Bilal Aslam
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is considered a major milestone in the history of India-Pakistan relations. While it has been deemed a diplomatic success between the two rival states, scholarship remains divided on whether it is emblematic of cooperation. For instance, a group of scholars argues that IWT is a key example of productive bilateral cooperation on the subcontinent, while other scholars, by contrast, point to the fact that the Treaty only divides rivers between India and Pakistan and does not represent a mechanism for cooperation or avoidance of conflict. For example, some scholars maintain that IWT’s “allocation of entire rivers rather than partial flows reflects an international situation which requires independent, rather than cooperative, river management.” As climate change intensifies, populations grow, and water demand increases, the Treaty faces unprecedented challenges. Therefore, there is a dire need for instituting a new water governance regime that promotes integrated management, technological innovation, and regional cooperation.
IWT was facilitated by the World Bank and signed by India and Pakistan in 1960. It divided the six main rivers of the Indus basin, giving control of three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India and three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan. It was premised on the idea of cooperation in transboundary water-sharing, and it was speculated that it will help normalize relations between India and Pakistan. Although IWT has survived the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, as well as the post-nuclearization crises, it has not contributed to easing tensions between the two countries.
Article VI of IWT maintains that both India and Pakistan shall regularly exchange data related to the flow and utilization of water, while Article VIII establishes the permanent posts of Indus Water Commissioners from both countries and binds them to meet on a regular basis. The meetings of the Pakistan-India Permanent Indus Commission were held alternately in India and Pakistan every year. However, since the right-wing Hindu nationalist government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is at the helm of affairs, this mandatory meeting has remained suspended. In September 2016, the Indian PM, while alleging that Pakistan had perpetrated a militant attack on the Uri army base in Indian-occupied Kashmir, gave a strong statement: “Blood and water cannot flow together,” and threatened to revoke IWT.
Analysts have identified a fundamental flaw in IWT in that it lacks space for a cooperative arrangement with regard to the joint development of the river basin. A report by Robert Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro for a US Department of Defense- managed policy institute argues that “one reason for dissatisfaction with the Indus Waters Treaty is that, as presently constructed, it offers very thin support to the integrated or joint development of the Indus river basin.” Also, according to reports published by the Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group and an Islamabad-based think tank, Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), the ‘water war’ rationale is more pertinent in the context of the future of water conflict between Pakistan and India, and it might well be looming over the Indus basin. Besides, issues like groundwater depletion, water pollution, and seasonal variations in water supply are making India and Pakistan mutually vulnerable and necessitate cooperation. Thus, while IWT is historically significant, it is no longer sufficient in addressing the region’s water security challenges. Therefore, a new water governance regime is essential for sustainable water management and regional stability, in line with Article VII of IWT, which discusses a roadmap of future cooperation.
The Indus basin is not only South Asia’s, but also the world’s largest contiguous irrigation system, covering an area of over 20 million hectares. Therefore, a new river governance regime based on multilateral, regional cooperation must be established. Further, widening the consultation process to a range of stakeholders, including China and Afghanistan, is important. This should include joint research, coordinated conservation efforts, and data-sharing mechanisms. One way forward is to expand the scope of water cooperation by working on collaborative projects in watershed management, flood control, and drought preparedness. Future meetings of Pakistan-India Permanent Indus Commission should include agendas such as the incorporation of modern technologies and methods, not least satellite monitoring, real-time data-sharing, and AI-driven water modeling. The use of modern technology can improve transparency and help bridge the trust deficit, thus creating a mechanism for dispute resolution.
Despite these challenges, IWT remains one of the few diplomatic successes between India and Pakistan. That said, it needs to evolve. The Treaty was designed in an era when climate change was not a major phenomenon, and when technological advancements in water management were minimal. A revised or supplementary agreement should account for these realities. In addition to formal government negotiations, Track II diplomacy involving scientists, civil society organizations, and local communities can help build trust. Research institutions and think tanks can also play a role in facilitating dialogue and proposing evidence-based solutions.
But for this to happen, the region in general and India and Pakistan in particular need a new generation of leaders – in politics, business, and civil society – who understand the implications of water scarcity and work towards dealing with them. Additionally, broadening the scope diplomatic engagements beyond state actors to include local communities, civil society, and scientific experts could depoliticize water-related discussions. The Indus River, it must be stressed, sustains millions on both sides of the border. Therefore, there is a need to prioritize human security over nationalist rhetoric.
Dr. Bilal Aslam is an Assistant Professor at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore.
The views expressed in the article are the author’s own, and they do not necessarily reflect those of Pakistan Politico.
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