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


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
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Good Food, Good Life

Appraising Operation Sunrise

Challenges in Counter Terrorism



Salma Malik

The month of July holds a special significance in Pakistan's complex war against militancy and terrorism. A decade and a year back, the sitting regime of General Pervez Musharraf was faced with probably one of the most difficult decisions to make – should a military led operation codenamed

Operation Silence / Sunrise be fully implemented or not. When confronted strongly over government's inaction by a group of media representatives at a local media and security workshop, General Musharraf voiced the complexities involved in executing such cleanup operations, and corresponding media as well as public reaction. The media bigwigs in attendance promised General Musharraf their complete vote of confidence and encouraged the military to *purge the city off evil...* henceforth media's countdown began.


However, the real countdown to the events that would eventually unfold in July 2007, started decades back, when the newly evolving Islamabad Capital Territory had its first Jamia Mosque constructed in its heartland by the year 1965. Due to the initial interior and exterior paint, the mosque came to be known as the Red Mosque or the *Lal Masjid*. Maulvi Abdullah was the first head cleric and custodian of the mosque and retained that position for more than three decades. By the late 1990s, the mosque had become a sectarian stronghold. Abdullah was

gunned down at the mosque in October 1998 and was replaced by his son Maulvi Abdul Aziz as the chief cleric, and both the sons Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Abdul Rasheed Ghazi took over his duties. The title of Ghazi i.e. participant and survivor of a Jihad, was used by Maulvi Abdullah and his sons, though their physical participation in a religious battle waged, remains unclear, perhaps the title was used because of the family's role in Afghan war of the 1980s.

security forces. Earlier, in 2004 the second son Abdul Rasheed was accused of masterminding terrorist strikes on key security installations, and a large cache of arms and explosives were discovered from his car. However he remained defiant, and in an interview to a correspondent of the British daily *The Telegraph* declared that, [S]ince meeting Osama bin Laden years ago, he had taken up the cause of jihad. "If they send in the forces then we are ready for them," he said, looking at a highly-

accessorized Kalashnikov rifle propped up in the corner of his study.

However, by late 2006 until mid-2007, the Masjid assumed a new vigilante role, launching an anti-vice campaign, seeking forced closure of music and entertainment outlets, foreign massage parlors, an alleged prostitution den, and even disrupting marriage celebrations through groups of 100-150 madrassa students, who as vigilante groups would raid these



Despite being a government (Auqaf) run mosque, Maulvi Abdullah and then later his family ran the mosque as their personal institution, which continues to date. Abdul Aziz as his father's successor retained the position of head cleric *formally* until 2005, when he was dismissed but not removed because of a controversial edict passed by him against the burial and funeral prayers of security personnel slain in War on Terror and counter terrorism operations. The mosque gradually became a transit and meeting point for militants en route the tribal areas to fight against the Pakistani

“The Lal Masjid and its custodians’ transformation from a mainstream religious institution to a weapon yielding militant stronghold, is a true example of the gradual decline in governance and lack of comprehension of such a critical problem by the decision makers”

places, cause disruption and threaten the people of severe consequences. In case of the parlor and den, they forcefully detained the female administration at the mosque. These student vigilante brigades armed with AK 47s, pistols and batons, gradually started to patrol their respective neighborhood areas, with government apparently helpless in the face of a religious backlash. When the local police intervened, they even held several policemen hostage for some days. The Lal Masjid clerics openly started to issue *fatwa* (religious decree) against prominent

political figures, targeting mainly women legislators such as then federal Minister Nilofer Bakhtiar, influenced by their sermons, Punjab's provincial minister Zile Huma Usman was assassinated by her bodyguard, who was one of their ardent followers.

The Ghazi brothers gradually sought to establish Sharia courts as a parallel justice system to “stamp out vice in society,” and threatened a country wide wave of suicide bombing through their youth if prevented from their “mission” by the government. “Our youths will shake their palaces with their suicide attacks,” Abdul Aziz warned the government at a heavily attended and charged Friday sermon, “The government has been saying that an operation against us is the last option, I want to tell the government that suicide attacks are our last option.”

In the meanwhile, intelligence agencies and the security forces came across credible evidence that the Ghazi brothers were protecting and harboring terror suspects including one of the July 2005 London bombing perpetrators. However, their attempts to raid the premises were prevented by burqa clad baton yielding female students of the mosque and affiliated madrassa. With a bulk of students (both male and female) belonging to the KP and FATA especially Malakand and adjacent areas, each time the security forces contemplated an intervention, they had to consider the repercussions, being already engaged in clearing these terror-hit areas from militants.

After a much publicly criticized period of inaction by the law enforcement agencies and the government, and a corresponding defiance by the clerics, the military at Musharraf's directive finally raided and cleared the mosque in a fifteen hour long intense operation, after laying siege of the mosque and surrounding areas, for several days. In the initial phase, despite firing and provocation from the mosque and madrassa students, the government kept on extending amnesty timeline, offering free passage as well as monetary incentives to the madrassa and mosque occupants. However, this hold up provided heavily

armed madrassa students from all over the city to converge at the Lal Masjid and taking up vantage positions, resulting in an indiscriminate exchange of fire with security forces. Dubbed as the most lethal peacetime sieges, the eventual military strike, *Operation Sunrise / Silence* (July 3-11), resulted in the death of Abdul Rasheed along with few other family members. According to the official count 9 persons were killed and 150 were injured. Whereas, the hitherto classified *Lal Masjid Commission Report* cites the count at not less than 103 people, including 10 security personnel. The weapons recovered on site and shown to the media team after a 48 hours' clean up, included

“ The role played by Lal Masjid as being a center point for promoting militancy and religious hatred was not ideological alone, enjoying special privilege and patronage under General Zia's regime that well suited even the international actors patronizing the noble cause of jihad against infidel Soviets ”

rockets, landmines, suicide belts, LMGs, Kalashnikovs, RPGs, automatic guns, pistols, revolvers, night vision goggles and over 50,000 live bullets of different calibers.

The Lal Masjid and its custodians' transformation from a mainstream religious institution to a weapon yielding militant stronghold, is a true example of the gradual decline in governance and lack of comprehension of such a critical problem by the decision makers. By no means, was the decision making elite unaware of the situation, as allegations and reports regarding the Masjid being



a large depository of assault weapons and sanctuary for militants and wanted terrorists would surface from time to time; however until the summer of 2007, no concrete action was undertaken. The role played by Lal Masjid as being a center point for promoting militancy and religious hatred was not ideological alone, enjoying special privilege and patronage under General Zia's regime that well suited even the international actors patronizing the *noble cause of jihad against infidel Soviets*. During the crucial decade of 1980s, the mosque became a stronghold of sectarian militancy used as a sanctuary as well as recruitment and training base for Afghanistan bound mujahedeen. Enjoying immense

patronage and protection from security agencies as well as certain power centers, by the time *Afghan jihad* terminated, it had transformed into a Sunni ideological center of religiously motivated militants and (later) Taliban.

However, the strategic consequence of this operation was extremely severe, giving birth to neo-Taliban, especially from the areas to which most of the madrassa students belonged, besides establishing a constituency of hatred against an institution, which had hitherto enjoyed immense respect and popular admiration. The Taliban upped their violence and militancy and became more tactically suave and specific in their attacks, with

an unprecedented increase in suicide bombings and activation of militant sleeper cells, to the extent of creating personnel reliability issues within the security sector. This tragic episode despite being a decade and plus old, is a proof that countering terrorism and militancy is much deep rooted and multidimensional in nature.

There is a need of addressing the socio-economic imperatives, that are at the root of this malaise. Counter terrorism is a collective responsibility and selective implementation of 2014 *National Action Plan (NAP)* are knee jerk responses at best pushing one institution to shoulder the entire responsibility.

Although the security forces have made immense progress in purging the country of terrorism and militancy, yet in the absence of a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy sustainable with complete support and backing of the civil military infrastructure, such tragedies will continue to haunt us in silence.

Dr. Salma Malik is Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence & Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

THE MIGHT OF PETRO DOLLAR: WHY SAUDI ARABIA CAN CONTINUE ITS ATROCITIES IN YEMEN?



Paul Antonopoulos

Back in April 2018, The United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres explained at a conference in Geneva that three-quarters of the Yemeni population were in desperate need of aid and protection as the war continued to rage.

He explained that over 8 million people in Yemen “did not know where they will obtain their next meal,” and that “every ten minutes, a child under five dies of preventable causes” and because of this, “nearly two-thirds of girls are married before the age of 18, and many before they are 15.”

It is clear that there is a significant humanitarian disaster occurring in Yemen that is mostly being ignored internationally as the world keeps its eyes on Syria, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea. So why then is Yemen being ignored?

To answer this question, we must ask why Syria, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea

are the focus. The most straight forward way to answer this critical question is by highlighting that neither of these four countries are under the orbit of American imperialism and are therefore targeted whether it be by military means and/or by severe economic sanctions in the hope that they become compliant and open their economy to corporate domination and US dollar hegemony. Accompanied with these acts of economic subversion are the constant accusations of human rights abuses made by Washington and their allies against these governments. They are accused of perpetrating human rights abuses against their own people.

But with Yemen having a food shortage crisis with ports blockaded, a cholera crisis, and civilians targeted by double-tap airstrikes, including attacks against schools, hospitals, weddings, funerals and any other social event possibly imaginable, why is there little international condemnation against the main perpetrator, Saudi Arabia?



“So long as the dollar hegemony is not threatened, any state can perpetrate human rights atrocities as Saudi Arabia perpetrates against its own people and Yemenis on a daily basis, but threaten this hegemony, then the full force of American might will be felt”

Turkish energy analyst and the Chairman of Ankara-based Institute for Energy Markets and Policies, Dr. Volkan Ozdemir, said in an interview with Sputnik Turkiye in 2017 that:

“For the last 44-45 years, the petrodollar system has been ruling the world, which means that the international oil trade had been mostly paid for in US dollars. It stems from the Middle Eastern crises of the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia bound itself to selling oil only in US dollars. Given that Saudi oil has played the major role in the US dollar becoming the world’s reserve currency, the US turned into the guarantor of the security of Saudi Arabia. Being the world’s reserve currency, the US dollar has remained the foundation of the US’ global hegemony.”

As Dr. Ozdemir explains, there is a very intimate relationship between Saudi oil and the US dollar. So long as the dollar hegemony is not threatened, any state can perpetrate human rights atrocities as Saudi Arabia perpetrates against its own people and Yemenis on a daily basis, but threaten this hegemony, then the full force of American might will be felt.

Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had ambitions to unify Africa through a single currency called ‘the Dinar’ that would be backed by gold and would liberate the continent from the US Dollar monopoly. The new gold-backed currency would have meant African states would have traded its vast and precious resources for gold, thus undermining the dollar that is literally only paper. What we saw in 2011 was his capture, torture, sodomization and murder by US-backed militants. This was also repeated earlier in the Muslim World with long-time Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein dumping the Dollar to trade Iraq’s oil in Euros; this being one of the main reasons for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Syria, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea in different manners are either outside the orbit of the US Dollar or have challenged its hegemony. Their resistance to being economically dominated by the US Dollar



Source: AFP

“ However, as Saudi Arabia is a compliant state to US imperialism and is a bulwark of protecting the Dollar hegemony on the global economy, it can escape all criticisms and allegations made against it ”

of protecting the Dollar hegemony on the global economy, it can escape all criticisms and allegations made against it. It is for this reason that Saudi Arabia can escape sanctions and criticisms despite its use of cluster munitions and White Phosphorus, killing journalists, attacking facilities run by aid organizations, and while all this occurs, the US and the UK have accelerated weapon sales to the puritanical kingdom.

Rather, Washington and London should have at the minimum taken on the example made by Islamabad who were asked by Riyadh to join in the coalition against Yemen, but maturely opted to remain neutral in such an aggression against the Arab world's most impoverished state. This is unsurprising as we continue to see Pakistan liberate itself from US control that previous leaders put the country under and we now see Islamabad operate mostly independently to make decisions

that are in the best interests, at least in foreign policy, of the Pakistani people.

So long as Saudi Arabia continues to help preserve the hegemony of the US Dollar, it will be able to continue human rights abuses, including the starvation of the Yemeni population, to achieve its goal of regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia believes that it is countering Iranian influence on its southern border, but this is literally coming at the price of thousands of deaths because of preventable diseases, starvation and airstrikes. The question then remains whether we can take US accusations against other states of human rights abuses seriously when considering the daily human rights abuses perpetrated by Saudi Arabia?

Paul Antonopoulos is a Research Fellow at the Center for Syncretic Studies.

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EXCLUSIVE
INTERVIEW WITH

SARDAR MASOOD KHAN

PRESIDENT AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Sardar Masood Khan is the 14th President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. A career diplomat, Masood Khan was Pakistan's Permanent Representative in the United Nations missions in New York and Geneva. He was also Pakistan's Chief Negotiator in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) from 2009 to 2014. While being Pakistan's Ambassador in China, Masood Khan played a monumental role in fostering Sino-Pak bilateral relations for which he was conferred the highest award by President Xi Jinping in 2015. Pakistan Politico met President Sardar Masood Khan to discuss the Kashmir issue, the evolving dynamics of international diplomacy and the shifting sands of Indo-Pak relations.

Q. *There could hardly have been a more challenging time for anyone to represent the Kashmiris. As President AJK, what is your strategy to counter the Indian propaganda of denial about the indigenous nature of the Kashmiri freedom movement?*

MASOOD KHAN: The times are challenging, no doubt. India has intensified its repression in the Indian Occupied Kashmir and its strong strategic alliances with the US and other western countries have shrunk space for a focus on the serious human rights situation in IOK or meaningful international diplomacy on Kashmir. India contends that Kashmir is a bilateral matter but then it has practically choked all channels of communication on Kashmir and IOK even on the bilateral plane, let alone allowing any substantive dialogue to find a lasting solution.

“ We welcome the High Commissioner's recommendation to the Human Rights Council to establish a commission of inquiry to conduct a comprehensive independent international investigation into human rights violations ”

My strategy, as the President of Azad Kashmir, has been based on six points: encourage the people of Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir to forge unity in their ranks; take the story and the case of Jammu and Kashmir back to the international community, especially the UN, where they belong; leverage the strengths of the diaspora community which has gained more clout in the Western countries and the Gulf region; use traditional and new media effectively; make Pakistan and Azad Kashmir strong economically; and reach out to the Indian civil society.

Q. *The Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights has recently published a report on human rights violations in IOK. How would this report influence the discourse on the Kashmir issue?*

MASOOD KHAN: This is the first ever report by the United Nations on gross and consistent violations of human rights in IOK. It lists a broad array of human rights violations including killings, blindings by pellet guns, sexual violence, mass unmarked graves, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, including children, torture, excessive use of force, lack of access to justice and a culture of impunity. The report points out how this reign of terror is sponsored, supervised and executed by the state and its forces deployed in the territory.

Following the martyrdom of Burhan Wani in July 2016, and ensuing killings of peaceful protestors by the Indian forces, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, had requested India and Pakistan to give unconditional access to Kashmir to assess the human rights situation. India rejected this request while Pakistan offered access to the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner was thus forced





to undertake 'remote monitoring' to collect and collate information.

The High Commissioner has noted that militancy in IOK has gone down drastically; and the protests (against Indian rule and brutalities) now have participation from larger number of people comprising of more young, middle class Kashmiris, including females. The character of the Kashmiri movement is essentially peaceful.

We welcome the High Commissioner's recommendation to the Human Rights Council to establish a commission of inquiry to conduct a comprehensive independent international investigation into human rights violations. We also welcome his recommendation to repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990 that empowers the Indian forces to commit crimes against Kashmiris. The report recommends that India's other draconian law – Public Safety Act 1978 – be amended. We believe this law too should be rescinded.

The significance of the report is that the analysis and recommendations come from an independent source, not from the Kashmiris or Pakistan. In the past, it was either Pakistan or the people of Kashmir talking about human rights violations in IOK or the international media and human rights organizations. India would reject such "allegations"; it used to be our word against theirs. Now it is the Office of the High Commissioner. It is different. It is a broad, damning indictment. We should not let it be swept under the carpet.

The report also asks for access to Azad Kashmir. I would say, subject to the condition expressed by Pakistan, Azad Kashmir is ready for engagement on the entire range of human rights in its territory. According to a district wide survey, Azad Kashmir has the highest educational score in the whole of Pakistan and the lowest crime rate. It attaches importance to the promotion and protection of human rights. Focused on promoting the rule of law, access to justice, transparency, accountability, and

fast economic development, we are ready to showcase what we are doing. We have nothing to hide.

Q. What will be the implications for Pakistan & AJK if India gets a permanent seat at the UN Security Council? What is our stance against the Indian membership in UNSC which India is aggressively lobbying for?

MASOOD KHAN: Before I respond to the question of India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, let me point out that the position of Pakistan and like-minded countries on the Council reform is based on a principle, which states that there should be no new permanent seats in the Security Council because permanent seats were created during, and in the aftermath of, the Second World War, reflecting geo-political realities of the time. Mainly victors of the war and their allies were accommodated as permanent members. Vanquished nations such as Germany,

Italy and Japan were kept out. The world has changed dramatically since 1945 and therefore there is no justification for creating new centres of privilege within the Council.

The drive for the Council's reform essentially stems from the aspirations of the 193 nations for a more democratic and accountable Council.

Four countries - Brazil, Germany India and Japan - called G-4 aspire to become permanent members mainly because of their size, economies and role in international politics. These countries are powerful today; but no country is powerful in perpetuity. You just have to look at the history of the last century to substantiate that point.

The reality is that the world today is much diverse and pluralist. Many medium-sized states, individually and collectively, compete with G-4 in terms of size, population, economy, military capability, contribution to UN peacekeeping, and commitment to democracy and human rights. Mexico, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea fall in that category.

Pakistan is part of a group of nations in the UN that calls itself *Uniting for Consensus* that includes most of the countries mentioned above. The group opposes any additional permanent members in the expanded Security Council. Instead, it proposes creation of a new category of members with longer duration and a possibility to get re-elected in that category. They believe that the United Nations should pursue the principle that all member states — small, medium-sized and large — are effectively represented in the reformed Council. Council reform should reflect the aspirations and interests of all; not the ambitions of a few.

If India ever becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council it will squeeze diplomatic space for Pakistan in the UN as a whole. One foreseeable consequence is that India would move to expunge from the Council the agenda

item on the India-Pakistan question which includes the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Moreover, India would step up its efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. The practical evidence of the conduct of the existing permanent members of the Security Council shows that they are there primarily to safeguard their own national interest. India would do the same. It is also true that India is lobbying for a permanent seat not just to hurt Pakistan but to acquire its big power status.

Q. Given that Indian atrocities in Kashmir are on the rise, it appears that we have been unsuccessful in producing an effective blend of propaganda and diplomacy in this age of electronic and social media. What in your opinion is the structural flaw in our mechanism that has limited us from selling our narrative to the world?

MASOOD KHAN: I would say we are not completely unsuccessful. The issue of Kashmir is alive in the media, in international forums, and in international political circles. It is seen as a very sensitive issue between Pakistan and India involving the fate and political future of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. World decision

“ If India ever becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council it will squeeze diplomatic space for Pakistan in the UN as a whole. One foreseeable consequence is that India would move to expunge from the Council the agenda item on the India-Pakistan question which includes the Jammu and Kashmir dispute ”

makers know that the issue has serious implications for international peace and security. You can partly attribute this success to the firm stand of Pakistan on the issue and the continuous sacrifices of the Kashmiris in the face of Indian brutalities. Pakistan's outreach efforts in this regard have been quite successful. Sometimes, this degree of tenacity and resilience shown by Pakistan and Kashmiris baffles the Indian diplomats, politicians and establishment.

That said, we would have to acknowledge that India is more successful in propagating its false narrative about Kashmir. India is subjecting Kashmiris to state terrorism, and yet it makes the world believe that it is fighting terrorism in IOK. It has committed most gruesome crimes in the territory and yet it projects itself as a victim. The sheen on India's story is, however, wearing thin after the brutal killing of Burhan Wani and the killing spree and blinding of innocent and unarmed Kashmiris that followed.

Your suggestion for developing a blend of propaganda (I would call it outreach) and diplomacy is sound. We must not work in silos. This kind of blend will entail closer coordination between the Foreign Office, other state institutions and the media. Our state institutions have some skills and experience in dealing with the traditional media - newspapers, TV networks, but the use of and liaison with social media largely remains amateurish. We need to learn to interact with the full spectrum on more professional lines.

I would say there is no structural flaw in our 'mechanism'; what we need to do is to catch up, because India, whether we like it not, is far ahead of us in the field of communication. First, we have to identify deficits we have in our overall approach and vehicles for influencing world opinion. The growth of our media and think tanks is recent. While we have the quantity, we lag behind in producing and marketing quality content. Our young leaders and communicators should focus on proficiency in the English language, which is now the international lingua franca. Having skills in these areas is

“What is even more important is to craft messages, within our national security paradigm, that we want to communicate to the world; and Kashmir should figure in the top three priorities, because the very statehood of Pakistan is linked to resolution of the Kashmir dispute”

important and I am confident that our universities, think tanks and even media houses are preparing a new generation of communicators and, in the process, are equipping our politicians and lawmakers with new, usable skills. What is even more important is to craft messages, within our national security paradigm, that we want to communicate to the world; and Kashmir should figure in the top three priorities, because the very statehood of Pakistan is linked to resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Second, our media and our communicators need to connect with the mainstream media of the world. There is too little scholarly content of high standard on Kashmir or for that matter on Pakistan's foreign and national security policies that is being produced. The distorted Indian version on Kashmir and Pakistan go unchallenged. As a result, Pakistan is not adequately understood in the world. To redress this deficit, our young professionals from government service, politics and civil society need to connect with the world and take their story to multiple audiences so that the world understands our perspective. A movement in that direction has already started; but we need to inject more vigour in it. One way to do so is to create common platforms with the diaspora community in Europe, North America and the Gulf,

which is increasingly becoming influential politically and economically.

Q. How is Kashmir being represented at the international level under your leadership and administration?

MASOOD KHAN: I have tried to internationalize the Kashmir dispute as far as it is possible. In the international community, there is apathy towards Kashmir and in most instances there is complete silence. It is our responsibility to break this conspiracy of silence driven by realpolitik. I have gone to different capitals to shine light on Kashmir and start conversations on a dispute that has the most serious implications for regional and international peace and security. IOK is in captivity; and its people and human rights defenders cannot go abroad to tell their story; but the people of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan are free and they can tell the world about the plight and suffering of Kashmiris.

The Azad Kashmir Government is focusing very diligently on good governance and economic development, especially in the areas of road infrastructure, hydropower generation, quality education, wider access to health facilities, promotion of tourism, and development of industrial, agricultural and telecommunications sectors.

Q. Do you think CPEC will have any impact on Kashmir? Are US and Indian noises on the subject (of CPEC passing through the 'disputed territory') engineered to distract Pakistan and China from achieving their goals of economic prosperity and global connectivity?

MASOOD KHAN: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has already had an impact on Kashmir in two ways. One, Indian noises have raised the profile of the Kashmir dispute internationally; and two, the CPEC's main artery which passes through Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir has been integrated with the CPEC through four projects (two

hydropower projects, a 200-kilometer long highway and an industrial zone). It is ironic that because of India's objection to the CPEC, the world is paying close attention to Kashmir. In the past, India would take utmost precautions to avoid any spotlight on Kashmir because it wanted the status quo. Yes, you are right, India's criticism of the CPEC is disingenuous, because the real motive behind India's protests is to undercut China's growing strategic and economic ties with Pakistan and the prosperity and stability that CPEC would usher in. Moreover, implementation of the CPEC will enable Pakistan to explore its West Asian, South Western Asian markets and thereby overtime decrease its dependency on India.

India's noises are false on another count. International law does not prohibit or circumscribe investment in the disputed areas. The European Union, for instance, has been making investments in the Palestinian territory and East Jerusalem for quite sometime without violating any international law.

Q. Is there any statistical evidence which supports the argument made by Pakistan that India is changing the demographics of the Indian occupied Kashmir?

MASOOD KHAN: Demographic changes in IOK are not a secret. Open source data can substantiate them. The Indian politicians and officials openly talk about them. Let us first talk about the so-called West Pakistan refugees, mostly Hindus and Sikhs, who migrated from West Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and were deliberately pushed to the Jammu region of IOK. Their current reported number is 125,000, and are mostly living in Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, and Poonch. Their actual number is much higher, ranging between 150,000 to 170,000. Steps have been taken to give them permanent residence, though they are not state subjects. In addition to giving them entry into the police and defense forces, in contravention of Articles 370 and 35-A of the Indian Constitution which give a semblance of autonomy to IOK, a Parliamentary

Committee has recommended that these refugees be given benefits of state subjects and thus pave the way for their permanent residence certificates.

Article 35-A of the Indian Constitution, which gives certain privileges to the Kashmiris in regard to settlement, employment, property and scholarships, are a special target of attack by the Hindu extremist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

Besides, India is implementing a plan to build a separate settlement in Kashmir for the Kashmiri Pandits who are currently living in different parts of India and Jammu. Land is being allotted for the "Sainak Colonies" for retired army officials who have served in IOK. This is a particularly vile and cold-hearted scheme because these very personnel would have terrorized and brutalized Kashmiris during their deployment in IOK. Other measures include steps to settle non-Kashmiri Hindu businessmen and industrialists in IOK, use Statistics Act 2008, Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets Act 2002, and Goods and Services Tax (GST) to manipulate and alter demography, to give chunks

“Our media and our communicators need to connect with the mainstream media of the world. There is too little scholarly content of high standard on Kashmir or for that matter on Pakistan's foreign and national security policies that is being produced. The Indian distorted versions on Kashmir and Pakistan go unchallenged”

of Kashmiri land and property to non-Kashmiris and shrink the rights of the Kashmiris. The objective is to open the doors for non-Kashmiri Hindus from Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat, Bengal and Kerala. These moves are accompanied by proposals to give three seats to Pandits and add five additional seats for "refugees from POK" in the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in order to reduce the majority of the Muslim constituents.

Kashmiri leaders have said that by making these changes, India is trying to create new realities on the ground in order to integrate the IOK with the Indian Union.

I would like to point out that the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I, prohibit deporting or transferring of its civilian population by the state occupying a territory. The Statute of the International Criminal Court goes a step further and states that direct and indirect transfer of parts of its civilian population by the Occupying State into the territory it occupies is a war crime. India is committing these crimes in IOK.

Q. Kashmir is referred to as a 'nuclear flashpoint' in this world. But the world's most dangerous place is already at war. How do you foresee a future India and Pakistan crisis quickly worsening the dynamics on the escalation ladder?

MASOOD KHAN: Kashmir is a potential nuclear flashpoint. Non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute is a huge risk for nuclear escalation at some point. The lethality of conflict escalation, unpredictably, should not be underestimated nor soft-pedaled. Despite the risks involved, the mutual nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan establishes equilibrium and reduces the chances of a full-fledged conventional war. But even a limited engagement along the Line of Control can flare up and that is why it is necessary to work on a Pakistan-proposed Strategic Restraint Regime comprising three components - nuclear restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution. Prime Minister

“To India, I would say you won freedom from the British rule; don't turn into a colonial power yourself to suppress Kashmiris and deny them what you have: freedom to choose a political future”

Narendra Modi's government has closed all doors for talks or engagement with Pakistan. Even if there was a dialogue between India and Pakistan one would not have hoped for a breakthrough on Kashmir but it could have advanced the stalled process on nuclear confidence building measures.

Q. How do you strategize to engage the moderate/sane voices inside India who are sympathetic to the Kashmiri freedom movement? Do you think there is enough momentum inside India that can bring it to the negotiating table with Pakistan on Kashmir issue?

MASOOD KHAN: Frankly, we do not have any effective strategy to reach out and connect with the Indian civil society. Following the confidence building measures that were put in place in the early 2000s, people to people exchanges have taken place. Most of the people who go to India pursue their careers or commercial interests. The Indian intellectuals who engage with people from our side want to foist their narratives, largely conforming to their official stance on us and to tell us how foolhardy or unrealistic it is to pursue our stance on Kashmir. The Indian side has also tried to use the CBMs to eclipse and render irrelevant issues that matter most to us such as Kashmir.

We need to have a genuine dialogue with the 'sane and moderate voices' as you put

“To give an alternative view on Kashmir is a cardinal sin in the Indian polity for which the state would demand repentance and expiation to avoid severe punishments”

civil society. The purpose should not be to create an atmosphere of misplaced bonhomie, but to try to make Indians understand our perspective and remind them of their responsibility to help Kashmiris get their rights and to put an end to the unrelenting oppression in the territory.

Yes, there are leaders in India who are saying openly that India's "muscular" policy in Kashmir has failed and that dialogue with the Kashmiri leadership and Pakistan is a must to move towards conflict resolution and peace. They also recognize that Kashmir is a dispute and there is a question mark on the so-called accession of the IOK to India. Congress leader P. Chidambaram, for instance, has repeatedly asked for a political solution of the Kashmir dispute.

But, let's not forget, that resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan alone will not give us a magic wand to resolve the Kashmir issue. Several rounds of bilateral talks held in the past have proved to be a farce and a mirage. In these talks, India would never, ever engage on the substitution discussion on the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir or the political future of its people because, as it

argues, it is already an 'integral part' of India. So our message to the Indian civil society should be to persuade its political parties to recognize the disputed nature of the IOK and start serious conversations with all the parties on ways to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

Q. What is your message to the people of AJK, IOK, Pakistan, India, and the world?

MASOOD KHAN: Peace is precious. We should spare no effort in its pursuit. We owe it to our present and future generations. To the people of AJK and Pakistan, I would say persevere in your political and diplomatic struggle, the dawn of freedom for Kashmiris will soon come. To the people of IOK, I pay tribute to them for their sacrifices in blood and salute them for their strong commitment to freedom and self-determination in the face of unabating coercion. To India, I would say you won freedom from the British rule; don't turn into a colonial power yourself to suppress Kashmiris and deny them what you have: freedom to choose a political future.

GLOBAL MILITARY OUTLOOK: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN



Syed Rifaat Hussain

EMERGING TRENDS

The modern state system which first emerged in Europe in the late 17th century, the Westphalian system, gradually spreading to the rest of the world, is coming under increasing stress. Its fundamental precepts of state-sovereignty, autonomy and territoriality, are fast losing their centrality. There are many who are questioning the relevance of the state-centric model of the international society and security. Proponents of globalization insist that we are living in an interdependent world where distinctions such as territoriality, which was the hallmark of the Westphalian system, is no longer salient.

Related to this is the second development which is the attempt to broaden and deepen the meaning of security. Human security, common security, cooperative security are new additions to the contested construct of military security. Military security is necessary but not a sufficient condition for making people secure. Other than military, non-military dimensions

are also gaining in importance and are becoming more relevant in the changing global context.

The third development is the power shift away from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries towards the Asia-Pacific region. This region represented by the economic rise of China and India is fast emerging as the new power house of economic growth and development. Along with this power-shift, the traditional emphasis on hard power is being replaced by soft power with emphasis on information power. Only those states are likely to survive which play the power game smartly. So there is the new emphasis on the smart power which combines the hard and soft elements of the power.

The fourth trend is the complexity and fluidity of the emerging global order. There are new actors such as Daish/ISIL, Al Qaeda that are posing challenge to the authority of established paradigm of the international politics. Cascading effects of non-state actors have made it very difficult for a state to manage security. The current economic difficulties faced by Greece is the prime example of this complexity. Added to this is a new trend towards multi-polarity and diffusion of

power marked by the rise of China, India, and BRICS.

The fifth trend is the development and induction of new technologies of war-fighting as part of the global drive towards strategic modernization of armed forces. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), has five central attributes at present which will shape the future of warfare in the contemporary world. These include:

- The ability to strike with great accuracy independent of range;
- The ability, through the use of stealth, to penetrate defenses with impunity;
- The emergence of unmanned warfare;
- The tactical and operational exploitation of space;
- And the ability to move information rapidly and widely across a joint battle network and exploit the effects of increased joint force integration.

In terms of nano technology, there are three regions of the world which control nearly eighty percent of the knowledge on new technologies. Europe controls



twenty-nine percent, Japan twenty-eight percent and the US twenty-seven of the total knowledge on nano technology.


Because of these structural changes, new zones of peace and zones of conflict are clearly emerging. Armed conflict, turbulence, social and political instability will continue to plague developments in the South zone while the Northern zone will remain focused on economic issues. Acts of terrorism and armed violence by non-state actors will continue to haunt both the zones.



As a result of Washington’ pivot to Indo-Pacific policy, Indian Ocean region has emerged as a new zone of great power rivalry which is contributing to greater instability and insecurity in the entire Asia-Pacific region. This is compounding the general sense of crisis of global governance in which all the existing regimes are facing mounting challenges – NPT, WTO, IMF. To cope with this global crisis of governance, new institutions are being developed to manage this crisis – The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) led by China is a case in point.


Five of the ten largest arms importers of arms, according to recent SIPRI data, are located in the Asia-Pacific region and this underscores the continued militarization of the region.

THE 10 LARGEST ARMS IMPORTERS



THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR WORLD:

In his 2009 book *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*, Leslie H. Gelb who is the former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, talked about the emerging new Pyramid of power.



Unipolar World on the International System-as-a-Whole Level of Analysis and a Multipolar World at the Regional Level of Analysis.

➤➤➤ FIRST TIER:	The US as paramount power
➤➤➤ SECOND TIER:	The Eight Principals: China, UK, France, Russia, Brazil, India, Germany, Japan
➤➤➤ THIRD TIER:	The Oil and Gas Pumpers
➤➤➤ FOURTH TIER:	The Regional Players: Mexico, S. Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, Nigeria South Africa
➤➤➤ FIFTH TIER:	The Responsible: Norway, Sweden
➤➤➤ SIXTH TIER:	The Bottom Dwellers
➤➤➤ SEVENTH TIER:	The Non-state Actors

SECOND TIER:

According to Gelb, at the top of the emerging power-hierarchy is the United States – a paramount power. Its economy outstrips all the other individual economies and is surpassed only by the entire European Union. China and India will take decades to catch up, if they ever catch up at all. While America now has competitors in technology and technological innovation, it remains the leader in those areas as well. And its military superiority far surpasses its economic advantages. The United States continues to spend about as much on its armed forces as all the other major industrial nations combined. More tellingly, it is in a class by itself in terms of usable military technology—the mix of hardware, software, and organization.

SECOND TIER:

Right below the United States is the second tier of countries consisting of China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and just barely Brazil. Call them The Eight Principals, or simply The Eight.

THIRD TIER:

The third rung of power-hierarchy is occupied by a narrow band of oil-producing states – the Oil and Gas Pumpers – which includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, the smaller Gulf states, Venezuela, and Nigeria (and obviously Russia as well). Their power derives from their large share of the global oil and gas supplies and the investment clout of their profits.

FOURTH TIER:

The fourth tier consists of mid-level states with mostly localized potential as The Regional Players. This group includes Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Most are far behind the top three tiers economically.

FIFTH TIER:

The fifth tier – which can be classified as

The Responsible – encompasses as many as fifty states, medium and small, all over the map. Most are responsible world citizens such as Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, Botswana, and Chile.

SIXTH TIER:

The sixth tier – The Bottom Dwellers or Problem States – includes about seventy-five states in varying degrees of political or economic disarray, or both. Examples include Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Nicaragua, and Burma.

SEVENTH TIER:

The seventh and the final tier consists of the Non-State Actors. They include refugee and human rights advocacy groups (the NGOs), terrorists, the international media, and international business. They are a highly disparate bunch in interests and actions, and they often act in ways contradictory to one another’s interests. They are now thoroughly intertwined with governments, societies, and individuals all over the globe and operate worldwide. It is difficult to measure their influence, but

they dwell everywhere and usually manage to get at least a hearing on big issues and a real voice where their expertise is engaged.

THE FUTURE OUTLOOK

Technology and new forms of warfare – UAVs, for example - will be widely used and new platforms based on information warfare will be developed and deployed with increasing frequency.

The second trend emphasizes on global surveillance and monitoring – revelations about NSA by Snowden is a case in point.

There is a rise of the global South and relative decline of American hegemony, and as a result of this development the power transition is not complete yet but it is a significant factor.

THE RISE OF INDIA

There are several factors that underpin the rise of India:

- Demography – second most populous country in the world.
- Democracy – largest democracy in the world.
- Economic growth rate is that of the fastest growing economy in the world. Some people contest that India is likely to be among the top four economies in the world.
- Expanding influence – India’s zone of influence has expanded.
- Internal cohesion and domestic stability will become a critical issue for a rising India
- Civilizational and cultural pull – India’s soft power is likely to continue to attract outsiders.
- Military strength – conventional, nuclear and space capabilities of India are likely to grow as India accumulates new wealth and a big chunk of this wealth is diverted toward defense. India is on course to being one of the largest military force due to its sustained drive for military modernization.

CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE SECTOR

Steady economic growth is needed to provide resources required to expand the defense sector. No defence sector can expand in isolation from economic strength of the country. Pakistan needs to get out of this three to four percent of economic growth rate and allow its economy to grow annually by at least seven to eight percent. There is a challenge of technological innovation because Pakistan is a late starter in this field. India began developing its IT sector much earlier than Pakistan. Now India is at the cutting edge of the emerging technologies which are going to shape the future of warfare. Nearly all cutting edge technologies especially in the field of information warfare lie outside Pakistan. Pakistan does not even have its "Silicon Valley."

Building new and modern platforms is expensive and it takes time to bring them online. Pakistan's heavy reliance on overseas suppliers for high-technology

aerial and naval platforms needs to be reduced.

Dependency on China is increasing, as seventy percent of Pakistan's defense imports emanate from China. The majority of defense factories in Pakistan only produce precision components or parts, mainly due to financial constraints and lack of private-public partnerships. Also there is the perennial problem of inefficient use of available funds.

Islamabad also confronts the absence of level playing field in procuring arms from the international markets. Occasional arms embargoes, owing to its nuclear arsenal and tension with India, starve Pakistan of the vital supply of equipment and components.

THE PROSPECT

These limitations notwithstanding, whatever Pakistan has produced has good international reputation which is garnering interest from international manufacturers in countries such as

Turkey. New defence partners, including Malaysia, Serbia and Turkey, could bring new expertise to the Pakistani industry. Annual 10% growth of the defence budget should create opportunities for local industry. Production of JF-17 Thunder, co-developed with China, could lead to export orders, with the two countries going on a sales push in order to secure export contract for the aircraft. New export rules and better government oversight should help boost foreign sales.

All is not negative for Pakistan. If we pay attention to these aspects that have been highlighted, Pakistan's defence industry has very good prospects of expansion and export.

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THE PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE



Michael Krepon

“Deterrence stability” has been the holy grail of nuclear arms control, the mechanism by which arms racing can be contained and stability in crises maintained. Advocates of strategic modernization programs often claim that they, too, are motivated by the pursuit of deterrence stability. In their view, failure to proceed with the missile or weapon in question would make the nuclear balance of forces less stable and more dangerous. Others make no apologies about seeking war-fighting capabilities to provide advantage if deterrence fails. They, too, assert that superior nuclear war-fighting capabilities can be justified as ensuring deterrence stability because the disadvantaged nuclear-armed state would not dare to challenge a stronger foe. This line of thought is making a comeback in the United States.

Can all of these interpretations of deterrence stability be true -- or might all of them be false? When and under what conditions might deterrence stability be possible? One thing ought to be clear: deterrence stability cannot be achieved through arms racing. If nuclear-armed states have serious security issues -- which was presumably the reason they armed themselves with nuclear weapons in the first place -- they are likely to find deterrence stability beyond their reach. If, however, nuclear-armed states have no ambitions beyond limited deterrence, there is evidence that deterrence stability can be claimed and maintained.

Nuclear-armed states like Great Britain and France do not have to worry about each other's nuclear capabilities. Consequently, they don't have a deterrence stability problem. London and Paris are keeping close tabs on Russian and Chinese strategic modernization programs, but these programs have yet to raise their deterrence requirements. Deterrence stability is within reach when a nuclear-armed state chooses to avoid arms racing and is confident that it has sufficient means to deter a nuclear attack.

Pakistan and India are not so fortunate. They appear locked in an action-reaction syndrome, which is why their stockpiles are likely to exceed those of Great Britain and France over time. This competitive dynamic is best symbolized by the Indian Army's embrace of “Cold Start” planning and the Pakistani Army's embrace of short-range nuclear options. Cold Start planning was prompted after the Kargil War by New Delhi's perceived need to deter further adventurism under the nuclear umbrella by Rawalpindi or its proxies. The Pakistan Army's decision to publicize its short-range nuclear capabilities was prompted by its perceived need to deter Cold Start-type military operations.

These moves and counter-moves to “enhance” deterrence have not led to deterrence stability. Nor have they provided a greater sense of security within India and Pakistan. Instead, they have provided further impetus to a nuclear arms competition on the subcontinent. India is contemplating the procurement of missile defenses and deployment of multiple warheads atop some missiles. Pakistan has expressed readiness to deploy MIRVs, as well.

“Nuclear weapons have so far contributed to deterrence in two extreme cases -- the avoidance of nuclear exchanges and major conventional warfare”

No one can reasonably claim that India's Cold Start planning and Pakistan's “tactical” nuclear weapons are irrelevant to deterrence. After all, there has not been another severe crisis on the subcontinent for the past decade. We cannot know for sure, however, how relevant these factors are because others might have been equally or more important in contributing to the absence of a major crisis. Pakistan's preoccupation with Afghanistan, the negative geopolitical repercussions from Kargil, the 2001-2 “Twin Peaks” and 2008 Mumbai crises, and the US drift towards India might also have contributed to

the absence of a crisis. New Delhi, the defender of the status quo that Pakistan finds so objectionable, has more to lose than gain from a crisis. It is preoccupied with growing its economy, trying to contain the violence in Kashmir, and keeping a watchful eye on China. Another major crisis might have been avoided even without Cold Start and tactical nuclear weapons. We just cannot say for sure.

What we can say is that nuclear weapons have so far contributed to deterrence in two extreme cases -- the avoidance of nuclear exchanges and major conventional warfare. It does not follow, however, that adding more weapons and new types of nuclear capabilities reinforce deterrence. If this were true, every additional increment, such as missiles carrying multiple warheads or missile defenses, would make the contestants feel safer and more secure. This clearly isn't the case, but the contestants feel that they are in a bind: if they don't keep up the competition, they might also feel less safe and secure.

Deterrence theory is oriented toward “more is better,” but this does not ensure positive outcomes in dangerous crises.

Deterrence theory, among its many failings, does not take into account paradox and irony. Take, for example, how the 2008 Mumbai crisis played out. India's profound embarrassment should have, at least according to deterrence theory, served to benefit Pakistan, especially when there was no Indian military riposte. But Pakistan has not enjoyed the benefits of enhanced deterrence as a result of the Mumbai crisis. Instead, Pakistan lost international standing and found itself increasingly isolated.

The paradoxes of nuclear deterrence applied equally to India. Cold Start planning failed -- and failed spectacularly -- to deter the Mumbai attacks. By not authorizing retaliatory strikes, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh compounded the damage to India's deterrence posture -- at least in terms of deterrence theory. Paradoxically, even though Indian decision makers backed down, New Delhi still secured impressive gains after the crisis passed in economic and geopolitical terms.

How Narendra Modi might respond to a high-profile attack is another

“ A competition to enhance qualitative and quantitative nuclear capabilities does not lead to deterrence stability, even at extremely high force levels, as was evident during the Cold War US-Soviet competition ”

matter entirely. Deterrence, after all, hinges on uncertainty, and no one can confidently predict whether he would demonstrate similar restraint under similar circumstances. He could decide to retaliate against provocation, and India could paradoxically lose more than it might gain as a result.

The paradoxes surrounding nuclear weapons continue to confound deterrence theorists. Nuclear advantages have not helped when fighting weaker, but determined foes on their own home turf. Tailored, low-yield warhead designs don't help if they require crossing the nuclear threshold in battle for the first time since 1945 -- and thus becoming an international pariah. Boosters of more and better nuclear capabilities therefore rest their case on the big picture, one that cannot be proven wrong: that nuclear deterrence “works,” and that it has saved lives from nuclear exchanges and full-blown conventional wars. Other reasons for the absence of nuclear wars are relegated to supporting roles, making the costs of deterrence acceptable.

These costs are growing. To take an extreme case, the United States plans to spend more than one trillion dollars over the next three decades to modernize and upgrade nuclear deterrence. The United States can afford these expenditures, as unwise as they might be. The United States won the Cold War in part because the Soviet Union's rickety economy could not afford a full-blown nuclear

competition. Perhaps a similar dynamic will play out with the Russian Federation, which also cannot afford to compete in a nuclear arms race with the United States. In this highly competitive dynamic, there are three exit strategies: the competitors can accept tacit constraints or negotiate reductions on their force levels; the state with the weaker economy can assert that it has sufficient nuclear firepower to deter and drop out of the competition; or the state with the stronger economy can quit an interactive competition and focus on economic or other means of gathering strength.

Deterrence stability lies in the eye of the beholder. If a competitor feels confident in the ability to wreak unacceptable damage on an opponent, regardless of imbalances in the force levels, that state can accept comparative disadvantage while presuming to achieve deterrence stability. During much of the Cold War, China maintained minimal deterrence capabilities against two massive superpower arsenals, believing this was sufficient to deter nuclear attacks. Neither superpower launched a nuclear attack against China, so Beijing could reasonably claim that its minimal deterrent served national security purposes. With US-China friction on the rise, China is now increasing its nuclear capabilities, but other forms of national power -- particularly naval, space and cyber capabilities -- also appear to have a significant priority along with maintaining high rates of economic growth.

A competition to enhance qualitative and quantitative nuclear capabilities does not lead to deterrence stability, even at extremely high force levels, as was evident during the Cold War US-Soviet competition. In lieu of deterrence stability by means of force structure, the superpowers agreed not to play with fire in highly sensitive locations after the Cuban missile crisis and accepted the post-Cold War division of Europe with West Germany as a non-nuclear weapon state. They were then in a position to negotiate constraints on their strategic nuclear forces. These negotiations did not, however, produce deterrence stability.

Instead, their competition continued, channeled through loopholes in the agreements reached. Significant force reductions became possible only when the Soviet Union was facing dissolution and the United States was prepared to accept deep cuts. A period of deterrence stability then followed, ending when the Russian Federation revived to challenge the post-Cold War order.

The Pakistan-India strategic competition constitutes a far different case. These “middle powers” in the global nuclear order have outstanding grievances that have only been magnified by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Their limited conventional war in the heights above Kargil and subsequent crises ratcheted up the nuclear competition on the subcontinent. China's strategic modernization programs and history of supporting Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, both civil and military, pose another significant complication. A triangular strategic competition is inherently unstable when all three of its legs are of different size, and two legs are conjoined at the expense of the third.

Now add border disputes, friction along these borders, the absence of constructive diplomacy and the low priority accorded to negotiating nuclear confidence-building and risk-reduction measures and one has a predictable recipe for deterrence instability. Under these circumstances, it is folly to think that additional nuclear capabilities will effectively “enhance” deterrence. Instead, they will prompt

“ A triangular strategic competition is inherently unstable when all three of its legs are of different size, and two legs are conjoined at the expense of the third ”



“ The holy grail of deterrence stability is accessible only to those nuclear-armed states confident in the efficacy of restraint ”

additional countermeasures, after which deterrence will once again be challenged.

The United States and the Soviet Union felt obliged to compete and disadvantaged

if they failed to compete. Moreover, both embraced war-fighting strategies and counterforce capabilities in the event deterrence failed. A rough balance at high levels of counterforce capabilities did not -- and cannot -- lend itself to deterrence stability, even in the absence of national missile defenses. The overlay of missile defense deployments can further intensify such a competition, unless one of the competitors is confident that defenses can be breached with modest effort.

China, Pakistan and India are now facing the same choices as the United States and the Soviet Union did decades ago, albeit at far lower force levels. Missiles carrying multiple warheads, missile

defenses, and counterforce capabilities are all on the anvil. Familiar dilemmas of the pursuit of “enhanced” deterrence are likely to repeat themselves. Nuclear overkill isn't stabilizing when it doesn't stop competitive behaviors. The holy grail of deterrence stability is accessible only to those nuclear-armed states confident in the efficacy of restraint.

Michael Krepon is the Co-founder of the Stimson Center and the author of Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb.

Terrorist Safe Havens in Afghanistan Threaten Pakistan

Jamatul Ahrar and TTP operating against Pakistan from their bases in Afghanistan



Rahimullah Yusufzai

There has been enough evidence of the transnational composition of militant groups operating in different parts of the world.

The ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities, common enemies and goals, easy interaction through the internet and porous borders are some of the reasons for such groups to be able to recruit in various parts of the world. Among these groups, al-Qaeda and Taliban managed to attract fighters from different countries and ethnicities while the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) went a step further and used the social media to radicalize and recruit men and women from all over the world.

The ethnic Kurds living in five countries most likely are interacting and cooperating with each other as part of

the different separatist groups seeking an independent Kurdish state. It is not only Muslim militants who joined transnational militant groups. The Tamils of Sri Lanka due to ethnic reasons received help from Indian Tamils and the Tamil diaspora present mostly in Western countries.

In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Afghan and Pakistani militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Haqqani network linked to the Afghan Taliban, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and others have occasionally cooperated and helped each other in the past. The al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) earlier and the ISIL, commonly known as Daesh, more recently have also inducted members from different countries and cultures in their ranks.

Still it came as a surprise when the outlawed Pakistani militant group, Jamaatul Ahrar, announced while claiming responsibility for the May 17 attack on a Frontier Corps convoy in Nowshera in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that the suicide bomber was an Afghan citizen. Publicly admitting this fact was something new and, therefore, surprising.

The Jamaatul Ahrar, a splinter faction of the proscribed, mainstream militant group, TTP, issued the photo of a young man wearing sunglasses and identified him as the suicide bomber Roohul Amin aka Qari Usman, a resident of Battikot district in Afghanistan's eastern Nangarhar province bordering Pakistan.

It was apparently the first time that the Jamaatul Ahrar, led by an Afghanistan-based Pakistani militant Abdul Wali aka Omar Khalid Khorasani, publicly admitted that an Afghan national recruited by it had carried out the suicide bombing in Pakistan in which 14 persons, including seven soldiers and seven civilians were injured. If true, this showed the evolving transnational composition of Jamaatul Ahrar and certain other militant groups.

The Jamaatul Ahrar and TTP leadership shifted to Afghanistan around 2009 after major operations by the Pakistan military against the local and foreign militants in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur and other tribal regions of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but the focus of their attacks has always been Pakistan.

It was no coincidence that another suicide attack was undertaken in Pakistan's Balochistan province also on May 17 and this time the military's media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), reported that "all five attackers were apparently Afghans." If confirmed, this was another indication that Afghan citizens recruited by Pakistani militant groups were willing to undertake terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The attack, which caused injuries to eight security forces' personnel, was claimed by the TTP led by Maulana Fazlullah, who was killed in a US drone strike in mid-June in Afghanistan's eastern Kunar province. All five TTP attackers were killed before they could enter the Frontier Corps' Madadgar Centre in Quetta and cause further damage.

In both cases, the attackers were on a major suicide mission on the same day and the target was the Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that serves in the frontlines of the war against terrorism and is deployed in FATA and all over the western border with Afghanistan. More importantly, the attackers

were said to be Afghans working for two Pakistani militant groups that have found safe havens in Afghanistan after losing control of territory in Pakistan. Until now, many Pakistani militants were fighting for Afghan militant groups and also the ISIL's Khorasan province chapter, but the trend seems to be changing as Afghans appear willing to fight on behalf of Pakistani terrorist organizations.

The TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar have had an uneasy relationship since August 2014 when the latter broke away after criticizing Maulana Fazlullah for deviating from TTP's policies. Though the two groups have never fought each other and have reportedly even cooperated while planning and executing terrorist attacks in Pakistan, their differences due to personality clashes and tactics have yet to be bridged. At one stage, the Jamaatul Ahrar announced its affiliation to Daesh, but the decision was withdrawn due to unspecified reasons. It is possible the move created differences in its ranks. Or the likelihood of a hostile reaction from the Afghan Taliban, which has been fighting Daesh for control of territory in Afghanistan, made the

“Jamaatul Ahrar is one of the most violent militant groups and has claimed responsibility for scores of terrorist attacks, including the one at Wagah near the border with India in November 2014 in which 55 persons were killed and more than 200 sustained injuries”

Jamaatul Ahrar leadership to reverse the decision.

The Jamaatul Ahrar is one of the most violent militant groups and has claimed responsibility for scores of terrorist





attacks, including the one at Wagah near the border with India in November 2014 in which 55 persons were killed and more than 200 sustained injuries. Pakistan's efforts to get it labelled as a terrorist organization finally succeeded on July 6, 2017 when the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the group. However, Islamabad's campaign to have its leader Omar Khalid Khorasani declared as a wanted global terrorist has yet to succeed due to opposition by the United States of America. As the Jamaatul Ahrar head is based in Afghanistan, it seems the US forces in the country and the Afghan government would have to accept responsibility for arresting him once he is declared a global terrorist.

As for the TTP, the UN Security Council sanctions committee included it in its list in July 2011. The US had declared the TTP a foreign terrorist organization in September 2010 and announced a reward of \$5 million for information leading to Maulana Fazlullah's arrest. Both Fazlullah and Omar Khalid Khorasani, for whose capture a reward of \$3 million was announced by the US, remained at large even though they were based in Afghanistan and had been regularly

claiming responsibility for attacks in Pakistan.

Maulana Fazlullah, who belonged to Swat, has finally been eliminated in the US drone strike in the eastern Kunar province, but the threat posed by his group primarily to Pakistan would not end until the TTP cadres find it difficult to operate from their safe havens in Afghanistan. His successor Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud is apparently an even more radical and committed militant because he is both a fighter and an ideologue. The fact that he belongs to the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan where the TTP was founded by Baitullah Mehsud in December 2007 makes it obvious that the group's leadership has returned to the Mehsuds from Swat and its new leader will strive to make his presence felt in future.

As for the Jamaatul Ahrar head Omar Khalid Khorasani, there were reports a few times that he has been killed or injured in Afghanistan. However, the reports were never confirmed. It is possible he was wounded in action as he apparently became inactive for a while. Though it was reported in October 2017 that he was killed in an American drone strike

in Afghanistan's Paktia province, it wasn't true as the US State Department added his name to its Rewards for Justice wanted list in March 2018.

With both TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar still operating from bases in Afghanistan and reportedly cooperating with the ISIL Khorasan unit that partially controls three districts in Nangarhar province bordering Pakistan, Islamabad has to be alert to this omnipresent threat.

The evolving transnational composition of these Pakistan-focused militant groups even if slow enhances the threat to Pakistan. The ideal way to counter this threat would be for Afghanistan and Pakistan to cooperate in tackling all such militant groups. Another way would be to facilitate a peace agreement between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul to prevent the transnational militant groups with a global agenda from exploiting the situation to their advantage.

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TRUMP MISSES, ROUHANI HITS: CALLING THE CURTAINS ON JCPOA



NEVER INTERFERE WITH YOUR ENEMY WHEN HE IS MAKING A MISTAKE



Sina Azodi

After months of speculation, President Trump finally announced his controversial decision last month to unilaterally withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and re-imposed the previously waived nuclear related sanctions on Iran. Previously, Iranian officials had warned of the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal, even threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nevertheless, after Trump's announcement Iran proclaimed that it will continue implementing the deal with other signatories to the JCPOA, if its interests are protected.

In response to Trump's all-out war against the JCPOA, Iran played what the famous mathematician, John Von Neumann dubbed the *Game Theory*. According to this theory, one player (Iran) plays

according to the best strategy of its opponent- in this case- the United States. Neumann argued that while this strategy may not guarantee a maximum gain, but it will prevent from a maximum loss. For the United States, the best outcome would have been Iran's withdrawal, which would put Iran in the violation of the JCPOA (maximum loss). Nevertheless, Iranians patiently waited for the U.S. to make the first move on the deal, and outmaneuvered the Trump administration, which from the beginning pushed Iran to abrogate the deal first.

Trump's decision to unilaterally abrogate the JCPOA delivered Iran a public diplomacy victory. For forty years, Iran was branded as a pariah state with no regards for international norms and treaties. However, Trump's decision to scrap an international agreement which bears the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council has changed that. Iran, by fulfilling its obligations under the nuclear deal, shifted the blame towards the U.S. and maintained the moral high ground. Recently, the UN

nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), published its first report after the US withdrawal, reaffirming Iran's compliance to the JCPOA.

Iran, by fully implementing the deal, has also been able to draw a wedge between the United States and its European allies, who joined the United States in enacting and enforcing a crippling sanctions regime on Iran's economy. However, it is noteworthy to mention that this is not a new strategy. Iranian statesmen have historically used a combination of concessions and short-term alliances to offset the pressures of hostile powers. For example, in 2003, Iranians negotiated with the representatives of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (EU-3) to avoid a potential conflict with the United States. President Rouhani, who at the time led Iran's negotiating team, in his book *National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy* states that Iran's strategy at the time was to negotiate a deal with the Europeans in order to create a rift between the United States and the EU over Iran's nuclear



“ While no European policy can force the global European companies to trade with Iran, and many of them have already left the Iranian market, lack of cooperation with US sanctions, and a proper enforcement of Blocking Measures can undermine the effectiveness of the sanction regime ”

program. During the Cold War also, Iran allied with the U.S. mainly to deter the Soviet Union from invading the country.

Unlike the Obama administration, when major world powers including China and Russia came onboard with the U.S. to curtail Iran's nuclear program, Trump's campaign against the international liberal order has clearly angered America's European allies. The EU has legitimate interests in preserving the JCPOA, and believes that the collapse of the deal will endanger the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and hence its security. Immediately after President Trump's decision to abrogate JCPOA, the governments of EU-3 issued a joint statement, expressing their "concern and regret," while simultaneously "urging" Iran to abide by its commitments; Iran has so far complied with their demands.

To be effective, economic sanctions require both coercion (enforcement) and cooperation. The current administration in Washington has already indicated that the economic sanctions will be enforced and has vowed for "historic" sanctions on Iran. Nevertheless, it is not clear if the EU states would be willing to cooperate with US extraterritorial sanctions. In fact, the EU member states have already updated the 1996 Blocking Measures to counter US extraterritorial sanctions. While no European policy can force the global European companies to trade with Iran,

and many of them have already left the Iranian market, lack of cooperation with US sanctions, and a proper enforcement of Blocking Measures can undermine the effectiveness of the sanction regime.

It seems that Iran's political establishment has concluded that while the benefits of JCPOA will never arrive, it can weather out the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy by keeping the lifeline of its economy-the oil exports- open. In the aftermath of President Trump's decision to abrogate the JCPOA, both Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, stated that if the EU guarantees Iran's oil sales, Iran will remain in the nuclear deal. While it is not clear if the European Union can realistically meet Iran's demands, it is expected to offer its package of "incentives" to Iran, in order to persuade the country to remain in the deal. The details of the package are yet to be clear; nevertheless, it should offer Iran certain trade benefits to counter the negative effects of US sanctions and convince Iran not to abrogate the JCPOA.

Iranians are perhaps hopeful that in the upcoming US midterm elections, Democrats can re-take the control of Congress, which could limit Trump's freedom of action. It is also noteworthy to mention that the 2020 US presidential elections are not that far away, and it is

possible-however unlikely- that a more workable president assumes office. While some pundits have suggested that Iran will be forced to negotiate with the Trump administration, I believe that no Iranian politician currently has the political capital to engage the Americans. The U.S. withdrawal from the deal has severely undermined the position of pro-engagement factions of Iran's polity, including President Hassan Rouhani. Furthermore, Ayatollah Khamenei is unlikely to show "heroic flexibility" and bless the negotiations with the US for a second time.

The current administration in Washington is mistakenly convinced that the maximum pressure policy would bring Iranians to the negotiations table; however, this view is flawed. In the coming months Iran will face the daunting threat of harsh sanctions on its already ill economy. However, given its peculiar cost-benefit analysis, and world view, Iran is unlikely to yield to the Trump administration's demands. Instead, it will do what it does best: wait and hope for better circumstances.

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CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE OF BOKO HARAM



Dr. Muhammad Ali

What is security? In general terms, security is defined very broadly. It is often classified into four distinct areas: political, economic, social, and environmental. Although, all the dimensions of security are important, economic dimension as a critical area needs urgent attention.

The security threats in the 21st century are threats to national, regional and global security. In Africa, the security threats pose difficult challenges. They range from the struggle to control mineral resources, under-development, poor governance, and the spread of religious fundamentalism and extremism or “Radical Islam” a term used in the western world. The threat from violent Islamic extremism is evident in Algeria, Mali, Kenya, Somalia, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania and the Central Africa Republic.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Since the advent of the fourth republic on 29th of May 1999, Nigeria with over four hundred (400) ethnic groups, belonging to several religious sects and seventy-two (72) registered political parties, has remained a multi-ethnic, multi-religious nation state. It is a nation grappling and trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity, ethno-religious conflicts and democracy. This is because over the years the phenomena of ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts, which have given birth to many ethnic militias like the O'dua People's Congress (OPC); the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MENDS).

The security problem or ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria is a manifestation of the emergence of political miscalculations and missed opportunities in the country. Nigerians are divided by language, culture and religion, which are supposed to be sources of strength rather than sources of conflicts. The struggle for political power and authority saw the emergence of internal conflicts and tensions, very often with negative consequences.

Many political analysts and social critics have alleged that, the demand for the distribution of public goods, services and political appointments or what is generally referred to as “federal character,” which by the way is a constitutional requirement in appointments to public offices are responsible for the conflicts in Nigeria.

Politicians in Nigeria, and in some cases Africa, have capitalized on this to create problems that often degenerates into serious confrontation due to selfishness or the absence of credible leadership or both as exemplified by the recurring violent clashes in many parts of Nigeria.

The inter or intra ethnic and religious conflicts are the major sources of disagreement in Nigeria. For example, the infamous Reverend Bako crusade at the College of Education Kafanchan in 1987 that left hundreds dead, the Kano riots of 1991 with over 60 people killed, February 1992 Zangon Kataf riots 1 & 2 with over 1500 dead, 1993 Tafawa Balewa crisis recorded 540 deaths, 1999 OPC/ Hausa Community Yam Market crisis in which 2000 lives were lost, the Hausa/ Yoruba Shagamu crisis of July 1999 with more than 1700 people killed, the Kaduna anti-Sharia riots 1&2 in 2000 recorded over 1650 deaths, 2001 Jos inter communal clashes with over 1000 people confirmed dead, the massacre of over 1000 Muslims in the town of Yelwa in Shendam local

government area of Plateau state in 2004 with a substantial number of Muslim women taken captive, the November 28th and 29th, 2008 communal crisis which had its roots in the election of a local government Chairman which the then state Governor Jonah Jang imposed on the people of Jos North local government claimed the lives of 632 Muslims. Over 1062 Muslim homes were completely burnt down, January 17th-22nd 2010 genocide in Jos North, Jos South and Barikin Ladi local government areas of Plateau state shows that insecurity in Nigeria has escalated.

All these conflicts represent a delicate fault line in the distribution of political appointments and services to communities while on the other hand it clearly shows the failure of government in its responsibilities to the governed.

Nigeria is a rich state and yet the level of unemployment, underemployment and human suffering with massive wastage of public resources and scandalous opulence by a select few has led to the fight against corruption. As President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces President Muhammadu Buhari (GCFR) has repeatedly admonished “**we must kill corruption before corruption kills us.**”

On the other hand, ethnicity and religion can be effective tools (sources) of support for government (leadership). But sadly, these tools have been abused by opportunist in position of power and are making state security vulnerable and susceptible. The security projections and estimates have shifted repeatedly since the commencement of civil democratic rule in 1999. No progress has been made on a straight line. Security projections are no longer done with commitment to values and principles of intelligence but it is done to serve personal vested interest. This has



created heightened public perception of the prevalence of insecurity in Nigeria.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

The policy of the United States of America, since the return to civil democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, for the lack of a better word, has been former President Obasanjo centered. He is considered more like a great statesman, a savior of Nigeria who does no wrong, having behind him a strong team of former ambassadors, experts and lobbyist. Therefore, the problematic nature of external influences played a critical role in the 2003 and 2007 Nigerian Presidential elections. The anti-Taliban dominated National Security Council (NSC) members who were Obasanjo's allies successfully rebuffed any attempt to have any sensible policy towards Nigeria.

Immediately after the sad event of September 11, 2001, Ambassador Lyman focused his attention on Taliban, Al-Qaida and the Nigerian Muslim Organisations; the Muslim North propagating the possibility of a linkage between the Muslim Organisations in Northern Nigeria and the Taliban or Al-Qaida or both. The narrative was presented as a global fight against the larger interest of the United States, in a global Jihad. In the period 1999 to 2007 during the eight

years Presidency of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Northern Nigeria witnessed multiple ethno-religious conflicts which afforded Ambassador Layman ample opportunity to come up with several write-ups of predictions and speculations for external linkage and possible collaboration between Northern Nigeria Muslim Organisations and the larger Muslim Jihadists Movements.

These and many events in and around the government of former President Olusegun Obasanjo and former President Goodluck Jonathan coupled with the pronouncements of Jonathan's National Security Adviser, General Andrew Azazi made many Northern bureaucrats to ask what went wrong and begin to suspect Obasanjo's intention towards Northern Nigeria. Through several international intrigues, Nigeria was pulled into by former President Goodluck Jonathan's Security Adviser Adrew Azazi and the result today is the violent extremism and killings of innocent lives by the group known as Boko Haram.

BOKO HARAM

It all started in 2002 as a revivalist or reformist religious movement fondly referred to by locals as “the Yusufiyya Movement” while the leader and his followers called it “JAMAATU AHALAL

SUNNA LIL DAAWATI WALJIHAD.” Its motive was to establish an “Islamic Caliphate” under the leadership of a little known scholar with no known history of western education by the name Mohammed Yusuf whose father was a follower of the heretic **Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine** who in December 1980 took Kano by storm resulting in the death of thousands of people before the military crushed his anti-establishment rebellion.

Muhammad Yusuf from all indications was bent on resurrecting the teachings of Maitatsini by urging Muslims to abstain from western education, reject working in any government establishment and embrace “Islam only”. Western education in their opinion is forbidden hence the acronym “Boko Haram” but this is in total contravention of the true teachings of Islam since Islam is an intellectual tradition and a social movement. Various scholars of repute have tried unsuccessfully to convince Yusuf to accept the fact that western education is not forbidden but to no avail.

This position taken by Yusuf has drawn him a lot of followership particularly from amongst Borno's rural population; largely uneducated, unemployed and poor. As the movement continues to wax stronger



Mohammad Yusuf in one of his preaching seasons before taking arms against the state

in Borno, his headquarter, branches were opened by his trusted allies in Adamawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Kaduna and Kano states. Suddenly, politicians began exploiting the group for electoral gains. The Borno State Government of the time under the leadership of Governor Ali Madu Sheriff (2003-2007) thought it convenient to fraternize with Mohammed Yusuf giving support in cash and kind in return for the support of Yusuf's congregation to the **All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)** controlled by State Government of Senator Ali Madu Sheriff for a second term in office.

The arrangement succeeded as Sheriff won a second term in office as Governor of Borno State (2007-2011) and in return he appointed Yusuf's close confidant and father in-law Hajji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs in his cabinet with the understanding that Sharia Law would be implemented in Borno State. One year into the second tenure of Sheriff, it became clear to Mohammed Yusuf that Sheriff was not interested in implementing Sharia Law as agreed when seeking for their support.

The failure to implement the Sharia law as agreed set Yusuf and his followers against the government of Borno State and the federal law enforcement agencies domiciled in the State, particularly members of the Nigeria Police Force whom they regarded as agents of oppression. This was the beginning of the end as Yusuf made a declaration to wage jihad against what he called the oppressive leadership of Madu Sheriff and to replace it with an Islamic model.

People who shared his ideology from across Northern States made it to Borno to be part of what later turned out to be

the worst conflagration ever witnessed in Borno State or any state for that matter; the day set for the jihad declaration was 29th July 2009. Followers of Yusuf came from all over Northern Nigeria, some part of Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon. They fought the establishment and in the process people were killed in thousands; women, children, the aged, the disabled and a handful of security operatives also died in the conflict. Members of the Nigeria Police Force were later accused of extra judicial killings by both domestic and international observers.

Mohammed Yusuf was captured alive by members of the Nigeria Army and handed over to the Police who in turn took him to the Governor. Governor Ali Madu Sherif (as he then was) ordered that Yusuf be killed and the police swiftly carried out the order which also included Hajji Buji Foi, thereby destroying the chance to obtain any evidence as to the sponsors of Boko Haram in Nigeria and their foreign collaborators. The killing of these two leaders is what gave birth to the open confrontation between federal troops and members of Boko Haram who are heavily armed. The fighting persists 9 years after.

This in a nut shell was the beginning of the insurgency by Boko Haram in North East Nigeria which has claimed over 25,000 lives to date with mass displacement of people, villages and large settlements to a point that by 2014, Boko Haram was in control of over 24 local government areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States coupled with the abduction of the 219 Chibok Government Girls Secondary School students in Borno State on 14th April 2014. It is believed that Boko Haram is getting Intel assistance from senior Nigerian intelligence officials. To these officials, this is a means to an end.

For two years, nothing was heard of the 219 school girls until May 2016 when an Army backed Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) found one girl with a child inside Sambisa forest close to the Nigerian border with Cameroon. Two others escaped in September 2016 and January 2017. In October 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the

Swiss Government brokered negotiation between the Nigerian Government and Boko Haram led to the release of 21 girls and in May 2017 another batch of 82 girls were released.

The Nigerian Army's continued sloth on the insurgents has decimated Boko Haram but pockets of them are still around and are routinely waging attacks. On 19th February 2018, a group of Boko Haram insurgents stormed the Government Girls Science and Technical College Dapchi Yobe State and abducted 110 girls in what can be described as failure of intelligence on the part of the security agencies. Dapchi is next to the second strong hold of Boko Haram a town called Kanamma and the withdrawal of troops deployed to guard the bridge that links Dapchi to Kanamma without providing adequate contingency was to say the least reckless. On 21st March 2018, exactly one month after the Dapchi abduction, 104 girls were returned based on interest based negotiation, 5 have died in captivity due to what one of the freed girls described as exhaustion and trauma while one Leah Sharibu is still being held on the grounds that she being the only Christian amongst them must accept Islam which she declined.

DISPLACEMENT OF COMMUNITIES

What followed in the wake of Boko Haram insurgency was the displacement of people from their villages, communities and towns in their thousands. This has added to the already fragmented security situation the North-East finds itself in following the raging attacks by Boko Haram insurgents and their female suicide bombers whom findings revealed were acting under the influence of drugs and not the teachings of Islam as they want us to believe.

The new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari (GCFR) vowed to end Boko Haram insurgency. It designed and perfected a new approach to the war on insurgency by directing that the Tactical Command Centre of the Army be moved to Maiduguri. This was complied with as the Army under a new leadership led by Lt Gen Tukur Yusuf Buratai was reinvigorated, alive and active. In no time,

“ **Boko Haram grew to be a major security challenge because it tapped into wide discontent with bad governance, corruption and official impunity** ”

they conquered and returned all the local government areas under the control of Boko Haram back to the fold of the State.

While the act of insurgency has been decimated, the major challenge to resettlement is corruption. There are recorded cases of officials entrusted with the management of the IDP camps diverting food and other essential items meant for the refugees into market places and sold off. This attitude of some of the officials has continued to cause hardship in the camps.

NIGERIA'S COUNTER TERRORISM ANTECEDENT

Since the year 2008 when the insurgent group Boko Haram started gaining momentum, an assessment of the steadily rising threats posed by the group in North Eastern Nigeria should have been made with precision and carefully managed based on cultural and traditional values. The Boko haram insurgents just like the Niger Delta Militants were dissatisfied and agitated with the dysfunctional and corrupt administrations of former President Olusegun Obasanjo to former President Goodluck Jonathan. It is not about establishing an Islamic Caliphate; it is about the interest of certain people in government including former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan.

Just after the 1st October 2010 bombing at the Eagle Square, Abuja during the Independence Day commemoration, President Good Luck Jonathan had told the nation that there are elements loyal to Boko Haram in his government. It was not

surprising, what was surprising was the inability of his administration to mention who they are or steps his administration intends to take against them.

There are no real interests to control the activities of Boko Haram because of the vested interests of certain foreign governments in collusion with their agents in the present administration and the country. Instead of using mediation at the onset, the government of the time misused its elements of national power against a purely civil uprising. Hence the crisis escalated with irreparable loss amongst innocent civil population including women and children. Contemporary threats in the form of insurgency or guerrilla war fare are difficult to predict because of the human factor and continuous scheming. Therefore, crime prevention experts are agreed that traditional law enforcement alone is not sufficient in the management of public safety.

THE WAY FORWARD

The best way to address cases of insecurity, religious extremism and violent clashes in Africa is to try and mitigate the underlying causes such as poverty, unemployment, ignorance, absence of social justice, political manipulation, corruption etc.

Governments in Africa should also stop paying lip service to issues of development and should seek to set up task forces to critically look at the education sector in respective countries. The following areas need serious attention:

1. Curriculum Development
2. Financing
3. Resource use
4. Teaching and Learning
5. Early Childhood Education
6. Primary and Secondary Education
7. Vocational Training and Skills Development Center's
8. The Physically Challenged and Education
9. Tertiary Education
10. Global Education
11. Launch and sustain a strong Civic Education programme to halt polarisation of religion.

12. Reorganize the Nigerian Police Force to see itself as a partner to citizens in detecting and dealing with all forms of threats to public safety and security. This can be attained through proper re-orientation, funding, training and re-training in modern security technics and provision of functional working tools for the personnel.

13. The war on corruption should be pursued with vigor ensuring that all those found guilty including top security personnel and politicians face the full wrath of the law.

14. Create the right and enabling environment for job creation, placement and empowerment.

The 21st century continues to face serious national, regional, and global security challenges. Africa, and by extension, Nigeria faces dire security challenges. If Africa and Nigeria do not get their acts together, the future of the continent is bleak.

Boko Haram grew to be a major security challenge because it tapped into wide discontent with bad governance, corruption and official impunity. To tackle this, the federal and state governments must work together and develop comprehensive work plans to address not only the insecurity challenges in Africa but the agitations that fuel the insurgency, gang violence, rustling and identity fanaticism etc.

Finally, a clear departure from the politics of money and banditry which has produced ready recruits for all sorts of violence must be revisited and redefined for the purpose of a united and progressive Nigeria because to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done. As such, there is a need for collaboration and partnerships across board to deal with national, regional and global insecurity in order to make the world a better and peaceful place.

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HARNESSING THE CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC) TIGER




Saba Shahid

It has already been established that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers Pakistan an opportunity for both economic and human development. However, we need to go beyond the debate on whether CPEC will be a “game-changer” or not. Rather we need to focus on the extent to which it can help Pakistan attain its development goals, and how effectively we can achieve the prerequisites to maximise benefits.

Projects in the CPEC are estimated to be between 46 to 62 billion USD, this is around 17 per cent of the country’s total GDP. It will enhance the geo-strategic location of Pakistan, providing easier access to the Middle East (via the Arabian Sea) and Eastern Europe to China and also improve Pakistan’s access to major international markets. In addition to infrastructure development, there are three key elements to CPEC: the development of the Gawadar port, investments in the energy sector and the development of Special Economic Zones. Each of these three areas have their respective challenges and opportunities including the considerable impact on Pakistan’s trade situation, business and entrepreneurship environment, employment levels and youth development.

Pakistan will be able to benefit from these opportunities if policies surrounding CPEC are transparent and evidence-based and are backed by a deep and clear understanding of local conditions.



source. Research indicates that there are over 60 individual projects that fall under the CPEC umbrella. Some of these have

been found through the official CPEC webpage, others have been announced by various ministries, including the *Long Term Plan on CPEC (LTP)* (in November 2017) produced by Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning Development and Reform while several others have been identified through newspaper articles, independent studies or even blog posts. Data collected from public sources revealed 12 infrastructure projects, 19 energy projects, 12 projects specific to Gwadar and 3 related to fibre optics and telecommunications and to the meteorological department. Additionally, the government has listed 6 provincial projects, which involve further infrastructure development, 9 projects related to the establishment of Special Economic Zones and 4 social sector development projects. Even whilst using public sources however, there is ambiguity and overlap within the same source while project lists are updated and changed, making it hard to track investment. For instance the western route has been indicated on the maps available by the official CPEC page but these infrastructure projects are not entirely listed within the CPEC project list on the same website. Moreover, it is hard to differentiate which projects are new and which are a repackaging of existing projects.

In effect there does not seem to be a single integrated resource that indicates all CPEC projects, their exact location, their cost breakdown or financing mix or the expected local employment and income it will generate. The absence of clear, reliable data that is difficult to authenticate is problematic because it feeds into a lack of national consensus,

Pakistan’s leadership will need to charter negotiations with China on CPEC in a manner that boosts trade in the country, provides Pakistanis an opportunity for technical learning and creates quality work. Such a framework should also ensure human development vis-à-vis investments in health and education.

“The government must prioritize its public data strategy that clearly maps out the location for each project, the relevant ministries, departments and professionals responsible, the time scale and financing for implementation, and the expected developmental impact the project is likely to have”

Overall, there are four major areas that require immediate attention to improve the management and operation of CPEC if transformative change to Pakistan’s development is expected. Each of these is discussed subsequently, in no specific order.

First, there is a need to address the inevitable demand for greater data and clarity on all CPEC projects. This must come from the state itself, which must provide reliable information, available in one consolidated

fuelling baseless debate and giving space to unnecessary speculation. The government must prioritize its public data strategy that clearly maps out the location for each project, the relevant ministries, departments and professionals responsible, the time scale and financing for implementation, and the expected developmental impact the project is likely to have. Such a strategy will allow for greater accountability on CPEC and can help promote trust and agreement on what currently is a very controversial undertaking. Additionally, ascertaining consistent transparency of the projects list will help build credibility and will allow more informed analyses.

The second prerequisite the government needs to fulfil to maximize CPEC’s benefits is to *exercise people-centred local development by including human development as a priority in the CPEC policy framework*. Any policy that intends to make CPEC an economic success should understand and respect the process of ‘Local Economic Development.’ To elaborate, local economic development is neither fully top-down planning nor completely bottom-up policymaking, rather, is a hybrid form of development design that emphasizes participatory and community-led growth. It argues against copy-paste initiatives and champions the significance of locally determined, tailor-made solutions. National consensus cannot be achieved where our diverse economic and social needs at the local level are not catered to. And this is vital if indeed the CPEC is expected to be inclusive and not exclusionary, benefitting only those communities that are able to participate just because they belong to a certain linguistic, ethnic, income class or geographic location. A local economic development approach will also improve the extent to which the economic gains of CPEC are spread or divided across the country. This point has been made even more relevant in the context of Pakistan’s governance post the 18th Amendment, which in theory should facilitate the process of a decentralized system of policymaking and implementation.

Third, is giving precedence to Pakistan’s

technological learning, absorptive capacity, and innovative capabilities. CPEC provides us a unique opportunity to benefit from Chinese expertise in various domains that will help Pakistan narrow its developmental divide internationally. This can be understood as ‘technological leapfrogging,’ a concept in development theory that emphasizes the significance of technological adoption and diffusion for human capital development and eventual economic growth. The Asian Miracle has excessively been studied in this regard, but more recent examples closer to home, include the ICT success of Bangalore, which has essentially allowed for the entire country to become a competitive player in the global knowledge economy. The beginning of this was India’s ability to adopt and diffuse innovation from MNCs and foreign investors, but this was complemented with policies to safeguard and facilitate indigenous industries. Pakistan will have to follow a similar path. According to a report by the Oxford Internet Institute (OII), we are already amongst the top 4 countries in the world when it comes to online freelancing in software development and technology. But skills development needs to occur at all levels of the labour force for better integration into the global economy and CPEC can help achieve this. Particular attention for technology adoption needs to be paid to sectors that require urgent attention such as value added agriculture, manufacturing, retail etc.

The fourth priority area is *maximising utility from greater regional connectivity and access to international markets*. This follows from the third point on the importance of becoming a knowledge economy and it is worthwhile recognizing that CPEC will provide Pakistan the platform for capitalizing on interactive learning. A seminal study by Ron Boschma titled *Proximity and Innovation: A Critical Assessment* identified various dimensions of proximity, whose interaction in the right balance can enhance a nation’s level of innovation. In addition to geographic proximity, organizational, cognitive, social and institutional proximities can be instrumental. Applied to the case of China and Pakistan, CPEC has the potential to

“Benefits from CPEC can only be materialized if the leadership consistently promotes consensus amongst the federating units and ensures development will occur in an equitable manner”

help Pakistan use all five proximities to enhance its innovation output. Boschma’s study also warns against expecting geographic proximity alone to yield results. This is caution against those speculating an automatic leap in development through CPEC. Instead, Pakistan’s policymakers should devise solutions that will assist and expedite the channels through which Pakistan can become a competitive player in the international economy. Human capital development through various training and skills development programs should therefore be incorporated in the various CPEC project negotiations.

Finally, to conclude, the opportunities provided by CPEC are numerous, and it is easy to predict the development impact an economic corridor can have in theory. In practice, these benefits from CPEC can only be materialized if the leadership consistently promotes consensus amongst the federating units and ensures development will occur in an equitable manner. Participatory project design through a human development approach is the only way forward as a trickle-down argument will not be enough to appease the varying needs and demands of a socioeconomically diverse country such as Pakistan.

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THE KASHMIR UPRISING



Farooq Hasnat

The ongoing insurgency in the Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK) is nothing short of a third generation war of liberation. Like their grandfathers and parents, scores of Kashmiri men, women and children continue to pour out on the streets of all cities, towns and even rural centers, challenging the occupation of their motherland. This time the mode of resentment departs from the past, as it is consistent, more representative, in gender, age and profession. Also added is the virtue of the absence of fear of the occupier's brutal suppression. In this context a safe parallel can be drawn with the courage of the Palestinians, also struggling against the colonization of their land. The Kashmiri opposition gained momentum, when Burhan Muzaffar Wani of Hizbul Mujahideen was killed on July 8, 2016 by the trigger happy Indian security forces, at the age of 22. Soon Wani, who was already known to people as social media activist, became a folk hero. Since then, the third wave of Kashmir war of independence began unabated.

In order to quell the uprising, the atrocities of the Indian Army reached new heights, where hundreds of protesting youth were ruthlessly killed and injured. The international community finally, last June, took cognizance of the atrocities and human right abuses in the Kashmir valley.

Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, the United Nations Human Rights (UNCHR) Chief recommended an investigation of the gross human rights violations in Kashmir. More than 145 innocent youth were gunned down and more than 15,000 injured



Sources: APP

since July 2016. Many of them were shot with pellet guns, fired directly at the face, making them blind in IOK. This is apart from scores of rape incidents and many thousands injured by the trigger-happy occupation security forces. The UN and other global actors, including the Muslim world contently ignored the continuous curfew and arrests of the Kashmiri people,

going on for decades. Even the notice taken by the UNHCR does not address the broader issue of the Kashmiri resentment, rather it confines exclusively to the matter of human rights violations. It seems that the investigation would not go into the real cause of the protest nor will it exert its authority, even to curtail human rights violations, on short term basis. Human

rights violations are part of the problem, but the real issue remains that of the Indian occupation of Kashmir.

However, the UN initiative highlighted the highhandedness of Indian atrocities. The report puts a dent in India's efforts to hide its gross human rights' violation by giving excuses of rise in Islamic militancy

We can divide the Kashmir issue into three broader eras. The first era began when the matter was taken to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and repeatedly vetoed by India's strategic ally of the Cold War era (1950s and 1960s), the Soviet Union. Kashmir, which was basically an unresolved agenda of the partition, became a fatality of the Cold War tensions.

and cross-border terrorism. India on its part is trying its best to wriggle out of this global exposure through various means, by undermining the UN report. Nevertheless, the UNCHR report noted that peoples' resentment against Indian occupation is, "on an unprecedented scale and involves mostly young, middle-class Kashmiris including females".

The second era from 1980s to 2010 is that of the indigenous uprising of the Kashmiri masses. Disappointed with the lack of interest by the international community, the people of Kashmir revolted in 1989. The third wave of protests and resentment, as hinted above, also known as the "Kashmiri Intifada" originated in 2016, when school children, college girls

“ Kashmir is no more a land dispute between Pakistan and India, but rather a colonized entity, where its residents are relentlessly struggling to gain independence for their homeland ”

and boys, young and old defied the Indian curfews and presence of more than half a million Indian troops, which is near half of the entire Indian army.

The events in Kashmir clearly demonstrate that it is not merely a casual expression of resentment against the Indian occupation, nor is it an insurgency, or initiated by some foreign elements, but rather a full-blown war of independence, which is sustaining with no plausible conclusion. The public uprising and its sacrifice is so immense that on 19th June, the otherwise pro Indian Chief Minister of IOK and ally of the BJP, Mehbooba Mufti resigned. As a result, the occupied area came under direct control of the Indian central government after governor rule was imposed. This power vacuum clearly demonstrates that India has exhausted all its options of suppressing the freedom struggle in IOK.

Kashmir is no more a land dispute between Pakistan and India, but rather a colonized entity, where its residents are relentlessly struggling to gain independence for their homeland. It is also a cause of serious concern for the advocates of human rights. At a time when human rights violations in the valley are in the limelight, Pakistan must ramp-up its diplomatic efforts in support of the legitimate demands of the people of Indian-held Kashmir.

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SELECTIVE ACTIVISM: THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN'S JUDICIARY IN COUNTER- TERRORISM



Sahar Khan

Pakistan's Supreme Court is known for its activism. In February 2018, the Supreme Court banned former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from leading the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and reversed all his decisions. This decision followed a previous one, where the Supreme Court had disqualified Sharif from office for lying about his family assets, forcing Sharif to resign as prime minister in July 2017. Yet, while the Court is being criticized for being overly involved in politics, it remains selective about its activism. For example, the Court continues to seek details of "missing persons," individuals who have been detained by military and law enforcement officials and listed as "missing" by family members. But from 1955, the Court has periodically used the doctrine of necessity, a legal principle used to justify executive overreach and military coups.

Since 2015, the judiciary has been sharing its powers with the military in the realm of counterterrorism. After Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP)'s attack on Peshawar's Army Public School that killed over 140 children in December 2014, the government passed the National Action Plan (NAP) that established military tribunals. In August 2015, the Court upheld the tribunals,

which continue to exist today. In other words, with the blessing of the Supreme Court, Pakistan's constitution allows civilians charged with terrorism to be tried in military courts. This begs the question: has the Supreme Court's activism promoted civil liberties within Pakistan? The answer is complicated, and rooted in the state's anti-terrorism laws.

Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Legal Regime

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 (ATA) serves as a foundation for Pakistan's current anti-terrorism legal regime. It replaced the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of 1975, a law designed to curb secessionist movements in the wake of the 1971 civil war that led to the formation of Bangladesh. The ATA has been amended over 15 times, but in its current form it has three overarching characteristics that impact the Supreme Court's relationship with counterterrorism.

The first is the wide definition of terrorism, which includes crimes like rape, arson, homicide, kidnapping for ransom, and aerial firing, among others. The all-encompassing definition of terrorism has overburdened the Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs), which are specialized courts mandated by the ATA. As such, the ATCs are sluggish.

Second, the procedures outlined in the ATA violate regular criminal justice

“After Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP)’s attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School that killed over 140 children in December 2014, the government passed the National Action Plan (NAP) that established military tribunals”

procedures, creating confusion regarding police methods for collecting permissible evidence. For example, according to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Act 1984 (Evidence Act), only confessions made in front of a District Magistrate (who is not a police officer but an administration with both executive and judicial functions) are permitted in court. But Article 21 H of the ATA allows for confessions made in front of a police officer at the rank of District Superintendent of Police (a senior rank police officers appointed by the provincial government) or higher in the ATCs. Such contradictory procedures not only result in poor investigation but hinder the police's ability to provide adequate witness protection.

And third, while the ATA does mandate ATC regulation, the lack of uniformity

amongst provinces has made transferring cases between ATCs across provincial lines difficult, which occasionally impacts the timeline of a case. Currently, case transfers are decided by apex committees, which are special provincial committees consisting of both civil and military leaders. But these committees are not open to the public, and remain opaque. Therefore, transferring procedures between ATCs and from ATCs to military courts continue to remain unclear.

Collectively, these discrepancies have made the ATA into a political tool of coercion, where people accuse others of terrorism in order to coerce them or seek personal revenge. According to numerous police sources I interviewed in 2015, it is relatively easy to book an individual under the ATA because it covers a wide variety of crimes despite difficulty in gathering witnesses because of poor witness protection.

In addition to the ATA, two more laws have shaped the Supreme Court's response to the government's counterterrorism efforts: The Pakistan Armed Forces Ordinance (PAFO) of 1999 that influenced the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation of 2011 in both FATA and PATA; and the 21st Amendment to the constitution or the 2015 Pakistan Army (Amendments) Act. The Sharif administration passed the PAFO in 1998 after declaring a state of emergency in Karachi due to a drastic increase in sectarian violence. From a judicial standpoint, the most significant characteristic of the PAFO was that the government allowed the military to establish military courts and try civilians under court martial procedures. Similarly, the 2015 Pakistan Army Act, passed unanimously by the parliament in 2015 after the APS attack, also allows the military to charge and try civilians using court martial procedures in military courts. The difference, however, is that while PAFO was a standalone law, the 2015 Pakistan Army Act is actually a constitutional amendment.

National Security vs. Civil Liberties: Judicial Dilemma

In *Mehram Ali vs. Federation of*

Pakistan, the Supreme Court evaluated the merits of the ATA soon after the government passed it in 1997. The Court recommended changes to the ATA but accepted the creation of the ATCs as long as these special courts remained under the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. As such, the Court set a legal precedent of accepting parallel court systems under jurisdictional grounds.

In *Liaquat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan* in 1999, the Supreme Court assessed the PAFO and declared that the military courts created under the law were in fact unconstitutional. The Court ruled that all terrorism-related cases should be heard by the already-established ATCs, under the procedures outlined in *Mehram Ali vs. Federation of Pakistan*. However, the most important aspect of the ruling was the negation of the doctrine of necessity. By 1999, the judiciary had used the doctrine in the past to either legitimize the military administration of justice under civilian rule or military rule altogether. But the use of doctrine varied across judicial levels. For example, in 1973, Pakistan was under martial law, administered by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. When the Ministry of Defense announced the arrest and conviction via military courts of a small group of officers accused of organizing a coup, two of the accused appealed the decision, claiming that they were retired, and hence civilians. As such, the military courts did not apply to them. The Lahore High Court ruled against the appeal and decided that under emergency law, civilians could be charged under the Pakistan Army Act, which dictates court martial procedures. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Then-Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman wrote the majority opinion in *F.B. Ali vs. The State*, which emphasized that civilians could not be charged under the Pakistan Army Act when a civilian leader imposed martial law. In other words, civilian laws would remain superior to military proceedings even in a state of emergency. But when the Supreme Court decided to dissolve the National Awami Party in 1977, it essentially paved the way for military courts to try Awami Party members accused of high treason. However, the Liaquat Hussain decision of 1999 created

an obstacle for military courts to be used as counterterrorism tools. The doctrine of necessity, however, was used again, just two years after the *Liaquat Hussain* verdict in *Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and Others*, when the Supreme Court legitimized Pervez Musharraf's coup and ouster of Nawaz Sharif.

The Supreme Court used the doctrine of necessity again when evaluating the merits of the latest military courts established via the 21st amendment in *District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v Federation of Pakistan*. The majority ruled that the military courts not only met principles and requirements of the criminal justice system but that the constitution allowed a deviation from the regular political system under emergency laws and/or exceptional circumstances (in this case, the APS attack). Some justices also argued that since the changes to the Pakistan Army Act were added into the constitution as an amendment, the Supreme Court actually had no legal authority to question the law—or the validity of the military courts.

Judicial branches worldwide are constantly balancing between national security interests and civil liberties. In the case of Pakistan, there is no doubt that the state is in the midst of two wars: the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, in which Pakistan is a partner, and domestic counterinsurgency against TTP and other militant groups that threaten the state's territory and sovereignty. Pakistan's Supreme Court, however, seems to have turned to the military establishment in the realm of counterterrorism. In other words, the judiciary has prioritized national security interests as outlined by the military establishment over civil liberties, which is a troubling development for two main reasons: it compromises judicial independence, which is a hallmark of democracy, and it encourages biased activism, which may lead to illiberal precedents. The Supreme Court, therefore, needs to be cautious of its own ambitions.

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THE LIMITS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN INFLUENCE:

LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH PACIFIC



Maria Bastos

Research on maritime security and related politics has increased rapidly with China's ambitious Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). While much attention has been paid to MSRI security challenges in the Indian Ocean Region, the South Pacific region, where China is also asserting its presence, has received relatively less attention, in particular among Pakistan security community. This article attempts to provide an overview on how China is being perceived as a security challenge for the South Pacific region, and how regional actors are responding to the Asian giant's expansion. The progress of China's MSRI will remain a security challenge to all the regions it crosses, thus contributing towards a strategic change in the security discourses and practices of regional actors.

The South Pacific region is perhaps better known by its paradisiac beaches and exotic people by former colonial powers, namely France and Britain. While the South Pacific region usually does not make inroads into mainstream international political commentary, there are interesting and relevant political dynamics which global security analysts must be familiar with. The rise of China and the MSRI imply that security and foreign policy analysts must be prepared to engage with a diversified and global approach to issues whose scope is no longer limited to local realities.

China's competition for influence in the region is however not new, and it has been traditionally linked with her most complex international issue – Taiwan. In a region composed by small nation-islands, Taiwan has however guaranteed official diplomatic relations with a few, including Kiribati and the Marshall Islands. Scholars and commentators have long ago signalled to this rivalry in the South Pacific region. As the region's nation-islands are in general vulnerable, and exposed to instability factors, including social, political and economic, external assistance offered by the Asian power has

resulted on yet another rivalry source. Financial aid has reportedly been the preferential tool to exercise power over the South Pacific nations. While Australia remains the main financial aid provider to the region, China appears to be increasing her stake, not only in terms of financial aid, but also by deploying a key tool of her diplomacy – soft power. The promotion of Chinese language, Mandarin, and the student exchange, are according to scholars, a preferential tool for China's assertive incursion in a region where it does not have a geographical presence.

Sino-South Pacific relations are neither new nor threat perception free, particularly to Oceania hegemonic power, Australia. However, the MSRI renews security challenges. Evidence can be found in the latter's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. It is noteworthy that in the document the Australian Government clearly identifies how China can pose a two-pronged challenge to the region: by direct competition with the US over economic and security issues, and by interference into the smaller states affairs. Australia goes an extra mile to urge China to "exercise its power in a way that enhances stability, reinforces international law and respects the interests of smaller countries and their right to pursue them peacefully." (Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017).

The significance of Australian posture is translated into the kind of partnership chosen to face increasing Chinese influence. By involving Japan, Indonesia, India, and the Republic of Korea, specifically labelled in the document as



Source: AFP

“China's competition for influence in the region is however not new, and it has been traditionally linked with her most complex international issue – Taiwan”

democracies, Australia aims to be able to control how regional order will unfold in view of Chinese presence in the region. Reified as the Indo-Pacific, Australia is leading the way to re-imagine the joining of seas, islands and continental land into a 'new' geopolitical block. To be sure, there are several possible ways to discursively frame this new regional arrangement. One way is to envisage it as a continuation of Western based power politics, considering that the West and the South, beyond a geographical meaning, have also acquired a geopolitical meaning that is unfixed and therefore contingent. If this way is followed, a space for interpretative approach arises, thus being possible to frame within foreign policy analysis contested factors like identity, and culture. Other way is by considering the traditional balance of power analysis, where this Indo-Pacific partnership, plus the United States, will extend all possible means to balance the crescent of Chinese influence.

The reader may by now be caught in the task of imagining whether this Indo-Pacific posture is desirable, or it is just the result of Western dominated power politics emboldened by a desire of blocking China's global designs, it is important to be aware of how the latter is persistently trying to go beyond imagined security strategies. A closer look to one of China's developing bilateral relations in the South Pacific region may provide a rationale to understand how and why regional powers are asserting security strategies to contain China, allegedly fearing a militarization of the region.

Recent rumours about an agreement between China and the small archipelago nation-state of Vanuatu to establish a military base were promptly dissipated by both countries officials last April. Further re-assurances were reportedly uttered by Beijing toward Canberra, and yet, a close look at the Sino-Vanuatu relationship deserves attention. First, the significance of Australian White Paper must be taken into consideration, and secondly, the kind of uncertainties and anxieties generated by China's MSRI elsewhere, reinforces threat perceptions in the South Pacific region.

Analysts and commentators on Australian security and foreign policy have been trying to make sense of why China is so keen on keeping Vanuatu under her sphere of influence. A variety of reasons have been uttered, including China's interest on expanding fishing activities, or even a desire to have access to an area that could potentially be used for nuclear tests. To be sure, Vanuatu's location, a mere one thousand miles north-east of the Northern Australian coast, may also be deemed a valuable a strategic military asset, should a naval confrontation between China, Australia and the United States arise.

Whether Sino-Vanuatu relations should be simply framed within the spirit of 'economic development' and 'South-to-South' cooperation, or whether analysts should keep enough space to consider the real strategic potential Vanuatu offers to China resulting in a security quagmire for Australia/United States, remains an

“To be sure, Vanuatu's location a mere one thousand miles north-east of the Northern Australian coast, may also be deemed a valuable a strategic military asset, should a naval confrontation between China, Australia and the United States arise”

increasingly difficult position to take. Doubts about Chinese capability to transform international politics should, at this point, no longer persist. China has challenged Western-framed approaches to developmental, security politics, and has been able to master soft-power like no other great power before her, which, may obfuscate the off-guard analyst. Therefore, China's foreign policy, as it is, is becoming increasingly complex, and needs to be

subjected to increased scrutiny and to dispassionate analyses.

The consequences of the MSRI are yet to be fully established, be it in the Indian Ocean region, the Indo-Pacific Region, the Arctic Region, or the Atlantic. Imperial powers, like Britain and Portugal knew too well the importance of having full control of the seas. The United States still privileges the strategic importance of having military bases, including naval ones, across the globe. Any closer look at the world map, aided by a flow of imagination will send the reader into a voyage marked by Chinese presence at key geopolitical spots. This was not always the case.

The new reality, aided by a romantic attitude that conflates past commercial successes with present geo-strategic needs appears to be here to stay. While the Australian dominated politics of the Indo-Pacific currently show determination to establish the limits of Chinese influence in the region, the potential for an asymmetric power distribution remains high, considering China's lead on soft-power management. Following developments on the politics of China's MSRI is therefore an imperative task for any serious security and foreign policy analyst studying Chinese foreign relations.

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Data Dilemma



Ramiz Ayaz Malik

To know and be informed is human nature and nothing can ever satisfy this particular need and want of knowing and being informed more. We are always hungry for information and shall remain so. The very hunger and desire for this attribute drove the simple phenomenon of knowledge towards recording and storing it. Both for later usage and for reference. Data is knowledge stored ready at hand for instant usage or reference. The more the knowledgebase the bigger the database.

Be it any sphere of life, the most important aspect for the masses is information. Information gathering is an art - a science - but most importantly it is assembling all possible information and filing it

accordingly in slots. The first paper sheets that got filled with public opinions were the foundations of today's data collection.

As dry and boring it may sound, this is what Data collection is and almost everything revolves around it today. It is data that makes us decide what or what not - to act upon or not. The data gathered since science of information collection and dissemination saw its dawn, transformed from archives on papers to digital storage with the advent of what we all are well aware of - the information age, starting with computers furthering to the internet.

Today, the evolved methods of database figures decide what is to be done and how to approach people, in which manner and in what desired styles, that will be acceptable to the individual and people on a collective scale.

But what exactly is data? As the famous 4Ws of advertising explain it perfectly: Who, What, Where and Why. All of that sewn together in a very methodical manner is data. Initially, dependent on manpower - a tedious and cumbersome task - the digitization and 'connectivity of things' made it easier to collect information and to deliver it.

Information is a subjective term here because 'communication' also is directly connected to data collection and usage. Not all data that is collected is for the commoners or shall we say consumers. What is dished out is the selected information driven by influencers and opinion makers. The real treasure is the individual information that defines every person worldwide.

Data collection which has billions of dollars invested in it since almost five decades has reached its peak active levels now with Artificial Intelligence assisting it. It is now usable in unique methods unimaginable to generations of the past. Almost, every company in the corporate sector collects user data and information to ensure better services and ease for their customers/consumers.

Like everything, data collection has both good and bad points. Where it is intrinsic in ease for both providers and customers – if hacked or stolen/misused – the same data can be used for any activity untoward the productive. It is, therefore, important that it be collected and stored in high security servers as it is need of the day.

Almost all of us are aware of what database is and how it can be gathered through everything available on our handhelds including connectivity tools essential to everyday life. When we are only ‘so’ willingly giving out our information for usage why even bother thinking if we are private on our connectivity devices? Once we log on we are logged onto relevant servers providing our data for our very own convenience. Simply put, it is an open world. Once we log on for any service. All of our usage and lifestyle patterns are uploaded and that is data. This is the very reason why companies like Uber, Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook, etc., and other Internet giants invested heavily in data mining.

The question arises, whether collected database is being used safely? Is it used for development and helping people on a collective level? That alone is a million-dollar question. It is so because myriads of its tentacles can grasp the knowledge for many unwanted activities as mentioned earlier. It is used primarily for security and research like we saw in the Seoul Olympics this year. But the very data that was used for the aforesaid was acquired by hackers who tried to over-ride the security measures in Korean Olympics but were checked in time. So, yes, we do have the capability to check any large-scale-database misuse. However, the matter is not a 100 percent. The Hilary email leaks was an example of database leaking. Conjuring up such tricks is part of the package when it comes to technology development and database used for security and research on governmental levels.

Companies also invest in securing data as the wave of information surges every day. But does it matter to an average user of technology? Not really. No one has much to hide and the ones snooping for

information are not really ever looking to target the common man/woman. They want something that is a chunk worth a lot. For this very purpose the CEO’s and parent organizations of IOT (Internet of Things) and online giants take multiple security measures towards protection of their user’s data.

The recent debate over the data leakage of NADRA lists rightly became a countrywide issue for the media to talk about and debate over. The primary question that arose was if at all, the entire or a chunk of that data got leaked, ‘how’ it would be useful to anyone? Aptly, the authorities addressed the matter. If the address was soothing or appeasing is something the masses choose for themselves as their opinion.

Reiterating the main issue and question of how NADRA data could be useful to anyone has a very simple answer. It is security related. The data that NADRA holds and guards holds every bit of information about every registered individual with a National Identity Card. That means every person from every demographic in the country with a NIC is a voter or a prospective voter (keep prospective in mind). The details are all present in the database. The said database here is the name, family number, ethnicity, religion and sect - members in that family and all that is related in verifying an individual along with every connected person to that individual connected through alphabets and numbers. Let us just say that this data is the DNA of a nation both politically and security-wise, as it is also used in ascertaining the population of a country. This alone explains how sensitive it can be.

This is key information for any group to benefit from, if attained by them, towards tampering regional or national level elections, referendums or population numbers or predicting future moves of a voter or how that voter or prospect acted the last time when any activity where collective mass decisions were made by hordes of people.

Data that identifies, verifies and elaborates information about an entire family is not

just the ‘regular – name and email’ data gathered by any random website but highly sensitive and in-depth information that is of utmost importance and should be kept as secure as possible. This same information can be used for any purpose from opinion making to campaigning to tampering results of any electoral process. Such sensitive data/information is of highest value in a country.

When it comes to national security cards for identification, data is the key to verify the person, place and many other things that can be useful for myriads of purposes. As long as this data is in secure hands it is assured that it may not be misused but if leaked or breached, it can be a high security risk. In the wrong hands it shall only make it too easy to know how to approach the demographic and inter-geographic circles where votes and voters matter. This may lead to what is popularly termed as rigging. An example is the debate in the US senate regarding Facebook data and accounts used for the elections last year. The hue and cry that took place over that data made the CEO of the giant company appear before the Senate.

Data is the key that opens many doors for anyone who may want specifics regarding individual or collective information about people and their trends of mind and influencing any outcome related to it. It is guarded similar to gold reserves and the good part is that mostly it is safe. How safe? That is the question which might never have a guaranteed answer because after all it can all be just transferred anywhere within seconds. This is why authorities store it in high level secure servers globally.

No wonder, recently the political parties raised the issue if this very data was secure or not, keeping the upcoming Pakistani elections in mind. It is assumed and assured by the relevant authorities that Pakistan’s database is safe now. For now, we will have to rely on the word of the relevant authority.

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OF VILLAINS AND HEROES: ROLE OF NARRATIVES IN CONFLICTS



Rizwan Zeb

In Akira Kurosawa’s classic *Rashomon*, different characters narrate their perspective of the story. *Vantage Point* treats the plot and its execution in a similar way. The story of the film is presented through the perspectives of different characters and just like the classical Indian fable, *the blind men and the elephant*, a complete picture emerges only after piecing all the perspectives and views together. By doing this, one gets a whole picture of the story or at least idea about the position of the parties involved. Can we use this to learn something about inter and intra-state conflicts?

Take for instance the single shot that shook the world fired by Garvrilo Princip that killed Hapsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo that resulted in the First World War. Who were Franz Ferdinand and Garvrilo Princip? Why Princip shot the Archduke? Why it mattered? And why it is important to find answers to these questions? How this knowledge can help us understand what exactly happened? What lessons and implications can be drawn from this that can help us in understanding conflicts? If at all?

Franz Ferdinand Carl Ludwig Joseph Maria (1863-1914), Archduke of Austria Este, Royal Prince Hungary and Bohemia

and heir of the Austro-Hungarian throne accompanied by his wife Duchess Siphie Chitek arrived in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Archduke was in Sarajevo to oversee the military training in Bosnia and inspect the imperial forces. Around 10:45 am, While he and his wife were traveling in an open car, they were shot dead by Gavrilo Princip. Archduke’s last words were “Sopher, Sopher Sterbe nicht! Bleibe am Leben fur unsere Kinder” Sophie, Sophie, don’t die! Stay alive for our children.

The assassination of Archduke resulted in a chain of events that culminated in the Great War (the World War I).

Now let’s look at this exact event through the Serb nationalist vantage point: for Serbs, the date 28 June was significant. On this day in 1389, Turks defeated Serbians and occupied their land. They were eventually incorporated in the empire after the 2nd battle of Kosovo that took place in 1448. Almost 450 years later, Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken over and incorporated into Austria-Hungary in 1908. A number of underground cells and organizations were struggling against the Austro-Hungarian occupation, prime amongst them was a Yugoslavs group called Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) struggling for freedom from the Habsburg occupier. For them, Archduke was a symbol of the oppressor and the occupier. The group worked out a detailed multi-tier plan to target the Archduke. Six members of the group were positioned

along the Appel Quay from where Archduke was planned to pass to reach his destination. Each of them was given the instruction to kill the Archduke. First of these; Muhamed Mehedbasic froze with fear and failed to accomplish his mission. Next was Nedlijko Cabrinovic. He threw a grenade at Archduke’s car but it missed the car Archduke was in but killed two and injured a few among the motorcade and passer-by. This resulted in a crowd that gathered at the site of the accident and the driver of Archduke’s car sped up thus the remaining militants could not do any further damage. Their mission failed. Archduke was safe and out of their reach.

Gavrilo Princip (1894-1914) who has been immortalized due to his shot that shook the whole of Europe struck gold when later in the day, he witnessed Archduke’s car that took a wrong turn and was about to turn at the junction of Franzjosestrasse and Appel Quay. He fired at the Archduke and his wife. Moments later both were dead.

Through this vantage point, Princip was not a villain or murderer, he was a hero, a freedom fighter and martyr for the cause of his people’s freedom and dignity. A hundred years later, on 21 April 2014, a bust of Princip was installed in Tovarisevo, Serbia. A year later, on 28 June 2015, his statue was unveiled in Belgrade. During the ceremony, President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic declared that Gavrilo Princip was a “hero”, “symbol of liberation ideas” and a “tyrant-murderer”.

Same event, same actors yet completely different perception and narrative of what happened. What lessons can be drawn from this for conflict resolution and the study of international conflict? Can this be helpful in understanding more recent ethnopolitical conflicts? For instance, take the example of ethnic conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. A question that continues to challenge the students of ethnopolitical conflict researchers is what led to such violence? How those, who were behind the cruellest and gruesome acts of violence, justify it? What narrative they had which led to and justified such hatred? How and why these



new rivalries, based on *older* differences and rivalries emerged? Who develops these narratives? How the Sinhalis reach the conclusion that the Tamils are “superhumanly cruel and cunning,” or that the “Serbs really feared Croats as latter day Ustasas?”

It is group elite that play the most important role in the construction and dissemination of a narrative. It is the ethnic elite that first, highlights “ethnic insecurity through highly selective and often distorted narratives and representations,” and second, frames the other. It is the elite who decide what is to be included in the narrative. For instance, when the American president William McKinley was assassinated on September 11, 1901, the New York Times declared that this event would be remembered and would have several effects on the future generations of Americans. At present nobody even remembers that event as it is not part of the over-all American narrative.

Narratives play a significant role in conflicts. Groups or states involved in conflict(s) develop conflict supportive narrative that “form a collective self-presentation and describe the causes of the conflict, its nature, the image of the rival, the conditions needed to win the conflict.”

Scholars such as Paez and Liu, Bar-Tal and Oren point to the two main elements of a conflict-supportive narrative: first, the eruption of the conflict and how it evolves;

second, the nature and orientation of the group or society involved in the conflict.

Conflict-supportive narrative has eight key points:

1. Justification of involvement in the conflict and the course of its development.
2. Dangers that the conflict constitutes to the security-threat to a group or a state’s cherished values, identity, and territory.
3. Delegitimization of the opponent.
4. Present a glorified image of the group.
5. Presentation of the group as the sole victim of the conflict and the opponent.
6. Encourages loyalty.
7. Emphasizes the importance of maintaining unity, by ignoring internal discords and disagreements in the face of an external threat.
8. A desire to live in peace.

Conflict supportive narratives do not provide an objective and accurate account of the situation as they evolve and develop. Such a narrative aims to unite the group for a struggle and is constructed selectively ignoring facts and information that does not suit the story line. According to Nadir, in such narratives, a framing language is used “that triggers emotions, memory, cognition, and motivations related to past events, nurturing and shaping these in line with the current conflict-supporting narrative.”

At the same time facts that do not fall in line with the overall theme are ignored. If that is not possible due to these facts being too well known, a justification/ explanation is created.

An important point in this regard is that it is the elite that use this collective memory in a coordinated and well-crafted narrative emphasising the grievances and injustices faced by the group. Such a narrative is not static. It evolves. New elements are incorporated in it to give a sense of enduring injustice. For instance, in the Yugoslav conflict, whatever Milosevic said in his various speeches and statements was not something new for the Serbs or that they were unaware of. Despite this, it was Milosevic who established a link with the past and the present. And this link gives birth to the sense of an enduring injustice.

Perhaps, that is why Richard Bulliet argued that “there are broad ideas that emerge from historical narratives. Perhaps most important is that the historical memory is fleeting and can be easily manipulated.” The elite use the historical memory to create a well-crafted narrative. Abdesselam Cheddadi is correct that “history is used to construct a version of events that is accepted as true and immutable...”

A closer look at all major conflicts reveals that groups or actors involved in the conflict had a narrative justifying their position and action in the conflict. These conflict-supportive narratives not only justify the group’s action in the past but also provide motivation and justification for current policy and action as well as the future course of action.

In sum, no conflict can be resolved unless a clear understanding of the narrative(s) of the parties involved in a conflict is achieved.

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LOW YOUTH DEVELOPMENT INDEX IN SOUTH ASIA: A HUMAN SECURITY RISK




Ayesha Khalid

South Asia is home to almost 30% of the entire world’s youth which, if developed, can alter the fate of the region. Usually, a country’s population development is manifested through its population and development indices which encapsulates quality education, health, household income and certain existing inequalities or vulnerabilities. However, in order to speculate the case of the South Asian youth population over the next 20 years, one must ask the question of how developed is the youth majority?

Statistics indicate that India has about 800 million young people who are at 0.287 on YUTT (Youth Unemployment in Total) Index which is low but not as lower as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Srilanka. In a recent report published by United Nations Development Programme Pakistan, Dr. Adil Najam and Dr. Faisal Bari estimate that more than half of Pakistan’s youth population i.e., around 54 million will reach up to 148 million in 2040. The potential of the youth in terms of skilled labor and engagement, whether in civic life or political, is one of the vital indicators to identify youth development. One of the main factors of low Youth Development Index (YDI) in the region is that youth does not

have many outlets to exercise their skills. Pakistan’s youth unemployment rate is 10.8 percent between the ages of 15-24, which is still better than Afghanistan and Srilanka standing at 17 and 22 percent but worse than India and Nepal at 9 and 5 percent. Having a 17.4 million youth population, Afghanistan has the lowest YDI 0.440 in South Asia, next in line with Pakistan with a youth bulge of 54 million at 0.470.

With more than half of the youth population in South Asia’s vastly populated countries such as India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh risks to security and well-being are imminent. Various studies indicate a relationship



between youth bulge of a country and civil strife and security unrest it faces. Given the population growth rate, regional security will largely depend on the structure, size and age of the population it is inhabiting. The age between 15-29, which is considered as youth, is ideal for producing military men, officers, young entrepreneurs etc. On the contrary, if they are not provided with opportunities to participate as an active part of the society, they can be used for human trafficking and if brainwashed, can easily be influenced negatively by ideologically and religiously motivated organizations. Cincotta enunciates in his essay, *Demographic Security Comes of Age* that countries with large youth bulge are 2.5 times more prone to experience an outbreak of civil conflict than states with older population. For example, Afghanistan’s youth population has increased to 45 percent in the last three decades due to high fertility rate which has provided more fuel to the armed conflict in the region.

With respect to conflict and youth bulge, it is interesting to note that France before French Revolution and Iran just before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 witnessed a huge youth bulge. But this remains a great challenge for the developing countries. Due to lack of education and job opportunities in developing countries, the same bulge can lead towards societal unrest by enabling discontent and crime if not channeled properly. However, demographic transition to democratic institutions and free markets can lower the risk of inter and intra state conflicts/violence. In the recent report by UNDP, most of the youth inhabiting the routes of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have reservations towards losing employment to non-local workers. However, these reservations are misplaced. From China’s perspective, they cannot afford to offer their human resource to Pakistan because China’s elderly people are growing at a rapid rate. Currently China has 17.3 percent of population that is 65 years and above. China has to



rely on machinery that will lead towards high productivity and automation. This is how they are managing the demographic transition within a short period of time in comparison to other countries. Similarly, not being able to meet good standard of living and employment, the developing states across South Asia are facing the issue of brain drain.

The demographic dimensions of conflict, defined by Cincotta et.al, assess why the nations with higher number young population are more vulnerable to civil conflict. The main factor involved as discussed is the political volatility among youthful population age structure that helps instigate revolutions, ethnic wars, terrorist attacks and state-sponsored violence within states. This, however, can be micromanaged if government acts to integrate with private sports clubs,

libraries and makes vocational training compulsory in secondary and higher level of schooling, enhancing employable skills of students. Therefore, enabling social and political participation at school level for broader peace and stability in the region. The region is undergoing a demographic transition which can only jump to the next phase if indicators of Youth Development Index are well planned.

Youth has an advantage over other fellow citizens if their engagement towards social and political life is improved. They can make informed decisions and their skills can be harnessed by eliminating inequalities and forming a coherent youth policy. A policy that can allow public places for youth engagement, bridging the gender gap, allowing new businesses by young people and making jobs for an economic activity that involves them

will be the one that will prove effective in managing Pakistan's youth bulge and harnessing its energies towards positive development of the country.

What can strengthen this policy is national curriculum designed to provide high-quality citizenship education which can instill much needed critical and rational thinking in pupils and enhance their understanding about democracy, government and responsible citizenship.

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