Source: Breaking Defense
Talha Ali Madni
On November 16, 2024, India successfully tested an indigenously developed hypersonic missile that can reportedly travel in excess of 1,500 kilometers carrying various types of payloads, including nuclear warheads. Recently, New Delhi also tested its first Supersonic Combustion Ramjet or Scramjet– critical to developing advanced hypersonic capabilities. Hypersonic missiles add a new dimension to threats to strategic stability in South Asia– a region prone to conflicts and a flashpoint for a nuclear exchange. Not only will it likely ignite a new missile race, but it will also destabilize the strategic balance between the two arch-rivals. Such weapons will aggravate risks during peacetimes and complicate crisis management in times of heightened tensions.
Hypersonic missiles travel at a speed in excess of 5,000 kilometers per hour. However, what truly distinguishes them is their precision and maneuverability. Ballistic missiles may travel at hypersonic speeds but fly on a predictable ballistic trajectory, making them susceptible to ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. Whereas, cruise missiles, though maneuverable, fly at a lower altitude and slower speeds. Hypersonic missiles can be either hypersonic glide vehicles or hypersonic cruise missiles. Hypersonic glide vehicles are types of warheads attached to a ballistic missile that jettison from the missile booster midcourse and glide towards their target. As for hypersonic cruise missiles, they use scramjets to fly at hypersonic speeds within the atmosphere.
Hypersonic weapons upset mutual vulnerabilities and, by extension, deterrence. In a hypothetical two-country world, if country A has hypersonic missiles and country B does not, it raises disarming counterforce temptations of the former against the latter. Nevertheless, in the long term, the mutual possession of hypersonic weapons, just like that of other strategic weapons, enhances deterrence by making disarming strikes mutually threatening. The introduction of hypersonic weapons in South Asia by India, seemingly aimed at dealing with China, is, however, likely to weaken strategic stability between it and Pakistan, too. For example, in a future India-Pakistan crisis, the possession of hypersonic weapons, coupled with Pakistan’s rudimentary second-strike capability and absence of BMD, may add to Indian counterforce temptations against Pakistan.
Although Islamabad claims to have achieved second-strike capability by testing submarine-launched cruise missile in 2017, there is a need to make it more robust and credible. For any nuclear possessor to have a credible second-strike capability, its second strike elements must be reliable, affordable, and sustainable; able to survive enemy attack and communicate; reach enemy territory with enough fuel to complete the mission; and destroy a target. Nuclear submarines are the main plank of second-strike capabilities. Without nuclear submarines, Pakistan has a weaker sea-based nuclear leg that centers on conventional submarines with limited range and survivability. All this raises some questions about the robustness of its second-strike capability while highlighting the need to buttress it.
Moreover, unlike New Delhi, Islamabad lacks a BMD system to protect its forces and population centers from any incoming Indian ballistic missiles. Although BMD is not impregnable, New Delhi’s multilayered BMD provides India with a degree of confidence in its ability to take riskier kinetic actions without having to worry about retaliation. Overall, these factors, coupled with the induction of hypersonic weapons, will likely give India greater impetus to carry out a counterforce strike against Pakistan. Without a shadow of doubt, this belief will contribute to eroding nuclear deterrence and prompting New Delhi to be more risk-acceptant.
Furthermore, these dynamics may also create and exacerbate Pakistan’s use it or loss it fears, compelling it to launch a preemptive strike in a future conflict. Also, Islamabad doubts over New Delhi’s No-First-Use policy, which have increased due to statements from key Indian officials, add to such fears. Moreover, India’s evolving crisis behavior, typified by a greater proclivity to use force and threaten escalation, will also affect Pakistan’s perceptions of India in a future crisis. This will create risks and uncertainties, contributing to weakening crisis stability.
In addition to all this, New Delhi’s possession of hypersonic missiles will also push Islamabad to keep its nuclear forces at a state of higher readiness during peacetimes. Currently, Pakistan adheres to a policy of keeping its delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads de-mated. Although there is no indication that Islamabad is planning to change this policy, the inclusion of hypersonic missiles in India’s inventory might necessitate a policy review. Should Pakistan decide to heighten its readiness levels, the likelihood of miscalculations will only increase.
All in all, in the absence of dialogue between India and Pakistan, the advent of hypersonic missiles in this dyad will make strategic stability more fragile. This is primarily because such missiles would give India more counterforce strike options, tilt the balance of vulnerabilities in its favor, and push Pakistan to counter those.
Talha Ali Madni is a Fulbright scholar of peace and conflict studies.
The views expressed in the article are the author’s own, and they do not necessarily reflect those of Pakistan Politico.
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