


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A detailed portrait of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a prominent figure in the Haqqani network. He is depicted from the chest up, wearing a white turban and a white shawl. He has a long, dark beard and mustache, and his expression is serious. The background is a textured, light-colored wall. The text is overlaid on the bottom half of the image.

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**HAQQANI**  
TERROR NETWORK  
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# PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS IN NAYA PAKISTAN



Source: AFP



Andrew Korybko

The rise of Imran Khan as Pakistan's Prime Minister might have been thought by some to herald a sea change in policy towards the US, but Islamabad will probably continue to responsibly manage the downward trajectory in bilateral ties with Washington and is unlikely to take any proactive measures that could suddenly alter the state of affairs between the two, even though it will proactively craft backup plans for what it should do in the event that the US initiates military and or economic provocations against it.

## “NAYA PAKISTAN” AND ITS PRIORITIES

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's (PTI) victory in Pakistan's latest elections in July 2018 led to the premiership of Imran Khan and the beginning of what many are describing as the era of “Naya Pakistan” (“New Pakistan”), and while the country is bound to experience a lot of internal change during this time, it is unclear exactly how different its foreign policy priorities are going to be. The previous government successfully charted a new path for Pakistan to take by hosting CPEC and entering into a fast-moving rapprochement with Russia, both of which are constructively contributing to the country's rising role as the Zipper of Eurasia in the emerging multipolar world order. The chief foreign policy task ahead of the new government is to avoid any sudden shocks that could offset this geostrategic reorientation, though that also naturally implies managing the downward trajectory of bilateral relations with the US.

The US is trying to contain Pakistan and is accordingly acting as an agent of regional destabilization. This will inevitably lead to domestic consequences for the country that could hinder the effective implantation of Prime Minister Khan's comprehensive reform agenda, which could in turn be politicized by his opponents to advance their own interests. It is for this reason why “Naya Pakistan” must remain focused on the US, for better and for worse, because Washington is in a position to simultaneously sabotage the new government's international and domestic plans. Islamabad is acutely aware of this, and that is why it is unlikely

to proactively make any moves that could suddenly alter the state of affairs between it and Washington, though that is not to say that it will not draft various plans to implement in response to any unfortunate scenarios initiated by the US.

## THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF A RAPPROCHEMENT

Prime Minister Khan's government has sent friendly signals towards the US and openly said that it wants to improve bilateral relations, though, this will most likely fall on deaf ears. Ideally, Pakistan would succeed in encouraging much more American investment in order to balance Washington's economic interests in neighboring India and also make it a stakeholder in country's stability, thus diminishing the chances that the kinetic manifestations of the Hybrid War on CPEC will intensify. Even though it is approaching the US with an olive branch in hand, “Naya Pakistan” will no longer accept the US making any disrespectful demands of it like before, insisting that the only partnership between the two must be an equal one instead of the lopsided

“ **Naya Pakistan will no longer accept the US making any disrespectful demands of it like before, insisting that the only partnership between the two must be an equal one instead of the lopsided relationship that characterized the previous decades, especially the last two after 9/11** ”



**“ Perceptions are important too, so while there might be certain benefits in framing some reactions to American moves as being just that – reactions – other times it may be to Pakistan’s advantage to emphasize the foresight that went into planning them beforehand, with the narrative employed depending on the intended audience. Relatedly, Pakistan needs to be careful how it plays its hand ”**

to further disengage from its erstwhile partnership. A perfect example of this in practice is the military training deal that Pakistan clinched with Russia right after the US decided that it would no longer be fulfilling this role.

### **THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT**

Perceptions are important too, so while there might be certain benefits in framing some reactions to American moves as being just that – reactions – other times it may be to Pakistan’s advantage to emphasize the foresight that went into planning them beforehand, with the narrative employed depending on the intended audience. Relatedly, Pakistan needs to be careful how it plays its hand. The US, being largely in control of the relationship’s dynamics, might exploit any of its counterpart’s proactive policies towards other countries (and especially America’s multipolar rivals) to paint Pakistan in a negative light, after which it can then “justify” its own preplanned provocations against it as being in “defensive reaction” to whatever it is that Islamabad is doing. For example, the optics would have been entirely different if Islamabad did not masterfully time its training deal with Moscow to coincide with Washington’s suspension.

### **TIT-FOR-TAT**

The principle that should be at the back of every Pakistani diplomat’s mind must be “tit-for-tat”, “action-reaction”, and the focus of their work must be on preparing various responses to whatever else it might be that the US decides to do against their country. It should be taken for granted that the current trajectory would not be reversed, but can only be responsibly managed, if not by both sides then at least by the Pakistani one. Competent experts can predict what the US might do next, which could therefore guide the country’s policymakers in the direction that is needed so that they are not taken off guard by anything that eventually happens. Correspondingly, the US response to Pakistan’s foreign policy actions can also be predicted, allowing decision makers to foresee what moves it will probably make to whatever Islamabad does.

Both great powers are therefore expected to continue interacting in such a manner, predicting their counterpart’s moves and sometimes taking the initiative to preempt them in a delicate international dance that is destined to end with their comprehensive disengagement from one another. It is not in Pakistan’s interests to suddenly alter this state of affairs by taking too radical a course of action against American interests such as abruptly cutting off the US military’s transit privileges to Afghanistan. It should still be, however, prepared to do something of the sort if provoked under the relevant circumstances, knowing fully well that this is the response that America anticipated if its actions warranted it. Pakistan should also prepare a plan in case US sanctions it just as fiercely as it is doing against Iran in order to undermine CPEC.

Naya Pakistan’s focus must be on responsibly managing the downward trajectory of relations with the US in order to pay full attention to the domestic reform process and consequently deliver on the many promises that the PTI made to the population. The US has a strategic interest in staging sudden provocations to “delegitimize” the new government by distracting it with externally provoked or exacerbated crises in the military and economic realms, respectively.

*Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based journalist and geopolitical analyst*

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# **A READING OF HISTORY FOR SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION**



Salman Bashir

History is an inexact science and depends on the inclination and the time period of those who record it. Yes, science is not only a social or anthropological discipline. Time encapsulates a vast, almost infinite, quantum of data which is there for anyone to select for the purpose of weaving around it, a new philosophy or to utilize it to trace a forward trajectory for a society, nation or a civilization. Also, to simply apply the past for replicating results

in societies that may have changed beyond recognition.

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama, thrilled at the imminent prospects of dissolution of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the West, declared the ‘end of history’ with a self-perpetuating liberal world order. In that sense geo-politics was dead. The advent of the new age was to be celebrated. Unipolar world- in perpetuity- was the new normal.



**“ In the sphere of global politics, the thinkers and decision-makers in South Asia rely on intellectual concepts and constructs that are wholly borrowed from the west. True geo-politics is again in ascendancy ”**

Yet, less than thirty years on, ‘liberalism’ and political and economic systems associated therewith are witnessing convulsions on a scale that could seriously jeopardize global peace. Fukuyama now holds ‘identity’ as an important factor influencing the course of societies and history.

How does one explain the re-emergence of racism, intolerance, xenophobia, tribalism and petty prejudice in apparently developed, affluent, democratic societies? Are civilizational virtues an aspect of affluence alone? Is moral degeneration a sign of irreligiosity or is prejudice accentuated by denominations of faith and race? A more pertinent question is whether human civilization is simultaneously progressing and regressing or is it only undergoing a course correction in the endless cycles of rise and fall.

In Pakistan, as elsewhere, scholars, diplomats and decision makers worry endlessly in trying to read ‘this’ point of inflexion in contemporary history. The standard discourse in Pakistan revolves around notions of politics and governance, civil-military relations, corruption and accountability, socio-economic inequalities, injustice and plenty of other issues. The debate is informed by a relativistic value code derived from the free world notions and the liberal scheme of politics and governance.

In the sphere of global politics, the thinkers and decision-makers in South Asia rely on intellectual concepts and constructs that are wholly borrowed from the West. True geo-politics is again in ascendancy. An age of alliances is being rejigged. A new Cold War is in the air. This will impact Pakistan and our region. There is no compulsion on us to take sides. But if compelled by circumstances, we may have to make an informed decision on which way to go. How credible is the present preposition of US vs China and Russia? This is perhaps a trillion dollar question, for the fate of the world would depend on the answer. But equally there is the possibility that this preposition is false. The Big Three – US, China and Russia – may well find a modality to co-exist and still better to cooperate. It is difficult to imagine that the process of globalization could be reversed. Global interdependence is a reality. It makes no sense to read the historical script as moving from currency to trade to a world war.

President Trump has the knack of the deal. His detractors, which are many, may be proven wrong, after all. Despite ‘fire and fury’ rhetoric, Trump did extend a hand of friendship to the maverick leader Kim Jong-Un of North Korea. Trump loves authoritarian figures, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping included. If so, what is this talk about trade war and forging a century long defense partnership with India?

Closer to home, India’s aspirations to become the single largest economy and a major world power deserve some reflection. True, economic fundamentals such as large population hence a large market, youth bulge, level of literacy, all would indicate good prospects for development. But the issue is not development alone. It is India’s rise as a major power enabled through technological and weapons assistance by the US. Even if India were to quadruple its GDP in a couple of years, build a formidable war machine to qualify as a major power, what will be its contribution at the civilizational scale to humanity? It has an increasingly deteriorating record on human rights, freedom, democracy or usurpation of individual rights, societal stratification by distinctions of caste and creed in addition to intimidation of immediate neighbors.

One wonders, besides Yoga and Bollywood sentimentalism, what does India have to offer to the world?

At the cost of being presumptuous, one can, in fact, identify a lot of solid South Asian cultural and architectural facets that were primarily derived from the mighty Turkish and Persian civilizations, of which Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran are the natural successors. This is not meant to be rhetorical. But it is worth a ponder whether there is anything of ‘original’ civilizational worth or value in South Asian societies or is all of it a case of infringed copyrights of the West in terms of thought, diction, culture, values and norms?

China is a distinct cultural and civilizational entity. The renaissance of the Chinese civilization is perhaps the most important and enduring feature of this age. This encompasses thought, arts, crafts, science, technology and a new way to interpret and understand society and history. Thus, besides material accomplishments, which

**“ China is a distinct cultural and civilizational entity. The renaissance of the Chinese civilization is perhaps the most important and enduring feature of this age. This encompasses thought, arts, crafts, science, technology and a new way to interpret and understand society and history ”**

denote the arrival of a Chinese century, mankind could hope to relearn or perhaps develop a new way of thinking about societal advancement.

**“ Pakistan’s societal transformation is taking place at a breakneck speed. The institutions of politics and governance cannot cope with the expectations driven by this phenomenal change ”**

The unique way in which China evaluates the present historical trends and the lessons that it derives, therefrom, yields responses which are novel in style and substance. For instance, global economic partnerships based on equality and mutually advantageous considerations, will eventually override geo-political games. This preposition is now being tested, and the results will inform the shape of global society for a long time to come.

Pakistan needs to introspect about its own place in space and time based on its national characteristics. There are no lessons that could be applied from elsewhere. Restructuring and reform of governance and society depends on holistic ideals, applied pragmatically through legislative and executive intent and adjudicated by a system of justice that responds swiftly and fairly to establish faith of the people in the state.

Pakistan’s societal transformation is taking place at a breakneck speed. The institutions of politics and governance cannot cope with the expectations driven by this phenomenal change. Understanding this immutable reality is the first step towards devising politics, economy and governance, adequate to the wishes and aspirations of the people.

*Ambassador Salman Bashir is a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and Ambassador to China, India and Denmark*



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# FROM ONE JIHAD TO THE NEXT: THE LIFE & TIMES OF JALALUDDIN HAQQANI



Rahimullah Yusufzai

When the Afghan Taliban announced on September 3 that Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani had died from “natural causes” after a long illness, the loss was emotional and largely symbolic for the militants as he had already faded from memory after being rendered inactive more than a decade ago by an unspecified disease.

Haqqani belonged to a bygone era. He was a man from the past, the 1980s and 1990s to be precise, when the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan and later the Taliban war against the Afghan mujahideen factions were at its peak. Haqqani remained active until the early 2000s when he began organizing resistance against the invading US-led coalition forces.

Much about Haqqani during his last years of life remained a secret. The timing of his death was a matter of contention as he was reported dead on a few occasions in the past. Afghan officials claimed he died at least four years ago. A former Afghan spymaster made the bizarre claim that the belated announcement of Haqqani’s death was linked to the visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pakistan as Islamabad was playing yet another game in the region to promote its interests. He did not bother to check that such visits by US officials to Pakistan have become a matter of routine and are now largely unremarkable.

The nature of disease that paralyzed and made him bedridden is not known, though it is said he suffered a stroke. Haqqani’s place of burial also is not known. Though the Taliban spokesmen insisted that he was buried in Afghanistan, many Afghans believe his burial took place in Pakistan. Nobody has provided any evidence to back these claims. The Taliban announcement that Haqqani was 72 at the time of his death is also questionable as different years have been mentioned as the year of his birth.

Secrecy has been the strength of Taliban and it has helped the group’s cause. It isn’t the first time that Taliban, or the Haqqani network that is part and parcel of the group, managed to keep a secret. Before managing to keep the elder Haqqani’s illness, death and burial a secret, Taliban had hidden from the world for tactical reasons the

**“ Haqqani belonged to a bygone era. He was a man from the past, the 1980s and 1990s to be precise, when the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan and later the Taliban war against the Afghan mujahideen factions were at its peak ”**





US President Ronald Reagan (R) speaking with Afghan Resistance leader Yunis Khaled at the White House, Nov 11, 1987

**“ As Haqqani proved his mettle in guerilla warfare, he started earning admiration from unexpected places and individuals. The late Congressman Charlie Wilson, who lobbied the US Congress and secured millions of dollars to assist the Afghan mujahideen, was so fond of Haqqani that he referred to him as “goodness personified”**”

group's founder Mulla Mohammad Omar's death for more than two years.

Though Haqqani was one of the most powerful and respected Afghan mujahideen commanders who fought against the invading Soviet forces and the pro-Moscow communist regime in Kabul in the earlier part of his career as a fighter, his subsequent role in founding and building the militant Haqqani network into a formidable and feared force received a lot more attention.

Haqqani was a hero for the Afghan mujahideen and the Taliban, but his opponents termed him a ruthless man who introduced suicide bombing in Afghanistan and killed those disagreeing with him. The Taliban statement announcing his death was obviously fulsome as it described him as a religious scholar and an exemplary warrior who was “among the great distinguished jihadi personalities of this era.”

There was a time in the 1980s when Haqqani and other Afghan mujahideen leaders were hailed as freedom fighters by US President Ronald Reagan. Though Haqqani did not visit the US and meet Reagan at the White House in May 1985, other mujahideen leaders made the trip. Maulvi Yunis Khalis, head of the Hezb-i-Islami (Khalis) to which Haqqani belonged, led the delegation to the US. As both henna-dyed their long, bushy beards, Khalis was inexplicably mistaken for Haqqani and it was wrongly reported in the media that the Haqqani network founder had been hosted by the Reagan administration at the White House.

As Haqqani proved his mettle in guerilla warfare, he started earning admiration from unexpected places and individuals. The late Congressman Charlie Wilson, who lobbied the US Congress and secured millions of dollars to assist the Afghan mujahideen, was so fond of Haqqani that he referred

to him as “goodness personified.” An Arab woman from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reportedly started liking the turbaned warrior and eventually married him as his second wife. The couple reportedly had two sons together, but she and her children continued to live in the UAE and apparently did not get involved in Haqqani's activities as a fighter.

Throughout the Afghan jihad, the American CIA, Pakistan's ISI and other intelligence agencies were keenly supporting Haqqani. US officials have admitted that at the time he was a prized asset for the CIA. Along with Ahmad Shah Masood, Haqqani was acknowledged as the most powerful mujahideen commander fighting the Soviet Red Army troops in Afghanistan from 1979-89. This was the reason they received a much higher share of resources, both weapons and money, than other field commanders. There were reports that those funding the

Afghan jihad gave Haqqani and Masood a share of the resources almost equal to that given to their parent parties, the Hezb-i-Islami (Khalis) and Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami, respectively. Haqqani attracted significant donations from wealthy Muslims, particularly Arabs, as he was considered a capable leader ready to train and protect Arabs and other ‘guest’ fighters from different countries. It was during this period that Haqqani built life-long association with the non-Afghan jihadis, including the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. More foreigners flocked to him than to the other mujahideen commanders. Those contacts with al-Qaeda and other militant groups became durable and were one of the major reasons for the Haqqani network to be sanctioned by the UN.

Haqqani, the Pashtun cleric and warlord belonged to the Zadran tribe from the southeastern Paktia province, but his influence spread beyond his tribe and area.

Adept at forging alliances and attracting fighters transcending Afghanistan's mosaic of tribal and ethnic groups, he first rose to prominence in Loya Paktia, the old name of the new provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost, and later became known all over the country.

Though Haqqani had been active in Afghanistan's splintered Islamic movement in the mid-1970s and was among the earliest

Afghan fighters to have shifted to Pakistan after the collapse of an Islamist uprising against President Sardar Mohammad Daoud, his active career as a mujahideen commander began when the Afghan communist military officers captured power as a result of the Saur Revolution in April 1978. The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave an impetus to the fight being waged by Haqqani and other Afghans as they justified it as a jihad against the foreign occupation force.



Anti-Soviet resistance fighters in eastern Afghanistan



**“ Haqqani’s fame rose in 1991 when he led the assault to seize Khost, the first city captured by the mujahideen after the February 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This was his moment of glory ”**

In due course of time, Haqqani established the first mujahideen radio channel that operated from his vast, tunnel-based training camp in Zhawar in Afghanistan’s Khost province near the border with Pakistan. This base, built with money provided by bin Laden and other donors, was attacked by Soviet and Afghan forces backed by airpower for days, but Haqqani’s men managed to defend it every time.

In an interview with this writer in Khost a day after the city’s fall, he predicted that this was the beginning of the end for President Dr. Najibullah’s Kabul regime. His words were prophetic as the communist regime collapsed less than a year later and was replaced by the mujahideen government in April 1992.

Haqqani’s fame rose in 1991 when he led the assault to seize Khost, the first city captured by the mujahideen after the February 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This was his moment of glory. Though Haqqani was made minister for justice, the cabinet barely functioned due to the mujahideen infighting. The fractious mujahideen groups made a mess of the government while the devastating battle for Kabul widened the split and weakened them to such an extent that Taliban captured power without facing any real resistance in 1996.



**Two Afghan children play on a Soviet tank destroyed by the Afghan Mujahideen**

Haqqani formally joined the Taliban in late 1995, but he played a minor role in the subsequent battle for Kabul in September 1996. It is said he was always a Talib, having studied at the Darul Haqqania madrassa in Akora Khattak in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Nowshera district and proudly affixing Haqqani to his name like its other graduates. However, as a shrewd man he bided his time and joined the Taliban movement when it began conquering one province after another. In the Taliban cabinet formed after the fall of Kabul, Haqqani became the minister of border and tribal affairs. However,

Haqqani continued to provide guidance and fighters to the Taliban force fighting battles in northern Afghanistan to seize the remaining territory held by the Northern Alliance. In the end, Taliban seized more than 90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory, but the fighting never stopped until 9/11 happened and the US decided to invade the country to destroy al-Qaeda for daring to attack America and oust Taliban from power for harbouring bin Laden.

Like millions of other Afghans, Haqqani became a refugee in Pakistan, moving his extended family to nearby North Waziristan

where he first lived in the main town, Miranshah, and then about three kilometres away at the camp for Afghan refugees at Danday Darpakhel village. The family stayed there, braving several US drone strikes that killed many of its members and at least one raid on the Haqqani-run mosque-cum-madrassa, Manba al-Ulum, by American troops conducted with Islamabad’s permission until the Pakistani military launched the massive Zarb-e-Azb operation in June 2014 and forced the surviving local and foreign militants to surrender, relocate or escape to Afghanistan.

The contacts developed by Haqqani with Pakistan during the days of the Afghan jihad continued for years. Even now Pakistan is accused of sheltering the Haqqani network, led since the past decade by his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, now in his early 40s and a most wanted man with a head-money of \$10m placed by the US. Pakistan has been denying the allegation, arguing that the Zarb-e-Azb military action targeted every armed group, including the Haqqanis, in North Waziristan. The US and its allies remain unconvinced

**“ The elder Haqqani was a great survivor. He mourned the loss of four young sons in fighting and suffered when another son was captured and sentenced to death. He survived ambushes and US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, evaded capture and overcame political intrigues ”**

to this day. Way back in September 2013, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Mike Mullen directly blamed Pakistan for harbouring the Haqqani network by alleging that it was acting as the veritable arm of the ISI. He made the statement exactly a year after the US designated the Haqqani network as foreign terrorist organization. However, this has not stopped the US from holding clandestine meetings with representatives of the Haqqani network because it knows that no peace deal with the Afghan Taliban would work without the Haqqanis’ participation, more so after appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2015 as one of the two deputies to Taliban supreme leader Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada.

The elder Haqqani was a great survivor. He mourned the loss of four young sons in fighting and suffered when another son was captured and sentenced to death. He survived ambushes and US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, evaded capture and overcame political intrigues. He held high positions, including being made the commander of all Taliban forces in October 2001 when the US invaded Afghanistan and member of the Taliban’s highest decision-making Rahbari Shura.

History would have been different if President Hamid Karzai overtures to Haqqani after the fall of the Taliban regime could have overcome US objections and led to a deal. Before long, Haqqani was regrouping his men, beginning with just a dozen fighters to wage a new round of guerilla war. This time the enemy was the US, his former ally, and the Afghan government installed by it in Kabul.

Though Haqqani could not remain active due to illness, he tried to stay relevant by issuing a video statement in March 2008, passing on his skills and giving instructions to Taliban fighters based on his battlefield experiences and advocating jihad against the anti-Islam forces that he claimed were occupying Afghanistan and other Islamic countries.

The last time Haqqani spoke was through a statement attributed to him on November 13, 2013 when he declared his son, Naseeruddin

Haqqani, who was murdered in Islamabad, a martyr and celebrated the occasion by congratulating himself and the Taliban ameer (head) and fighters. Obviously, he was too ill and weak to record video footage as he did in 2008, but the tough words were evidence enough that Haqqani remained defiant as ever.

**“ Haqqani fought all his life against different enemies, including two superpowers, USSR and US, and refused to make compromises on his beliefs. He founded an armed group driven by religious, ideological and political causes ”**

Haqqani fought all his life against different enemies, including two superpowers, USSR and US, and refused to make compromises on his beliefs. He founded an armed group driven by religious, ideological and political causes. The Haqqani network is still largely shadowy and known for its resilience and capacity to cause violence. Though the network is part of the Taliban movement, it has operated independently for so long that it is still allowed to raise donations and plan attacks.

Haqqani’s legacy has been the use of violence to achieve the desired goals. His resistance to the foreigners who occupied Afghanistan won him many admirers, but his orders to kill Afghans who espoused different beliefs made him a hated figure among his own people.

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# IRAN

## IN THE AGE OF MULTIPOLARITY



Saeed Afridi

It can be argued that the demise of the US' unipolar moment lay in the hastily ill-conceived 'War on Terror' in the wake of the World Trade Centre attack. The US embarked on a series of interventions that interrupted the gradual assimilation of regional powers into the US fold, among them is Iran. Despite having considerable congruence with the United States' stated goals, Iran found itself among the US' 'axis of evil' and a virtual neighbour to US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The War on Terror provided Iran with the first real opportunity in almost a century to carve out a regional policy wholly dependent on Iran's own interests, rather than those of an external power. As a regional power with a sphere of cultural, religious and historical influence extending beyond its borders, Iran embarked on a series of regional measures that allowed it to play to its strengths. As the unipolar moment waned and multipolarity

began to emerge, Iran was better placed to gauge and take advantage of the relative strengths of the multiple powers vying for influence in West Asia as well as fill the vacuum left by their weaknesses. Cooperating with multiple powers to encourage inter-dependency within regional frameworks is the mainstay of smaller regional powers in a multipolar world.

Multipolar world becomes a catalyst for regionalism as regional powers see greater economic integration of the region as a means to emerge as global competitors. Iran's geographical area of influence has historically had a core region which largely corresponds to Iran's political boundaries of today. However, during previous Persian regimes that have risen to hegemonic status within the region have done so by physical expansion into Central Asia, Western Afghanistan, Eastern regions of

what is today Iraq and western regions of what today constitutes Pakistan. Iran may consider expansion of its influence in these areas as a precursor to emerging as a politico-economic contender in a multipolar world. Rather than rely on a confrontational physical expansion of its borders, Iran has begun a process of reintegration into the economic activities and trade of these regions. Iran's foreign policy is now reorienting itself towards a greater role in its historical sphere that spans from the Levant in its West, the Central Asian republics to its North and to the Ganges plain in its East.

Despite its concerted policies to export its ideational revolution to its immediate region, Iran's newfound expansion of influence beyond its physical borders has been a result of Iran's engagement and considered positioning with contending global powers, including the United States.



**“ Previous Persian regimes that have risen to hegemonic status within the region have done so by physical expansion into Central Asia, Western Afghanistan, Eastern regions of what is today Iraq and western regions of what today constitutes Pakistan. Iran may consider expansion of its influence in these areas as a precursor to emerging as a politico-economic contender in a multipolar world ”**

#### IRAN & THE UNITED STATES

Iran opted for neutrality during the First Gulf War between Iraq and the United States, which may have assisted to a lesser degree in the inevitable US victory. The US invasion of Afghanistan was assisted by Iran through its network of allies within Western Afghanistan and its influence with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Iran's attempt to ingratiate itself with the US was unceremoniously rebuffed when it was included in the 'axis of evil'. Though this may have been a result of the US-Israel relationship, it nonetheless put considerable strain on Iranian attempts at rapprochement towards the US. The policy faltered completely once the US rebuffed Iran's attempts at striking a 'Grand Bargain' in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the America's near unilateral

invasion of Iraq. Miscalculating the success of the Iraq invasion, US ended the Zarif-Khalilzad dialogue in Geneva and instead embarked on a course of regime change through the political destabilisation of Iran by providing material assistance to Kurdish and Baluch insurgencies. As the invasion of Iraq turned into a protracted conflict, the US came under repeated attack by largely Sunni insurgents backed by its own Gulf allies. US insinuations of an Iranian role defied the ground realities and the use of pro-US Sunni outfits to attack largely Shia populations in Iraq provided Iran with the opportunity to solidify its hitherto weak cooperation with Shia outfits hesitant to accept Iranian assistance. By the end of the decade, Iran had firmly established proxy control over much of the South and Central regions of Iraq and also placed itself as the main ally of the Iraqi government in its coming battle with the largely Sunni-Wahabi-Daesh nexus, or Islamic State. By the end of the conflict in the early 21st century, Iran had emerged as the most powerful political player in Iraq through a working anti-Kurd alliance with the second important regional power in Iraq, Turkey.

#### IRAN AND RUSSIA

During the decades of internal political as well as economic instability, Russia's presence on the international stage diminished to the point of near irrelevance. Rather than presenting an alternative to the US vision of the world, Russia became an object of it instead. Internal reforms inspired by the Washington consensus had ushered in a period of extremes in the Russian society and regionally Russia retreated from even its most entrenched presence in Central Asia. After these initial years of what became known as Euro-Atlanticism, the first concerted vision towards a Russo centric policy of foreign relations emerged in the form of "Eurasianism". At the outset, Eurasianists strived for regional and foreign relations based on mutual interests linked to the Russian state, rather than ideationalism or idealism. Though this included non-confrontation with the United States, its mainstay was to forge relations with other regional powers to advocate and facilitate the emergence of multipolarity, though the preferred term used was

multi-vector diplomacy. Despite its own troubles with Muslim separatists, most notably in Chechnya, Russian Eurasianists considered Muslim countries, and Shia Islam in particular, as a natural ally in the quest for multipolarity. Eurasianism drove Russia's re-engagement in the Caucuses and Central Asia found in Iran a partner with mutual interests. This soon extended to the anti-Taliban alliance in Afghanistan. With Putin's Russia playing a more assertive role in the Middle East and Central Asia after the US faltering in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's relations with Russia improved considerably despite conflicting views on Iran's nuclear ambitions and interest in the Caspian Sea. Iran's membership of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Iran to a sea based trade route with India was an example of this new momentum. As Russia's role in the Middle East grew, so did that of Iran and the culmination of this partnership came about with the civil war in Syria. Over the course of the conflict, Iran through Russian assistance was able to place itself as the most important regional player within Syria in particular and the Levant as a whole, to the great detriment of US and Israeli interests.

**“ China has greatly assisted coordination between SCO and Iran as well as CAREC and Iran, enhancing both Iran's trade ties within the bodies and assisting in furthering Iran's influence, something Iran failed to do on its own for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse ”**

#### IRAN AND CHINA

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asian Republics presented Iran with an opportunity to expand its influence as Russian dominance waned. However strained relations between the US and Iran acted as a formidable barrier as the new republics remained cautious of US reactions towards greater ties with Iran. Competing with Turkey for influence, Iran found itself having a considerable disadvantage due to the promotion of its Shia ideational measures in a predominantly, albeit loose, Sunni region. Pan-Turkism held more sway in the initial years and Iran, still under sanctions was unable to match Turkey's prowess for economic and industrial assistance.

Iran's efforts to further transportation and trade links in Central Asia under the umbrella of the ECO also suffered mixed results, limited in part by Iran's own industrial capabilities. It was not until the advent of China into the region as a trade partner, first under the structure of the SCO and then under CAREC that Iran finally began to solidify its position in the region. After the launch of China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), termed the New Silk Road, Iran found itself in a pivotal role encompassing not just Central Asia but also Afghanistan and Pakistan. The elaborate BRI included a set of six land-based corridors to enhance trade between China and the entire Eurasian continent. The most elaborate, ambitious and difficult to realise of these corridors is the China-Central West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) which links China with Turkey through four Central Asian Republics and Iran. The importance China places upon Iran in this corridor is evident from the 'comprehensive strategic partnership' agreed with Iran in 2016 and the slew of coordinated efforts both countries have undertaken to enhance trade between the Central Asian Republics who are members of the corridor. China has greatly assisted coordination between SCO and Iran as well as CAREC and Iran, enhancing both Iran's trade ties within the bodies and assisting in furthering Iran's influence, something Iran failed to do on its own for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse. Iran's muted stance, compared to Turkey, on China's internal problems in Xinjiang is a further indication of the

lesser importance Iran has placed on the ideational aspect of its foreign policy, at least with respect to China. As China expands its reach through investments in port facilities in both Turkey and Greece, Iran's ability to trade with Europe is being enhanced as part of the corridor. China's significant investments in upgrading Iran's transport and energy infrastructure, including railways and dormant gas fields, has also improved Iran's position in regional trade. Improvements in Iran's trade and Energy infrastructure through cooperation with Chinese firms has led to a resurgence of Iranian influence in Central Asian Republics at a level not witnessed since the mid 19th century.

China's BRI has also provided Iran with an opportunity to slip back into a region that has historically been susceptible to Iranian influence for millennia but has since the beginning of the 20th century remained largely devoid of any significant Iranian political or economic presence. Along with the CCWAEC, China is also developing another corridor as part of the BRI with Iran's Eastern neighbor Pakistan. The China-Pakistan economic Corridor (CPEC) inherited much of its framework from previous agreements under CAREC and has been easier for China to advance but its significance for Iran has not gone unnoticed in Tehran. Both China and Iran consider greater co-operation between Iran and Pakistan in order to 'link' the two corridors as an eventual goal. Iran has made several overtures to Pakistan to increase cooperation and as Chinese investments in both these corridors gain pace, the eventual linking of CPEC and CCWAEC seems to be inevitable. Once linked, Iran would act as a pivotal trading state between the key economic entities of Europe, Russia, China and India.

Despite being an important regional entity for much of recorded history, Iran was unable to assert its influence within its immediate region during much of the 20th century. Lack of a concerted and Iran-centric foreign policy devoid of external influence throughout much of the past century meant that Iran was not in a position to truly take advantage of the opportunities presented to it in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. During the unipolar moment Iran found

**“ As the second decade of the 21st century approaches a close, Iran has found itself in an enviable position to first expand into its historical sphere of economic, political and cultural influence in the Levant, Central Asia, Pakistan and North India and then embark on a future course to solidify its position as a major trade conduit in its immediate region as well as the larger Eurasian economy ”**

itself largely contained within its physical borders and its ideational influence mostly curtailed. The emergence of a multipolar world allowed Iran the opportunity to enhance its cooperation with emerging powers and use their initiatives to further its own regional goals. As the second decade of the 21st century approaches a close, Iran has found itself in an enviable position to first expand into its historical sphere of economic, political and cultural influence in the Levant, Central Asia, Pakistan and North India and then embark on a future course to solidify its position as a major trade conduit in its immediate region as well as the larger Eurasian economy.

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# THE BULLYING SWAGGER



Cheryl Rofer

Before Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo posted his Instagram account featuring “swagger,” he had repeated the word several times. The first Instagram photo is a mock seal for the “Department of Swagger.” The second post says that Shakespeare wrote about swagger, and mentions General George Patton’s swagger stick. It contains four photos, two of Pompeo, one of Patton, and a drawing of Shakespeare.

Swagger is consistent with other parts of Trump’s foreign policy, particularly the idea of America First. President Donald Trump has used the phrase often, despite its associations with World War II isolationism and anti-Semitism. Let us look at some of Trump’s actions to perhaps derive what “swagger” and “America First” might mean.

As negotiators from Canada and the United States worked on a revised NAFTA agreement, Trump commented, off-the-record, to journalists that he intended not to make any concessions, so that Canada would both be insulted and would have to bend to his will. The comments became public, with speculation that Trump himself had given the go-ahead.

The purpose of the tariffs Trump has levied on a number of products seems to be to generate leverage to force other countries to his terms in trade. A Canadian view reads, “having divided Mexico and Canada to conquer them, he intends to bludgeon both nations with an American-made baseball bat until they cower under the sheer force of American power.”

In negotiations with North Korea, the United States has failed to consult with allies South Korea and Japan. South Korea and North Korea are negotiating independently. North Korea wants an end-of-war declaration. The United States wants a list of all North Korea’s nuclear weapons related sites, or perhaps 60 per cent of its nuclear weapons. They are stalemated, with no apparent diplomacy in progress beyond kind words from Kim Jong-Un to Trump, and Trump’s tweet of thanks.

Having taken the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program – Pompeo presented Iran with a list of 12 demands on changing its behavior. The purpose in imposing this set of disparate demands is not clear. Iran is unlikely to

**“ Trump expects that other countries, including India, will stop buying Iranian oil as a result of US sanctions. Trump has also berated Prime Minister Narendra Modi on their trade practices and mocked his accent ”**

comply with all the demands. Sanctions are scheduled to return in November, which provides a timetable.

Trump expects that other countries, including India, will stop buying Iranian



Source: AFP





**“From an administration whose face is largely elderly white male, diplomacy is acceptable only as bullying swagger. Not only does insistence on that characteristic marginalize the women working in the State Department, but arrogance is seldom appropriate to diplomacy”**

oil as a result of US sanctions. Trump has also berated Prime Minister Narendra Modi on their trade practices and mocked his accent. He has unilaterally ended aid to Palestinians and ordered their diplomatic mission out of Washington.

Michael Green, an Asia advisor to President George W. Bush, summarized the approach on trade for the New York Times, “the White House approach to every country now is that we want you to cave on these random issues we have chosen, which are prioritized by nothing more than presidential whim. And you have to visibly lose on them. There are no win-wins.”

But the approach goes beyond trade as can be seen in the demands to Iran and North Korea. America First seems to mean breaking earlier agreements and imposing unilateral demands. There are no explicit statements of what happens if those demands are not met, and, in the case of North Korea, the demands have been fading as North Korea ignores them.

So bluster and swagger are a big part of America First.

It is no accident that the examples of swagger in Pompeo’s Instagram account are men. The word means a kind of walk with extreme confidence, even arrogance. There are a “Premier Modern Men’s Luxury Lifestyle Magazine” and a men’s deodorant called “Swagger.”

From an administration whose face is largely elderly white male, diplomacy is acceptable only as bullying swagger. Not only does insistence on that characteristic marginalize the women working in the State Department, but arrogance is seldom appropriate to diplomacy. Dignity and confidence are the diplomatic qualities that come closest.

It is hard to imagine a foreign policy situation in which swagger will improve things. And, Secretary Pompeo, here is what Shakespeare said about swagger in *Henry IV Part 2*, Act II, Scene IV:

*let him not come here: no, by my faith; I must live among my neighbours; I’ll no swaggerers: I am in good name and fame with the very best: shut the door; there comes no swaggerers here: I have not lived all this while, to have swaggering now: shut the door, I pray you.*

**Cheryl Rofer** is a chemist, retired from Los Alamos National Laboratory after 35 years of service



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# HYBRID WARFARE SHIELDING STRATAGEM



Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Global politics is fluid and dynamic. Nations are combating identical and contrasting traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Security analysts are calling a mix of these challenges as Hybrid Warfare. Clausewitz said, “every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The changing characteristics of warfare or aggression certainly require a change in the prevalent national security approaches. Therefore, conceptualization and contextualization of hybrid warfare are imperative for avoiding doctrinal lags. Though, every nation has to chalk out strategies to counter hybrid warfare according to its own peculiar national security challenges, yet hybrid warfare is a difficult concept to grasp.

Hybrid warfare is a new entrant in the lexicon of warfare. It is a western terminology, which popularized after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. Russian analysts referred to it Gerasimov Doctrine or new generation warfare. Chinese called it an unrestrained war. Nowadays, security analysts have employed a plethora of terminologies such as asymmetrical, unconventional, non-linear, gray zone conflict, competition short of conflict, active measures, and new generation warfare to depict the range of current conflicts. Frank

G. Hoffman argues, “the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical with the psychological, kinetic with non-kinetic and combatants with noncombatants. We also see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, states and non-state actors by the capabilities they are armed with.” This converging mode of battles is termed as Hybrid Warfare.

Hybrid warfare broadens the idea of conflict to include various elements of national power to impose aggressor’s will on its opponent(s) through integrated adaptive and asymmetric synchronized destructive effects on them in a multidimensional space and in various spheres of life. In it the primary focus is “taking control of society, influencing the mindsets of people and manipulating people who are responsible for making important decisions in a state.” The foe manipulates core values, motivational factors, cultural biases, ethnic dissimilarities, sectarian differences to spoil the strategic, communicational and critical infrastructure of a country.

Hybrid warfare is an effective tool to provoke asymmetrical warfare in a hostile country. Admittedly, asymmetric warfare strategy is the choice of a weaker actor and thereby logically weaker nations or actors adopt

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**“ The foe manipulates core values, motivational factors, cultural biases, ethnic dissimilarities, sectarian differences to spoil the strategic, communicational and critical infrastructure of a country ”**


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hybrid warfare strategies to avoid attribution and retribution. Militarily superior states are employing hybrid warfare strategies against their weaker opponents since total war as an instrument of state policy is becoming obsolete and less relevant. Resultantly, the probability of full-scale conventional war, especially between nuclear states is also gradually receding as an option for settling disputes.



Source: AFP





**“ Islamabad is cognizant of this form of threat and is struggling to thwart risks emanating from hybrid warfare. However, there can never be sufficient countermeasures to successfully deal with this form of warfare ”**

Through hybrid warfare, one battlefield is created employing a combination of tactics and fusion of war forms simultaneously for example traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive social behavior in addition to multiple other forms.

Technologically advanced nations are in an advantageous position in the realm of hybrid warfare. They can exploit non-attributable means like cyber, information warfare, surprise, deception, extensive use of proxy and Special Forces. In addition, they can use political sabotage, economic pressure, intelligence operations and special operations coupled with posturing of conventional forces if need be to exploit a wide range of options for a favorable outcome of the conflict.

Pakistan is poised to become the world's top hybrid warfare battleground due to its pivotal role in China's Belt Road Initiative. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and emergence of Gwadar seaport frustrates its adversaries. The opponents of Pakistan are hatching conspiracies and operating below the threshold of conventional warfare, through a blend of military and paramilitary tools using radicalized militants and ethnic separatists, cyber tools, and information operations as proxies to coerce, destabilize and shape its policies to their advantage.

Islamabad is cognizant of this form of threat and is struggling to thwart risks emanating from hybrid warfare. However, there can never be sufficient countermeasures to successfully deal with this form of warfare.

In this uncertain and dynamic world, Pakistan's ability to protect its core values would arise from its competence to defend its integrity and interests against present and future threats. Though hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, offset warfare, non-linear warfare, and cyber warfare, yet in a crisis it is not only the armed forces that have to respond in a unified manner but the entire nation, government and all its organs, media and the people who must respond in an integrated fashion. For galvanizing the non-military sections of the society, it seems appropriate to establish the Hybrid Warfare Stratagem Center (HWSC). It will assist in building up the capability to enable Pakistani policymakers to better understand the hybrid threat phenomenon, develop metrics to get a grip on events, systematically address vulnerabilities, and contemplate how hybrid threats might develop in the future.

Defensive apparatus against the hybrid warfare onslaught ought to include both kinetic and non-kinetic fences. The non-

kinetic defensive mechanism must be based on the humane and people-centric approach. It upholds the laws of the land and ensures Human Rights. Nonetheless, in unavoidable contingencies, law enforcement agencies can use minimum kinetic means without causing any collateral damage. Without any hold, law enforcement agencies use overwhelming force against foreign and hardcore terrorists.

Against a highly sophisticated, hybrid warfare strategy perpetrated against the Pakistani state and society, national security policymakers need to chalk out a comprehensive counter-strategy. This comprehensive counter-strategy should include private sector businesses, all government agencies, the military and academia to confront hybrid warfare unleashed against Pakistan.

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# RATIONALIZING PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR A SEA-BASED DETERRENT FORCE



**“ In a nuclear dyad, deterrence is stable where neither side has an incentive for a decapitating first strike. This requires the nuclear deterrent forces to be survivable and possibly able to evade a first or preemptive strike ”**



**Saima Aman Sial**

On 9th January, 2017, Pakistan test fired a sea-variant of Babur cruise missile, with a range of 450 km, from an underwater movable platform. The ISPR Press release stated in this regard that, “the successful attainment of a second strike capability by Pakistan represents a major scientific milestone; it is manifestation of the strategy of measured response to nuclear strategies and postures being adopted in

Pakistan's neighbourhood.” One might ask whether the development of an under-sea nuclear capability by Pakistan is a reaction to India's nuclearization of the Indian Ocean or a standalone development? What are Pakistan's motivations that have led to this development?

With the rationale for the development of its nuclear weapons mainly driven by security, important tenets of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine suggest the same. Pakistan's nuclear deterrence has clearly been established against India. Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) is considered

to be the guiding nuclear policy. However, the credibility demanded that nuclear deterrence not be conceptualized in a vacuum but made relative to the technological advancements and developments in the regional strategic environment.

Pakistan's CMD did not initially entail development of a nuclear triad, as was reflected by Pakistan's response to India's





**“ A nuclear submarine armed with ballistic missile (SSBN) is an ideal platform for featuring an assured second strike force and the operational deployment of the platform requires at least 3-5 submarines ”**

draft nuclear doctrine of 1999. However, as the Cold War nuclear competition showed, a nuclear dyad is stable only when both sides have capabilities that are survivable. Fear of pre-emption is highly destabilizing for deterrence. Therefore, after India's nuclearization of the Indian Ocean exhibited by the launch of a nuclear submarine INS Arihant (SSBN) in 2009, Pakistan seriously started considering developing a sea-based nuclear capability, as manifested in the country's decision of establishing the headquarters of the Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC) in May 2012.

The rationale for Pakistan's development of a credible second strike capability is multi-causal. Primarily, it is driven by the logic of a stable deterrence equation between two nuclear-armed adversaries. In a nuclear dyad, deterrence is stable

where neither side has an incentive for a decapitating first strike. This requires the nuclear deterrent forces to be survivable and possibly able to evade a first or preemptive strike. However, in South Asia, owing to India's development of an assured second strike capability alongside advancements in Ballistic Missile Defense system (BMD), the fear of decapitation of Pakistan's nuclear forces becomes too real. The BMD gives psychological superiority to the possessor to carry out a decapitating first strike and take out the residual incoming nuclear weapons of its adversary through the BMD shield. The adversary then has two options. First, to increase the number of its nuclear missiles/platforms to evade decapitation or second, to go to sea to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces. Clearly for Pakistan, India's attempts at BMD acquisition and augmentation of its second strike capability

have been a motivation for development of its own undersea nuclear deterrent. The ISPR statement reflects this much, “the missile features terrain hugging and sea skimming flight capabilities to evade hostile radars and air defences, in addition to certain stealth technologies, in an emerging regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment.”

Pakistan has to deal with the curse of geography as well. Lack of strategic depth has complicated the challenge of survivability of Pakistan's nuclear forces. Pakistan has been using mobility and concealment as means to retain the survivability of its land-based nuclear arsenal. The mountainous terrain provides a natural survivability means (much like the hardened silos) in this regard. There is an underground tunneled rail system through which the missiles are moved on

**“ Considering that abundance of Pakistan's trade is carried through sea (more than 96 percent), any blockade of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) would lead to a nuclear precipice for Pakistan. The economic threshold and fear of a possible blockade therefore demands acquisition of capabilities that strengthen Pakistan Navy's (PN) sea denial strategy ”**

mobile launchers. However, two decades since nuclearization, advancements in the Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) capabilities are increasingly becoming a challenge for the survivability of Pakistan's land-based mobile assets. India is currently upgrading its indigenous ISR capabilities by acquisition of drone technology in collaboration with other international partners. India's agreement with the United States for sharing information on 'vital security aspects' in the realm of space as well as sharing of satellite data for 'maritime domain awareness' demonstrates the shifting landscape in this regard. In this emerging scenario, Pakistan's development of a sea-based second strike capability can be attributed to strengthening the credibility and survivability of its nuclear force.

In Pakistan's nuclear use doctrine, the economic threshold features as one of the thresholds for possible use of nuclear weapons. Considering that bulk of Pakistan's trade is carried through sea (more than 96 percent), any blockade of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) would lead to a nuclear precipice for Pakistan. The economic threshold and fear of a possible blockade therefore demands acquisition of capabilities that strengthen Pakistan Navy's (PN) sea denial strategy.

Owing to its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis a bigger naval force and a checkered history of wars, Pakistan's naval strategic thought accords a lot of importance to platforms that aid its overall naval strategy of offensive defense. A submarine armed with cruise missiles fits well with that strategy. It allows Pakistan Navy to retain leverage on both conventional and nuclear domains.

The most likely platform for Pakistan's Babur-III cruise missile would be the recent Agosta 90-B submarines, equipped with the air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems that help them remain submerged under water for longer periods. Being diesel-electric submarines they also have an advantage of being quieter than the nuclear submarines. Agostas will most likely serve to be Pakistan's version of a survivable second strike force.

A nuclear submarine armed with ballistic missile (SSBN) is an ideal platform for featuring an assured second strike force and the operational deployment of the platform requires at least 3-5 submarines. However, the SSBNs are a costly undertaking and Pakistan's Agosta's equipped with AIP serves the purpose of a survivable deterrent force just so credibly, without being too expensive a platform. Operationalization of a nuclear deterrent force at sea would have implications for Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, force posture and command & control that would require serious deliberations within the strategic decision-making community.

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# PAKISTAN AT THE UNGA INVOKING MULTILATERALISM FOR ITS SECURITY AND STABILITY



Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

Every year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) becomes a gala of international diplomacy in which all states vociferously tell allies, adversaries and the entire international community about their worldview, approaches to problems and vision for the future. Pakistan went into the 73<sup>rd</sup> session of the UNGA led by its new Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi. Islamabad's top diplomat delved on all the glaring foreign-policy related issues faced by Pakistan. Understandably, rivalry with India and the simmering Kashmir conflict were at the heart of Qureshi's address. However, both these challenges, amongst others, were seen through the lens of regional stability and the ability of world bodies to resolve conflicts. The tone and tenor of Pakistan's statement accentuated the most conspicuous threats to peace in Pakistan and South Asia, signaling that meaningful efforts at the multilateral level are necessary to resolve issues.

At the outset, Qureshi outlined the guiding principles of the country's foreign policy. Pakistan, he said, would engage with its neighborhood and the world based on equality and respect while remaining committed to safeguarding its sovereignty. Clearly, spelling out sovereignty, national interest and respect, means that these issues will be right up on the agenda of the new government. The issue of sovereignty was raked up once again when Qureshi discussed the role that India has played in sabotaging peace efforts. While lamenting India's reticence to talk with Pakistan despite peace offers by the newly-elected Prime Minister, Imran Khan, Qureshi warned India of reprisals if it entertained thoughts of a limited war. Given that third parties have time and again raised eyebrows about escalation dynamics in peace times, and intervened during crises, Pakistan's warning was not just meant for Indian consumption but directed at influential third parties. Kashmir is often

**“ While the Cold Start Doctrine(CSD) is India's own army-centric concept, the Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) and the fast-evolving Indo-US defense ties mean that third parties impact strategic stability in peace times and crisis stability during crises. Thus, efforts to redress instability are incomplete without the cooperation of third parties ”**

deemed as a nuclear flashpoint between the two countries. Pakistan used this to good effect. While highlighting the centrality of the Kashmir dispute in festering regional instability, Qureshi implored the UN to help bring an amicable end to the issue, which also happens to be on the agenda of the Security Council. After emphasizing as to why the non-resolution of the protracted conflict puts the region at great risk, Pakistan called upon the UN to institute a Commission of Inquiry and fix responsibility of gross human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir that were brought to the fore by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Though nuclearization of the South Asian theatre has bolstered the bilateral deterrence equation between India and Pakistan, strategic stability is under constant threat. Qureshi pointed out that strategic stability is under pressure due to the induction of destabilizing weapons and the assimilation of incendiary doctrines. While the Cold Start Doctrine(CSD) is India's own army-centric concept, the Ballistic Missile Defense(BMD) and the fast-evolving Indo-US defense ties mean that third parties impact strategic stability in peace times and crisis stability during crises. Thus, efforts to redress instability are incomplete without the cooperation of third parties.

Qureshi did not directly address the history of Pak-US relations and how Islamabad has been left in a lurch. Instead, he weaved a link between stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad repeated its long-held view that the Afghan quagmire cannot be solved by military means, something that was but a signal to the most powerful third party – the US. This assertion becomes all the more real when one sees that Washington has been non-committal to talking with the Taliban.

Pakistan tried to evoke third parties' consideration by first shedding light on its successful counterterrorism endeavors over the past decade and a half and then identifying the role India has played in propping up violence inside Pakistan. The possible reason behind going the extra mile in ascribing terrorism to India could be to impress upon the international community





that this may well become a major cause of crisis in the future.

Pakistan also tried to allay fears about China's Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), of which it is an integral part by virtue of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC). Terming CPEC as an antidote to terrorism, Pakistan said that the project will benefit one and all. This was yet another signal to detractors not to see BRI as a threat but as an opportunity. One must be reminded that both India and the US have taken exceptions to the project.

Pakistan has invariably taken exceptions to attempts aimed at giving its arch-rival an edge in multinational groupings like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The concern was addressed by Qureshi in his address wherein he called upon global powers to refrain from bending rules and adopt a rule-based approach.

**“ The possible reason behind going the extra mile in ascribing terrorism to India could be to impress upon the international community that this may well become a major cause of crisis in the future ”**

Pakistan's thrust at the UNGA was targeted at broaching with the international community

the need for playing a greater role in regional peace. By assiduously portraying India's recalcitrance to give peace a chance, Pakistan shifted the burden on India and other players. The drift of Pakistan's enunciations in the UN was simple: global and regional players have vitiated the security profile of the region and hence the very players must help lower temperatures and put the region on the path of peace. In order to lend its diplomatic voice more strength, Pakistan has to follow up its robust campaign at the UNGA by striving to increase its clout in the region and beyond, ideally by mustering internal strength.

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# THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY REALITY OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

## WHERE THE MONEY FLOWS, THE STORY GOES!



**Zeeshan Shahid Khan**

Pakistan has always been on the forefront of providing support to the international community in maintaining peace. Apart from being one of the very few countries in the world with an active, real and many times larger enemy to concentrate its defensive efforts against, namely India, Pakistan has always contributed to international peacekeeping efforts around the globe in an un-paralleled manner. It was one of the foremost countries to provide resources for UN Mission in Congo in 1960 while still in the embryonic phase of its own development having limited trained human resource capacity and equipment. This clearly depicts Pakistan's stance toward international peace keeping. It has since continued to provide military, police, and civil administrative staff to UN missions in over 41 countries with a total participation of over one hundred and fifty thousand personnel. Pakistan continues to remain in the top two providers of Peace Support Staff in international peacekeeping operations for the past many years. Moreover, Pakistani forces have generally remained



highly praised by the UN leadership as well as the countries where deployed due to their high standards of moral conduct and humanitarian support. Whether it be Somalia or Sierra Leone or Sudan, Pakistani contingents have been highly praised and deeply loved by the local communities and UN leadership alike.

Officially, Pakistan has provided support to UN in the form of Peace Keeping Forces, commonly known as Contingents (Forces), Military Observers (MILOBs) and Civil Police (CIVPOL). The contingents further provide military forces and equipment for peace keeping, engineer support for rebuilding roads and infrastructure, hospitals for health care and civil police for training or operating in collaboration with local

**“ The love of Sierra Leonean people for Pakistani Forces was visible during the departure of Pakistani Forces. The roads for five miles leading up to the exit point were lined by men, women and children singing the Pakistani national anthem with tears rolling down their faces. This is a testament of Pakistan's unparalleled support to post conflict African nations and those under turmoil ”**



government. Military Observers may be tasked to carry out numerous activities but always without weapons which puts them at high risk. These tasks may vary depending on the mandate and mission but may include assessments of key elements of unrest, monitoring and reporting government functioning, monitoring UN Forces and their output, illegal activities including Diamond Mining, human trafficking etc.

Pakistan has provided assistance to UN Peace support operations in many African countries including Sierra Leone over the past 50 years where one of the largest contingents was deployed. The assistance provided has been in numerous forms while interacting as mediators between the parties in conflict and in support of a democratic governance structure, with aim of strengthening the system and removing the prime causes of the conflict due to which it was initiated.

These measures include electoral support based on power sharing, socio-economic development, confidence building measures while enforcing law and order. Use of force against any party in the conflict has always been kept as the last resort if all else fails and has mostly been used to ensure that law and order prevailed post conflict.

In Sierra Leone, however, even after the involvement of UN for over 4 years, the key issues triggering the civil war were not close to having been resolved. Sierra Leone being a hub of illegal diamond trade and smuggling in the world remained the poorest among the western African nations. Diamonds were in such abundance that one could just use a trowel to dig a foot deep and find one. With so much diamond, people rarely bothered about Gold, which could easily be panned from any of the streams. Natural resources of precious metals such

as Titanium etc were abundant. However, it was diamond which was the key valuable object. The presence of diamonds attracted many armed groups to take over mining areas. As per one estimate, about 89% of diamonds were smuggled out with or without involvement of government officials. The powerful political and bureaucratic elite





# Pakistan's Contribution To UN Peacekeeping






illegally traded another 10%, while only 1% of its actual worth trickled down to the public. The common man only ate broken rice with watery Kassawa once a day. Hunger and disease such as Lassa virus and Malaria was rampant. Anything that could move except a car and anything that could fly except a plane had been eaten during the war and afterwards. There were hardly any animals left even in the dense afforested areas. There were reports of cannibalism and magic rituals. Fathers would willingly trade their teenage daughters for food. Women would willingly become sex slaves for food. And this was being done under the watchful eyes of the rich elite as well as foreigners who were from NGOs and UN alike. Women were being bought and sold in cities and towns. Female genital mutilation was common and was even celebrated in various communities by throwing village parties. Tribal sentencing for committed crimes in ruthless manner was a common thing. And all this was happening after the war had ended.

During the war, human debauchery had crossed all known limits of ruthlessness. While various rebel groups and sub groups took over village after village, strong young boys were taken as child soldiers and trained to be merciless. They were taught that respect is only gained through the barrel of the automatic weapon they carried. The left over children were lined up in the village center and had at least one of their limbs chopped off by a machete leaving them screaming and passing out in pain, only to wake up to live the rest of their lives with one of two arms or legs. Imagine a whole generation in a country left with one arm or leg! Women were raped and then savagely tortured with their bellies cut open and their unborn children ripped out of their wombs. These were the gruesome realities through which the people of Sierra Leone had survived.

Yet, while UN forces and NGOs created a semi peaceful status in the country, only such conditions persisted that maintained sufficient peace for making businesses for other powers shine. The root cause of the conflict i.e corruption leading to extreme poverty was not being addressed in a methodical manner and in most cases was



neglected totally. It was repeatedly reported in ops and intelligence reports by MILOBs that unless the key issues are resolved, peace will not be long lasting. Quite akin to Sudan where conflict restarted once the UN peacekeepers left. However, it was felt that the reports fell on deaf ears. But peace was important to the foreign stakeholders and had to prevail even though the root causes were not being addressed. After all, majority of diamond smuggled out of Sierra Leone through Lebanese businessmen ended up in Antwerp, Belgium for fine cutting after which they made their way to the British markets in London. The contract for mining titanium used for construction of Satellites and space vehicles was awarded by Sierra Leone government to a US company for merely US \$5 (or \$35) per year. Even the UN observers were not permitted to enter the area. The sign said, "Trespassers will be shot."

Under the umbrella of humanitarian support, natural resources were being plundered by powerful nations. The seas were being illegally harvested of seafood by ships from Northern Europe to China. Such was the epic proportions of plundering and looting under the nose of the UN. The Indian UN forces had been kicked out for smuggling diamonds which was carried by officers of the Indian UN forces and not through Indian companies unlike the powers of the evolved developed world. Similar situation persisted in Somalia in the 90s when US Military Engineers company was mining uranium and loading a ship per week to carry it away. In Congo and Central African Republic, Diamond and precious metals were being looted. The leadership of the UN mission across Africa clearly echoed the capitalist powers hitherto, silently authorized for plundering the riches of Africa

**“ When the business interests of the pen holders coincide with the hegemonic designs of the state committing atrocities, organizations responsible for Peace seldom come into play ”**

under a legal business framework while UN provided security. Sierra Leone was under the leadership of the British, Liberia under the US and Côte d’Ivoire under the French. The best Chocolate still comes from Côte d’Ivoire and delightfully savored in France. Where the Money flows, the story goes!

Notwithstanding the capitalistic interests of greater powers, forces provided by developing and third world countries in the UN such as Pakistan continue to do their job in the finest manner and in most cases even above the mandate oblivious to the greater picture. Pakistani Military Engineers continue to rebuild roads and infrastructure often beyond the approved budgets on self generated funds. The units have rebuilt schools and other development projects without additional budgetary approvals. Pakistani military units as well as individuals even provide cooked food from their own rations to the local population. Officers often take personal responsibility of local village children for their educational expenditures including uniforms, books and food. Some of them even spend their evenings in teaching the children. All of this has been personally observed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Congo. By peacefully disarming and integrating over 10,000 Sierra Leonean rebels in to society as productive individuals, Pakistan set an example of true dedication to the cause of peace and social stability in the region. The love of Sierra Leonean people



for Pakistani Forces was visible during the departure of Pakistani Forces. The roads for five miles leading up to the exit point were lined by men, women and children singing the Pakistani national anthem with tears rolling down their faces. This is a testament of Pakistan’s unparalleled support to post conflict African nations and those under turmoil.

Conflicts continue to grip numerous countries across the world from the Middle East to Asia. However, places like Kashmir and Myanmar continue to be completely ignored. Apparently, the signing pen only moves over the mandate when there is something to be gained by those holding

it. When the business interests of the pen holders coincide with the hegemonic designs of the state committing atrocities, organizations responsible for Peace seldom come into play. And hence, the seeds for greater conflicts in future engulfing whole nations slowly germinate.

**Zeeshan Shahid Khan** was United Nations Military Observer in Sierra Leone from 2003 to 2004.

*The pictures used in this article have been taken from Pakistan Army Spirit of Peace Report and some pictures are from author’s personal collection.*





# IS PAKISTAN READY FOR THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP?



Sameer Ali Khan

The discussions over extension of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership to non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) tend to overly focus on differing perspectives on the criteria. This piece discusses the non-proliferation arrangements that a state has in place to qualify for the group's membership. In 2016, India and Pakistan – two of the non-NPT NWSs – applied for group's membership with each citing their own credentials. While India is generally presented as a country that has already completed some groundwork for NSG's full membership; it is important to see where Pakistan stands in those domains.

It needs to be seen what Pakistan has done to ensure non-proliferation on its part rather than what has happened in the past. While some tend to argue that owing to the A Q Khan network's proliferation activities, Pakistan does not qualify for the group's membership. However, Pakistan's explanation that it has done enough to ensure that such an episode does not recur is equally plausible and is backed by its legislations and institutionalization of export controls. On the other hand, it is also rightly argued that NSG is considering membership of India that provided the very basis of its

formation after India diverted safeguarded fuel for its first nuclear device and tested it in 1974. If it was possible to overlook the Indian record while extending the waiver and considering prospective membership, it should be easier to overlook Pakistan's episode that has been duly rectified.

Following the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S., India signed an Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The agreement somewhat extended the facility specific safeguards into an umbrella agreement that reduced the administrative hassles as India brings more reactors under the IAEA safeguards (primarily the imported reactors). However, experts have found the agreement lacking and argue that India 'can' technically exploit the loopholes to further its military program. On the Pakistani side, there are practically two sides of the nuclear program i.e. the civilian side and the military side. There is no third category as 'unsafeguarded civilian reactors.' There is not as much need for a clearly laid out separation plan in Pakistani case as there was in the Indian case. This is primarily because Pakistan's entire civilian nuclear program is under the IAEA safeguards. Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear fuel

**“ NSG is considering membership of India that provided the very basis of its formation after India diverted safeguarded fuel for its first nuclear device and tested it in 1974. If it was possible to overlook the Indian record while extending the waiver and considering prospective membership, it should be easier to overlook Pakistan's episode that has been duly rectified ”**



**“ There is no third category as ‘unsafeguarded civilian reactors.’ There is not as much need for a clearly laid out separation plan in Pakistani case as there was in the Indian case. This is primarily because Pakistan’s entire civilian nuclear program is under the IAEA safeguards. Pakistan’s unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle is only relevant in the civilian side when it comes to fuelling the KANUPP (the first nuclear power plant in Pakistan that went operational in 1972) ”**

cycle is only relevant in the civilian side when it comes to fuelling the KANUPP (the first nuclear power plant in Pakistan that went operational in 1972). Pakistan has to fuel this plant from indigenous nuclear fuel since the supply of fuel was curtailed following the Indian nuclear test in 1974. Nonetheless, the facility remains under the IAEA safeguards as does the spent fuel. With the KANUPP likely to shutdown in 2019, Pakistan’s unsafeguarded fuel cycle will have no role in the civilian side and hence there could be an automatic separation of civilian and military fuel cycle in Pakistan.

Other than separation of civilian and military nuclear programs, another important factor that is cited as a pre-requisite for NSG’s membership is signing of an AP with the IAEA. NWSs outside the NPT would negotiate and sign AP similar to those between the IAEA and the NPT member NWSs. The precedence here is that of India. In case of Pakistan – just like India – a prospective AP would ensure that a single agreement governs the safeguards over Pakistan’s entire civilian nuclear program and facilitate the access of IAEA inspectors to associated facilities in Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, negotiating and settling on an AP should not be a problem since Pakistan’s nuclear program (civilian and military) is not as complex as India’s. In India’s case the third category of civilian and yet unsafeguarded facilities create the

problems which still need rectification. As long as a facility remains outside the IAEA safeguards, there is no plausible mechanism to ensure that it is not contributing towards the military program and the facility has to essentially be regarded as a military facility.

Lastly, there was this understanding that India would not resume testing of nuclear weapons in return for the civilian nuclear cooperation agreements and the NSG waiver. However, there are no legal instruments that oblige India in this regard. The mere threat here is that the supplier states will abandon their cooperation agreements with India. While India has signed over a dozen civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with the NSG member states, only the U.S., Japan and Australia have stated that Indian resumption of nuclear testing would violate the agreements. It is unknown whether other supplier states have put similar conditions as those agreements remain shrouded in secrecy. In a situation where there are no legally binding instruments obliging India to refrain from testing and several other suppliers (which can potentially continue to supply nuclear materials and technology to India even if it resumes nuclear testing), India remains unrestrained on the issue of nuclear testing. On the other hand, Pakistani moratorium on nuclear testing is likely to continue being governed by Indian moratorium as per its stated policy.

Pakistan can ill afford to resume nuclear testing as long as India does not. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community devises a mechanism to legally oblige the two states to enter into a legal arrangement that restricts their option of nuclear testing. Simultaneous entry in to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be a top consideration for NSG’s membership. Another possibility could be a bilateral legally binding agreement between the two states that forecloses the possibility of nuclear testing in the region.

On the count of these three aspects of civil military separation, additional protocol and nuclear testing, Pakistan appears to be well prepared to enter into the NSG and contribute positively toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime at large. However, Pakistani stance on nuclear testing is likely to be affected by Indian position on the subject. Therefore, it would be logical to demand similar obligations from either side when it comes to joining the NSG. In Pakistani case, it would be ostensibly easier to iron out the details given the simpler nature of Pakistani nuclear program.

*Sameer Ali Khan is a currently a visiting fellow at Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad.*

# “一路”法治合

## THE BELT AND ROAD

2018年7月2-3日 中国·北京 2-3 J



## FROM BILATERAL TO MULTILATERAL

# CPEC

## AS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY



Kishwer Munir

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an inclusive project with an estimated value of \$65 billion and has a great potential of integrating the regions i.e. Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and Africa through the creation of economic and strategic environment. The corridor is set to accelerate the commercial and economic activities in the region and

create new opportunities for regional development. The model of economic corridors comes from transport corridor i.e. the ways to connect one economic center with the other. Transport corridors can integrate the economies of one region with the other but it requires a great deal of energy and improved infrastructure to develop as economic corridor.



**“ Pakistan’s geographical location, if used, can benefit not only Pakistan but all the countries who will be investing in CPEC. Iran, Afghanistan and India are the natural beneficiaries of the project and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Central Asian states and Russia can join the project ”**

investment, which is expected from Saudi Arabia and China since both share close strategic relations with Pakistan. It is in the best interest of Pakistan to offer new investment opportunity to all those who wish to join. The states that can become part of CPEC include Afghanistan, Iran, Singapore, and Japan.

Saudi Arabia has been asked to join CPEC formally by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan, in his first visit to Saudi Arabia last month to invest heavily in the bilateral infrastructure and industrial development project. The visit was multi-faceted that affords a better understanding of why Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Bajwa visited China at the same time. Pakistan is grappling with an economic crisis and looking for an increase in its foreign-exchange reserves aimed at exploring new economic investment opportunities to avoid going to the IMF. In the past, Saudi Arabia has financially bailed-out Pakistan during economic crises. It had loaned Pakistan \$1.5 billion in 2014 to strengthen its Rupee currency after Pakistan obtained its IMF bailout package.

### **Prospects and Challenges of Saudi Arabia’s Inclusion in CPEC**

With the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in CPEC, the investment of \$10 billion is expected in the shape of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Along with FDI, Pakistan can also get deferred payment on oil which can ease the burden on Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. KSA can invest in special economic zones which will create jobs for the locals and duty free structure will benefit investors. Pakistan can also get parking money from Saudi Arabia. With bilateral and multilateral funding assistance from Saudi Arabia, China and development banks, Pakistan can improve infrastructure and enhanced connectivity with the region.

With the opening of CPEC, new opportunities for other countries to invest have arisen. Iran is facing pressure from the United States which can push it towards China for seeking new opportunities in providing gas and oil routes to China. Turkey is another key economic entity in the region at the center of Eurasia neighboring Syria and Iran. The

physical connectivity offers an opportunity to enhance trade between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and it is a natural corridor for Pakistan to get access to Turkey via Iran. The CPEC can be utilized to strengthen socio-economic development of the trio that did not materialize under a previous regional cooperation, signed by the three countries in 1964. One of the obstacles in realizing this dream is that both Turkey and Iran had opposite interests in Syria.

The Saudi investment in Gwadar will further augment its value in comparison to Iran’s Chahbahar port. It will give KSA access to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea which will help it in accessing Central Asian markets. Saudi Arabia has stakes in Central Asian States and hence may show eagerness in making investments in Pakistan.

### **Challenges**

There are two different views on Riyadh’s inclusion in CPEC and its implication on Pakistan. First, Pakistan’s offer to Saudi Arabia to join CPEC will put question marks on its neutrality in the Middle East and nature of its relations with Iran. Riyadh and UAE’s investment in Gwadar and various infrastructures will increase their stakes in Pakistan. Second, if Iran joins CPEC or invests in gas sector in Balochistan, its stakes in the country will increase. The induction of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in CPEC will put the interests of both countries at one

**“ The induction of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in CPEC will put the interests of both countries at one place. This will provide Pakistan with the leverage to mediate between the two rivals in the Middle East ”**



place. This will provide Pakistan with the leverage to mediate between the two rivals in the Middle East.

Pakistan’s assurances to Saudi Arabia that it will provide security and strategic support to the country wherever needed, have multiple repercussions. The previous government of Nawaz Sharif, despite its family relations with Saudi Arabia, resisted KSA’s demand to deploy Pakistani troops in Yemen. The new government may concede to Saudi Arabia in future by giving it the space to invest in Gwadar. Prime Minister Imran Khan reiterated that Pakistan will always stand with Saudi Arabia in difficult times and would not let any other country attack it. However in the same vein, Khan has asserted the importance of resolving all conflicts in the Muslim world through dialogue. Khan expressed this view in an interview with Saudi Gazette when he was asked about attacks by Houthi militia on Saudi territory. However, Saudi Arabia’s inclusion in CPEC will test Islamabad’s policy over Yemen and other Middle Eastern conflicts.

### **Iran, India and Afghanistan: Natural Beneficiaries of the CPEC**

Pakistan is located on the crossroads of the ancient land route of India to Turkey via Iran. India can expect economic benefits from this flagship project of BRI by opening up new

channels of communication through Pakistan to reach out to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asian states. However, its historic rivalry with Pakistan might not allow it to realize these economic benefits with an open mind. Both states house a billion plus people out of which millions are living under the poverty line. Both states should be responsive to the idea of dialogue. CPEC can be bolstered by extending it to India through subsidiary links from Punjab which can be useful in turning the mutual security threat suspicion to benefit. On the other side, Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project can fulfill the energy needs of India by streamlining it into CPEC.

Afghanistan has immense geo-strategic importance in the calculus of China and Pakistan as it provides direct access to Central Asian states and then Russia. But realization of the economic opportunities generated by CPEC depends on peace and stability in Afghanistan. Instability in Afghanistan will not only affect Pakistan but Iran, Russia and China also. Pakistan and Afghanistan in their recent engagement showed their resolve to end cross-border terrorism and militancy.

CPEC is a bilateral project in which induction of any other country has to have consensus of both countries. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia in CPEC holds its risks and opportunities

**“ The physical connectivity offers an opportunity to enhance trade between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and it is a natural corridor for Pakistan to get access to Turkey via Iran ”**

but China will be the beneficiary of this as it will open new doors for it in the Middle East and offer more energy resources to achieve its grand strategic plan of transporting oil. For Pakistan, it is important to revisit its foreign policy by breaking from the status quo and encouraging multiple actors in the region to join CPEC to create a win-win scenario for all stakeholders.

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# AGNI-V

## A WEAPON OF INSTABILITY



Tanzeela Khalil

Agni V is India's longest range, 5000 km, solid fuel propelled Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) which has been regularly tested every year since 2012. The only year it was not tested was in 2017. Unfazed by the Indian testing of an ICBM capability, Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation stated, "the lack of U.S. condemnation of India's latest missile test demonstrates that the U.S. is comfortable with the Indian progress in the nuclear and missile fields and appreciates India's need to meet the emerging strategic challenge posed by rising China." It is not a shocker since U.S. sees India as a major global partner and the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership is likely to continue as it serves U.S.' interest of countering China in the region.

The non-testing of Agni V in 2017 was aligned with the Indian bid for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group – an export control

regime regulating the nuclear trade. India's state-friendly media reported that India deliberately exercised 'strategic restraint'. However, India has still not become a member of the NSG and its nuclear modernization is far from achieving any semblance of 'strategic restraint'. It appears that the Indian membership of three out of four export control regimes has emboldened it not to worry about the consequences anymore. This understanding by India is further compounded by its learning from history where it has hardly faced any consequences for its proliferation beginning from its first test in 1974. Several reports suggest that initially India deliberately understated the range of its BrahMos at 290km in order to evade the radars of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – a group regulating exports of missiles to prevent proliferation. Shortly, after its membership of the MTCR in 2016, India tested the same missile with an enhanced range beyond the MTCR's stipulated thresholds of approx. 300-400km in July 2018. This pattern of deceit suggests that one should not trust even the Indian commitment to non-testing

since this restraint is only until it becomes a member of the NSG, the very club which was created in reaction to the Indian nuclear testing in 1974.

On the face of it, India is associated with several multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and continues to express support for universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament. However, there is nothing India has done practically to translate its verbal commitment into words. In fact, the current upward trajectory of the Indian nuclear and missile developments suggests otherwise.

**“Canisterization, MIRVing, shift from liquid to solid fuel missile inventory, ready arsenal and less response time are indicative of modernization in nuclear arsenal augmenting assertive control. Indian inventory of nuclear delivery systems indicates that India has options for use both in counter-force and counter-value settings”**

**“The latest test of Agni-V was conducted by India's Strategic Force Command (SFC) using a canister based launch system on 4 June 2018 which is an indication that the missile is being readied for induction. Canisterization further suggests mating of the warhead and the missile providing a desirable launch time in high state of readiness”**

The latest test of Agni-V was conducted by India's Strategic Force Command (SFC) using a canister based launch system on 4 June 2018 which is an indication that the missile is being readied for induction. Canisterization further suggests mating of the warhead and the missile providing a desirable launch time in high state of readiness. Former Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Chief, Avinash Chander's, statement about his mandate to reduce Indian response time from hours to minutes is achievable now. This is a clear departure from India's earlier known policy of keeping the warheads and missiles in a de-mated form. Some reports suggest that like Brahmos, India is also understating the actual range of Agni-V and that the actual range could well be around or over 8000 km. While the Chinese and the Pakistanis are equally alarmed by Agni-V, Indian ICBM raises concerns at the global level as well since it is capable of hitting targets as far as Australia and Europe.

Canisterization, MIRVing, shift from liquid to solid fuel missile inventory, ready arsenal and less response time are indicative of modernization in nuclear arsenal augmenting

assertive control. Indian inventory of nuclear delivery systems indicates that India has options for use both in counter-force and counter-value settings. While the long-range Agni missiles may be used for counter-value strikes, the short-range missiles like Prithvi, Prahaar, Dhanush and Brahmos can be used for counter-force strikes especially aided by India's increasing I2SR (Intelligence and Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities. All of this represents offensive posturing which is reflective of a visible shift in India's nuclear doctrine. The U.S. and the West are apparently comfortable with these destabilizing strategic developments in South Asia since it serves their purpose to groom India against the rise of China with whatever means available. However, Pakistan cannot take Indian nuclear doctrine on its face value and ignore these visible shifts. It therefore has some compelling choices to make to maintain strategic stability in the region.

*Tanzeela Khalil is currently a Visiting Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Islamabad*







**“ Islamabad can also benefit from KSA's overseas expansion of its economy to seek investment in the CPEC and related development and energy-infrastructure projects ”**

Riyadh is an important strategic partner for Islamabad which has always bailed Pakistan out whenever it has faced economic and political constraints in the past. KSA is not only a strong strategic partner of the United States, it is also the third largest exporter of oil to India. With its Vision-2030, KSA is now heading towards liberalizing its society, culture and diversifying its economy. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 reflects determination “to become a global investment powerhouse”. The vision offers “better opportunities for partnerships with the private sector”. It also seeks to ensure that half of the defense production takes place within the country. These elements of the Vision-2030 create opportunities for Pakistani conglomerates, including mining and construction companies, defense manufacturing sector and other industries to internationalize their production activities in the Kingdom. Pakistan's coastal zone is 990 kilometers long. With the extension of the continental shelf, Pakistan's maritime zone extends to 350 nautical miles from the coastline. Therefore, Pakistan can also attract investments from mining and exploration companies in the Gulf extracting seabed and subsoil resources from its continental shelf.

Another salient feature of the Vision-2030 related to Pakistan is expansion of the Saudi oil-production giant Aramco into a ‘global industrial conglomerate’ encouraging other major companies to expand overseas. KSA also seeks to position its strategic location as

# PAKISTAN'S DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST



Riaz Khokhar

One of the key challenges to Pakistan's foreign policy relates to how it navigates its policy in the volatile Middle East. In this regard, balancing its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran would be thwarted by the bitter rivalry between the two bastions of the Muslim World. Saudi Arabia had offered \$1.5 billion as a “friendly grant” to the former government when Nawaz Sharif became the premier in 2013. Return on that investment is all well known. The question, however, is will KSA's financial inducement of \$1 billion for Imran Khan's new government and its further pledge of \$4 billion by the Islamic Development Bank demand a retune of Pakistan's Mideast diplomacy in favour of Riyadh?



Iran was uncomfortable with Islamabad at deploying its troops in Saudi Arabia and its former Army Chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif leading the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance. Pakistan's current Army Chief, Gen. Qamar Bajwa recently assured Tehran of Islamabad's neutrality in the Mideast rivalries conveying that Pakistani forces would never be used against any other state. However, for Pakistan, the challenge to balance relations with its western neighbor is critical now that the KSA has accepted Pakistan's invitation to invest heavily in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).



**“ Islamabad can seek KSA's political and financial help in reforming its education and madrassah curriculum in line with its National Action Plan and reverse the deep-rooted extremist mindset that still prevails ”**

a connecting hub for the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. Pakistan provides a crucial geoeconomic bridge for Saudi Arabia to expand the economic outreach of Aramco and other major corporations across South and Central Asia.

Islamabad can also benefit from KSA's overseas expansion of its economy to seek investment in the CPEC and related development and energy-infrastructure projects. It is therefore favorable for Pakistan that Saudi Arabia is going to be the third economic partner in the CPEC. Convergence of interests of these countries can bring huge dividends.

Saudi Arabia also seeks liberalization of its society through encouraging a degree of women emancipation, promoting its entertainment industry and above all fostering tolerant paradigm of Islam. Arguably, it was largely the historic Saudi financial support that had radicalized a large segment of Pakistani society in the 80s through proliferation of madrassas. KSA's transformative approach envisions 'a tolerant country with Islam its constitution and moderation its method'. Islamabad can seek KSA's political and financial help in reforming its education and madrassah curriculum in line with its National Action Plan and reverse the deep-rooted extremist mindset that still prevails. Such cooperation would

help reconstruct the society on moderate, tolerant, and liberal principles of Islam.

Another critical element of the Saudi Vision-2030 for Pakistan's interest is that the Kingdom has vowed to issue 'green cards' within five years with a view to offering more rights to foreigners to live and work in KSA. This shows that the Kingdom is seeking to reduce dependence on unskilled workforce which creates many opportunities as well as challenges for the government of Pakistan. Most of the Pakistani manpower presently working in the Middle East, constitutes an unskilled workforce with a very small segment of professional and skilled workers. Islamabad needs to invest in skill development of its exportable human resource. The government needs to increasingly invest in the knowledge economy and produce more professionals and skilled human resource so that they can compete in the international job market. This will not only reduce unemployment from the country but also enlarge the amount of Pakistan's national exchequer by increasing remittances.

The United States supports Saudi Arabia's transformation of the Vision-2030. Islamabad can use the KSA channel to renew its military, economic and cultural ties with Washington.

With respect to India, Pakistan's military and strategic partnership with the Kingdom has arguably kept Indian strategic influence at bay. It may also be true that New Delhi's cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries at the moment is limited to securing its energy routes. India has also leased Duqm port from Oman. The port lies in close proximity to the Chabahar and Gwadar ports. In the context of China's competing ports and naval facilities in the Indian Ocean, Duqm port's strategic implications cannot be disregarded. It is therefore imperative in this context that Islamabad strengthens its maritime diplomacy with the Gulf countries. Pakistan Navy leads the Combined Task Force-151 of multinational naval forces in the Gulf of Aden. This places Pakistan in a leading position to regulate maritime security affairs.

In so far as the Kashmir issue is concerned, it would be challenging for Islamabad to

seek KSA's support. KSA not only enjoys strategic relations with the United States, it is also quite comfortable with Israel and India's security concerns. In this context, Pakistan's Mideast diplomacy must ensure that the implacable antagonism of the Mideast rivals, their 'competing ideologies, geostrategic designs and economic interests' in the region do not overshadow its own national interest and security policy objectives. Though Tehran does not offer the magnitude of economic and strategic capital that Riyadh offers to Islamabad, it is an important friend to Pakistan that shares similar security and economic challenges in the region.

It is commendable on part of Premier Imran Khan and the Army Chief, General Bajwa, that they are balancing Islamabad's relations with a range of Mideast adversaries. Yet, with the growing economic, cultural and strategic ties with KSA and renewed US sanctions on Iran, considerable challenges for Pakistan's economic and security relations with Iran are likely to surface.

Iran and Pakistan need to grapple with the internal security challenges in Sistan and Balochistan provinces and address other border security concerns. Cross-border terrorism and sectarian rifts are common issues of serious concern. Last but not the least, both the countries need to also work seriously towards increasing their reciprocal investments in CPEC and Chabahar projects.

Thus, Pakistan must find balance between its relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to effectively deal with its already existing security and economic challenges. It is only through diplomatic adroitness and pragmatism of the leadership can these challenges be tackled.

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# STRATEGIC IN AFGHANISTAN



Jaweria Waheed

Seventeen years of war in Afghanistan have resulted in a strategic stalemate plagued with a stalled peace process. Afghanistan is strategically important and is a fulcrum of power in the South Asian political landscape. Afghanistan has become a theatre of proxy war in which the United States, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and India are important players. The stalemate is because of a fixed power calculation which supports the zero sum game in Afghanistan in which little has been achieved in attaining long term peace. This impasse represents the

prisoner's dilemma where rational actors (in this case, Afghan government, Taliban, United States, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and India) fail to cooperate with each other to achieve sustainable peace even if each of them would benefit from doing so.

Afghan government is its own worst enemy; rampant corruption, lawlessness and weak state institutions have virtually crippled the country. Local Afghans have found an alternative in shape of the Taliban because of this dysfunctional government. Peace in Afghanistan would help the Afghan government to make better use of billions of dollars it receives from the international community. Instead, the government's predatory corruption; political divisions,

socio-economic challenges and nepotism have only contributed in strengthening the Taliban-led insurgency.

The Islamic State and the Taliban exhibit differing models of jihad. Their agenda, strategy, tactics and tools are different. Islamic State falsely claims to represent Muslim Ummah in its global multi-fronted war against the 'Shia-Zionist-Crusader alliance'. The Taliban, however, focuses on Afghanistan, seeking to establish an Islamic Emirate within its borders and does not plan to take over the world. The Islamic State's Khorasan chapter has appeared as a great challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition to its animosity with the Afghan government, Islamic State's expansion in

# STALEMATE

Afghanistan has shaped Taliban's policies and modes of operation. The Taliban's willingness to pursue and welcome peace efforts in Afghanistan could help them in getting legitimacy at the national, regional and international levels.

For the United States, the dilemma becomes more pronounced because the costs of staying and leaving Afghanistan are both high. Afghan forces have been assisted and trained by U.S. advisors but it is disturbing yet instructive to know that the Afghan government is still unable to govern more than 40% of Afghanistan which is under the Taliban control and influence. U.S. economy shares a heavy burden of this war as Washington spends almost \$45 billion annually in Afghanistan. Simply pulling

out its forces would leave a power vacuum not only for the Taliban and the Haqqani Network but for transnational terrorist groups like Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. Abandoning Afghanistan with an abrupt troop pull out is, therefore, not an option for the United States since it will not only lose the good will of the people in Afghanistan, but also perpetuate instability in the region. US forces, the Afghan National Army and the feeble National Unity Government (NUG) have failed to rein in the Taliban and the Islamic State, something that has worsened the country's security profile

Russia and Iran have also helped the insurgency in order to offset any U.S. successes in Afghanistan. Tehran and Moscow have been publicly accused by the US of providing funds and ammunition in a bid to counter the Islamic State's rise in its neighborhood. India uses Afghanistan for its proxy war against Pakistan. Major players in the conflict have been promoting their own foreign policy agendas by exploiting the Taliban as the face of the insurgency. It appears that Afghanistan will not only become yet another theatre in the multi-fronted rivalry between Washington and Moscow but may also witness the US and Iran battle each other.

Given that the Afghan quagmire is deepening because of multifarious factors, fixation with a one-dimensional and military-heavy approach is a recipe for disaster. The role of major stakeholders spoils the process of consensus building between the opposing sides. The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, recently announced the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as special advisor on Afghanistan with a stated agenda to overcome the stalemate between relevant stakeholders by developing opportunities to bring the Taliban and Afghan government on the

**“ Given that the Afghan quagmire is deepening because of multifarious factors, fixation with a one-dimensional and military-heavy approach is a recipe for disaster. The role of major stakeholders spoils the process of consensus building between the opposing sides ”**

table. The need of the hour is deft diplomacy through incremental and sustained CBMs, reducing the mistrust among stakeholders by aligning their divergent interests to achieve reconciliation through mutual consensus. However, in order to give negotiations a chance two things are needed. Violence must be stopped by all the concerned parties and regional and international actors must converge on the single agenda of brokering peace in the war-torn country. Disrupting peace processes because of geopolitical rivalries, will close whatever little spaces are created for ending a seemingly endless war.

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