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


CONTENTS



06

Riaz Mohammad Khan
An Overview of the
Afghan Conflict and
Looking Ahead



34

Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
The S-400
Deal and Pakistan's
Quest for Strategic
Stability



48

Amina Afzal
Deterrence Stability
in South Asia:
Between the Devil
& the Deep Blue Sea



10

Qadir Khan Yousafzai
The Saliency of
Pak-Afghan Border
Management



36

Zainab Dar
Fake News and
Political Rhetoric:
The Foreign Policy
Challenge



52

Samran Ali
India-China Relations:
Competition and
Prospects for
Cooperation



14

Maimuna Ashraf
S-400: An Addition
to India's Ambitious
Mosaic of Offense
Defense Capabilities



40

Hamzah Rifaat Hussain
Spoilers in
Pakistan-Iran
Relations



19

Syed Rifaat Hussain
Book Review |
The Blind Eye:
U.S. Non-
Proliferation Policy
Towards Pakistan
From Ford to Clinton



44

Maria Bastos
Feminism,
Foreign policy
and Hope



21

Salma Malik
Security & Conflict:
Developing a
Gender Lens



25

Rupert Stone
India, Russia
and the
S-400 Deal



28

Saeed Afridi
Book Review |
Reimagining Pakistan:
Transforming
a Dysfunctional
Nuclear State



30

Interview:
Purush Chaudhary
Pakistan State of
Future Index

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Source: AFP

Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Kabul on June 14, 2012

AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN CONFLICT AND LOOKING AHEAD



Riaz Mohammad Khan

Since 1979, the Afghan conflict has deeply impacted Pakistan and Pakistan's foreign relations, in particular its relations with the United States. A brief survey of how the conflict has affected Pakistan and the region is necessary to analyze the current situation and examine what lies ahead.

The Soviet military intervention and the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s catapulted the Zia government into international prominence and forged close cooperation

between Pakistan and the United States. This cooperation helped Pakistan meet many of its defense and economic needs. More importantly, the resulting environment provided enough room for Pakistan to cross the nuclear threshold. At the same time, because of its preoccupation with the Afghan Jihad and also for reasons of its own myopic internal and economic policy, Pakistan missed out on the opportunities offered by the phenomenon of Globalization that has transformed the world since the 1980s. Regionally, the Afghan Jihad contributed to the weakening of the Soviet Union which collapsed mainly because the closed Soviet system had become unsustainable in an era of information and technological revolutions.

During the 1990s, following the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan drew all the wrong lessons, ignoring the momentous changes in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Pakistan got mired in the fratricidal Afghan conflict in a bid to build its influence in an otherwise insular and war-torn Afghanistan, euphemistically described as "strategic depth." This turned out to be delusional. Pakistan's policy fell into the Afghan ethnic divide, especially after its pronounced support for the Afghan Taliban. Meanwhile, the US watched the Afghan developments with some concern but remained distant. Furthermore, Pakistan encouraged non-state actors/militants to abet an indigenous Kashmiri uprising, a policy which only damaged the Kashmiri struggle. A later course-correction resulted in the alienation of many of these militants who joined hands with other radical elements to wreak terror in the country.

9/11 once again changed Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban were routed, and internationally Pakistan lost its voice on Afghan matters. The sponsors of the Bonn process ignored Pakistan's sound suggestion to ensure ethnic balance within the political and security apparatus needed for Kabul. Also instead of bringing them into the fold of the Bonn process, the Afghan Taliban were lumped together with Al Qaeda. The error of judgment on this score continues to haunt the US-led-coalition in Afghanistan. Somewhat paradoxically, the need to access Afghanistan once again shaped a cooperative US relationship with Pakistan. But, differences over the Afghan

Taliban widened as the latter revived and regrouped. The growing US frustration over failure to stabilize Afghanistan started to vitiate US-Pakistan bilateral ties which have come under further stress because of emerging realignment in the larger Asian region with deepening Indo-US relations. This fact notwithstanding, Islamabad will have to rethink its approach to Afghanistan for improvement in US-Pakistan relations.

This background helps us examine the principal features and main drivers of the low intensity Afghan conflict, the competing interests of outside powers and the resulting tensions. More specifically, before looking at the future, a reality check is needed on the plight of the Kabul government, the US military presence, the Afghan Taliban, efforts aimed at reconciliation and other external interests especially the role of India.

“ During the 1990s, following the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan drew all the wrong lessons, ignoring the momentous changes in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Pakistan got mired in the fratricidal Afghan conflict in a bid to build its influence in an otherwise insular and war-torn Afghanistan, euphemistically described as “strategic depth” ”



AFGHANISTAN POST-BONN

The Kabul government, put together under the Bonn framework, remains fractious and weak and is being essentially sustained by US military and economic support. The Afghan army is capable of defending urban centers in particular Kabul even though it is largely dysfunctional in areas where the Afghan Taliban have influence. The army also suffers from ethnic imbalance which goes back to its inception. The Afghan economy continues to be largely a war economy heavily dependent on US funds. On the plus side, education, public services and developmental activity of the past two decades have transformed the Afghan society enough to be able to resist the return of the Taliban rule of 1990s. Therefore, regardless of instability, the Bonn political dispensation will survive.

Similarly, despite US desire to reduce overseas burdens, a residual American military presence will continue for the foreseeable future largely because once established militaries are averse to erasing their footprint. Even Russia and China will tolerate such US military deployment as a check on Islamic militant elements. The arguments that the US military presence in Afghanistan is aimed at China or at Pakistan's strategic assets are questionable. The US maintains military bases all around China in the Asia Pacific. As for Pakistan's strategic assets, any US contingency, even though extremely improbable, will rely on space and cyber technologies rather than

on paratroopers. At present, however, the US military presence is generally viewed as necessary for stabilizing Afghanistan.

Pakistani policy makers often express concern over India's growing influence in Afghanistan. They see Washington encouraging a greater role for India in the country. Of particular worry is the suspected cooperation between the Afghan intelligence agency and its Indian counterpart for subversion in Pakistan. While Afghanistan has the sovereign right to build its relations with any country, Pakistan has a legitimate expectation that the Afghan territory is not used for anti-Pakistan activity. To ensure this, however, Pakistan will have to work through Washington and Kabul and not through the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan interest in overland transit of imports from India is complicated by the Pakistan-India tension. Nonetheless, it is in Pakistan's interest to offer maximum facilitation for Afghan goods transiting overland to India or for its overseas commerce through Karachi. It can also be argued that free flow of overland transit trade, if it materializes, could create a stake for both Pakistan and India in the stability of Afghanistan.

The Taliban have proved to be a tenacious force. They revived largely owing to Pushtun disaffection following US military action and the early US diversion to invade Iraq. The Afghan Taliban have undeniable influence in rural stretches of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, but again and again they have failed to maintain their hold

over urban centers. They could do so in the 1990s because at that time Afghanistan was isolated and, like the soldiers of fortune of bygone centuries, the Afghan Taliban could afford mobility and surprise maneuvers in large numbers. Now they are exposed from the skies. Nonetheless, while they cannot hope to overrun Kabul or any other notable urban center, they remain part of the Afghan political landscape something being grudgingly recognized by the US led coalition. This change may have been caused by the US frustrations in Kabul or perhaps the emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan in the recent years.

The contact between US Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells and the Afghan Taliban representatives last July is the first clear signal of American seriousness in promoting reconciliation that accommodates the Taliban. Following 9/11, for the Americans, reconciliation essentially meant surrender by the Taliban. Pakistan argued that it could not be asked to target the Taliban at the same time it is being brought to the negotiating table, however, the fuzziness of Pakistan's position at the operational level spawned distrust and demands for "do more." The unsavory Coalition Support Fund arrangement also incited the US demand.

Apart from the US reticence, Pakistan's mistakes stalled early efforts for reconciliation undertaken following a nod from the Obama Administration in 2014. The Pakistani side faced an awkward position when prior to the Murree parleys, it failed to take the Americans or Kabul into confidence about Mullah Omar's death. The present US-Taliban contact offers another opportunity.

THE WAY FORWARD

According to a statement by the CENTCOM commander, Gen. Joseph Votel in early October, the US expects Pakistan to use its influence with the Taliban leaders residing inside Pakistan to cut off contacts with the Taliban commanders inside Afghanistan. Secondly, the US wants these leaders to come to the negotiating table. The second demand is at the heart of reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan. It points to the way forward provided we have clarity on two points. First, the status quo and persistence of conflict will continue to inflict huge costs



Members of the Afghan delegation during the Afghanistan Conference, Bonn, 2011

Source: AFP

“ We need to cross another psychological hurdle, a false argument that the Afghan Taliban are our only friends in Afghanistan and abandoning them is perfidious. This argument is often combined with another erroneous premise that time is on the side of the Taliban ”

on Afghanistan and Pakistan, more than on any other country in the world. Secondly, the chance of a clear Taliban victory is next to nothing.


As a first step, Pakistan should declare that it will welcome any contacts by the Afghan

Taliban leaders with any party including Kabul and the Americans for the purpose of reconciliation and peace. Secondly, we must use whatever influence we have with these leaders to engage in reconciliation process. Undeniably, this influence is limited. Yet we have one clear responsibility: we cannot allow our territory to be used for operations inside Afghanistan. Such activity would militate against our sovereign control as well as against our stated policy not to allow the Afghan war to be fought on our soil.

We need to cross another psychological hurdle, a false argument that the Afghan Taliban are our only friends in Afghanistan and abandoning them is perfidious. This argument is often combined with another erroneous premise that time is on the side of the Taliban. Reconciliation is the only reasonable course for all Afghan parties. The Taliban can bargain to retain influence where they have it and possibly a share in the Kabul political dispensation. Take the example of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who sits in Kabul today after having waged relentless military campaigns for power for nearly three decades. Like him, today the Afghan Taliban have contacts with Iran and some support. Iran may have been motivated by concerns about Daesh but certainly not by a desire to put the Taliban in the driving seat in Kabul.

For reconciliation, apart from Kabul and the Taliban, Pakistan and the United States have a key role. Other regional countries such as Iran, Russia, China, India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey can be helpful within and outside the several multilateral forums for that purpose such as the Moscow Format, the Quadrilateral Contact Group, the SCO Contact Group and the Heart of Asia initiative. Success will, however, depend on the seriousness and flexibility shown by the four key parties in pushing for a workable arrangement for peace. Once reconciliation succeeds and peace returns to Afghanistan, the outside parties, especially the US and China (provided they are not caught up in rivalry), can greatly contribute to the development of Afghanistan and the region. Pakistan must also proceed with the confidence that no one can supplant the inherent strengths of its relations with Afghanistan rooted in common geography, history and demographics.

*Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan is the former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and the author of **Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity***



THE SALIENCE OF PAK-AFGHAN BORDER MANAGEMENT



Qadir Khan Yousafzai

The Afghan Parliamentary elections gained more traction and importance due to the completion of the second round of Afghan Taliban talks with the U.S. delegation in its political office in Doha, Qatar. The head of the Afghan Taliban's political office, Al-Haaj Muhammad Abbas Stanikzai, deputy head Mualvi Abdul Islam Hanfi and central members of the office like Sheikh Shahabuddin Dilawar, Qari Din Muhammad Hanif, Zahid Ahmedzai and Muhammad Sohail Shaheen met with the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad to discuss the cessation of hostilities and finding a way forward to solve the Afghan imbroglio.

Afghan Taliban stated that Khalilzad agreed with their viewpoint about the presence of foreign forces on Afghan soil as a major hindrance to peace. The U.S. delegation did not deny this statement, however, Khalilzad agreed that the engagement process for stable peace in Afghanistan had to continue. This positive statement about continued engagement by Khalilzad was an important development for the Afghan peace process and was also welcomed by Pakistan. Even though the Taliban want engagement with the U.S. on the peace process, they refused to provide any guarantees about refraining from obstructing the elections that took place last month. Afghanis were warned against participating in the polls as the Taliban vowed to target polling stations, security forces and the polling staff. The threats were carried out and many candidates were killed during the election process with several areas targeted by the Taliban including polling stations. According to the statistics released by the Afghan Election Commission, 9 million out of 12 million people were registered as voters that include 3 million women voters. 54,000 security personnel were deployed at 21,000 polling stations. However, the voting process was severely disturbed due to the attacks carried out by the Taliban.

“ Pakistani border forces and civilians are targeted from the Afghan side. The fencing process is being impeded time and again. Recently, tension erupted in Tandadera area where Pakistani forces were busy in fencing the border ”

In order to facilitate the conduct of peaceful elections, Pakistan sealed the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan is involved in fencing the Af-Pak border as part of its border management system. The fencing has been vociferously opposed by the Afghan government in Kabul and there have been instances where Pakistani security personnel have been attacked by the Afghan forces. This opposition is appalling since the border management system is globally considered extremely important for safeguarding the borders. On Pakistan's eastern flank for example, India is not only trying to fence the international border but also illegally attempting to insert smart fences on the Line of Control. According to India's Border Security Force (BSF) officials and the Home Ministry, these fencing projects will cover many parts of the border. The fence will include thermal imaging, infrared and laser-activated barriers that are part of India's high-tech smart-fencing surveillance system.

In the current milieu, Pakistan has also started its border management campaign on its western border with Afghanistan. It has tightened its security on the border by planting fences and trenches on a 1,400 km-long stretch of the Af-Pak border (total length is 2,600 km). However, instead of



Source: AFP

cooperating, Pakistani border forces and civilians are targeted from the Afghan side. The fencing process is being impeded time and again. Recently, tension erupted in Tandadera area where Pakistani forces were busy in fencing the border. However, these tensions are not new. Last year, due to indiscriminate firing by the Afghan forces at the Chaman-Spain Boldak border, scores of Pakistani civilians were killed. But the border fencing process has not come to a halt. Pakistan is determined to complete it against all odds. The first leg of this project will be completed at the end of 2018. Approx. 432 km of highly sensitive area has been fenced. In the next phase, a 400 km stretch will be fenced at a cost 10 billion rupees. The phase will be completed in 2 years. Out of 443 fortresses planned to be built, 150 have already been completed, some of which are constructed on the peaks of mountains that are 12,000 ft. in height. Moreover, 1,100 checkpoints have also been built. The erection of checkpoints and

barbed fences has increased the chances of eliminating cross-border movement of miscreants.

There have been several rounds of tri-nation dialogues between Britain, Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss Pakistan's border management system and other Afghan affairs but none has been successful. Due to the closure of the Af-Pak border last year, Britain convened the triangular conference which was attended by the National Security Advisors of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The main point raised in the conference was that of border closure. The purpose of the meeting was to lessen tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the latter did not get any reassurances from the former. Though Pakistani and British officials met separately, Afghan NSA, Hanif Atmar took to social media and said that the meeting was positive. The moot was important because Pakistan had closed the border owing to tensions. Pakistan had taken this decision

after Afghanistan failed to cooperate on border management and rein in elements that were using Afghan soil against Pakistan. Afghanistan heavily banks on Pakistani ports for its trade. It costs Afghan traders much more in using Indian ports and air routes for trading purposes. Due to the closure of the Chaman border, thousands of containers were stopped at the Karachi port. Rise in terrorism will harm both countries. Hence, Pakistan has implored the Afghan government to strengthen security on the 2,600 km-long border.

It is beyond the capacity of one country to fully patrol the long border. The terrain is made up of high peaks and treacherous passes and approaches. Despite getting help from U.S. and NATO forces, Kabul has been unable to bring about peace. Its inability to control swathes of Afghan territory is intertwined with its tacit espousal to terrorists' activities in Pakistan. A round of recriminations began. After Islamabad



Source: AFP

“ Pakistan is involved in fencing the Afghan-Pak border as part of its border management system. The fencing has been vociferously opposed by the Afghan government in Kabul and there have been instances where Pakistani security personnel have been attacked by the Afghan forces ”

handed over a list of 76 miscreants who were directly involved in dastardly attacks in Pakistan, Kabul also provided a list of 32 sanctuaries to Pakistan.

Pakistan has intermittently closed its western border owing to its non-cooperation from Afghanistan over the fresh spate of terrorism since 2016. One of the reasons as to why the border was closed related to the attacks in Quetta on the judicial fraternity. Remnants of the Indian networks that were apprehended in Balochistan went into Afghanistan and established havens. This increased difficulties for Pakistan's LEA's in arresting militants. Another important reason for closing the border was to protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from malignant intriguers. This is because foreign powers are active in propping up and perpetuating the presence of Daesh so as to use it as a pretext to limit CPEC and through it the reach of Pakistani and Chinese goods in international markets. Thus, agents like

Kulbushan Jadhav were needed by India to achieve this objective. Proscribed organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jamat-ul-Ahraar have established permanent hideouts in Afghanistan whose only aim is to engage soft targets in Pakistan. While the Pakistan army-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb was successful in dismantling terrorists' safe havens, the importance of following the National Action Plan was underscored by the top brass of Pakistan military.

Pakistan has repeatedly iterated its desire to fence the border. It has also called upon Afghanistan to change its stance in a bid to end the ordeal for the peoples of both countries. One of the most glaring allegations made by Washington and Kabul is that Pakistan facilitates cross-border infiltration which leads to terrorism. Regardless the veracity of such claims, Pakistan is taking steps to deny miscreants any chances of slipping away by starting the fencing process. There are militia and other elements in

Kabul that are bent upon subverting this initiative and vitiating ties between the two countries. Pakistan, on the other hand, is seriously pushing the peace process at the military, diplomatic and political levels, something that was testified by a high-powered delegation visit to Afghanistan led by the new Foreign Minister. It is about time Afghanistan realizes that the initiative of border management proposed by Pakistan is beneficial for both countries. Dithering, blame-games and intrigues will have grievous implications for the region.

Qadir Khan Yousafzai is a Columnist at Jehan Pakistan

S-400: AN ADDITION TO INDIA'S AMBITIOUS **MOSAIC OF OFFENSE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES**



Source: AFP



Maimuna Ashraf

India's pursuit of advanced military technologies has enabled it to secure its place among the world's top importers of conventional weapons over the past two decades. India has also been investing in developing missile defenses for a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield coupled with an integrated, and multi-layered air defence network. After testing the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) missile for high altitude interception in 2006 and Advanced Air Defense (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception in 2007, India and Russia concluded the much anticipated US \$ 5.2 billion deal in October 2018 for the purchase of five regiments of Russian-made S-400 Triumf surface to air missile system.

S-400 is Russia's most advanced, effective and mobile long-range air defence system, capable of intercepting cruise and ballistic missiles, stealth aircraft and drones at an engagement range of 400 km. Significantly, S-400 comprises an improved radar system capable of locating targets 600 km away, with the ability of engaging approx. 36 targets simultaneously. Its anti-ballistic missile capabilities enable it to intercept ballistic missiles travelling at the speed of 4800 meters per second, at a distance of 60 km.

India has signed the final commercial contract of S-400 with Russia at a time when Delhi-Washington bonhomie is on the rise and the latter has threatened to impose economic sanctions on countries engaged in significant military and intelligence transactions with Russian defense entities. It was speculated that the S-400 deal, originally approved in 2015, might be called off in view of the possibility that India's decision could be treated under the recently announced US Congress legislation known as Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), aimed at punishing Russia for its alleged meddling in 2016 US presidential elections. However, the finalization of the S-400 deal not only

laid all speculations of its possible demise to rest, but also signifies that India remains apprehensive of embedding itself completely under US orbit and is seeking a strategic balance between the major powers in order to achieve its goals of military modernization. India's strategic defence cooperation is not restricted to Russia and the US, as Israel and France are also emerging as some of its largest weapon suppliers. The S-400 deal is followed by a \$777 million agreement with Israel for the supply of Barak-8 Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) defense system for seven ships of the Indian Navy.

Given Indian dependence on Russia for 60% of its weapons inventory, and the emerging strategic convergence of China and Pakistan with Russia is also fueling India's regional strategic outlook. Similarly, given India's centrality to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy of containment of China, the US might look the other way and not want India to risk its national security matrix by endangering its partnership with Russia, on which India relies heavily to match China's strategic capabilities that already include S-400. It remains to be seen whether the US eventually grants India a waiver to exempt it from CAATSA sanctions. The treatment of India under the scanner of CAATSA can potentially undermine the Indo-US strategic convergence and trust built over the past decade.

Increasingly, India is building an ambiguous mosaic of offensive and defensive weapons systems. It is actively developing an assured second-strike capability through submarine launched ballistic missiles (K-4 & K-15) and submarine launched cruise missiles. Moreover, India is testing ballistic missiles from canister-based launch systems and road-mobile launchers (as the Agni-V test) and shifting liquid solid fuel to solid fuel (as Agni-II and Prithvi-II) to improve its readiness level, deployment flexibility and survivability during a crisis. Similarly, the induction of short-range systems such as tactical/battlefield ballistic missiles (Prahaar & Pinaka) and the cruise missiles (such as BrahMos and Nirbhay) hint towards the development of counterforce strike capability. This trend of technological development and acquisition reflects a growing shift towards pre-emption which questions India's

stated No-First Use (NFU) and minimum deterrence posture. In this realm, the S-400 will further reinforce India's strategic land and air-based deterrence in two ways: first, by reducing India's vulnerability to Pakistan's ballistic and cruise missiles and second, by increasing the vulnerability of Pakistan's air force assets that can be tracked and targeted within Pakistan's own airspace. The BrahMos-A already possesses the ability to strike deep within Pakistan. Resultantly, this will serve to undercut Pakistan's offensive posture yet strengthen India's offensive-defensive posture, making the S-400 a potent damage limitation platform for India.

Although the procurement and full operationalization of the S-400 will take another decade, India has yet to achieve the high level of accuracy and readiness to carry out a comprehensive first strike. Nevertheless, India's current acquisition of such destabilizing missile systems

“ One way for Pakistan to address the S-400 challenge is to develop and deploy Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)-equipped ballistic missiles such as the Ababeel and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARVs) warheads. This will increase the probability of penetrating India's BMD defended targets ”

generates two possibilities: first, India will have the flexibility of first-use under the guise of NFU policy; and second, the S-400 defense system can be employed to degrade Pakistan Air Force's offensive and defensive capabilities by targeting PAF AWACS and Aerial Refueling Tankers and fighter aircraft within Pakistani air-space if India intends to launch a preemptive strike. The S-400 can also be potentially effective against sub-sonic cruise missiles like Babur and Raad. Interestingly, in response to US claims of Russia violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) Treaty, Russia maintains that the US missile defence systems deployed in European/NATO countries can be converted into offensive missile platforms. Similarly, such long-range BMD and SAM systems as the S-400 serve a dual offense-defense purpose.

Pakistan will have to take immediate and remedial measures to counter the possible effects of this development. One way of addressing this challenge is to develop and deploy Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)-equipped ballistic missiles such as the Ababeel and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARVs) warheads. This will increase the probability

of penetrating India's BMD defended targets and shall improve the effectiveness of Pakistan's ballistic missiles. Similarly, supersonic versions of Babur and Raad cruise missiles will have to be developed which can be effective against such SAM systems. In addition, a robust and improved ISR capability can track the accurate location of mobile surface to air missile systems like the S-400 and enable real-time targeting through SEAD and DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence) operations. Moreover, the induction of Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft in the distant future can provide Pakistan the capability to penetrate a S-400 defended site. Eventually Pakistan will have to develop hypersonic cruise missiles and other standoff systems to maintain the credibility of its deterrent capability.

Therefore, India's development and acquisition of multifaceted capabilities disturbs the fragile strategic balance in South Asia and will be perceived by Pakistan as part of a provocative strategy to achieve escalation dominance. Although missile defenses do not provide a full-spectrum and fool-proof protection but bear the potential to trigger a conflict due to the possessor's false sense of security. The induction of

“ Given India's centrality to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy of containment of China, the US might look the other way and not want India to risk its national security matrix by endangering its partnership with Russia ”

missile defenses by India will inevitably exacerbate arms race instability and will only contribute to regional instability in South Asia.

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


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U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN FROM FORD TO CLINTON

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Syed Rifaat Hussain

Both as a dominant global power and as a leader of the Western world, United States has been among the leading advocates of the policy of global nuclear non-proliferation. Washington has used war, threats of war, coercion, economic sanctions, regime changes, extended deterrence and multilateral statecraft as instruments to contain the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation. As a result of this sustained U.S. led efforts only three states – India, Pakistan and Israel – remain outside the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968, while the rest of the world has collectively forsworn its right to own nuclear weapons by joining the NPT as non-nuclear weapon signatories. NPT grants the legal right to own nuclear weapons to only those states that acquired nuclear weapons before 1967 and these states happen to be veto-wielding five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The book under review by Dr. Rabia Akhtar examines the conduct of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy toward Pakistan

under five successive U.S. administrations – Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush – and concludes that “U.S. failure to prevent Pakistan from achieving and testing its

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nuclear weapons capability was not a policy failure per se but an enforcement failure” where all five administrations “tried to establish an imperfect quid pro quo with Pakistan pushing the latter to choose between aid and the bomb.” By shifting “non-proliferation goalposts and prioritizing foreign policy over non-proliferation policy,” Washington created dilemmas for itself that resulted in its ultimate failure to “influence proliferation behavior of a state [Pakistan] with determined nuclear ambitions.”

Rabia’s lucid account of the failure of the U.S. non-proliferation policy to rein in Pakistani nuclear ambitions is significant for several reasons. First, it relies heavily on primary sources including declassified documents from each of the presidential archives, and declassified governmental documents that have become available through the Digital National Security Archives and the National Security Archives based at the George Washington University, Washington DC to shed light on the reasons because of which the US was unable to prevent Islamabad’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, it is the first detailed account of the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan

over three decades covering policies of five administrations. Third, it looks at the Pakistan-U.S. alliance as a “two-way street”, as a “synergistic relationship, where both countries used the leverage they had towards each other to best serve their national interests.” According to Rabia, in this process of bilateral bargaining, “both countries used each other to get what they wanted – Pakistan more adeptly than the United States.” She convincingly argues that “Pakistan achieved more than it had bargained for - it not only modernized its conventional military capability through U.S. military assistance but also developed a threshold nuclear weapons capability at the height of its engagement with the United States in the final decade of the Cold War. It was made possible due to *minimal interference from the five administrations.*”

This new information regarding U.S. tolerant attitude towards Pakistani pursuit of nuclear weapons runs counter to Pakistani popular narrative, which characterizes Washington as an implacable foe of Islamabad’s quest for nuclear weapons. Rabia uses this information to call for a “reset with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policies” towards Pakistan. Fourth, Rabia’s superb account of flawed and failed U.S. practice of non-proliferation policies towards Pakistan, however, leads her to conclude that the prevalent narrative of “betrayal has two sides to it” and if both Islamabad and Washington recognize this “bitter truth” then they can avoid a complete rupture of their ties.

Rabia points out three broad “inconsistencies” with respect to how Pakistan’s narrative has taken shape on U.S. non-proliferation policy. First, the narrative suggests that the U.S. has repeatedly practiced double-standards on non-proliferation in South Asia by punishing Pakistan and India differently for the same offense.

Second, Pakistan has long believed that its efforts to acquire civilian nuclear technology to meet its legitimate energy needs have been “thwarted since the

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1970s whereas India was rewarded for its proliferation behavior by several U.S. administrations.” Rabia cites Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and U.S. support for Indian membership in the NSG as prime examples of this obstructionist U.S. stance towards Pakistan as viewed by Pakistani policymakers. She further notes that U.S. support for India is galling to Islamabad since “compared to Pakistan, India’s nuclear export control regime and the safety and security of its nuclear installations has poor record based on several reported cases of nuclear thefts and security breaches.”

Third, Washington forsook its alliance with Pakistan and sanctioned it after achieving its major geopolitical goal of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Rabia’s riveting account of the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan, reveals a “peculiar pattern” marked by a paradox, namely, “that although the non-proliferation policy by each administration

was designed to create an imbalance in favor of Pakistan not going nuclear yet ended up with achieving just the opposite.” Rabia explains this paradoxical situation by pointing out to tensions between Congress and the Executive Branches of the U.S. government. She writes: “Within each administration, the Congress exhibited its apprehension about Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation yet we see that it preferred giving aid to Pakistan with non-proliferation conditions attached. The Executive on the other hand, valued the security relationship with Pakistan and preferred giving aid with little to no non-proliferation conditions attached. The waivers cleverly enshrined in the U.S. non-proliferation legislation enabled the Executive to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and development... Pakistan benefited from the disconnect that resulted from this fortuitous good cop, bad cop routine played by the Congress and the Executive.” She notes, “the theft, the lies, the deception, the duplicity and manipulation that Pakistan is faulted for by the West –all of it- was Machiavellian, essentially needed to achieve its national security.”

Rabia has written a magnificent history of U.S. non-proliferation efforts towards Pakistan that should be read by everybody interested in proliferation issues. This elegantly published book tells the remarkable story of Pakistan’s rise as a nuclear weapon state in the face of intense but varying degrees of American legislative opposition.

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Security & Conflict: Developing A Gender Lens



Salma Malik

Looking back in history, the last decade of the Cold War was a very happening time. As the curtain slowly drew on the Cold War, the world theatre appeared a kaleidoscope of different hues and developments. If authoritarians such as Nicolae Ceaușescu were the cold and grim reality of Eastern Europe, people worldwide were won over and fondly reminisced the stellar performance by the world's youngest gymnast Nadia Comenaci, whose world records at the 1976 Montreal Olympics as a fifteen year old remain unparalleled. Across the globe, the humanitarian plight and devastation wreaked on Afghanistan and the resilience of its people in the last battlefield of the Cold War was emblematically reflected through the mysterious green-eyed Afghan refugee girl who graced the cover of June 1985 National Geographic. The nameless Afghan Girl became the icon of what and how the West perceived Afghanistan under the Soviet invasion: a mystery land which appears invincible to outsiders yet holds immense depth and promise in its rugged beauty.

The end of the Cold War transformed the face of conflict, no longer the discourse centered around bipolar superpower rivalry which had valiant hand reared mujahedeen bringing the mighty Soviets down. The invincible dictators were being killed by common people, Nadia Comenaci a woman in her thirties defected her beloved homeland in the mortal fear of her life and safety, an anonymous Chinese youth became the icon of defiance as he bravely held his ground in front of the rolling armory of the Communist party. The kaleidoscope now holds images of a three year old Alan Kurdi's face down on a Turkish beach, but in an eternal sleep. Of Amal Hussain, who at the age of seven

“ The trailblazers of yesteryears such as Laila Khalids and Hanan Ashrawis have paved way for a generation of young women today, Malala Yusufzai, Ahed Tamimi, Nadia Murad and many others, who are known to all, courtesy the overarching power of social media ”

recently died in a refugee camp due to starvation, her skeletal image splashed worldwide by the New York Times, highlighting the humanitarian plight did create an international outcry, similar to young Alan Kurdi but neither could move the global powers from wreaking further havoc. Both these children represent countless others facing the cruel reality of contemporary conflict worldwide. In search of the icons of resilience, the mysterious Afghan girl was tracked down with much difficulty in 2002 in a remote region of Afghanistan, now a woman in her thirties. The eyes still their vivid hues of green, now reflected the plight of countless other Afghan women, displaced from their homeland, living the lives of refugees, facing the ravages of conflict, the death, destruction, personal losses, trauma and poverty, which becomes a part of their being.

The trailblazers of yesteryears such as Laila Khalids and Hanan Ashrawis have paved way for a generation of young women today, Malala Yusufzai, Ahed Tamimi, Nadia Murad and many others, who are known to all, courtesy the overarching power of social media. Notwithstanding, their sacrifices and contributions alone

are a sufficient source of recognition and appreciation. Furthermore, sexual violence as a weapon of war gained worldwide recognition, owing to the relentless efforts of Dr. Denis Mukwege from Congo. Affectionately known as *Dr. Miracle*, Mukwege who shares the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize with Ms. Murad, in the last two decades has been helping women recover from the violence and trauma of sexual abuse and rape in war-torn eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Terming rape as a true *Weapon of Mass Destruction*, these people have more than often put their personal security at risk by courageously combating war crimes and seeking justice for the victims. Rape, physical abuse, slavery, sexual violence, women at risk during war are neither new aspects nor are being explored the first time. However, the realization that war and conflict are not an exclusive space restricted to men in arms has set in and that the male dominated discourse is a lens that needs to be altered and corrected.

Women even when at the center stage of discourse on security and conflict, have usually been showcased as victims whether affected directly or indirectly often portrayed as an inanimate liability and collateral of conflict that needs to be dealt with and settled. In addition to being civilian non combatants, women comprise a major percentage of directly affected population. They also endure the indirect brunt of war as mothers, daughters, wives and may have a persona other than hapless victims. Women are and may also be perpetrators, combatants or participants. As decision makers, they could influence the conduct and consequence of conflict. This lens remains unifocal, primarily because the discourse on security and conflict has long been driven and defined from a masculine perspective. The women practitioners in the field have been fewer and those who have aspired to reach the higher echelons of decision making, usually hit a glass ceiling. Majority of women practitioners and academics in the field of security studies, in order to claim the limited space accorded to them, take conformist, pre-defined positions mimicking the established narrative which is hardly a gender-neutral discourse, and

try to appear to be *man enough* to earn respect and rank.

While categorizing women in conflict, the most direct reference point is women as victims. The most direct consequence of conflict to the person of women ranges from harassment, abandonment, displacement, loss of protection and livelihood, to the more heinous actions such as rape, physical abuse, slavery and girl child soldiering to name a few. Women in refugee or displaced citizens' camps have been regularly subjected to harassment and abuse. Not only women of all ages stand vulnerable, girl child marriages in such camps are a very common occurrence. Access to education, medical aid (even in extreme critical cases), queuing up for daily rations and toilet facilities become a perpetual challenge and adds to the abuse which is endemic in such places. With male members either engaged in active combat or falling victim to it, women are compelled to redefine their role assignment as the sole bread earners, often finding employment as laborers or tillers, stepping out of their zones of modesty and comfort. The atrocities wreaked in Indian occupied Kashmir, paved way for a new conflict lexicon comprising terms such as half widows and widow villages (Dardpura, Hari) and children of conflict.

Women pushed into or *voluntarily* joining militant ranks, girl/ women child soldiering, or those involved in trafficking, are a subject of regular abuse and sexual violence. A pattern which is visible in almost all conflict zones is that women are the choice targets of regime oppression. The attendant consequences of conflict such as male members facing disabilities, loss of livelihood or losing male child to militant cadres brings about an overall structural transformation as a direct consequence of conflict. While it is understandable that reestablishing normalcy in a post-conflict ravaged society is by no means a small task, however, very little effort goes into addressing the impact of trauma, loss and abuse on the mental health of women. In a post-conflict environment, women generally fade into the background as comfort providers and caregivers, but hardly any

narratives support their life stories of how they rationalize and overcome their own trauma let alone that associated with the entire family that depends on them.

Despite the gradual acceptance of young women joining armed forces in combat cadres, the concept of women as combatants or perpetrators as part of informal militia is tabooed. In the 2007 Lal Masjid incident, female students of the affiliate Jamia Hafza madrassa formed the first line of defence, equipped with sticks and stones buying their male comrades time to arm and take positions. They also toured the neighborhood as part of the vigilante brigade preaching and at times enforcing the norms of morality and virtue. At the height of the wave of militancy and terrorism, there have been several suicide bombing incidents attributed to women but there were no official confirmations primarily due to cultural sensitivities related to post-mortem details of females but also that it would have taken the conflict narrative in a different dimension. It was widely noted in the press that women in Swat collected funds, happily volunteered their jewelry and championed the militant leader Fazal ullah's cause. The reality of female Sri Lankan Tamil suicide bombing squads and their proactive role in the Tamil insurgency has been widely accepted globally. However, in Pakistan, despite two decades of fighting militancy and terrorism, there is neither a formal acceptance of conflict zones nor signing of the UNSC Resolution 1325 which places stipulations with regards to gender roles in peace and security.

On the other hand, there have been many success stories of women as stakeholders in peace mitigation including the recently demilitarized area of Swat after ten years of militancy and reconstruction and phased rehabilitation by the military which has seen female civil society members facilitating the armed forces in de-radicalization, reconstruction, youth rehabilitation and conflict transformation. It is important to reach out to women in these conflict zones (who themselves have been belligerents) at a personal grid, appeal to the cultural codes of women as peace emissaries and invoke traditional

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role of women as harbingers of peace to enlist their support in post-conflict rehabilitation and transformation efforts. Women peacemakers often appear to be more sensitive in identifying post-conflict needs, addressing grievances between warring parties and offer viable solutions to these problems through cost effective, local resources to facilitate community development in a sustainable manner.

In the changing face of security and conflict where women are mostly considered part of the problem, they also need to become part of the solution. They need to be consulted when it comes to critical decision making on issues of war, peace and security since alongside men, they also suffer just as much or more in some cases. To consider developing an alternate or gendered lens, women themselves have to self-actualize, be the instruments of change, create and claim space, and break the stereotypes. Their walk cannot be solitary. Men need to join their cause and help break these stereotypes that identify with women only as victims. The world has seen enough hardship and violence, it can certainly benefit from some soft power.

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INDIA, RUSSIA AND THE S-400 DEAL



Rupert Stone

In early October, President Putin of Russia visited New Delhi for his annual summit with India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and signed a number of deals. Most controversially, India agreed to purchase five regiments of Russia's mighty S-400 long-range missile defence system. The deal originated in 2016, but is more problematic now because the US Congress imposed new sanctions on Russia in 2017. If India follows through with the Russian purchase (delivery is expected by 2020), it could incur penalties from the US.

This is a quandary for Washington. Delhi is an emerging strategic partner and central to Trump's Indo-Pacific and South Asia strategies. Indeed, the Trump administration urged Congress to insert a waiver authority in the legislation allowing the president to exempt some countries from sanctions. But strict conditions must be satisfied if a waiver is to be granted: it

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should be in American national security interests, for example, and the countries involved must be taking steps to reduce their relations with Russia.

The US clearly benefits when its partners beef up their air defences. But Delhi buys a lot of Russian weaponry. From 2013-17, India was the top importer of Russian arms, accounting for 62% of transfers. True, Russia's share of India's imports declined since 2008-2012 as Delhi diversified away from Moscow, increasing its purchases of US weapons. But Indian reliance on Russia is still substantial, and US sanctions would blow a hole in its defence acquisitions.

The US, for its part, must uphold the sanctions regime, and that will be much harder if it waives sanctions on Moscow's chief arms purchaser. Moreover, if India acquires a fifth-generation stealth fighter from the US, and then integrates that fighter with the S-400, the jet's capabilities could be compromised by exposure to the system's radar. This is already a headache for Washington in the case of NATO ally, Turkey, which recently purchased the S-400 on top of a previous deal for American F-35 aircraft.

India got much needed waivers for its dealings with Iran. Trump withdrew the US from the nuclear deal concluded between the permanent five members of the UN Security Council and Germany, with an array of new American sanctions on Iran. India is one of Iran's main oil importers, and will continue its purchases despite the threat of American punishment. Delhi is also investing in the Iranian port of Chabahar. It remains to be seen whether Trump will grant waiver for the Indian purchase of the Russian S-400.

The Indian media is confident that Washington will not impose penalties for the Russian deal, at least. But Trump himself said ominously that India "will soon find out". Ever the dealmaker, it is possible he will demand something in return for waiving sanctions. It was reported recently that the US is asking Delhi to buy American F-16 jets in exchange for a waiver. India may not accept this condition: why would it want an aircraft which its adversary Pakistan has possessed for the last three decades?

Delhi is unlikely to back down. It wants the

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S-400 to protect itself from neighbouring China, which already has the system. Moreover, Delhi is keen to sustain relations with Moscow, still its principal defence supplier. India-Russia ties have weakened in recent years as Russia's ties with China have deepened. Delhi, already dwarfed by Beijing's superior military strength, is clearly frightened of a Sino-Russian alliance, all the more so because its own relations with China are tense, as the 2017 Doklam standoff demonstrated.

Furthermore, India is worried by Russia's growing involvement in Pakistan. This is a surprising development, given that Islamabad and Moscow were staunch adversaries during the Cold War and into the 1990s. But, now, relations are thawing at a rapid pace, with arms transfers, joint exercises, and a military training program. It has even been rumoured that Pakistan may acquire Russian missile defence systems. Ties extend into the energy sector, with Russia helping build a gas pipeline between Lahore and Karachi.

Russia has also reversed course on Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Moscow and Delhi joined with Iran to back the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the Afghan civil war. Now, however, Russia has formed contacts with the Taliban and is cooperating with Islamabad on ending the conflict through dialogue. While India supports an Afghan-led peace process, it

has been reluctant to endorse talks with the Taliban, which it sees as a terrorist group that Pakistan backs to advance an anti-Indian agenda in Afghanistan.

Fears of a Russia-Pakistan alliance are overblown. Their ties might have developed quickly, but Pakistan's purchase of Russian weapons is tiny compared to India's. While there have been murmurings about the possibility of Russian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, Moscow has already built nuclear reactors in India, and in October agreed to build more. Russian trade with Delhi, though low at just over \$10 billion in 2017, is far higher than the figure of around \$0.5 billion clocked by Russian and Pakistan last year.

But the prospect of a Russia-Pakistan-China axis clearly irks India, and partly explains why it is keen to push through with the S-400 deal. As Ejaz Haider writes in his recent article on S-400, improved Indian air defences should be a security concern for Pakistan. However, good ties between Russia and India are arguably beneficial for the region. As US-China relations deteriorate, the risk of rival bloc politics is intensifying. An India that preserves its relationship with Russia is less likely to align itself firmly in the American camp and feed into this Cold War-type scenario.

A solid Russia-India relationship also enables Modi to maintain a diversified foreign policy and achieve greater strategic autonomy. And Russia could help improve India's relations with China, which are already warming after the Wuhan summit between Modi and President Xi earlier this year. It is even conceivable that Russia could bring Pakistan and India together in talks, although that seems unlikely right now. 2019 is an election year in India, and Modi's government angrily rejected peace talks in September.

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
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BOOK REVIEW | **REIMAGINING PAKISTAN: TRANSFORMING A DYSFUNCTIONAL NUCLEAR STATE**

HARPERCOLLINS, INDIA, 2018 ISBN 978-9352777693



Saeed Afridi

The premise of Husain Haqqani's latest book "Re-imagining Pakistan: Transforming a Dysfunctional Nuclear State" is that Pakistan is an ill-defined, inexact contrived, economically unviable and geographically feeble construct held together through paranoia, conspiracies, extremism, rent-seeking and militarised brutality, destined to disintegrate. Rather than an exercise in substantive academic debate, this book should be recognised as a commercially astute venture that serves to satiate the prevailing atmosphere in its key target markets, the United States and India - a book written to sell.

The book excels in identifying the missteps, misconceptions, skewed self-image, misplaced development priorities and lack of economic planning that dominate Pakistan's political discourse, torn apart by prejudiced anecdotal narratives that extoll or criticise preferred entities. The book rightly summarises Pakistan's democratic debate as a generalised tug of war between shallow fundamentalisms masked as victimisations. Democrats masquerading as victims of a propagandised militarism, not as superficial adherents to democratic form yet devoid of democratic substance. Militarists camouflaged as maligned stalwarts fighting an existential battle against the intellectual slavery of insincere democrats, not as avaricious

Bonapartists. Religionists veiled as the righteous guardians of Pakistan's ethical soul against the forces of Westernisation masked as modernisation, not as zealot traditionalists. Pakistan's paranoid agora echoes of conspiracies and counter-conspiracies that need no factual evidence; conspiracy-narratives never do. The result is that Pakistan's discourse is largely devoid of any concerted efforts towards state-building or efficient resource utilisation. The book captures this sense of conspiratorial victimhood and the incestuous opportunist collaboration among these rent-seeking groups, with and against one another, almost to the tee.


Sadly, that is where it stops. Despite its length and repetitions, it presents no remedial mechanism. There is no concerted effort to present a course that would set the prevalent ill-conceived self-

image of victimhood on a path towards cooperative self-correction. Instead it plays on the idiocies forwarded by all these groups and presents Pakistan as a collection of their propagated insecurities. Without presenting any curative ideas, let alone mechanisms, the book alludes to an equally fanciful orientalist reversion that Pakistan's ills would disappear if it agreed to undo the original sin: its creation.

The book does disingenuously catalogue almost all the reasons why Pakistan needs to be re-imagined, but, despite its title, does not re-imagine Pakistan. It presents the litany of fundamental problems the state suffers from, while alluding to, but never explicitly stating, a deliverance that would see the country crawl back into the womb from which it was supposedly begotten.

Haqqani's view of Pakistan mirrors Charles Inglis' view of the newly formed America to the point that if sections of Inglis' pamphlets suffered rudimentary editing they would not be misplaced in this book. Rather than building upon its idiosyncratic contradictions to forge a new, constructive nation, Inglis was nostalgic for a refined colonial construct firmly within the fold of the 'mother country'. American unwillingness to do so was the precursor to the subsequent barbarism, bloodshed, militarism and contrived national identity reinforced through expansionism and falsified rhetoric. Inglis' idea was to see an America which was nominally independent but firmly British. Haqqani's Pakistan is no different.

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and ought to be taught and discussed in the country’s academic institutions.

Pakistan’s discourse is witnessing a generational shift spearheaded by its increasingly self-aware, though as yet intellectually rudderless, younger generations. Both the product and the object of an increasingly connected world, they display a marked unwillingness to accept disingenuous narratives presented in sanitised form. In most cultures, such a development provides the building blocks for a complex social discourse which leads to the emergence of a heterogeneously evolved self-image and identity. It is important to ensure that they are acutely familiar with this book as a continuing attempt at reinforcing colonial intellectual shackles that are Pakistani in façade but not in nomenclature. It is perhaps the best example of postcolonial discourse appropriation and probably the last; a true swansong for Macaulayism in Pakistan.

The book can thus be summarised in one long sentence:

An epidermal effort to justify, through a collection of references and anecdotes, the premise that paranoia ridden Pakistan, destined for Balkanisation, should not exist as a state outside the borders of post-colonial India, titled not as a reversion but a re-imagining.

This is a book written ‘for’ an India that no longer exists and ‘about’ a Pakistan that never existed.

Saeed Afridi is an Energy Security Researcher, University of Westminster, UK

Much like Inglis’ audience was not the Americans at large but the Colonial British, their American loyalists and the dominant Eurocentric world, Haqqani’s audience is not Pakistanis at large, but Indians, fellow compatriots who still see Pakistan through a colonial lens and the America-centric world. The Indian ‘mother land’ aspired to here is a benign economic giant, sanitised to gloss over the emerging social and communal powder-keg; a modernised image of the colony it once was, not the state it subsequently became.

The writing style employed is repetitive reinforcement of a predetermined conclusion, made apparent almost at the outset. What follows are thousands of words interjected spasmodically by hundreds of diverse references

and quotations providing a veneer of scholarship but adding little substance to investigating the hypothesis; feigning academic scholarship through profuse citation. It is a style favoured by public relations and campaign managers, where excessive name dropping & uncontextualised contradictory snippets become much more important than substance while selective generalisations, presented as facts supporting the preconceived message, substitute robust and nuanced argument. The book also indulges in a seemingly endemic problem among most Pakistani public intellectuals; the viewing, describing and extrapolating of history through subjective anecdotes without employing a systemic study of history.

This book is a must-read for all in Pakistan

PAKISTAN STATE OF FUTURE INDEX

Puruesh Chaudhary

Puruesh Chaudhary is a futures researcher and strategic narrative professional. She has a professional master's degree in International Negotiation and Policymaking from Institut De Hautes Études Internationales Et Du Développement, Geneva. Her work mostly involves futures research, knowledge-collaborations and content intelligence within the framework of human security. She has featured amongst the world's top female futurists. She is the Founder and President of AGAHI, a non-governmental organization, which works extensively on creating shared spaces for interactive learning, collaborative thinking and knowledge sharing. Pakistan Foresight Initiative is a project of AGAHI which aims to improve policymaking and strategic narratives on key priority areas of the Foresight Lab; facilitative platform – a thinkware that is engaging legislators, strategists, academicians and the community for developing shared understanding for effective implementation of decisions. She has produced foresight research compilation on Pakistan State of Future Index 'Anticipating 2027' a single measure that indicates that the country is relatively improving over the next 10 years; The Future of Pakistan up to 2060 building on four possible scenarios; is a published co-author for 'The Future of Business' a critical insight on rapidly changing world; The Big Idea: Next Generation of Leadership in Pakistan needs a 'New-Think' analytical overview of foresight decision-making and strategic narratives in country. In an exclusive interview for Pakistan Politico, Puruesh Chaudhary shares her views with us on the Pakistan Foresight Initiative and Pakistan State of Future Index report.



“ The Pakistan State of Future Index is based on historical data of selected variables for the previous 20 or in some cases more years and on judgments about the best and worst plausible 10-year outcomes for each variable ”

QWhat is “Futures”?

Purush Chaudhary: In a world of policythinkers and strategists this is not anything new – to think through; several governments, large corporations alike postulate possible, plausible, probable, and preferable futures. They study the worldviews and the myths that underlie them. This helps them create options, list decisions, test ideas, leading to actionable insights – the decision-makers in this sort of world in order to navigate, are continuously building on the sense of comprehension about the general direction in which something is developing or changing. And this what essentially Futures is.

QWhat is Foresight Lab and how do you distinguish it from any other research Lab?

Purush Chaudhary: The Lab is an open, systematic, participatory process that supports research design and formulation of policies as a result with a medium- to long-term perspective. It is more of a thinkware. There is an element of strategic thinking, which informs policy-making and enables strategic planning and action into implementation. This data-driven process is invariably very different from any of the Labs or Think tanks in the country – it systematically enables a discourse that creates futures by examining the past trends generating collective insight without prejudicing the autonomy of individuals or organizations participating.

Over the course of four years, we have been engaging different universities across Pakistan. And the way the lab is evolving, it has a technical team, domain specialists, a policy network, and a council are – and all of this is dynamic, intrinsically human-dependent and yet at the backhand we constantly improving the tools that we could make available for the academia. In short, there is an inherent dynamism which constantly fuels the ideation process. But say for instance, if this process does not lead us to being ahead of the curve, nor at the tail end of the innovative exercise, then we have to rethink, advance our agility and our capacity for sensemaking.

The purpose is very simple. If we are to improve Pakistan's state of competitiveness or even the wellbeing of the people then it inherently depends on the 'choices' it creates in collaboration with multiple stakeholders as a shared value proposition; in a manner done for the decisions needed to be taken for a better tomorrow.

QWhat elements are essential for the “Futures Study and Research?

Purush Chaudhary: Data is critical to Futures' research, but so is the expert knowledge and most importantly our perception of time. There are so many different ways of doing futures; one of which we have done recently is generating the state of future index report on 30 variables classified across social, technological, environment, economic and political imperatives. What we are further exploring is how would

“ The Foresight Lab is an open, systematic, participatory process that supports research design and formulation of policies as a result with a medium- to long-term perspective. It is more of a thinkware ”

different trends affect the conditions of Pakistan across different timeframes. This will be quant-driven research in which we would study the impact of future events, the gaps in policy thinking, the possible actions required. Millennium Project, a global futures studies and research think tank, our knowledge and technical partner, has one of the most elaborate compilation on futures methods and techniques. Each year the team connects to its 63 Nodes all over world and reviews humanity's 15 global challenges. This provides a very thorough framework to assess the global and local prospects for humanity. This effort enriches views, deepens the perspective – and really establishes unique global linkages.

Q How is the Futures research likely to affect Government, Corporate Sector, Academia, and the Research community?

Puruesh Chaudhary: Due to increasing complexities and the socio-cultural dynamics of modern societies that comes with improving access to information and knowledge, the magnitude and therefore the nature of challenges that arise alongwith provokes a greater attention from the policymakers. Much of the world today, is gradually shifting from the grandiosity of geopolitics to

bringing its immediate attention towards the cities and local communities. And, as and when the focus of power gravitates towards the individual, it will be up to the systems' thinkers to prevent crises and negative effects of heightened intricacies. Foresight can facilitate the impact factors that can trigger the drivers of change to move in a direction that is in the wellbeing of the people. In the near-term, some of these drivers include but are not limited to: youth demographics, talent markets, artificial intelligence. And this affects everyone.

Q What feedback have you received on Pakistan State of Future Index “Anticipating 2027” publication launched in 2017?

Puruesh Chaudhary: Although futures effort in the public space is very recent in Pakistan, but the feedback we have been receiving from the global foresight community, our very own academics, think tanks has been very encouraging. In Pakistan State of Future Index “Anticipating 2027” we attempted taking stock of the last 20 years. Recognizing that a lot has changed, the State of the Future Index indicated the 10-year outlook for the future of Pakistan. The Pakistan State of Future Index is based on historical data of selected variables for the previous 20 or in some cases more years and on judgments about the best and worst plausible 10-year outcomes for each variable. SOFI is constructed with key variables that are individually forecast and that in aggregate can indicate the potential trend of the future. SOFI is useful for assessing the consequences of different policies and for showing the combined potential outcomes in an easy to understand fashion. We are now working much closely with the academia in refining our canvas of approaching the challenges and the opportunities of Pakistan, in a rather systematic and holistic manner.

Q How do you see Futures evolve in Pakistan at the federal and at the provincial level?

Puruesh Chaudhary: In Pakistan, we do not have a Futures Studies programme at the tertiary level. This reflects lack of an overall national discourse as well.

However, this is not to say that there is no space for this form of learning. If systematically pursued, we will move towards transformational changes that would contribute greatly towards the wellbeing of the people. There is a need to connect foresight to decision-making in government training programmes in a way that a network could be developed for quick environmental assessments to improve insights that will gradually build the capacity to postulate random future events that may affect the policies. The Pakistan State of Future Index can greatly contribute towards organizing relevant knowledge of the local context in a manner that can identify policy gaps and provide space for new thinking. This should lead to establishing a permanent parliamentary “Committee for the Future,” as Finland has done to provide foresight to other parliamentary committees to improve their decision-making. Foresight Lab therefore can create a collective intelligence system linking related units in government agencies and e-government systems which can participate in informal long-term strategy networks to share best practices. Pakistan is a resource-stressed and a poorly- governed country – so, this way of thinking suggests that there is a need to take:

- An undertaking of an overall strategic review of the national system
- Process for identifying priorities for innovative actions with a multi-layered data-driven approach
- Mechanism for building common visions among actors and stakeholders
- Engaging wider expertise on human knowledge enabling robust decisions exploring alternate pathways
- Creating the likelihood of greater consensus on matters related to national security.



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THE S-400 DEAL AND PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY



Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

The 20-year old nuclear dyad in South Asia has been typified by the action-reaction model, whereby arch-rivals, India and Pakistan have buttressed their deterrence mix and maintained a robust bilateral deterrence equation. Even a cursory glance at the history of nuclear South Asia suggests that Pakistan has reacted to the developments deemed as threats to strategic stability in the region. India's nuclear tests of May 1998 were responded to by Pakistan with those of its own within weeks. Pakistan, for its part, has redressed imbalances by coming up with antidotes against India's nuclear and conventional advancements. Pakistan's gradual seaward nuclearization, MIRVing and the induction of the Nasr missile are all but illustrations that the strategic balance, however tenuous, is owed to Pakistan's timely counter moves. This is primarily because Islamabad has remained committed to thwarting efforts to deride its deterrence regime.

Despite playing an important role in the three crises following the overt nuclearization of South Asia, bilateral



deterrence mechanism is under threat. India's acquisition of Russia's lethal and most advanced S-400 missile defense system is a move that will dent strategic stability in the region. Though a discussion on the features of the S-400 is beyond the purview of this piece, it is noteworthy that the deployment of the system could adversely undermine the mainstays of Pakistan's riposte capabilities. The S-400 can target aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles well outside India's territory. This deadly war-fighting capability of the system could have serious implications for Pakistan in peace time and during crises. The shield could embolden India to militarily punish Pakistan for its alleged role in spawning terrorism in India. During a crisis, a false sense of security could afflict India which could lead to crisis instability.

However, despite all the dangers and pitfalls associated with the S-400, the development is not rattling. The S-400, with its entire wherewithal attempts to threaten Pakistan's deterrence drive and its effectiveness. Over the years, Pakistani officials have iterated that Islamabad will continue adding value and strengthening deterrence vis-à-vis India. As a matter of fact, the country is visibly moving towards what its strategic managers have called Full Spectrum Deterrence. Pakistan's quest to fill gaps in its deterrence will mean that developing a countermeasure to the S-400 system will be one of the most pressing preoccupations of its strategic fraternity.

Recently, Pakistan's Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Zubair Hayat categorically stated that while India, bolstered by third parties, is introducing weapons of instability, Pakistan is fully committed to maintaining credible minimum deterrence against a full spectrum of threats in order to maintain stability in the region. Taking cognizance of threats to deterrence credibility, Gen. Zubair, who formerly spearheaded the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), said "we have and we will continue to provide necessary response to ensure that strategic balance is maintained and Pakistan's deterrence remains credible. Let there be no doubt on that account."

A similar statement was recently made by Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai, who happens to be the country's most experienced strategic practitioner. Kidwai asserted that "the history of our strategic force development clearly indicates that Pakistan has never allowed this (strategic) balance to be disturbed to our disadvantage; we have always found effective solutions to redress induced imbalances from time to time." He maintained that Pakistan has adequate responses to S-400 and hence it is not a game changer.

The enunciations from the top officials may sound overly optimistic but are well in line with the workings of nuclear Pakistan. This implies that Pakistan could mull over increasing the number of warheads and delivery vehicles so as to hamper the ability of S-400 to engage all incoming missiles. According to an Air force pundit, Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, Pakistan will come up with a response in due course as more information about Triumf's technical and operational specifications will be brought to light. Tufail is optimistic. He says, "We fought outnumbered in 1965. We came up with a response to the Indian nuclear capability and literally tied its hands. I am very confident that we can do the trick this time again."

“ The S-400 can target aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles well outside India's territory. This deadly war-fighting capability of the system could have serious implications for Pakistan in peace time and during crises ”

“ Pakistan's resolve to come up with a befitting response to India is certainly an anathema to arms control and disarmament but is much-needed to stop deterrence failure ”

The S-400 does have the propensity to discredit Pakistan's war-fighting and deterrence capabilities. However, it does not imply that India's induction of the S-400 will not be responded to by Pakistan. As evident by the trajectory of Pakistan's nuclear excursion, it would ensure that deterrence and strategic stability is upheld at all costs.

Pakistan's resolve to come up with a befitting response to India is certainly an anathema to arms control and disarmament but is much-needed to stop deterrence failure. This goes on to amplify that while non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament are important goals for the nuclear weapon states, the very powers have not helped in creating an enabling environment to achieve them. If anything, third parties like Russia, the United States and China are arming both South Asian states in a bid to further their own interests but are jeopardizing stability in the region. The sale of S-400 to India is yet another example of how Pakistan is being compelled by the strategic and threat landscapes to increase its reliance on its strategic weapons in order to maintain strategic stability.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGE



Zainab Dar

The rise of post truth politics, wherein, the politicians rely on using rhetoric to win the elections and influence public opinion has become a prominent feature of politics in recent times. Use of social media and political communication intersect at an unprecedented level in this scenario. Technological revolution has transformed every sphere of life and politics. International relations remain one of the most affected arenas in these circumstances. There is no denying that social media has changed the dynamics of political communication. It is imperative to study these dynamics for scholars of political communication. Moreover, its impact on national security and foreign policy merits analysis as well.

People who have access to internet and social media have an effective platform to exhibit their views on domestic and foreign policies of their respective governments. It is also a place to get updates about latest political developments. Thus politicians and political analysts alike have started considering it as a main platform to

express their thoughts and ideas on all major issues prevailing in their respective countries. However, the prevalence of social media also seem to have played its role in the rise of populism in not only the developing states but also the developed states as well.

Social media seems to have given impetus to right-wing populism in the West. President Donald Trump not only relied on populist political rhetoric before elections but implemented his policies based on it as well. Trump not only delivered on his promise to ban Muslims from entering the US after his victory but also withdrew from international treaties as well. Right-wing French politician Le Pen who campaigned on the agenda of Islamophobia and anti-immigration, came pretty close to winning the presidential elections in France in 2017, something that her father could not achieve in pre-social media era. In Brazil, fourth largest democracy in the world, the victory of right-wing Bolsonaro in the presidential



elections has shook the global political landscape. The world was aghast at his assertions regarding gun-ownership and dictatorship. The rise of these populist politicians suggests that populist political rhetoric is easy to sell on social and electronic media rather than ideas that are factually accurate.

Social media has not only given a platform to discuss crucial political issues but also to spew political rhetoric to demean one's opponents. And this trend is not only exhibited by the politicians belonging to opposition parties but by apparently seasoned journalists and analysts as well. It is an easy tool to malign one's opponents as the miscreants can get away with their comments in the absence of any fact-checking.

Fake news played a critical role in getting the message across in this scenario. Scholars of political communication opine that the prevalence of fake news has heralded the era of post-truth politics

wherein the importance of truth has diminished in the face of plethora of fake news and bogus opinions circulating in both electronic and social media. Real issues are given secondary coverage when trivial things are given prime time by the anchors on news channels. Political rhetoric pertaining to social issues and domestic policy is understandable but

“ Social media has not only given a platform to discuss crucial political issues but also to spew political rhetoric to demean one's opponents ”

national security and foreign policy are not spared by these people as well.


Meanwhile in Pakistan, the recently elected government of PTI has come under the ire of rhetorical criticism on social media. From PM's traveling in a helicopter to an Israeli airplane landing in Pakistan, the political pundits do not spare the government of harsh and divisive criticism regardless of the consequences. Speculations in the guise of assertions regarding country's foreign policy and security are circulated without any authentication from the government.

Pakistan's move to take loan from the IMF to avert the economic crisis became one of the most talked about issues on the social media. There were legitimate reservations regarding the repercussions of such a move. However, some viewed it from a zero-sum perspective, and warned of grievous consequences and mocked the PTI government for overturning their promises made before the elections.

“ At a time when Pakistan is looking for external support to extricate itself from various crises of serious proportions, fake news on matters related to inter-state relations could adversely affect Pakistan’s diplomatic campaigns ”

Apocalyptic scenarios were conjured in the wake of Pakistan’s negotiations with the IMF. The Jamal Khashoggi affair became another major divisive issue wherein people came up with their respective opinions as to how Pakistan should deal with the Saudi Arabia in the wake of this diplomatic crisis facing the country. The realist perspective was swept under the carpet to gain the moral high ground. The considerations were legitimate had they been not biased. The deep-rooted antagonism against the government rather than the actual incident is manifested in various posts on this issue. The prospect of not having to go to IMF subsided in the conversations on social media amid this criticism.

While it is imperative to communicate consideration of all ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups in a country, foreign policy is one sphere where bipartisan support is critical for the national interest of a state. Pulling it in the domain of political bickering and rhetorical ideals does no good for any citizen of the state. Thus, it is necessary to dissociate this domain from jingoistic political rhetoric. Handling foreign policy related issues is an intricate matter. A government, be it from



any political party, is at the receiving end of criticism from the opposition but also the public at large. While chest-thumping and jingoism may win a leader more popularity, an act done with the very spirit may harm a country’s national interest.

While the term “U-Turn” is used euphemistically, it has little meaning in terms of policy and governance. Imran Khan’s decision to seek a bailout from the IMF or Trump’s unwillingness to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, are normal processes whereby leaders change their approach after assuming power. Media and detractors’ constant reminders about the leaders’ previous pronouncements without context, impedes a leader’s ability to take decisions that are needed, because of the fear of backlash.

At a time when Pakistan is looking for external support to extricate itself from various crises of serious proportions, fake news on matters related to inter-state relations could adversely affect Pakistan’s diplomatic campaigns. Fake news on domestic issues also poses challenges in the foreign policy domain. Playing up a local event on mainstream and social media without verification could be detrimental to Islamabad’s international image, something that is a major foreign policy concern for Pakistan. Although the use of fiery political rhetoric and divisive criticism is dangerous but cannot be dealt

with by curbing freedom of speech and expression, which are fundamental rights of the citizens.

There needs to be a change in political culture which makes people more sensitized to the nuances of diplomacy, national security and foreign policy. Politicians, and the ones in power, should be taken to task but divisiveness and jingoism can impede the functioning of the government. Moreover, fake news can only be controlled when people would learn to verify the news from credible channels rather than sharing. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the politicians and analysts to share responsible content on their social media accounts. Inter-state ties are not conducted on emotions; they can become more complex if decisions are made in the midst of charged environments. Thus, in order to allow actual policy to take center stage, critique on foreign policy and national security issues must be measured and free from political affiliations.

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SPOILERS IN PAKISTAN- IRAN RELATIONS



Hamzah Rifaat Hussain

More than a dozen personnel of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were recently kidnapped in a pre-dawn raid along the Pakistan-Iran border. With the Balochistan province to the east and the Sistan Balochistan province to the west of Pakistan, this development can be construed as part of a wider trend of attacks aimed at sabotaging the existing relationship between Tehran and Islamabad. History between the two countries is replete with IRGC's guards being targeted as well as cross border firing from Iran into Pakistan. Tehran carries out cross border firing on the pretext of targeting militias which it considers to be a threat to its territorial sovereignty and integrity. Wider trends aside, this development can also be placed

in the context of regional dynamics in West Asia of which Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, the torrid situation in Afghanistan as well as Sunni-Shia proxy warfare are key elements.

Unlike previously, where Jundullah-a militant group primarily associated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan with its top commander, Hakimullah Mehsud, carrying out the attacks, the Jaish-ul-Adl (the Army of Justice) claimed responsibility for this particular abduction of the guards. Images have been published on the abducted Iranian soldiers by the Salafist jihadist group which is not only based in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province but is also notorious for carrying out attacks against the Iranian military and civilians as well. It is also designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and Japan and poses a potent threat to the prospect of peace and stable relations between Iran and Pakistan. Ordinary they are not and ordinary they are not likely to be.

The group with its 'Sunni- Salafi' disposition is widely considered to be directly supported by Saudi Arabia which Iran accuses of fomenting discord in the region and within its borders. The export of the ultra-puritanical Wahhabi ideology and the pernicious effects on coexistence across Asia have resulted in the mushrooming of demagoguery which groups such as Jundullah and Jaish-ul-Adl are known for. While Pakistan has responded with offering cooperation to Iran to find out the whereabouts of the abducted guards, the relationship between both countries can deteriorate considerably in light of several factors.

Saudi Arabia has recently offered Pakistan \$3 billion worth of assistance to check the latter's balance of payment crisis and its strong foothold in Pakistani affairs continues to be a concern for Tehran. While the trust deficits may not translate into hostility and suspicion as is the

“ The export of the ultra-puritanical Wahhabi ideology and the pernicious effects on coexistence across Asia have resulted in the mushrooming of demagoguery which groups such as Jundullah and Jaish-ul-Adl are known for ”

case with Afghanistan's response to the Kandahar attacks recently, with baseless allegations being leveled, prospects of cooperation between Iran and Pakistan are undoubtedly under threat due to the Saudi factor.

Security dynamics in the region can also mar cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Few can deny that the major point of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the presence of militia groups which subscribe to the 'Salafi Jihad' ideology, which Saudi Arabia purportedly exports. As per arrangements such as the Afghanistan/ Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Stability, the involvement of Iran as a party given its genuine grievances holds potential in diffusing tensions which are wreaking havoc in the region. For that to materialize however, there needs to be greater goodwill and trust between Kabul and Islamabad which going by the response to the Kandahar attacks has not taken place. If a Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) with China, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan can be formed with the aim of promoting long term stability in Afghanistan, then the Af/ Pak Action Plan for Peace and Stability

to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is an area worth exploring. Expecting outside mediation to resolve crises of such proportion particularly given the quagmire that Iran faces with sanctions and the JCPOA issue, makes any arrangement beyond a bilateral or trilateral framework untenable. Regional dynamics do provide an opening for cooperation but also has significant impediments given Russia, the United States and China's competing interests in the region.

Sunni-Shia proxy warfare continues to be a historical reality, but that, notwithstanding, Pakistan has made extensive strides in tackling terrorism inside its borders. Dismantling the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and a marked reduction in the amount of attacks taking place across the country is indicative of how the country has tackled terrorism head on. The country can also not afford another Iranian/ Saudi Arabia brawl to take place on its soil and such warfare is considered to be undesirable economically given that Pakistan is cash-strapped and there are repeated calls for economic cooperation through the One Belt One Road initiative or trade from numerous capitals. Policy options for both Pakistan and its neighbors need to thus, center on resuscitating their economies, focus on restructuring and rebuilding state institutions as well as devise strategies for long term stability in Afghanistan. Incidents such as the IRGC guards' abduction are irritants in ties between the two neighbors.

Terrorism as Dr. Jeffrey Bale of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies defines, is an operational technique with the prime objective of delivering a message to a wider target audience. Abductions, kidnappings, killings, beheadings and suicide attacks are operational techniques aimed at sabotaging peace processes, dialogue, agreements and mechanisms for dispute resolution and in Asia so far, they have been highly successful. The India-Pakistan relationship or the Af/ Pak relationship are clear examples of how mistrust, suspicion and hostility brew whenever spoilers such as Jundullah, TTP, the Afghan Taliban or

“ The India-Pakistan relationship or the Af/ Pak relationship are clear examples of how mistrust, suspicion and hostility brew whenever spoilers such as Jundullah, TTP, the Afghan Taliban or Hindu extremists carry out operational techniques to target audiences, be it the military, civilians, governments or even the international community ”

Hindu extremists carry out operational techniques to target audiences, be it the military, civilians, governments or even the international community. For Pakistan, something similar happening in the case of its relationship with Iran is undesirable despite the fact that Iran is receiving considerable flak in the international community in the form of sanctions. A dynamic foreign policy would mean mending fences with every neighbor and Tehran and Islamabad need to do exactly that.

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FEMINISM, FOREIGN POLICY AND HOPE



Maria Bastos

The study of foreign policy is currently facing important challenges mostly associated with forecasting the world order. Those challenges imply an imbalance between two nexuses operating at different but comparable levels. At the macro-level, the military-economic power nexus occupies

the center stage of foreign policy study and decision-making. At the micro-level, it is the human rights-democracy nexus which constitutes problems for the military-economic power nexus. However, in contemporary IR, we are witnessing that the military-economic power nexus continues to manipulate the



Source: Foreignpolicyimag

human rights-democracy nexus to assert its hegemony in a neo-liberal world order. Consequently, existing armed conflicts are likely to perpetuate for longer periods and the potential for new ones to arise increases. Under this scenario, an enquiry into the structures and institutions that construct the military-economic power nexus is urgent, given the rising deterioration of democracy and human rights regimes. An attempt to map out and advocate for a feminist foreign policy must be made because it could contribute towards reducing conflicts. It could also help weaken the prospects of a widening military-economic power nexus, and lead to the promotion of human, women and girls' rights, and democratic practices.

Foreign policy as a discourse and as a set of practices has been shaped by the individuals who control the sources of political and military power worldwide. Those individuals happen to be men

“Feminist theory, whether as part of social sciences or international studies is not a monolith body of knowledge. It has grown out of diversity, the lives, and indeed the bodies of politically engaged women and men across the world”

(and women) whose *modi operandi* have contributed to the production and reproduction of patriarchal structures in societies across the world. In turn, those structures potentiate military and economic power hegemonies, at the expense of human and democratic rights. Consequently, as extensive research has shown, women, girls, and children are, or become the most vulnerable individuals, either in war and conflict scenarios or in regimes where military power spreads through state and society institutions.

Feminist theory, whether as part of social sciences or international studies is not a monolith body of knowledge. It has grown out of diversity, the lives, and indeed the bodies of politically engaged women and men across the world. Questions of gender and gendered relations have either been absent or outright marginalised. However, the past three decades have witnessed a significant shift in the ways feminist theories and gender-based approaches have started a meaningful dialogue with IR and foreign policy approaches. It has been an uphill struggle to bring gender to the centre of mainstream debates in IR. The result is rather positive since the number of panels and sections in international

conferences have grown along with peer-reviewed publications in feminist IR and feminist foreign policy domain.

The relevance of a feminist approach to foreign policy and international politics may not be apparent to those trained in conventional approaches within IR and sub-fields. Also, it must be clarified, being a woman does not produce an outright recognition about the need for a feminist approach to IR and foreign policy. In her seminal book, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, Cynthia Enloe asks a question: “where are the women?” This simple question, hitherto erased or deliberately silenced has served as hermeneutical locus from where subsequent relationship started disentangling the gendered ways in which IR and foreign policy have been theorised, taught, and practised. However, an answer cannot be outright obtained. Not because women and girls are not there, but because they have been made invisible.

Enloe's book is certainly an important beginning to those interested in finding answers, and perhaps to change the ways questions within the discipline are posed and pursued. Being curious, as she often mentions, for instance, about low-secretarial women in foreign offices, or the workers (women and men) at all the Middle Eastern airports, will bring to fore a number of networked questions within which the military-economy power nexus transits and operates. Thanks to the research of Enloe and many other IR and international studies feminists, the hidden reality of a heavily gendered discipline and its associated practices continues to be deconstructed.

One of the most visible results of this long struggle is the institutionalization and implementation of a feminist foreign policy. Since 2015, the Swedish government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström became the first member of the international community to be fully committed to advocating and implementing a feminist foreign policy. Foreign policy élites in several countries and also in international organizations have shown a genuine commitment to

“ A Feminist foreign policy is a tool and a working plan that can and should be turned into legislation across the world, according to the reality on the ground ”

follow Sweden's pioneering work. A case in point is Canada where the government of Justin Trudeau has welcomed and accepted pursuing a feminist foreign policy. While not institutionally endorsing a feminist foreign policy, New Zealand's foreign policy objectives clearly remain committed to it, particularly under the new government of Jacinda Ardern.

Swedish Feminist foreign policy is informed and constituted by reference to two factors. One is a thick ethical component that is derived from and reinforced by concepts such as 'ethics of care' and 'gender cosmopolitanism', which in turn are constitutive of Sweden's self-identity. The other is a normative framework derived from the UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security, namely resolutions 1325 and 1888 (the latter carried the strong commitment and endorsement of Hillary Rodham Clinton back in 2009).

In 2018, the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry launched the Handbook of Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy. The document is a comprehensive guide on what constitutes a feminist foreign policy, and how it can be pursued and implemented through working methods. The Swedish Feminist foreign policy, according to the Handbook, is "a working method and a perspective that takes three Rs as its starting point and is based on a fourth R." The Rs are Rights, Representation, Resources, and

Reality. The target is to enhance and strengthen women and girls' lives by ensuring these four Rs remain at the core of the government's policies at local and international level. The whole document provides an outstanding balanced account. Governments willing to adopt and implement this model will be able to end discrimination, gender inequality, and consequently empower women to be active participants in decision-making processes. Particular attention is given to women's participation in post-war conflict resolution, a theme which has been further developed by the UN Women through a published guide titled Women's Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the Implementation of Peace Agreements.

There are two important factors that must be spelt out since they are paramount to validate Swedish Feminist foreign policy's gender equality perspective and its applicability across continents. Firstly, the Swedish Feminist foreign policy, according to the Handbook "begins and ends with reality." It states that "the policy shall be based on facts and statistics about girl's and women's everyday lives, and shall produce results in people's lives. Otherwise, it loses its relevance." Secondly, the policy is based on the key concept of intersectionality that confers it a greater degree of potential for inclusiveness and reflexivity. Intersectionality in feminist theory became a central concept. It signifies that gender as a social category is not, and should not be sought in isolation from other categories like class, race, ethnicity and sexuality. Thus, Swedish Feminist foreign policy, "takes into account the fact that people have different living conditions, levels of influence and needs."

The institutionalization of Feminist foreign policy by Sweden and by UN Women, with latter dedicating great attention to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) discourse, has been gaining strength and currency. It has also received criticism particularly on how a feminist foreign policy could contribute to change the tenants of the above-mentioned military-economic power nexus. There are already

a couple of results on the table. Sweden has stopped selling weapons to Saudi Arabia after the latter opposed Margot Wallström to speak at the Arab League meeting. Norway has recently halted an arms deal with the UAE, given the latter's involvement in the Yemen War. WPS at work here. And a recent spat between Canada and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also underscored that a committed Feminist foreign policy can contribute to challenging regimes where human rights are systematically violated domestically and across the border.

In sum, a Feminist foreign policy in the terms proposed by Sweden, constitutes a key step towards the reduction and elimination of gender discrimination, at home and abroad. The vulnerability of women and children intensifies under scenarios of poverty, climate change, conflict, and migration. The scenarios, while for the majority of us, remain locked into the screens of mobile phones and laptops, are the daily reality of millions of human beings. Demanding an end to it is an ethical obligation and a cosmopolitan commitment. Thus, a Feminist foreign policy is a tool and a working plan that can and should be turned into legislation across the world, according to the reality on the ground. It is possible to achieve compelling conflict resolutions, successful disarmament, and strong human rights regimes if states pursue an inclusive foreign policy which is gender-neutral in lingo and is sensitive about promoting the human rights-democracy nexus in tandem with the realist power projections.





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
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DETERRENCE STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: BETWEEN THE DEVIL & THE DEEP BLUE SEA



Amina Afzal

India and Pakistan's seaward nuclearization has received great scholarly attention off late. The thrust of recent literature on the issue focuses on whether an at-sea deterrent has bolstered deterrence stability or aggravated chances of an outbreak of a crisis with escalatory potential. While proponents of a sea-based nuclear force argue that it will augment second-strike capability and ensure stability, critics have raised question marks on the survivability of assets and the overall impact on crisis stability. Given that both countries are moving towards acquiring an at-sea nuclear deterrent, an analysis of seaward nuclear expansion is central to any discussion on strategic stability in South Asia.

Earlier this month, India's first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) the *Arihant*, successfully completed its first deterrence patrol. This gives India a platform from which it could launch nuclear missiles from under the sea. In November 2017, India conducted sea trials of its second nuclear submarine. Likewise, Pakistan's successful test of its nuclear capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) Babur III in 2017 and 2018 also confirmed speculations that the country was working towards achieving a nuclear triad. Recent steps towards completing a nuclear triad have complicated the nature of arms competition and crisis stability in South Asia.

STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SEA-BASED DETERRENCE

The development of sea-based nuclear forces by India and Pakistan was in line with their evolving nuclear doctrines and their approach towards the concept of credible minimum deterrence. It can be argued that for India, credible minimum deterrence was never a static concept

and was instead based on the evolving capabilities of its adversaries. For example, a 2001 report by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency had predicted that if India's nuclear strategy and forces evolve as per the criteria envisaged by its National Security Advisory Board, it "would not constitute a 'minimum deterrence' posture, as that term is generally understood." The report also warned that given the China factor in India's threat assessment its "rhetorical commitment" to minimum deterrence would be "no more than a pacifier for the international community." India's threat perceptions vis-à-vis China ultimately led to its 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces, which called for the need to maintain credible deterrence instead of credible minimum deterrence proposed by India's draft nuclear doctrine.

The notion of credible deterrence has led to calls for India to keep its nuclear development open-ended to enable it to deal effectively with emerging threats. Such changes in India's policy prompted a similar change in Pakistan whereby its policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) now guides the development of its nuclear capability. Approved in 2013, Pakistan's FSD vis-a-vis India had remained incomplete in the absence of a sea-based deterrent. Given the threat of India completing its nuclear triad, many in Pakistan believe that FSD "remains

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unsustainable so long as the sea-based reserve is also not available.” India’s at-sea deterrent compelled Pakistan to not only pursue its own triad, but also improve its conventional naval capabilities. The emergence of ambiguous concepts of deterrence alongside a worsening nuclear and conventional arms competition after the emergence of sea-based nuclear weapons therefore places deterrence stability at a precarious point in South Asia.

REMAINING ISSUES

Even as deterrence in South Asia becomes increasingly unstable, there remain various other factors that beset India and Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear triad. For instance, a nuclear triad would create several issues related to communication as well as command and control for both countries. Submarines generally have one-way communication to ensure

their location remains secret. In such an environment, both countries would have to deal with the “always-never dilemma,” i.e. the challenge of ensuring that an authorized launch is possible at all times while also ensuring against an unauthorized launch. For a command and control system to work effectively, pre delegation of launch authority will be necessary, which could potentially lead to the misuse of nuclear weapons. Constant communication remains undesirable for submarines because they become more susceptible to being detected, but absent such communication, the assurance of continuous civilian supremacy over the at-sea nuclear deterrent remains questionable. For these reasons, both India and Pakistan have come under question about the nature of their respective nuclear command and control structures at sea. For example, a fall 2017 Washington Quarterly article by Christopher Clary

and Ankit Panda questions the efficacy of Pakistan’s triad on this basis.

Another concern is the vulnerability of nuclear weapons at sea to theft, sabotage, and accidents, thereby increasing the existing threat of nuclear terrorism. Coordinated efforts are needed by employing surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable command structure in both India and Pakistan to ensure the protection of naval vessels both on and offshore. However, recent incidents like the one involving *Arihant* in 2017, the *Sagar Bhushan* in 2018, and several others before them reinforce the argument that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons at sea. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the threat of non-state actors will subside with the addition of sea-based nuclear weapons, and both countries remain unable to eliminate that threat.

Costs associated with modernizing and expanding submarine systems are an added economic burden that neither country has the ability nor demonstrated desire to deal with.

Another aspect that merits attention is the China factor in the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean region. India believes that its SSBN fleet could help bolster its conventional naval deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing, while its undersea deterrent is widely perceived to be intended to deter China. From the Pakistani perspective, however, India's military remains poised towards Pakistan. On the naval front for example, the K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile has a range of 750 kilometers and is Pakistan-specific. For Pakistan, a second-strike capability is important given the country's lack of strategic depth. These triangular dynamics involving India, Pakistan, and China complicate both deterrence stability and arms competition.

Finally, another factor to consider is how the presence of a sea-based deterrent has led to a blurring of conventional and nuclear forces, thus influencing the threat perceptions of China, India, and Pakistan. The interaction between conventional

naval capabilities and strategic systems at sea complicates crisis stability, as anti-submarine or anti-ship warfare in this context can be likened to counterforce capabilities. A crisis scenario involving nuclear-armed naval forces could create a potential confusion in terms of interpretation. For example, there is an Indian tendency to view all Chinese naval movements, whether nuclear-armed or conventional vessels, as part of a creeping monolithic advance. It is also widely believed in India that the country's SSBN fleet could have significance for conventional naval deterrence.

Similarly, there have been suggestions in Pakistan that it should enhance its naval capabilities to offset India's conventional naval advantage in the Indian Ocean. According to analyst Iskander Rehman, Pakistani commanders have discussed the possibility of placing nuclear-tipped cruise missiles aboard conventional submarines in order to emulate "Israel's alleged decision to place nuclear-tipped cruise missiles aboard conventional submarines." For strategic stability to endure in such a situation, it is important that both countries develop operational concepts and build robust command and control processes.

AVOIDING DETERRENCE INSTABILITY

Pakistan and India are equally vulnerable to the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. In the absence of a bilateral mechanism between the two navies, minor naval incidents could easily spiral out of control. Given the geographical contiguity between the two countries, frequent interactions between naval platforms are imminent. In such a scenario, the difficulty in ascertaining the intentions and capabilities of maritime vessels, especially those operating at close ranges, would undoubtedly increase the chances of escalation. Decision makers in both countries could benefit by evolving bilateral mechanisms to control incidents at sea. Ultimately, the vulnerability of a sea-based deterrent or ineffective command and control mechanisms may well lead to deterrence instability in South Asia.

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INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS COMPETITION AND PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION



Samran Ali

The Chinese economy has already outgrown the U.S. economy. India has also replaced France and is now the sixth largest economy in the world. Both countries are also major political and military powers with growing regional and global stakes, respectively.

However, they have opposite political systems and divergent views on most global issues. While India takes pride in being the world's largest democracy, China adheres to the socialist values. India is strategically aligned with the United States, who sees India as a potential counter-weight to China. Therefore, India and China are not only economic competitors but also military rivals due to their border disputes, respective strategic visions and India's efforts to achieve strategic parity with China. However,

despite these issues, there is growing cooperation between them in the realms of economy and trade. Both states are also careful about managing their conflict short of major military confrontation.

Competition

Issues between India and China emanate from their border disputes. They include, Aksai Chin – which is governed by China but also claimed by India; Arunachal Pradesh – governed by India and claimed by China and; Doklam – the area disputed



Source: AFP

between China and Bhutan where they had a two-month-long standoff. Border intrusions have occurred several times between the two sides owing to unresolved border issues. Both countries, therefore, have to maintain a military presence in the disputed areas even though these disputes are not hot or active. However, chances of small border clashes may not be ruled out. Both countries are engaged in a competition to further their influence in border areas and countries situated between them, Nepal and Bhutan.

Chinese Concerns

China realises that the closer Indo-U.S. partnership is aimed at the containment of China. India also enjoys warm relationships with Vietnam and Japan who also oppose the Chinese position on the South China Sea. Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, is in exile and resides in India which angers the Chinese. India supports the U.S. policies of a heavy-handed approach in Afghanistan. China, on the other hand, favors political reconciliation as long-term instability in

Afghanistan may also affect China. India has tested missiles capable of hitting the Chinese mainland, the Agni-V missile is noteworthy in this regard.

Indian Concerns

A major area of competition in future between India and China is likely to be in the Indian Ocean. Both powers want to militarily dominate the ocean. India regards the Chinese policy in the Indian Ocean as one of military dominance rather than economic interests. India also sees

“ A major area of competition in future between India and China is likely to be in the Indian Ocean. Both powers want to militarily dominate the ocean ”

the Chinese high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project as Chinese strategy to encircle it. India is not supportive of the growing Sino-Pakistani relations. It opposes the BRI and CPEC initiatives. In its view, Sino-Pakistan cooperation is aimed at hurting Indian interests and perceives that it may have to confront the two-front war in future from China and Pakistan.

A dispute over the water issues can also not be ruled out due to the fact that China is upper riparian country and India is dependent on China for water flowing in the Brahmaputra River. India blames China for constructing dams on rivers and diverting the water flow. China has blocked India's attempt to become a permanent member of UNSC and NSG.

India and China are also engaged in an economic competition. China is a huge economy and India is a growing economic power. In 2017 trade volume between the two was approximately \$84.44 billion but this is tilted heavily in China's favor with a trade surplus of at \$51.75 billion.

Cooperation

Both India and China are not taking the competition to a level that adversely affects their political relationships. India is balancing its relationship with China vis-a-vis U.S. A neutral India, even if it is not pro-China, places China in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the United States.

There have been many developments in this regard. To address the issues emanating from territorial disputes, both the countries have set-up five Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) points to quickly address the local level disputes on the spot.

The Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Modi met in the Chinese city, Wuhan in an informal summit. The 'heart-to-heart' talk between the two leaders is being heralded as an effort to rebuild trust and improve ties that were hit by the 73-days long Doklam standoff, last year. Both sides agreed to improve communication between their militaries to maintain peace at the border, handle all their differences peacefully through talks and work on a joint economic project in Afghanistan.

“ Indian soft-power in China is at work in bringing the two sides closer. In the future, Indian and Chinese trade and the cultural relationships are poised to grow further ”

Subsequent to the Modi-Xi meeting, there has also been an exchange of positive statements from both sides. Xi described China and India as the backbone of the world's multi-polarization and economic globalization. Indian Defence Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, responding to a question on May 08, said today that there was no tension between the navies of India and China in the strategic Indian Ocean region. Referring to PM Modi's visit to China she said, "We [India and China] are talking and meeting each other. That is a big change."

To decrease the trust deficit, India stopped the Tibetans from joining Dalai Lama for the 60th anniversary of the failed uprising. After this, the Tibetan 'government in exile' shifted major programs slotted for New Delhi to Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. Recently, India and China also signed an internal security cooperation agreement that among other areas of cooperation, will involve intelligence sharing between the two sides on terrorism and transnational crimes. Chinese Defence Ministry has also announced joint military drills between the Chinese and Indian armies later this year.

China has repeatedly offered India to join its Belt and Road Initiative. Bilateral trade between China and India amounts to \$84 billion in 2017, increasing by 18.63 percent from the previous year. The people to people contacts have also been increasing. There are more than forty direct flights between India and China every week. Thousands of Indian students are studying in Chinese universities. Lately, Indian movies have also been becoming popular among the Chinese cinemagoers. Therefore, Indian soft-power in China is at work in bringing the two sides closer.

In future, Indian and Chinese trade and the cultural relationships are poised to grow further. In future one might see the space growing for political moves that can further enhance their cooperative relationship. Considering these developments, Indian and Chinese bilateral relationship is likely to grow in future and we may see more cooperation than competition between the two.

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