into a seafaring power capable of exerting influence all throughout the Indian Ocean Region, with the end result being that America's newest proxy can "contain" China by leveraging its Damocles' sword of interventionism over the EU and Africa's maritime trade routes with the People's Republic, whether through CPEC or the Strait of Malacca.

“The US is clearly signaling to Pakistan that it has an interest in contributing to India's air & missile defense capabilities so as to give New Delhi the advantage in offsetting Islamabad's nuclear deterrence and therefore destabilizing South Asia”



Source: Business Reporter

This is a long-term plan that will not yield instantaneous results, but its effects on Pakistan can already be noted as regards the game-changing summer 2016 “Logistics Exchange Memorandum Of Agreement” (LEMOA) that allows the US to use all of India’s military infrastructure on a case-by-case “logistical” basis, thereby turning the South Asian sate into a gigantic American military base.

Not only that, but India’s recent military agreement with Oman to use the peninsular country’s Duqm port in the Arabian Sea has serious implications for CPEC because of the possibility of “cutting off” Gwadar during wartime. It should be assumed that the US would assist both of its regional allies in this scenario, which is why the threat that this poses must be constructively used to incentivize the

Pakistan Navy’s rapid development and focus on submarine warfare in order to asymmetrically respond to this challenge. Furthermore, Pakistan must proactively take steps to safeguard China’s Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) between Gwadar and Africa in order to assert itself as a transregional military power, though this can only happen with forthcoming Chinese support. As such, it’s important for Pakistan to stress the naval implications of the US-Indian Strategic Partnership on China’s CPEC maritime security.

MEDIA

Lastly, the most intangible but nevertheless globally influential manifestation of the US-Indian Strategic Partnership is the cooperation between both countries’ media outlets in amplifying anti-Pakistani weaponized fake news narratives for




“The country [Pakistan] must fight to regain ownership of how it is portrayed abroad otherwise it will never fulfill its geostrategic destiny as the Zipper of Eurasia”

discouraging international entrepreneurs from using CPEC. The centerpiece of China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity is only as useful as the rest of the world thinks that it is, and it would be mistaken to believe that the project can be beneficial to Pakistan’s interests if it solely functions as a Chinese corridor to the Indian Ocean. Without growing international involvement in this initiative through the participation of Central Asian, West Asian, Arab, African, and European countries, CPEC will forever remain a painfully missed opportunity that could have otherwise developed into the Convergence of Civilizations for strengthening the trend of multipolarity all across the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is precisely for this reason why the US and India are working so hard to smear Pakistan’s international reputation by portraying it as a “third world, terrorist-exporting, failed state” that no sensible entrepreneur would want to do business in because of the assumed security risks involved. In response, Pakistan needs to develop a holistic perception management strategy (whether publicly unveiled as a white paper or kept classified) that addresses these claims and highlights the country’s across-the-board successes in recent years. To this end, clinching partnerships with multipolar media outlets (both mainstream and alternative), as well as communicating through academic and expert communities, is a must if Pakistan hopes to have any chance at defending itself from this informational onslaught. Sometimes, perceptions are reality, which is why the country must fight to regain ownership of how it is portrayed abroad otherwise it will never fulfill its geostrategic destiny as the Zipper of Eurasia.

Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based journalist and geopolitical analyst.

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PAKISTAN’S NEW ROLE BETWEEN CHINA AND EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF CHINA’S SILK ROAD PROJECTS

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a flagship project, is a global wave. The initiative covers 68 countries, 62 percent of the world population, and one third of the world GDP. It spans three continents -

Asia, Africa and Europe - and may soon be embraced by the Americas. It projects hard power through solid transnational investments across continents and soft power through a new international culture of cooperation amongst nations and regions.



Sardar Masood Khan

Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road



Already, under this initiative, plans are underway to invest US \$ 1 trillion in infrastructure, energy and industrial projects. It has its own banking system under the banner of the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This initiative is much bigger than the Marshall Plan in volume and geographical expanse.

Dozens of Chinese cities are connected with dozens of European cities. China invests in Europe in the energy,

telecommunications, and real estate sectors; and Europe receives millions of Chinese tourists. Europeans have invested heavily in the industrial and services sectors in China creating mutual dependencies.

CPEC is the flagship project and essentially an offshoot of the BRI. So any role Pakistan can or will play between Europe and China will be within the framework of the BRI and CPEC combined.

As the hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is both a conduit and a destination for logistical chains, trade and investments. Over the years, Pakistan has strengthened its national security and developed



national consensus around this game-changing mega-project.

CPEC is not an apparatus to colonize Pakistan. Pakistan is too large and important a state to be colonized; China is not and has never been a colonial power and the colonial era is over forever. Pakistan is a sovereign and solvent and will pay up its CPEC and non-CPEC debts. If anything, Pakistan has become a land of opportunity.

I believe that both the BRI and CPEC are a conscious effort to reach out to Europe which will bring Europe closer to the Chinese markets and vice versa; and for Europe it is prudent to reciprocate. Many European countries are reciprocating and taking their own initiatives to secure and expand their space in the BRI.

However, Europe's response to the BRI right now is split. Supporters welcome it. The French President Macron, for instance, said that his country would be a "cheerleader" for the BRI in the European Union and the British Prime Minister

Theresa May talks of Sino-UK relations' as the "golden era", post-Brexit and post-BRI. Critics contend that the BRI will erode the EU's unity and cohesiveness, give tough competition to European trading and corporate entities in the Eurasian markets, and may well affect or even threaten its security and its share in the overall power balance in the long run.

German Chancellor Merkel sees the BRI's impact as one of the "greatest challenges" and German political elite is calling for a "One Europe" policy towards China. They suggest that the EU's interests are aligned more naturally with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries - the US, Japan, Australia and India - and therefore it should explore a rule-based connectivity by partnering with them.

The CPEC is not just a stand-alone project. It is developed into a plexus or a docking port for connecting East Asia, South Asia, Central, West, and Southwest Asia. It may well become a collaborative arrangement like BRICS in due course since many regional and extra-regional states are showing interest in it. Although launched by China and Pakistan, it has already attracted attention of Russia, Turkey, Italy, France and the UK. Germany, Spain, and others could join in and the cumulative investments from these countries will give a huge stimulus to the CPEC itself. Several European countries are already consulting with Pakistan and China to participate in the CPEC projects.

The UK, in particular, which is linked officially to the BRI, has shown keen interest in investment in non-EU projects such as CPEC. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has called it "a wonder project" and has encouraged UK firms to support the "construction of this fabulous venture", which in his view will "revive the ancient Silk route and see the rebirth of trading caravans connecting East and West." He has expressed optimism that Karachi would be Asia's "biggest trading entrepot" along with Dubai, Singapore and Shanghai.

Similarly, France has shown interest in strengthening economic and co-

“As the hub of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan is both a conduit and a destination for logistical chains, trade and investments”

mmercial relations with Pakistan and has acknowledged that CPEC has created many business and investment opportunities for the two countries and France is willing to come forward with its technology and expertise to fill the gaps in Pakistan. The French president has called CPEC a good connectivity channel for the region; and France has already increased its investments in multiple sectors in Pakistan, with a Euro 700 million development portfolio. But this is modest, given the vast potential that lies ahead.

While Russia and Pakistan are exploring several avenues of defense and military cooperation, both countries want to build economic ties inside and outside the framework of CPEC. The Gwadar Port, in particular, will give Russia access to warm waters via Central Asia for international trade, which has been an age-old dream of the Russian strategists. Russia has also shown readiness to invest in many economic sectors, including a steel mill, roads, railway and pipelines.

Pakistan is already doing business with Europe. Europe contributes nearly 25% of Foreign Direct Investment to Pakistan and the volume of Pakistan-EU trade is Euro 12.7 billion approximately. Under GSP+ arrangements, meant to support Pakistan's governance, sustainable development and environmental protection, Pakistan



enjoys concessions in duties on two thirds of categories of export items. The European Union is Pakistan's most important trading partner, accounting for 13% of Pakistan's total trade and roughly 24% of Pakistan's total exports. To the EU, Pakistan mainly exports textiles and clothing; and it imports, from the EU, machinery, transport equipment and chemicals.

Pakistan is conscious that it needs to tap the full potential of the EU's market of 460 million people, as well as the EU's treasure trove of technology and knowhow. Pakistan is not a small market either with a population of 207 million and 62 percent of them under the age of 30. This is the biggest youth bulge which makes Pakistan the youngest country in the world.

Pakistan would use CPEC as a catalyst for economic transformation, modernize its industry, develop its maritime economy, build its human capital, and diversify its trading partners and sources of investment. Joint investments by Europe, Pakistan and China under the umbrella of CPEC would create huge opportunities for livelihoods, businesses and human development. In this context, it will build bridges between Europe and China, Europe and Asia. Pakistan will play a pivotal part in this process.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir, is also now integrated into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and four projects under CPEC have been initiated. These are two hydropower projects, one of them being directly funded by the Silk Road Fund, one expressway and an industrial zone. This augurs very well for Azad Kashmir's economy.

Sardar Masood Khan is the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). This is a summarised version of his speech delivered at the Austrian Institute for European Security Policy (AIES) on May 29, 2018 in Vienna.

NPT AT 50

WHITHER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AT 50?



Tariq Rauf

Fifty years ago, on 1 July 1968, the landmark Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature concurrently in London, Moscow and Washington. The NPT entered into force on 5 March 1970, following ratification by 40 non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) along with its depositary States – the UK, USA and the USSR. Today, the NPT has 193 member States; India, Israel and Pakistan continue to refuse to sign the treaty, North Korea remains the only country to have left the treaty (in 2003); and, South Sudan which is the world's newest country has yet to sign.

PRE-EMINENT NUCLEAR TREATY

Over the years, the NPT has come to be regarded as the world's most important multilaterally negotiated international treaty on global nuclear governance. Of its 193 States parties, 188 have permanently renounced nuclear weapons and have accepted and implemented intrusive on-site verification and inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on their exclusively peaceful nuclear activities. For their part,

five nuclear-weapon States (NWS) – China, France, Russian Federation, UK and US – have undertaken a binding obligation to reduce and eliminate all of their nuclear weapons, however, under the treaty there is no timeline or procedure for nuclear disarmament.

The NPT was drafted during 1967-1968 principally by the US and the USSR in their joint quest inter alia to prevent the emergence of additional States with nuclear weapons, especially a resurgent post-World War II Germany, and to ensure that nuclear technology would not be used for military purposes by other States (except for the five NWS). More than 20 countries with aspirations for nuclear weapons renounced their ambitions and joined the NPT as NNWS. These included, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and Sweden among others. South Africa unilaterally dismantled its six untested nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as a NNWS in July 1991. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine which had Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories when the USSR collapsed at the end of 1991, also acceded as NNWS to the NPT. In addition to the five NWS, there are four other nuclear-armed countries that are not members of the NPT – India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan.

In 1995, the-then 178 NPT member States agreed that the treaty would remain in

force indefinitely with the conditions to: (a) achieve nuclear disarmament; (b) conclude the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, prohibiting all nuclear explosions; (c) negotiate a treaty prohibiting production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; and, (d) set up a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region of the Middle East (MEWMDZFZ). Of these, only the CTBT was completed and opened for signature in September 1996 but it has yet to enter into force; the other conditions have yet to be fulfilled.



CHALLENGES

Golden anniversaries tend to be occasions for celebration of the past half-century and for hopes for a better future. For the NPT, however, at present all signs indicate a looming disastrous failure


at the quinquennial review conference to be held at the UN headquarters in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2020 marking its 50 years in force. The principal reasons being the failure: (a) of the Nuclear Weapon States to fulfill their

nuclear disarmament obligations – there exist nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world at 107 deployment and storage sites in 14 countries; and, (b) to establish a Middle East WMD-free zone.

The obligation for nuclear disarmament emanates from Article VI of the NPT from the very day of its signing that was reaffirmed and defined by consensus agreement among all NPT States at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT review

conferences. However, despite substantial reductions in nuclear weapons by the five Nuclear Weapon States there still exist nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons and nearly 2,000 metric tonnes of direct weapon use nuclear materials in the arsenals of the

nine nuclear-armed countries (sufficient for more than 125,000 nuclear weapons).



There are nine nuclear-armed countries. US nuclear weapons also are deployed in Belgium, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands and Turkey under NATO auspices



Source: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) at Princeton University – used with permission

Predictions for the collapse or failure of the NPT, leading to a “cascade” of proliferation resulting in a world with a “crowd of nuclear-armed countries”, are not new and have cropped up in the past. Whether the NPT will collapse or wither away remains an open question, especially now that in

2017 the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted at the UN by 122 countries. None of the five NWS, nor the NATO and other US allied countries, and neither India, Israel nor Pakistan, joined in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 nor voted in favour

of the TPNW. The worry of the NWS and their allies relying on nuclear deterrence is that many NNWS might opt to leave the NPT in protest at the continuing stalemate on nuclear disarmament and opt for the TPNW instead.


It should be recalled that only 25 kilogrammes or less of highly enriched uranium and 8 kilogrammes or less of plutonium are needed for a nuclear warhead.

There have been five nuclear security summits – Moscow 1996, Washington 2010, Seoul 2012, The Hague 2014 and Washington 2016 – with the objective of “locking up the world’s most dangerous

materials”, but they have covered only 17% of these materials (which are in peaceful use under IAEA safeguards) while 83% is in military use and outside any international monitoring or verification.


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Voting at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 July 2017 on the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons



Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative

“The obligation for nuclear disarmament emanates from Article VI of the NPT from the very day of its signing that was reaffirmed and defined by consensus agreement among all NPT States at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT review conferences”



not joined the treaty by ensuring that the vast majority is not developing nuclear weapons and their nuclear activities are under intrusive on-site verification or safeguards of the IAEA. Only under the NPT, do the five NWS hold themselves accountable for nuclear disarmament.

While the NPT is not popular in Pakistan and India, nevertheless it also contributes to their security. Until 1998, unlike India, Pakistan attended NPT meetings as an Observer State. It should resume doing so from next year. As for the CTBT, neither India nor Pakistan has signed, but again unlike India, Pakistan is an accredited Observer thus differentiating it from India. Pakistan can continue to improve its international standing by taking additional initiatives.

To conclude, all NPT States now need to get their act together, find a common purpose and focus, bridge their growing differences on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapons prohibition treaty, and the Middle East WMD zone, with a view to working for an agreed positive outcome in 2020 to strengthen the integrity and authority of the treaty as well as its full implementation and achieving universality.

The recent meeting in Helsinki between Presidents Trump and Putin, as well as the Singapore Summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, reflect a much-needed change from the practice of cutting off dialogue with adversaries and may encourage some much needed movement towards

difficult diplomatic negotiations to resolve important international security matters. Russia and the US should extend the New START treaty on nuclear reductions to 2026 and resolve their differences over the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty; the US and North Korea should sign a peace treaty leading to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through disarmament by North Korea and the cancellation of extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea by the US.

Personal comments by Tariq Rauf, Alternate Head of the IAEA NPT Delegation 2002-2010; Senior Advisor to Chair of Main Committee I (Nuclear Disarmament) 2015 NPT RevConf and Senior Advisor to Chair of 2014 NPT PrepCom; and Non-Proliferation Expert with Canada's NPT delegations 1987-2000.

“The NPT contributes to the security of all countries, including those which have not joined the treaty by ensuring that the vast majority is not developing nuclear weapons and their nuclear activities are under intrusive on-site verification or safeguards of the IAEA”

As for the Middle East WMD-free zone, the commitment to its achievement and to bringing Israel into the NPT after its nuclear disarmament was part and parcel of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. In 2010, NPT States agreed to convene an international conference on this matter in 2012. However, the US, the principal backer of the 2012 MEWMDZFZ conference unilaterally backed out, leading to the collapse of the 2015 NPT review conference. If no concrete progress is achieved by early 2020 on the Middle East zone including on Israel's denuclearization, the NPT review conference on its fiftieth anniversary in 2020 is doomed to failure.

Among the non-nuclear-weapon countries, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria have been found to be in non-compliance with their commitments under IAEA safeguards as they were found to be engaged in activities relating to nuclear weapons development. Of these cases, only the Iran nuclear file remains active. Earlier this year, US President Trump unilaterally pulled out of the 14 July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by the EU, France, Germany, UK and China, Russia and the US with Iran under which Iran pledged never to develop nuclear weapons. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula also continues as a major challenge.

WAY FORWARD

The NPT contributes to the security of all countries, including those which have

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A STAR ALLIANCE MEMBER

INTERVIEW

CLIMATE CHANGE IS THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE FOR PAKISTAN:

TAHIR RASHEED




Syed Muhammad Abubakar

Tahir Rasheed is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of South Punjab Forest Company (SPFC) – a subsidiary of the Forestry, Wildlife & Fisheries Department, Government of the Punjab. As the CEO of SPFC, Tahir Rasheed is responsible for promoting commercial forestry in Punjab, increasing forestry investments and promoting international linkages to further best practices. Tahir Rasheed hails from Balochistan and has worked in different ecological zones of the Province. Prior to joining SPFC, Tahir Rasheed was affiliated with different international and national organizations in various capacities. He also served as the General Manager of Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) Pakistan, CEO of IUCN's Sustainable Use Specialist Group-Central Asia (SUSG-C Asia) and Balochistan head of World Wide Fund for Nature-Pakistan (WWF-Pakistan). In an exclusive interview for Pakistan Politico, Tahir Rasheed shared his views with Syed Muhammad Abubakar on the environmental threats that Pakistan faces and the measures needed to deal with them.

Q. *How can Pakistan reduce its vulnerability to extreme weather events given that it is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change?*

For any third world country, it is a matter of resources and capacity and Pakistan is no exception to this. At the international level, countries with resources and capacity are less affected from extreme weather events. In the United States alone, there are more cyclones and natural calamities and even if we find thousands of people getting affected, in matter of days and weeks, the country mobilizes its resources to deal with displacements. But in Pakistan, if thousands of people are displaced in a natural disaster, it takes us a very long time to recover due to lack of institutional capacity and resources.

We as a nation are less prepared to fight this global threat since the available mitigation measures are limited. Even though Pakistan has one of the lowest greenhouse gas emissions in the world, it does not guarantee our protection from unpredictable climate change. However the damages can be reduced through building resilience of vulnerable communities, capacity building of institutions and improving socio-economic conditions.





Furthermore, our future planning is weak which can be gauged from the decision to venture into the construction of coal-fired power plants to meet our energy needs. This will surge our emissions bringing them at par with other South Asian countries and since our planning and capacity building sides are weak, we will not be able to effectively cope up. The result would be a manifold increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, which the country will find difficult to protect itself from.



being affected from climate change. These people live in a localized context and rely on the natural environment for water, food, livelihoods and other requirements. Healthy mountain ecosystems act as a buffer against the impacts of climate change for local communities, wildlife and downstream populations. Further downstream, towns and cities depend on mountain water for drinking, agriculture and industry. It is the need of the hour that mountainous communities are introduced to ecosystem-based adaptation, as an important strategy for adapting to climate change. Both federal

as well as provincial governments in collaboration with international agencies should make integrated efforts to support ecosystem-based approach at the policy and grassroots level. This will not only diversify the ecosystem services but also contribute in the form of sustained supply of water to the downstream communities.

Q. Water scarcity has emerged as the biggest issue of Pakistan. How can Pakistan ensure water security for its people while meeting its development objectives?

The policy-makers should promote floodplain management in order to better manage floods and excess rainfall naturally. Today, we are experiencing acute shortage of water due to population bulge and unsustainable practices. A national consensus has emerged to promote water conservation after the approval of the much awaited National Water Policy. The policy should be implemented in true spirit if we are serious in addressing the

water woes of our country. Punjab is on its way to prepare the first-ever groundwater policy and other provinces should follow suit.

Today there is a clarion call to build dams to store water and generate electricity but water efficiency is direly needed to conserve what is available. Israel being a semi-arid country has promoted precision agriculture which has greatly benefitted it. Pakistan can definitely learn from this successful case of water conservation. Also, low delta crops should be promoted and water-intensive crops discouraged.

Most importantly, we should seek benefit from our extensive network of canals by lining them, which will enhance water efficiency by up to 22 per cent and help to bridge the water deficit gap. To address the issue, the decision by the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) to establish the 'Dam Fund' is a worthy effort and if the public enthusiastically contributes to it and a water pricing mechanism is implemented, it can help to partially achieve the target. The concept of 'Per Crop Per Drop' should be promoted in the agriculture sector. It is high time to optimize our water resources and make water allocations to priority sectors.

Q. What are the current and projected impacts of climate change on glaciated areas of Pakistan (in KP and GB)? How can Pakistan cope with it?

As you are well aware, Pakistan is ranked seventh in the list of countries most vulnerable to climate change, according to GermanWatch's global climate risk index. During this time period of 20 years, Pakistan lost US \$ 3.8 billion, lost 10,460 lives and suffered from 141 extreme weather events. As climate change increases the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in Pakistan, it is estimated that due to the fast melting glaciers in Himalayan, Karakoram and Hindukush (HKH) mountain ranges, 3044 glacial lakes have been created in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit Baltistan, out of which 33 are marked dangerous, which can result into Glacial Lake Outburst

Floods (GLOFs). At the moment, more than seven million people are at risk in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit Baltistan due to unprecedented melting of glaciers. In 2015, a single GLOF incident in Chitral had cost the district US \$ 100 million, more than its allocated share of resources.

Research has shown that over the next two to three decades, fast melting glaciers will increase flooding in the Indus river and its tributaries. However, after that, the glaciers will slowly recede thus affecting the southern parts of the country, which are largely dependent on this resource for agriculture.

After the 18th amendment, the subject of environment has been transferred to the provinces. None of the provinces has the capacity to deal with climate change. Therefore, all concerned departments should work towards enhancing their capacity to deal with the threats posed by climate change and work in an integrated manner, through the establishment of a national framework. Resources should be allocated in this regard and local communities should be empowered for environmental conservation. A three pronged strategy of working at policy level, district level and community level can definitely help.

Q. Pakistan's natural resources are getting exhausted at a rapid pace. What measures are needed to save the remaining forests and improving the forest cover?

Pakistan is already a forest deficient country as the existing forest cover is only 1.9 per cent. To give you a scale of the magnitude, in India and China, the forest cover is 23.8 percent and 22.2 percent respectively.

Unfortunately, there are conflicting numbers on the actual forest cover in Pakistan. Therefore, comprehensive stock-taking should be done which can further lead to development of strategy and action plan. In my opinion, the way forward is the engagement of farmers and entrepreneurs, which can promote afforestation. The

total forest land in Pakistan is only 4.5 per cent, therefore the only way to improve the green cover is through afforestation on private land through agroforestry and farm forestry.

In this era where people are generally sensitized, political parties are leading the debate on climate action. Greening Pakistan through massive afforestation campaigns is the manifesto of almost every political party. The new government must fulfill these promises. Furthermore, projects such as Billion Trees Tsunami Afforestation Project (BTTAP), South Punjab Forest Company (SPFC) and Green Pakistan Programme (GPP) should be scaled-up.

At first, the government should enforce a ban on forestry land-use change, so that it is not used for other purposes since Pakistan's forest cover is far below the international standards of 20%. Further, there is a dire need to promote urban forestry which is the most neglected issue at the moment. The green belts in cities need to be identified so that forestry-related activities can be performed and entrepreneurs urged to invest in it. Pakistan needs to create a market of sustainable wood as part of sustainable forest management.

Q. Increasing rural to urban migration has exerted tremendous pressure on the urban areas of Pakistan and has also made these urban centres vulnerable to extreme weather events such as heatwaves, smog, and urban flooding. How do you think cities should develop in order to tackle such scenarios?

The best approach to tackle these unforeseen weather events is to make investments in smaller cities, so that facilities are available in such areas and the influx from smaller cities and villages to larger cities could be controlled. This will help reduce the burden on already strained environmental resources. Further, the government should legislate on restricting cities from expanding beyond a certain limit. A ban should be in place and thoroughly enforced to protect



Source: AFP

green belts and parks from turning into concrete structures. There is a dire need to introduce massive afforestation projects in all the urban centres of the country, which can help offset the emissions produced. If Pakistan is to protect its cities from the deadly impacts of climate change, it should promote vertical expansion which guarantees food security and groundwater recharge to help conserve urban trees.

Strategic placement of trees in urban areas can cool the air from 2 to 8 degrees Celsius. Furthermore, the role of urban forests is immense since each tree can absorb upto 150 kgs of carbon dioxide per year, thus contributing to mitigating the effects of climate change. Trees placed around buildings can reduce air conditioning needs by 30 per cent in the urban centers.

Q. *Is population bulge increasing pressure on the natural resources of Pakistan?*

Yes, population growth is playing a major role in deforestation, over-abstraction of groundwater and extinction of wildlife. The 2017 census of Pakistan revealed that the population of the country has increased to 207.74 million with an average annual growth rate of 2.4 percent. This extremely high population growth rate hampers Pakistan's GDP growth rate pushing us

to think about family planning measures. The recent suo motu notice taken by the honorable Chief Justice of Pakistan on the alarming population growth rate in the country is a welcome move and it can be hoped that he orders the relevant federal and provincial departments for effective legislation on the matter.

It must be noted that population bulge is exerting tremendous pressure on the mountain dwellers of northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit Baltistan, where land is scarce. These people depend on ecology for livelihoods and even with a slight change in the fragile ecosystem due to anthropogenic activities their survival can be at stake. The increasing population has to be managed alongwith the provision of livelihood opportunities.

Q. *As the CEO of South Punjab Forest Company (SPFC), how will Punjab be able to meet its wood requirements?*

SPFC's initiative will lead to the afforestation of 40 million trees in Punjab, which will help meet the requirements of the wood-based industry particularly the Medium-Density Fiberboard (MDF) and particleboard industries. For SPFC, it will be a landmark initiative as the private sector will be engaged to invest

in forestry and earn sustainable returns. This initiative will lead to the afforestation of 40 million trees, carbon sequestration of 35 million tons, creation of 15,000 green jobs and minimum 25 percent of SPFC's share to be conserved during the concession period. SPFC's mission of the development of natural, economic and social capital in blank forest land through Public Private Partnership (PPP) will instill a green revolution in Punjab.

Q. *Would you like to give any message to our readers?*

My message is of sustainability and conservation to protect what is left behind and work collectively to address the environmental issues of our country. The policymakers should be further sensitized on greater environmental preservation and all initiatives on environment should have the necessary political and bureaucratic will to achieve the said targets. The green agenda of political parties should be taken forward. Parliamentarians should also be sensitized for greater environmental lobbying.

Syed Muhammad Abubakar is an international award-winning environmental writer with an interest in climate change, deforestation, food security and sustainable development.

THE END OF ATLANTICISM?



Source: AFP



Tughral Yamin

At the time that the Cold War ended and the Berlin Wall came down, I found myself attending the German Staff Course in Hamburg. Overnight our course material was

changed and the enemy forces were no longer based on the Soviet order of battle. The Red Forces were replaced by mythical Pink Forces that we now fought our imaginary battles against on maps and table top exercises. I was quite intrigued because the enemy was no more the Warsaw Pact, so by extension the *raison d'être* for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) no more existed.

I asked my German classmates and teachers, why were the Europeans still continuing with it when the threat was no more? Most replies that I got lacked clarity and conviction. I was told there were still common enemies like Saddam Hussain. A megalomaniac dictator with ambitions to make nuclear bombs that could be used against Israel. These allegations would ultimately prove false but would destroy



Source: AFP

Iraq in the process. The actual reason to defeat Saddam Hussain was to occupy his oilfields – the largest in the world. True to the predictions by my German friend, the first Gulf War was fought in 1991 to ‘liberate’ tiny Kuwait from Iraq.

Thereafter the nature of warfare changed. On September 11, 2001, members of a shadowy organization called Al Qaeda struck on mainland United States and destroyed the Twin Towers in Manhattan and hit the building of the Pentagon in Washington DC. The age of terror had arrived in all its forms and manifestations.

The US launched a counter offensive against the Taliban government in Afghanistan that had provided refuge to Al Qaeda’s leadership. The mission to destroy Al Qaeda became the Global War against Terrorism. Along the way the Americans found it convenient to strike against Iraq once again to complete the unfinished business of dismantling the Baathist government and hang Saddam Hussain. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, an International Stabilization Force (ISAF) led by the US tried to steady the war wracked country. The ISAF was predominantly NATO. Seventeen years on,

the war has not ended in Afghanistan and there are increasing signs of frustration because the resurgent Taliban continues to operate with impunity and control large swathes of territory. Another addition to this explosive cocktail is the presence of the local franchise of Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan or Khorasan.

While American diplomats and generals and the government in Kabul are thinking of actually talking directly with the Taliban, there are also signs that the NATO alliance is completing its life cycle. President Donald Trump has increasingly

shown his annoyance with his European partners. The Meeting of the Group of 7 wealthy nations in Canada showed cracks. The iconic picture of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel leaning down and glowering at a pouting Putin sitting down in a chair as an unhappy child was a picture worth a thousand words. To add insult to injury, before leaving Quebec, Trump met his Canadian host Trudeau and used harsh words to berate him. The pressure was ratcheted up in the Brussels NATO conference, when Trump ordered his European allies to share a larger burden of defense. He wanted them to


not just increase their defense spending but do it from 2 percent of their GDP to an unprecedented 4. In Britain he blasted the British Prime Minister, Theresa May for her pro-European policy after Brexit and praised her former colleague Boris Johnson for ditching her. There was more to come. Trump next went to Helsinki to meet the Russian President. There was a general expectation that Trump with his brash attitude would stand up to Putin and blame him for interference in the 2016 US election. No such thing happened and on his return Trump had to do a lot of explaining to his home audience.

While Trump was seen as cozying up to the Russians he had declared a trade war not only against China but also against the Europeans and the Canadians. All this seems to have made the American foreign policy murky. The nuclear deal with Iran has been trashed and a new relationship has started with North Korea’s Kim. The US Embassy has opened up in Jerusalem and in the Arab world the Saudis are firmly in his pocket. The world is changing at an alarming pace.

Although NATO is not yet dying a premature death but if it does there will be a range of new alliances. The Russian, Chinese, Iranian and Pakistani intelligence chiefs have recently met to discuss the issue of the IS in Afghanistan. It was reported in the press in April this year that Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) would hold battle drills in the Urals in which Indian and Pakistani Special Forces would operate together.

In the changing environment a number of questions come to mind. If NATO goes, would the Europeans make a defense alliance of their own? Britain and France have nuclear weapons but rest everyone else is dependent on the extended deterrence provided by the US. The Americans have bases in Germany, Japan and Korea. Would the US be decreasing its military footprint around the world? Would it be accepting the Russians as equal partners despite the annexation of Crimea? These are questions that should be agitating the minds of military and defense analysts the world over. New combinations and permutations need to be studied and implications for the region must be considered.

Dr. Tughral Yamin is Associate Dean, Center for International Peace and Stability, National University of Science & Technology, Islamabad.



FROM BADR-1 TO PRSS-1: PAKISTAN'S JOURNEY INTO SPACE



Ahmad Khan

Pakistan's premier space agency, SUPARCO made 200 million plus Pakistanis proud once it launched a remote-sensing (PRSS-1) satellite and a technology evaluation satellite (PakTES-1A) on July 9, 2018. These two satellites mark a big achievement in the socio-economic development of the country.

Pakistan's space odyssey dates back to the peak of the Cold War once it became the third Asian country to launch a sounding rocket in collaboration with the American space agency, NASA. The space cooperation became a victim of the geopolitical developments once the two allies became disenchanted. Stringent

technology denial by the West and lack of interest in supporting Pakistan pushed its space development to the backburner.

The first major breakthrough was witnessed once Islamabad launched its communication satellite Badr-1 in 1990. The second baby step was Badr-2 that was launched in 2001. The defining moment in Pakistan's space program arrived in 2011 when it launched its communication satellite PakSAT-1R in 2011. Today, Pakistan has entered the club of advanced spacefaring nations which have remote sensing satellites. Not one but two remote sensing satellites were launched in tandem. This launch will not only help Pakistan project its soft image in the world but also reap the socio-economic advantages for its national growth by benefitting from space technology.

In 2016, an agreement was signed between SUPARCO and the China Great Wall Industrial Cooperation to build PRSS-1. The PakTES-1A on the other hand, was entirely SUPARCO's own engineering endeavour. Both were launched from Jiuquan Satellite Center using Long March 2C/SMA rocket. It was the first commercial flight of Long March 2C to take any foreign payload in space.

Primarily, the data provided by these satellites will be used for multiple purposes. Images captured by PRSS-1 will be used for planning, managing, monitoring, and utilization of natural resources to improve the life of a common person in Pakistan. The data will help in improving the economic growth of Pakistan. In addition, remote sensing capability will also help organizations and institutions designated for environment monitoring in Pakistan to sharpen their climate change assessments. Likewise, the imagery provided by PRSS-1 will help in improving knowledge of the supply of freshwater and managing the distribution of water.

In the past two decades, Pakistan has been affected by super floods and droughts. Unfortunately, the water management system in Pakistan is in its worst condition. Major water dams are too few in number. As a result of this poor water management,

massive water crisis in Pakistan is looming large. Situational analysis on water scarcity in Pakistan done by the UN and other international organizations suggests that Pakistan is likely to run dry by 2025 if the situation persists.

PRSS-1 could be a real game-changer. Space experts believe that remote sensing satellites could help countries to resolve their internal conflicts. For example, the distribution of water among provinces in Pakistan is a daunting task. The authorities over time have failed to convince the provinces that all of them are getting their due share of water. In view of this lingering problem, PRSS-1 could play a decisive role as it will provide the images of the supply of water, level of water in the reservoirs and will highlight other indicators for better management of water. The satellite will also help in preparing feasibility reports for constructing more dams in Pakistan which is the need of the hour. Hence, PRSS-1 could play a major role in resolving the lingering water crisis in Pakistan. Eventually, the remote sensing satellite will help improve the capabilities of the departments and institutions related to water management in Pakistan to make better assessments of the situation and devise strategies to deal with the impending crisis. PRSS-1 will also be useful in agriculture to estimate future crop yields and monitoring. Furthermore, the remote sensing applications will be used to study the spread of several chronic diseases, mapping them will help ensure better health solutions for Pakistanis.

In general, remote sensing satellites will offer Pakistan the ability to predict and ascertain the level of precipitation and runoff water for a given area since it has greater application in agriculture, monitoring and predicting groundwater supplies, flooding, drought and atmospheric changes in Pakistan. In this regard, SUPARCO has undertaken landmark projects such as the development of geospatial systems for irrigation management, glaciers mapping and monitoring, river and flood vulnerability assessment, crop damage assessment, seawater intrusion mapping and groundwater prospection.

“Pakistan's space policy is predominantly devised on technological determinism as it wants to bolster its space program for peaceful purposes and for socio-economic development and its Space Vision 2047 is the documented manifestation of its peaceful exploration of space”

The launch of PRSS-1 and PakTES-1A has proved to be a real morale booster for Pakistan. SUPARCO has achieved another milestone in its long history of space exploration. The time gap between the last launch and the present was almost seven years, but it is still a giant leap forward for Pakistan. The Space program is getting considerable attention in Pakistan as it sees space program vital for its national power.

Major spacefaring nations are getting tremendous socio-economic benefits from their space programs and history of the Cold War space race is rife with success stories. Pakistan's space policy is predominantly devised on technological determinism as it wants to bolster its space program for peaceful purposes and for socio-economic development and its Space Vision 2047 is the documented manifestation of its peaceful exploration of space.

Ahmad Khan is a PhD Scholar in the National Defence University, Islamabad and a former visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council, US.

SECURITIZATION OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: A NECESSARY APPROACH?



Aisha Saeed

With the advent of the 21st century, geostrategic positioning of a country has regained its relevance in the national policy making. The post Cold War environment defused and pushed back the realistic adherence to maintaining strong security-centric policies as the world moved towards understanding the importance of diplomacy to settle sore ties and forge stronger renewed alliances.

The traditional arch rivalry, away from the Western theatre, remained embedded particularly in South Asia which suffered from the splinters of forming alliance with key players during the Cold War. On ground, the de-escalation and the end of the Cold War gave way to the new world order. The global community committed itself to more peace treaties to ensure future world peace. Yet, the proxy wars continued in various regions of the world while countries kept the channels of communication open with each other. Pakistan's foreign policy, like other states, was also shaped by the geopolitical considerations post-partition. The constitutional guideline for the conduct of foreign policy aimed at fostering cordial relations with all countries. With India however, the first conflict came couple of months after independence shaping the contours of its defense policy. Later on, protracted conflict over Kashmir and subsequent wars fought with India in 1965 and 1971 provided Pakistan the reason to pursue nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's security policy continued to be shaped by the geostrategic dynamics in the region during the Cold War. Pakistan being a smaller state aligned its national security objectives to that of the United States – its chosen ally in the Cold War – and sat in the driving seat through the proxy war fought in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and the US. The prime consideration in fostering an alliance with the US during the Cold War was

to develop its military muscle to thwart threats from India. The aftermath of the Afghan War brought millions of Afghan refugees to Pakistan and forever tainted its policy towards Afghanistan.

Pakistan's foreign policy over the years has seen significant tilts towards the United States and China for different reasons. For Pakistan, China has not only acted as a buffer against India but has quietly fulfilled its strategic and economic needs. The obvious push towards China and other Islamic countries in the Middle East came during the periods Pakistan was sanctioned by the United States for pursuing nuclear weapons.

American foreign policy has vigorously pursued and safeguarded its national and security interests around the globe. In its pursuit to maintain the superpower status – the sole unipolar power – US foreign

the eyes of the international community. Currently, Pakistan is not only looking at the country's foreign policy through the prism of security but also through that of geo-economics. The country has become a linchpin of the expansive One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative with the initiation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Its overtures to Iran and Russia suggest that the country is looking at ways of regional integration rather than strictly focusing on the security sector. Also, its repeated efforts to have a balanced policy in all Middle Eastern disputes, show that its foreign policy is getting more flexible and is not strictly embedded in the security binary.

Pakistan's foreign relations with most countries hinge on a traditional foreign policy based on goodwill. At a glance, Pakistan's foreign policy is ideal as it caters to both national needs and international



policy has militarized international politics rather than champion peace and harmony globally. Pakistan through better part of its history was aligned with the United States for which it has suffered immense foreign policy losses and continues to do so. While still recovering from the aftermath of the Afghan War, partnering with the US in the Global War Against Terrorism post 9/11 further complicated Pakistan's already limited foreign policy choices.

Defying all odds – from being called a failed state to a fragile state on the verge of collapse – Pakistan marks its 71st year of independence. Turning the tables on militants, Pakistan restored confidence in

norms. The influence of security policy over a conventional foreign policy is limited to few countries and that too dictated by the changing geostrategic alliances and dynamics in the region. For the next five years, one can hope that Islamabad's sensible realization amid regional and global changes to formulate a balanced foreign and security policy will determine its place as an important regional player.

Aisha Saeed is an independent media and foreign policy research analyst.

Source: AFP

INTER-STATE RIVALRIES: A PERPETUAL CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA



Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

which were published by IPRI (available on their website) and are reviewed here.

All these challenges require concerted and robust conflict resolution efforts. However, collective and coherent approaches are not being devised due to intense rivalries. Undoubtedly, the aforementioned roadblocks are keeping the region from actualizing its potential. The concern for South Asia watchers is that there is little hope for meaningful progress on these issues owing to simmering rivalries.

Regarded as a nuclear flashpoint, the Kashmir issue lies at the heart of the decades-old Indo-Pak rivalry. While peace in South Asia can only be achieved if both countries amicably resolve the conflict, New Delhi's recalcitrance is met by Islamabad's defiance. India's reticence to talk on Kashmir is faced with a Pakistan that continues its diplomatic, political and moral support for Kashmiris' right to self-determination.

Moreover, the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is also hampered by the Sino-US rivalry that has brought Washington and New Delhi into a strong strategic relationship. Termed as the net security provider in the Indo-Pacific Region, India was given a great boost vis-à-vis Pakistan when the US listed Hizbul Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and called upon Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used against India. Visibly, Washington battled for India's long-held narrative on Kashmir.

Besides, the US also echoed India's view on the colossal China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) when its Secretary of Defense, Gen. Mattis said that the project passes through a disputed territory. CPEC, by virtue of being a flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), gives China access to markets in West Asia and the Middle East while obviating its reliance on the Strait of Malacca. China's meteoric rise was termed as a strategic competition and a greater threat to the US in its National Defense Strategy(NDS). Hence, the Indo-US strategic convergence must be seen in the context of US' efforts to contain China's clout in the region and beyond. Opposition to CPEC, owing to regional and global acrimonies is stalling the chances of regional connectivity.

The simmering Afghan quagmire is also a victim of competition between regional and international actors. The prospects of regional cooperation for a peaceful settlement are dim. Pakistan and the United States bicker over the milieu in Afghanistan, the latter accuses Pakistan of not doing enough to clamp down on militants who are targeting US and Afghan forces. Pakistan, on its part, takes serious exceptions to elements that are perched in Afghanistan and are carrying out terrorist attacks in the country. Also, in-line with its long-held security psyche, Pakistan opposes Indian role in chalking out a future dispensation for Afghanistan. Former Pakistani envoy to Afghanistan, Rustum Shah Mohmand while presenting his paper "Navigating Troubled Pathways: India's Role in Afghanistan and Pakistan's



Source: Shutterstock

Apprehensions," at the above mentioned IPRI conference stated, "the perception in Islamabad is that by establishing a strong foothold in Afghanistan, India would, in many different ways, try to cause damage to its vital security interests."

Apart from these misgivings, the Afghan situation can vitiate due to China's growing ingress in Afghanistan. China has been active in Afghanistan in the realms of diplomacy and economy. It has ramped-up its efforts to find a solution to the imbroglio. Beijing's view on the war in Afghanistan resonates with that of Pakistan, something that can cause the US to mistrust China's diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, China's bid to include Afghanistan in the highly-touted CPEC may not sit well with the US, for it has termed such Chinese efforts as part of "predatory economics."

Perhaps, the subversive role that the US-Russo tiff can play in Afghanistan has been understated. Moscow's resurgence in the international arena is reflective in its activities in Afghanistan. It launched the Moscow Process and implored the

US to contrive a political settlement with the Taliban and fight the menace of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). However, a unified front against terrorism looks improbable as both Washington and Moscow resort to recriminations. The US alleges Russia of arming the Taliban while Russia blames the former for supporting the Islamic State(IS). Afghanistan is fast becoming a new theatre for a Russo-US showdown.

There is another challenge to peace in South Asia that pertains to the age-old Indo-Pak rivalry. The bilateral deterrence equation between the two arch-rivals is under constant threat. Fears of escalation and failure of deterrence have emerged due to India's quest for escalation dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Bolstered by its ties with Washington, New Delhi's advancements in its nuclear and conventional forces are compelling Pakistan to follow suit. India's seaward nuclear expansion was followed by that of Pakistan and its pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) system resulted in Pakistan moving towards MIRVing its delivery vehicles. Pakistan has also developed theatre nuclear weapons


in a bid to thwart India's incendiary Cold Start Doctrine. While a maximalist approach lends strength to deterrence, the non-resolution of disputes between the two countries may result in early reliance on the ultimate weapon.

All these concerns are conspicuous and becoming more glaring due to intense adversarial relations. The US is the strongest party involved in the region and has a great role to play. As an experienced crisis manager in the region, the US must now put a premium on crisis prevention. It can do so by encouraging an Indo-Pak dialogue and finding a broad based settlement in Afghanistan. If allowed to fester, inter state rivalries will dent prospects of the ascendancy of geoeconomics in South Asia.


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Nikita Khrushchev



Muhammad Ayub Khuhro



Sergey Radchenko

BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND KHUHRO: THE INITIAL EXPLORATIONS IN SOVIET-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Not long after coming to power in the wake of Joseph Stalin's death, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev presided over a major turn in Soviet foreign policy, a turn towards what today we would call the 'global South.' The move was a reasonable response to the rapid transformation of international politics. Decolonization opened up new opportunities for extending Soviet influence to far-flung corners of the world by offering fledgling post-colonial regimes political support, economic aid and, of course, weapons.

The assumption in Moscow was that these regimes could become the Soviet Union's natural allies, or at least fellow-travellers,

in the struggle against 'imperialism.' But what made sense from the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist theory, did not always make sense in practice. A case in point was the Soviet relationship with Pakistan that, from the very beginning, was plagued by tensions and mistrust. Pakistan was notably omitted when in 1955 Khrushchev undertook his first grand tour of Asia, visiting Afghanistan, India, and Burma. While in India, he strongly endorsed New Delhi's position on Kashmir, earning Jawaharlal Nehru's gratitude.

But the following year, the Soviet leadership made a tentative attempt to engage with Karachi. This balancing act was the consequence of Moscow's concern

over Pakistan's membership in the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, which threatened the Soviets Union's southern flank. In addition, building bridges to Pakistan reflected Moscow's growing appreciation of the complexities of the so called "third world," and a realization that careful neutrality was often a better policy than mindless support of one side over the other in conflicts that the Soviets could not even begin to understand.

Hence, in March 1956 Khrushchev's close confidante, Anastas Mikoyan travelled to Pakistan on an ice-breaking mission. The CIA reported that the hosts were "impressed." "A change has come over the Russians," noted the newly appointed President Iskander Mirza. The order of

“In 1955 Khrushchev undertook his first grand tour of Asia, visiting Afghanistan, India, and Burma. While in India, he strongly endorsed New Delhi’s position on Kashmir, earning Jawaharlal Nehru’s gratitude”

policy and Pakistan’s militancy. “India and Pakistan,” Khrushchev said, “were born from one mother... India took the road of peaceful coexistence and you picked up a stick as soon as you were born. You don’t have enough strength but you are already spoiling for a fight, grabbing a stick and threaten your neighbours with it.”

Nonplussed by this inauspicious opening, Khuhro offered spirited defence of Pakistan’s involvement in military pacts. He proclaimed that Pakistan had no intention of ever fighting the Soviet Union and if Turkey, England or the United States attacked the Soviets, Pakistan would not participate in the war. So much for alliance obligations. “We need it [the Baghdad Pact] for self-defence,” said Khuhro. “Who do you need to defend yourselves against,” retorted Khrushchev – “tigers and lions”? He was unwilling to buy Khuhro’s explanation that Pakistan felt a constant threat of India’s invasion, and suspected that Karachi was being manipulated into joining hostile pacts. Never mind, he declared. “All these pacts you have joined will die like insects. We do not fear them.”

Thus, on the whole, it was hardly a friendly conversation. Khuhro was clearly exaggerating when he claimed, upon returning to Pakistan, that the Soviet leaders “wanted to cultivate close and mutually beneficial relations.” If anything, Khrushchev’s main tactic was to bully Karachi into quitting anti-Soviet pacts. “Don’t be offended,” he said. “But you cannot fight with us because we are considerably stronger than you. I am not bragging, I am just putting things as they are.” This early episode of Soviet-Pakistani relations points to one underlying characteristic of the Soviets’ approach to Pakistan: it was always part and parcel of Moscow’s regional policy, and that imposed severe constraints on the relationship.

Always seeing India for a much more important partner, the Soviet leaders were unwilling to engage with Pakistan on its own terms. When opportunities presented themselves – as in 1966 – the Soviets were happy to mediate between

India and Pakistan, and assumed the pretence of genuine neutrality, but for the most part they demonstrated the attitude that was already clear in Khrushchev’s comments in 1956: that Pakistan was just a pawn of external forces, and that the Pakistani leaders would do well to come to their senses and embrace the USSR because they needed a good relationship with Moscow much more than the other way around.

This perspective on Pakistan as a “pawn” became especially pronounced in the 1980s, during the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. At one point, the Soviets and the Indians, discussed the possibility of launching a joint invasion on Pakistan. It was only with the end of the Cold War that Moscow attempted to reposition itself on the Indian subcontinent by seeking rapprochement with Islamabad.

The Cold War has receded into history and the regional alliances that once annoyed Khrushchev – the Baghdad Pact and SEATO – are now merely a vague recollection. Instead, in June 2017, India and Pakistan both joined a regional body co-sponsored by the Russians and the Chinese, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Of course, the SCO is by no means an alliance. Yet in a sense, the erstwhile adversaries now find themselves on the same side of the trenches. It remains to be seen whether being, figuratively speaking, on the same side, will take the edge off the long-running conflicts like the one between India and Pakistan. If and when tensions erupt, the main challenge for Russia will be to engage with Islamabad on its own terms. The long and troubled history of Moscow’s regional diplomacy suggests it would not be easy.

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PAKISTAN, SPACE AND NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS



Misbah Arif

In the 21st century, the traditional interstate security threat perception has been stretched out to include nontraditional issues like environmental degradation, climate change, health and social security. Comprehensive security, encompassing political, social, economic and environmental factors is facing major implementation challenges in almost all states. Pakistan recently launched two satellites into space to address such threats.

Water and food security top the list of non-traditional security threats that the South Asian region faces. Increasing food prices are demanding change in policies and new technologies in agriculture sector to ensure food security. It has been estimated that millions of people are suffering from high levels of poverty in the region. Moreover, natural disasters have put South Asia among the world’s most volatile regions. A great number of people have died and financial damages have been caused due to natural calamities like floods, scarcity of water, high urban population density, energy shortages, air pollution etc. Environmental degradation and climate change will further increase the vulnerabilities leading to scarcity of resources, melting of glaciers, floods, diseases and migration.

These non-traditional threats, threaten the viability of Pakistan’s socio-economic sector, which in turn hampers political stability in the country. In Pakistan, low-probability and high-impact events such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, storms and cyclones have increased in frequency, inflicting unbearable human and financial losses upon the state. The earthquake of 2005 caused approximately 0.1 million deaths, made 3.5 million people homeless and incurred \$5.2 billion worth of financial losses. Similarly, the floods of 2010 wreaked havoc all over the country affecting 20 million people.

In addition to natural disasters, climate change and variations in precipitation patterns also affect agricultural produce, exacerbating food shortages. Food scarcity is an issue predicted to become one of the most important problems faced by the states in future. Likewise, dwindling freshwater resources has led many scholars to forecast inter-state ‘water-wars’ in not too distant future. These non-traditional security challenges merit urgent attention before they spiral out of control, posing a threat to the development and survival of Pakistan.

In view of these developments, exploration of space is becoming an attractive venture for states in order to counter prevailing non-traditional security challenges. Satellite remote sensing is so far considered a powerful and efficient tool to study the environmental impact. Remote sensing is a phenomenon that has numerous applications including photography, surveying, geology, forestry and many more. Remote sensing has many uses in disaster management, from risk modeling and vulnerability analysis, to early warning, to damage assessment.

“ The Satellite is equipped with a high resolution optical payload that will enable Pakistan to meet its imagery requirements in the areas of land mapping, agriculture classification and assessment, urban and rural planning, environmental monitoring, natural disaster management and water resource management for socio-economic development of the country. ”

Satellite technology has thus become one of the fundamental sources of information in assessing, monitoring and mitigating natural disasters and related phenomena. Space technologies, including satellite remote sensing technology in particular, have demonstrated proven capabilities in meeting challenges of such nature.

Pakistan launched Remote Sensing Satellite-1 (PRSS-1) to deal with these non-traditional security threats. It will operate in sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 640 km. The Satellite is equipped with

“ Pakistan is now in a position to mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters through early warning systems, technological advances in building and infrastructure construction, improved sanitation systems, increased disaster preparedness, and having an effective emergency response strategy ”

a high resolution optical payload that will enable Pakistan to meet its imagery requirements in the areas of land mapping, agriculture classification and assessment, urban and rural planning, environmental monitoring, natural disaster management and water resource management for socio-economic development of the country. Through recently launched PRSS-1, the environmental monitoring and management, covering all four environmental areas i.e. land, air, coast and marine would be accomplished. Pak TES-1A (Pakistan Technology Evaluation Satellite-1A) was also launched alongside PRSS-1. It is an indigenously developed 285 kg remote sensing satellite that is circling at 610 km sun-synchronous orbit.

Pakistan is now in a position to mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters through early warning systems, technological advances in building and infrastructure construction, improved sanitation systems, increased disaster preparedness, and having an effective emergency response strategy. Expanding and enhancing the information and knowledge base on climate change, as well as mapping vulnerabilities, can help create adaptive measures to reduce the effects of climate change.

Water insecurity is the most serious challenge for Pakistan due to population explosion and urbanization, massive expansion of tube-well irrigation, reduced levels of precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated retreat of the Himalayan glaciers. According to the World Resource Institute, Pakistan is going to face a high level of water stress by 2020. By 2030, the ranking will worsen further to extremely high level, thus pushing Pakistan to the list of top 33 countries under extreme water stress.

In view of present challenges faced by Pakistan, PRSS-1 can be utilized for water remote sensing. RSS capability is very crucial in understanding the dynamics of water quantity and quality, which can be used to simulate water resources management scenarios under different water quantity or quality demand. Through RSS capability one can identify, map and calculate the total surface area of the water bodies in different seasons. The most significant utility of PRSS-1 data includes climate forecasting to track weather-related natural disasters like floods, storms, rain etc and in accelerating response, recovery and rebuilding efforts immediately afterwards by the relief departments.

“ Water insecurity is the most serious challenge for Pakistan due to population explosion and urbanization, massive expansion of tube-well irrigation, reduced levels of precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated retreat of the Himalayan glaciers ”

Without doubt, the accurate weather forecasts are also extremely important to determine country's electricity demand, its generation, supply, electric infrastructure and onwards the cost to consumers which has been a critical issue for Pakistan since several years. Moreover, the satellite data may be used to study the spread of several chronic diseases thereby contributing to ensure better health and recovery of citizens.

“ It is time for the decision-making elite to give SUPARCO particular attention. It is about time Pakistan realizes that the space technologies can play a vital function in both enhancing productivity in business and economy and facilitating the socio-political progress. ”

Remote sensing of agriculture helps in crop classification and track changes which helps in improving forecast of production. Remote sensing is commonly used for crop classification, yield forecasts, and also for monitoring post-harvest residues and on-site meteorological conditions. Remote sensing is very helpful for countries like Pakistan whose economy is heavily dependent upon agriculture output.

The UN Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER) runs regional workshops and provides technical advice to individual countries. Pakistan should actively participate in

such workshops to get better information about disaster management by using space technologies.

Remote sensing technology plays an important role in disaster management especially during the preparedness and response phases. These technologies could not only provide cost efficient and effective methods of water management but they also accurately monitor and predict long term trends of depletion of resources. Considering the non-traditional threats faced by Pakistan, it is the need of the hour to work on space program due to growing demand from the civil communications, including the Global Positioning



System, mobile telephony and the internet. Therefore, it is time for the decision-making elite to give SUPARCO particular attention. It is about time Pakistan realizes that the space technologies can play a vital function in both enhancing productivity in business and economy and facilitating the socio-political progress.

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TERRORISM OVER THE INTERNET



Talal Raza

In Pakistan, the internet penetration is rising with the passage of time. Freedom House reports that as of 2017, internet penetration stands at 15.5%. According to an estimate, there are more than 44 million social media users in Pakistan. Given the scope of the internet, people are increasingly using it for multiple purposes. Some of them are pursuing economic activity, some are using internet to freely express themselves and some are using it to connect with others and pursue common objectives. Digital Rights Monitor reports that women in Pakistan are also making full use of internet to make money and build an online community of solidarity through groups like Soul Sisters Pakistan.

In the midst of unparalleled opportunities provided by the internet, Pakistan is also faced with a number of challenges through this medium. These challenges range from the use of technology by hostile state actors to damage critical information infrastructure in Pakistan to the use of internet by non-state actors to weaken Pakistan internally. In between these two extremes, there is another challenge posed by the state machinery itself that is excessive use of the force under the pretext of “national security” to safeguard Pakistan’s cyberspace. In the midst of all this, let us explore how terrorists pose a threat to the security of Pakistan via cyberspace.

All over the world, policy makers and researchers are gradually realizing the potential the internet has for terrorists to

further their agenda. Initially, the major concern was around how Al-Qaeda was using the technology and even video games to “spoil” the minds of the masses. With the emergence of Daesh in 2014, policy makers and experts were introduced to a new terrorist organization that was not only lethal in the battlefield but also had social media prowess. It is not difficult to find videos in which Daesh is punishing the “traitors” or the wordpress blog allegedly being run by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. A simple google search will lead you to millions of results. These videos and blogs reveal that these militant organizations understand exactly how to use technology to their advantage.

What objectives are these terrorist organizations trying to achieve by using the internet? Based on my research, I can state that any militant organization using the internet will be trying to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

1. Infuse terror: by using gory videos and images depicting how “traitors” would be punished, terrorists use the internet to infuse terror into the minds of the people and possibly avert anyone from going against them or calling them out. Multimedia content produced by Daesh is a classic example of this sending a clear message.
2. Propaganda: most of the terrorist organizations are seen using internet for propaganda purposes to spread their ideology and showcase their activities to let people know how “successful” they are. Often times, glorification of their leaders or fellows is an important part of their propaganda. For instance, Al-Qaeda telecasting fiery speeches of their leaders such as Aimen Al Zahwari or Daesh showing videos of an actual

attack on their enemies subscribed to depict them as heroes against infidels.

3. Recruitment: merely spreading propaganda is not the ultimate objective. Terrorist organizations build upon their propaganda drive to reach out to new recruits over the internet. A number of attempts have been made to lure vulnerable population from Europe and elsewhere to join Daesh in Syria.
4. Funding: to sustain their terror activities, terrorist organizations have used internet to request for donations to the very least. Although there have been concerns that terrorists might also be using crypto-currency, however in the absence of much evidence, that analysis seems a bit exaggerated. There was only one case where a woman was caught by the US law enforcement agencies after she tried to get money to ISIS using Bitcoins.
5. Attack on critical information infrastructure (Cyber terrorism): attacking critical information infrastructure using any malware is a real possibility however there has not been a single case of any terrorist organization being able to pull off a cyber-terrorism attack.

In the Pakistani context, the terrorist organizations have mostly used internet to infuse fear, spread propaganda or motivate people to join them. In the context of funding, they have only used online means to send out calls for generating funding. Some quarters have believed for long that terrorism over the internet is a “non-issue” and that in a developing country like Pakistan it is not effective for terrorists to use internet to further their agenda. However, multiple reports show

Source: ImageAbyss



that terrorists have an active presence over the internet. Last year, Dawn newspaper, carried out an investigation and found out that 41 of 64 proscribed organizations had an active presence on Facebook. There have also been reports that commanders affiliated with Daesh are making attempts to reach out to their potential recruits using Facebook and encrypted communication apps such as Telegram.

In order to push back against the scourge of online terrorism, Pakistan has at its disposal a series of laws including Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act, Anti-Terrorism Act, and Fair Trial Act. These laws allow the government to crackdown against online hate speech, disrupt the recruitment and fund raising drive and preemptively stop terrorists from carrying out terrorist activities. They also empower the government to censor any content that is threatening for Pakistan. Recently, the government censored the communication app, Telegram apparently owing to fears that terrorists might use it for secure communications.

Punjab Information Technology Board has spearheaded a number of technological interventions to catch terrorists. They ran a campaign called “Peaceful Pakistan” to promote a positive image of Pakistan and vetted objectionable blogs and websites propagating hate speech, violence and

extremism in Pakistan. The National Counter Terrorism Authority is also trying to establish units to specifically counter terrorist propaganda online. Unconfirmed reports also suggest that in Pakistan social media is monitored by its intelligence agencies for uploaded content. This however is not only done in Pakistan. Some other countries like the US also carry out strict surveillance of the internet and social media of its populace.

All these initiatives show that Pakistani policy makers are cognizant of the fact that the threat of terrorism in cyberspace is real and could turn lethal if not kept in check. While it is commendable that the mechanisms are in place to check terrorists’ access to cyberspace, law enforcement agencies and the relevant stakeholders need to ensure that these counterterrorism laws are not misused. The problem starts when elements within the state apparatus use these anti-terror laws to settle personal scores or stifle dissent. The government also needs to be more transparent about the ways it is regulating the internet and social media to increase the confidence of the nation about its mechanisms. There are a number of cases where the government has chosen to remain silent without providing adequate explanation for its surveillance procedures. For instance, it could settle down speculations about the

intelligence agencies monitoring social media accounts by engaging the public as to why it is necessary and what law permits such surveillance. Similarly, why has it chosen to ban the Telegram app and not others that use the same technology. It would be instructive if the nation knew about the successes of anti-terrorism laws pertaining to cyberspace by letting people know of the number of blocked social media accounts or websites tracked. Whatever limited information is available in this realm is based on informal sources or corporations who publish transparency reports regularly on their websites. That too only is based on speculations in the absence of solid evidence. Unless the government opens up about its counter-terrorism measures, Pakistanis will continue to feel insecure on their privacy being violated.

The secrecy surrounding counter-terrorism relating to cyberspace is not new and many human rights activists around the world have raised issues with privacy where surveillance and monitoring of social media accounts, emails and e-commerce activities are concerned. Pakistan however is new to this debate where these issues are very cautiously raised. It is the role of media and civil society to help people understand their rights and responsibilities as internet users. Learning needs to happen on both sides of the divide. As users and consumers, we need to be responsible how we use social media and the internet. On the other hand, the government needs to assure its citizens that in its pursuit to catch cyber terrorists, people’s right to privacy will not be violated. A controlled, suffocating, banned, limited internet is not the answer to dealing with the rising threat of terrorism on the internet. There will always be proxy IP addresses, free or paid, as means to view the banned content. A more open and transparent cyber terrorism policy which engages all stakeholders and encourages cyber vigilantism as a national duty is the need of the hour in Pakistan.

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THREAT TO PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL SECURITY BY THE ISLAMIC STATE OF KHORASAN



Abdul Basit

is attracting the younger generation of Pakistani militants in its fold.

The two recent attacks by the ISK in Pakistan and Afghanistan underscore the magnitude, scope and nature of its threats to the region. On July 16, ISK targeted an election rally of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in Mastung killing 149 people – including Nawab Siraj Raisani – and injured over 300 people. Following this attack, the security forces eliminated the mastermind of the attack and chief of ISK’s Balochistan chapter, Mutfi Hidayatullah in Kalat district. Similarly, on July 18, ISK militants stormed a hideout of the Afghan Taliban in northern Afghanistan’s Sar-e-Pul province killing 15 Taliban fighters.

“The battlefield has expanded from real world to the cyber world where the battle of ideas and hearts and minds would be won only by better and smarter ideas”

These two attacks show the geographical outreach and operational capabilities of ISK. Both are high-profile attacks and intended to create mass casualties and publicity. Conceptually, the strength and functionality of a terrorist group is measured through four variables, its ability to carry out attacks, traction of its



ideological narrative in the society, ability to recruit people and generate financial resources. On all four counts, ISK is well off. Moreover, according to renowned terrorism scholar Barack Mendelsohn, the lethality and viability of a terrorist group is mapped by looking at the number of partnerships it creates with other like-minded groups in a conflict theatre.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), ISK has created ideological and operational partnerships with the Orakzai and Bajaur factions of the Pakistani Taliban. Similarly, militant group Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) which operated out of the strategic Tirah valley and is now based in the eastern Afghanistan's Nanagarhar province is ISK's implementing partner. Short of pledging allegiance, the LI provides logistical support to ISK.

In Balochistan, anti-Shia militant groups such as Jandullah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi (LJA), Saifullah Kurd faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-ul-Islam are cooperating with ISK. These groups have facilitated ISK's attack in interior Sindh and Balochistan by providing their organizational infrastructure and logistical support in return for money.

In mainland Pakistan, some elements of erstwhile Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – renamed as Jamaatud Dawan (JuD) – have defected to ISK. As a matter of fact, the current ISK chief, Aslam Farooqi is an ex-LeT commander. Recently, some elements from Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) have also joined hands with ISK. ISK has no formal organizational presence in Pakistan but through the above-mentioned alliances, it is capable of carrying out high-profile attacks in the country. The military defeat of the IS-central in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria has not affected the operations of ISK in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the relocation of some IS-central fighters from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan has strengthened ISK's organizational and operational capabilities. In 2017, media reports indicated that some French, Moroccan, Algerian and Chechen fighters from Syria relocated to northern Afghanistan's Jawzjan province. In March this year, in a 25-minute propaganda

video, an ISK commander invited IS supporters and sympathizers worldwide to perform the so-called "hijrah" (migration) to Afghanistan if they faced difficulties in travelling to Iraq and Syria. Recently, the heads of Russian, Iranian and Chinese intelligence agencies met in Islamabad to discuss the growing footprint of ISK in Afghanistan, the steady trickle of fighters from Iraq and Syria to the war-torn country and the threat these developments entail for regional security.

ISK has two main factions in Afghanistan based in eastern Nangarhar and northern Jawzjan province. The faction in Nangarhar primarily comprises of former Pakistani Taliban commanders and fighters, while the group in Jawzjan consists of former militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). As mentioned earlier, the Nangarhar-based ISK faction is headed by Aslam Farooqi, while the Jawzjan-based IMU faction of ISK is led by Abdul Malik, son for IMU founder Tahir Yuldashev.

The most dangerous aspect of ISK's threat to Pakistan is its ability to create a niche among the educated and younger generation of jihadists in the country. Whether it was the Saad Aziz-led pro-IS faction in Karachi involved in numerous attacks in the port-city or the Balochistan-based cell of college and university educated militants involved in attacks in Quetta, as mentioned in Qazi Faiz Issa Commission report, ISK has galvanised young and educated militants from Pakistan into its fold. Another case in point is Liaquat Medical College's student Naureen Laghari from Hyderabad, who was recruited online by ISK to carry out suicide attack on Easter Celebrations in Lahore in 2016.

Ideologically, ISK is a Salafi-Takfiri militant group and it not only apostatizes Shias but it also ex-communicates Sufi Muslims. This is why ISK has deliberately targeted sectarian and communal fault lines in Pakistan involving attacks on Shia Imambargahs and processions as well as on Sufi Shrines. If ISK gains further in Af-Pak's militant landscape, the character of sectarian conflict in Pakistan will

“ Likewise, the preventive and countering strategies against ISK's ideological narrative have to factor-in issues of educated youth, remove their genuine grievances, give them ownership in the political system, pay attention to job creation and encourage student politics in universities so that they are retained within the mainstream of the system instead of moving towards the fringes ”

transform qualitatively from Sunni-Shia dynamics to intra-Sunni divisions as well.

ISK is a regional threat and requires joint and concerted efforts in regional and multilateral frameworks to counter its influence. Likewise, the preventive and countering strategies against ISK's ideological narrative have to factor-in issues of educated youth, remove their genuine grievances, give them ownership in the political system, pay attention to job creation and encourage student politics in universities so that they are retained within the mainstream of the system instead of moving towards the fringes. Lastly, the battlefield has expanded from real world to the cyber world where the battle of ideas and hearts and minds would be won only by better and smarter ideas.

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PERSISTENT CONFLICT BETWEEN NWSs: SOUTH ASIA VS THE KOREAN PENINSULA



Christoph Bluth

It has been a long-standing axiom in International Relations that nuclear powers do not go to war with each other. This belief is particularly strong among advocates of the realist school of IR. Nuclear weapons eradicate doubts about the balance of power and act as equalizers between powers whose military and economic capabilities are otherwise quite unequal.


The situation in South Asia seems to defy that principle. While the development of nuclear arsenals by India and Pakistan

was not universally welcomed, there was nevertheless the expectation that it would prevent conflict in South Asia. However, after the nuclear tests the frequency of armed conflict increased. This has been commonly explained on the basis of the "stability/instability" paradox. If two states have a stable deterrent relationship at the strategic nuclear level, the conventional balance matters, giving rise to conventional conflicts. The problem with using this and other Cold War paradigms is that the geography and the structure of the strategic relationship in South Asia are

quite different. An alternative approach has been developed by Uzma Mumtaz at Leeds University who has argued that by conceptualising the situation in South Asia as a protracted conflict, new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict and the role of nuclear weapons in suppressing a natural evolution of the conflict will be developed. It shows that nuclear weapons prevent major war and that the conflict fluctuates around a basic level of rivalry which is constrained to sub strategic local skirmishes.

The closest analogue to the situation in South Asia is the conflict on the Korean peninsula where the outbreak of full-scale war is prevented by nuclear deterrence and the high risks of casualties in a conventional war. Consequently,

“ If two states have a stable deterrent relationship at the strategic nuclear level, the conventional balance matters, giving rise to conventional conflicts ”



the DPRK has resorted to low-level military actions and military diplomacy to prosecute the conflict. The realist explanation of North Korea's behaviour is that the DPRK is seeking to maximize its power and behaving as a state normally does, reacting to a hostile environment. The problem with that explanation is that it is insufficient to explain the dynamics of North Korean foreign policy. North Korea behaves as if it can ignore the disparity of power with the United States. Despite its relationship with China, North Korea is not "bandwagoning" with China and has no longer a reliable security guarantee from Beijing. North Korea engages in risky confrontations with South Korea and the United States that provoke harmful non-military coercive responses (eg. sanctions) and at time takes risky military actions (sinking of naval vessels, attacks on artillery positions, interception of naval vessels).

The other element of North Korea's policy that is not explained by realism is the cycle of confrontation and cooperation that seems designed to provide North Korea

“ The more developed the nuclear arsenals become in South Asia, the less likely a major war is going to be. The same is true for the Korean peninsula ”

with certain economic benefits which are then lost again. Conflict transformation theory suggests that this is the pattern in a persistent conflict in which one side is dissatisfied with the status quo, but the presence of nuclear weapons prevents a full-scale war and therefore neither side has the capability to resolve the conflict in its favour. The United States has responded to the situation by using the mechanisms of the UN Security Council and unilateral sanctions to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in return for normalized political relations and economic benefits. Various efforts to achieve this over the decades have failed because North Korea was never fully prepared to give up the nuclear card and the aggressiveness of the regime and its persistent and egregious human rights violations have inhibited the United States from fully accepting the regime as legitimate.

The efforts to denuclearize North Korea are based on a contradictory set of beliefs about the North Korean leadership. On the one hand it is believed that the North Korean leadership has such a disdain for international norms and is so irrational that deterrence is ineffective and that therefore a policy of containment is too dangerous. On the other hand, we can be very generous to North Korea to achieve denuclearization and once this is accomplished the problem is solved and North Korea can be treated as a normal country. This ignores the fact that the nuclear program is a consequence of the persistent conflict on the Korean


peninsula and that denuclearization itself will not resolve it.

The recent crisis stirred up by North Korea's provocative missile launches, nuclear test and the threats of "fire and fury" from the United States concealed the fact that the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula is actually quite stable and that despite the fiery rhetoric a full-scale war is highly unlikely. In other words, nuclear deterrence is effective. North Korea's cycle of confrontation and cooperation has now moved to the cooperation phase to cash in on the fruits of its military diplomacy. Complete denuclearization however remains an unlikely prospect.

The conclusion of this analysis is both comforting and troubling at the same time. Major war is increasingly unlikely in either South Asia or Korea. The effectiveness of strategic stability in South Asia is underestimated. The more developed the nuclear arsenals become in South Asia, the less likely a major war is going to be. The same is true for the Korean peninsula. The bad news is that strategic stability means that the protagonists are not forced to resolve the conflict. It would take a major geopolitical shift to change this. In Korea this might occur if China decides to change policy on Korea. In South Asia a reorientation of India towards its strategic relationship with China and a shift of focus in Pakistan to deal with the militants and extremism are hypothetical examples. But for now, all we can expect is a shift in the modalities of the conflict to more political rather than military instruments and nothing will change fundamentally in the near future.

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MAKING SENSE OF TTP'S TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN



Shahzad Akhtar

Pakistan has been faced with the threat of terrorism for more than a decade. While violence has decreased in recent years, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliated groups continue to carry out terrorist attacks targeting Pakistani civilians. After 9/11, US launched a military campaign in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and its protectors, Afghan Taliban, forcing them to flee the country. Al Qaeda established a foothold in the tribal regions known as Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with the support of local groups. These local groups coalesced to form TTP in December 2007. Since then, TTP has emerged as a potent threat to Pakistan's domestic security.

Following its establishment, TTP and its affiliated groups unleashed a wave of terrorism in Pakistan. This has cost Pakistan heavily as more than 70,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives and the country had to face serious economic losses. Pakistani military has undertaken a number of operations including operation Zarb- e- Azb in 2014 which has dislodged TTP from the FATA region and many of its leaders have taken refuge in Afghanistan's eastern part where the Afghan government has limited control. Despite the fact that intensive counterterrorism operations have severely damaged TTP's infrastructure in the FATA, TTP has managed to survive as a terrorist organization while perpetrating terrorism in Pakistan against civilian population. To mention few, TTP-affiliated group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar in a suicide attack at Wagha in November 2014 killed sixty people. The most brutal attack carried out by TTP was the massacre of 132 children at Peshawar Army Public School in December 2014 in the North-West of Pakistan. In addition, TTP-related terrorism has continued unabated since then targeting Pakistani civilians.

“The government must encourage the development of civil society that would create opportunities for the socially marginalized and isolated people to tie-in peaceful voluntary associations”

This leads to a fundamental question: what motivates terrorists to commit acts of terrorism against the civilian population? Most importantly, why do terrorist organizations continue to perpetrate terrorism despite their consistent failing in coercing a government to extract any political concession? This analysis employs two theoretical models, developed by terrorism scholars while attempting to answer these questions, to analyze TTP's continued involvement in terrorism in Pakistan despite losing its political efficacy.

First, the strategic model – the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies – posits that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians for political objectives. According to this view, terrorists are political utility maximizers who view terrorism as an effective tool to realize political change compared to alternative forms of protest. This model implies further that people join a terrorist organization because they are deeply committed to achieving political objectives. The counter terrorism strategies flowing from this line of argument suggest reducing political utility of terrorism. These strategies include no concession policy, no appeasement or democracy promotion by which people can resolve their issues without resorting to violence. By considering terrorists as political maximizers, this model predicts that terrorists would abandon terrorism if it consistently failed to coerce policy concessions or to achieve political ends.



Source: AFP

Let us analyse TTP's behavior as a terrorist organization to see whether it is consistent with the prediction of the strategic model. TTP's use of terrorism as a tactic against civilian population has not only turned the public opinion against them but also forced the government to adopt an aggressive military approach

which significantly destroyed TTP's infrastructure ultimately deprived it from its base in FATA. For example, Pakistan's military launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb after TTP attacked Jinnah International Airport in Karachi in 2014.

Even after losing territorial control, a

major setback to the organization, TTP has consistently carried out acts of terrorism in Pakistan. This behavior contradicts the prediction of the strategic model according to which TTP should have abandoned terrorism after finding out its ineffectiveness in achieving political ends. Some analysts may argue

that TTP terrorists are irrational people or a bunch of psychopaths because their use of terrorism has put even the survival of the organization in danger, not to mention its political objectives. However, a number of psychiatric studies reveal that terrorists are not irrational people, they are very much rational.

If TTP terrorists are rational people then what explains TTP's motivation for

“The natural systems model predicts that terrorist organizations will consistently engage in acts of terrorism to continue and justify their existence while preserving the social unit”

not to achieve organization's declared political objectives, but to develop strong and effective ties with other terrorist members. Social solidarity seems to be the main motivation for a terrorist to become member of a terrorist organization. This model draws on organization theory.

Natural system model, a leading approach in organization theory, posits that people participate in organizations not to achieve



Source: AFP

committing acts of terrorism especially when it has persistently failed in achieving political ends? This behavior can be explained by employing the social solidarity model to explain TTP's continuation of terrorism despite its failure to realize political goals. Social solidarity model posits that people join terrorism

“The natural systems model predicts that terrorist organizations will consistently engage in acts of terrorism to continue and justify their existence while preserving the social unit”

their official goals, but to experience social solidarity with other members. Achieving organization's goals seem of little relevance for participating in an organization against personal inducements of achieving sense of solidarity. This model contends that organizations will act to preserve their existence by offering social benefits to its

“The strategic model – the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies – posits that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians for political objectives”

discussion suggests that terrorists think and behave more as social solidarity maximizers, not political maximizers.

Pakistani security forces have launched a number of military operations in FATA since 2004 against terrorists. These operations have proved quite successful in dismantling terrorists' hold and infrastructure in FATA. However, these operations have led to massive mass-dislocation creating a large pool of socially alienated and marginalized people especially youth. This disenfranchised youth particularly has become an easy prey for TTP. Some journalists covering FATA note that the Pakistani Taliban have recruited unemployed youth with no prospects of education and work. In addition, the Pakistani forces' actions have further alienated the local people. Many young men living in refugee camps after being dislocated from their native areas joined the Taliban to avenge the death of their family members and friends who were killed because of the indiscriminate bombing during the counterterrorism operations.

Availability of recruitment in the form of socially alienated people has enabled the TTP to continue with its terrorist campaign in Pakistan while enjoying a safe haven in Afghanistan. This observation is also consistent with the fact that even when terrorist organizations do not succeed in achieving political objectives, they commit acts of terrorism to generate new recruits, enhance membership morale, and strengthen the social unit. The social solidarity model helps us to understand why the TTP commits acts of terrorism in Pakistan despite its political ineffectiveness. This line of argument has implications for counterterrorism policy.

In order to formulate an effective counterterrorism policy, the government should focus on taking measures to reduce or eliminate alienation of people especially of youth. By improving youth education and employment, the government can effectively prevent youth from falling into the hands of terrorists. The government must also encourage the development of civil society that

would create opportunities for the socially marginalized and isolated people to tie in peaceful voluntary associations. In addition, counterterrorism operations, which tend to create dislocation and social isolation, and motivate revenge, must be carried out cautiously to reduce collateral damage. These policies will help to diminish social benefits that terrorists' organizations offer, thereby reducing their leverage of recruiting potential terrorists.

Recently emerged Pashtun Tahafaz movement (PTM) committed to peaceful protests, has demanded the rights of the Pashtuns living in FATA and beyond. It has attracted a significant number of socially alienated youth of FATA. PTM has launched peaceful protests demanding return of dislocated population to their home places and respect of their human rights. It also demanded cessation of extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances and clearance of landmines in FATA. Though PTM has been criticized for various reasons, it has at least provided a platform for the socially alienated youth to tie in a peaceful movement. Mishandling of PTM by the state can potentially encourage the disenfranchised youth to look for platforms promoting violence.


“Availability of recruitment in the form of socially alienated people has enabled the TTP to continue with its terrorist campaign in Pakistan while enjoying a safe haven in Afghanistan”

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STRENGTHENING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME



Sitara Noor

Pakistan's nuclear programme has remained under global scrutiny for potential nuclear security risks and associated challenges since its inception. Notwithstanding the perceived threats, Pakistan has a clean record of running its civilian nuclear facilities safely and securely under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Over the past few decades, Pakistan has taken stringent measures and upgraded its nuclear security infrastructure significantly.

Nuclear security is a process that requires constant revisions corresponding to the evolving threat perception of the state. Therefore, in order to remain effective, nuclear security regime needs to be sustained

and updated with the evolving situation. The IAEA defines national nuclear security regime as a set of system that builds through the implementation of relevant international legal instruments, information protection, physical protection, material accounting and control, detection of and response to trafficking in such material, national response plans, and contingency measures. The agency also emphasizes upon the need to sustain nuclear security regime at national as well as the operational level.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME

Pakistan's nuclear security regime comprises of national legislation, regulatory framework, institutional development, nuclear security infrastructure and international cooperation. Pakistan's nuclear security plans commensurate regularly revised threat assessment and take into account the emerging challenges to increase confidence in its national nuclear security measures. Pakistan appropriated additional nuclear security commitments by ratifying the 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016. The 2005 amendment has widened the scope of the convention to cover physical protection of nuclear facilities as well as the nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. Adherence to the amended CPPNM also requires expanding the scope of offences to include smuggling of nuclear material as well as the actual or threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. It also requires member states to develop information sharing mechanisms in case of theft; robbery or other unlawful acts involving nuclear material.

WAY FORWARD

It is important to note that even before the ratification of the amended CPPNM, Pakistan was in the process of updating its physical protection measures according to the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). However, after the formal ratification of the amendment, it has become even more important to highlight

Pakistan's sustained efforts in the nuclear security domain. In this regard, the following steps may be considered to strengthen and make Pakistan's nuclear security regime more sustainable:

- At the time of signing the CPPNM, Pakistan had placed a reservation on article 2.2 of the Convention dealing with domestic transport. In response to this, various countries posed a counter reservation and questioned Pakistan's commitment to the spirit of the nuclear security convention. After ratifying the 2005 amendment, that reservation becomes null and void in principle, however, Pakistan may formally request the IAEA to update the official record.
- To address international concerns, Pakistan should be more open in sharing information regarding nuclear security measures in place. Under the amended CPPNM, states are encouraged to establish cooperation and develop an information-sharing mechanism for physical protection of civilian nuclear material and facilities. Under that framework, Pakistan can take proactive measures to share necessary information and establish bilateral information sharing mechanisms.
- It is important to distinguish between nuclear security and physical protection, both theoretically and technically, as an interchangeable use of both terms leads to certain ambiguities. Physical protection is a corollary and a subset of overall nuclear security regime based on state practices and international commitments. Likewise, at the national level, there is a need to define clear responsibilities of various stakeholders in a nuclear security regime. For example, under the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) ordinance (2001), PNRA is one of the competent authorities for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities from a regulatory perspective. Roles and responsibilities of other competent

authorities under the National Command Authority should be explained. This becomes even more important when a nuclear security task involves multiple stakeholders such as the transport security.

- PNRA is in the process of drafting a new regulation that would lay out clear guideline for nuclear security requirements from the regulatory perspective, for example, the Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(s) and Nuclear Installation(s) (PAK/925). Once promulgated, this regulation will pave the way for a more nuanced understanding of roles and responsibilities of the fundamental principles such as defining design basis threat, quality assurance, graded approach and security culture as well, which is an important element in sustaining the nuclear security regime.
- The amended CPPNM requires the state to declare a range of unauthorized activities to be charged as a punishable offence under the national laws. In this regard, most of the offences are covered by the NCA Act and PNRA ordinance, however, there is need to identify specifically which law can be applied on any offence under CPPNM (amended) in Pakistan Penal Court.
- Lastly, Pakistan may consider inviting the IAEA to carry out an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. IPPAS was created by the IAEA to assist member states in strengthening their national nuclear security regimes. IPPAS missions, carried out at the request of the states concerned, provide peer advice on implementing international instruments, and the Agency's guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.

Sitara Noor is an independent consultant based in Islamabad.

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